Fostering technologies for sustainability: improving strategic niche management as a guide for action using a case study of wind power in Australia by Healey, G
i 
Fostering technologies for 
sustainability:  
Improving Strategic Niche 
Management as a guide for action 
using a case study of wind power 
in Australia 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Gerard P. Healey 
Bachelor of Engineering 
 
School of Aerospace, Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering 
Science, Engineering and Technology Portfolio 
RMIT University 
February 2008
ii 
Declaration 
I, Gerard P Healey, declare that this thesis is my own work unless otherwise 
referenced or acknowledged. The research has been undertaken since my 
commencement in the PhD program in accordance with the relevant ethics procedures 
and I have not submitted the research for any other academic award. Any editorial 
work has been duly acknowledged. 
 
Gerard P Healey 
February 2008 
iii 
Acknowledgements 
There are many people who deserve to share in this PhD, because without them it 
would not have been possible. 
First and foremost are my supervisors, Andrea Bunting and John Andrews. Without 
their patience, constructive comments and ongoing support over the past five years, 
this thesis would be in far worse shape and I would not be the researcher that I am 
now. 
I would like to thank all of those who spoke to me as part of this research at 
conferences, workshops, and over coffee. In particular I would like to thank those 
people who generously gave up time for formal interviews – Karl Mallon, Rick 
Maddox, Grant Flynn, Megan Wheatley, Bruce Cameron, and Sarea Coates – and for 
informal chats, including Craig Wilson, Peter Cowling, Hugh Outhred, Iain MacGill, 
Craig Oakeshott, David Mercer, Tim Le Roy, and Tim Farrell. I also must thank those 
at the Technische Universiteit Eindhoven who gave me much needed guidance and 
criticism during my visit in 2004, including Rob Raven, Frank Geels, Geert Verbong, 
Johan Schot, Mattijs Taanman, and Deborah Tappi.  
I would also like to thank my friends and family who provided much needed 
distraction from the frustrations of research, particularly Pat, Stef, Benny, Rosalba, 
Darryl, Derek, Alan and Matt. My mother, Jan Healey, and Aunty, Gill Clarke, 
deserve particular thanks for proof reading a number of chapters. 
Finally, but by no means least, I want to thank my partner, Rilla Maxton, whose love 
and support has kept me sane. 
iv 
Publications related to this research 
Healey, G. and Bunting, A. 2002, 'Overcoming barriers to wind power diffusion: The 
Method of Strategic Niche Management', Proceedings of Solar Harvest, The Australia 
& New Zealand Solar Energy Society, Newcastle, Australia, pp.8. 
Healey, G. 2003, 'An Introduction to the greenhouse gas benefits of wind power in the 
National Electricity Market', Proceedings of Destination Renewables, The Australia & 
New Zealand Solar Energy Society, Melbourne, Australia, pp.276 - 286. 
Healey, G. 2004, 'Fostering Technologies for Sustainability: Learning from the Case 
of Wind Power in Australia', Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and 
Society, 2, 2, 1 - 17. 
Bunting, A. and Healey, G. 2005, 'Australian’s Mandatory Renewable Energy Target: 
Driver of Institutional Change?' paper presented to World Renewable Energy 
Congress, Aberdeen, May 22 - 27 
Healey, G. and Bunting, A., 2008, Wind Power in Australia: Overcoming 
Technological and Institutional Barriers, Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 
28, 2, 115 - 127. 
v 
Abbreviations 
AAC 
ACCC 
ACNT 
AEA 
AGO 
AIGN 
APIC 
ASX 
AusWEA 
BCSE 
CoAG 
CRA 
DITR 
DOI 
DSE 
EEC 
EIMWG 
ERAA 
ERD 
 
ESCOSA 
ESIPC 
FCAS 
IEA 
LETAG 
MCE 
MLM 
Australian Aluminium Council 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Australian Council of National Trusts 
Australian EcoGeneration Association 
Australian Greenhouse Office 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
Australian Paper Industry Council 
Australian Stock Exchange 
Australian Wind Energy Association 
Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
Council of Australian Governments 
Charles Rivers Associates 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (Federal) 
Department of Infrastructure (Victoria) 
Department of Sustainability and Environment (Victoria) 
Energy Equity Corporation 
Energy Intensive Manufacturing Working Group 
Energy Retailers Association of Australia 
Environment, Resources and Development Committee (South 
Australia) 
Essential Services Commission of South Australia 
Electricity Supply Industry Planning Council (South Australia) 
Frequency Control Ancillary Services 
International Energy Agency 
Low Emissions Technical Advisory Group 
Ministerial Council on Energy 
Multi-Level Model 
vi 
MMA 
MRET 
NECA 
NEMMCO 
NGF 
NRET 
NSW 
OECD 
ORER 
PCG 
PWEP 
RTWG 
SA 
SEAV 
SEDA 
SEIAA 
SNM 
TVCG 
VCAT 
VRET 
WEPWG 
WETAG 
Mclennan Magasanik Associates 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
National Electricity Code Administrator 
National Electricity Market Management Company 
National Generators Forum 
New South Wales Renewable Energy Target 
New South Wales 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator 
Prom Coast Guardians 
Portland Wind Energy Project 
Renewables Target Working Group 
South Australia 
Sustainable Energy Authority Victoria 
Sustainable Energy Development Authority (NSW) 
Sustainable Energy Industries Association of Australia 
Strategic Niche Management 
Tarwin Valley Coastal Guardians 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
Victorian Renewable Energy Target 
Wind Energy Policy Working Group 
Wind Energy Technical Advisory Group 
 vii 
Table of Contents 
Abstract.............................................................................................................................. 1 
1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 4 
1.0 Context and research aim.................................................................................... 4 
1.1 Research design .................................................................................................. 6 
1.1.1 Research questions and thesis aim.........................................................6 
1.1.2 Principles for case study research ..........................................................7 
1.1.3 Empirical research strategy....................................................................9 
1.2 SNM: Fostering socio-technical change ........................................................... 11 
1.2.1 Background ..........................................................................................11 
1.2.2 Conceptual framework.........................................................................12 
1.2.3 Guide for experimenting with new technology ...................................16 
1.2.4 Strengths of SNM ................................................................................18 
1.2.5 Weaknesses in SNM as a guide for action...........................................19 
1.3 An opportunity for learning: Wind power in Australia 1997 – 2007 ............... 22 
1.4 Thesis structure ................................................................................................. 27 
2 Understanding socio-technical change.................................................................. 29 
2.0 Introduction....................................................................................................... 29 
2.1 Momentum in socio-technical regimes............................................................. 29 
2.1.1 Stability ................................................................................................30 
2.1.2 Momentum...........................................................................................31 
2.1.3 Lock-in.................................................................................................34 
2.1.4 Discussion and summary .....................................................................37 
2.2 Pressure for change ........................................................................................... 37 
2.2.1 Disrupting socio-technical regimes......................................................38 
2.2.2 Responding to disruption .....................................................................38 
2.2.3 Discussion and Summary.....................................................................41 
2.3 Socio-technical transitions ................................................................................ 42 
2.3.1 A conceptual model of socio-technical transitions ..............................42 
2.3.2 Development paths for new technology ..............................................44 
2.3.3 Discussion and summary .....................................................................45 
2.4 Actors in niche development ............................................................................ 46 
 viii 
2.4.1 The role of actors .................................................................................46 
2.4.2 Consensus and disagreement ...............................................................52 
2.4.3 Discussion and Summary.....................................................................59 
2.5 Understanding positive feedbacks .................................................................... 59 
2.6 Stimulating positive feedbacks ......................................................................... 67 
2.7 Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks ................................................... 70 
2.8 Conclusions....................................................................................................... 80 
3 Industry development............................................................................................. 82 
3.0 Introduction....................................................................................................... 82 
3.1 Wind farms........................................................................................................ 83 
3.2 Wind industry.................................................................................................... 85 
3.2.1 Overview..............................................................................................86 
3.2.2 Australian Wind Energy Association (AusWEA) ...............................88 
3.2.3 Local manufacturing ............................................................................90 
3.2.4 Wind industry summary.......................................................................92 
3.3 Broader actor network....................................................................................... 92 
3.3.1 Government..........................................................................................92 
3.3.2 Electricity system managers ................................................................94 
3.3.3 NGOs and Communities ......................................................................94 
3.3.4 Broader network summary...................................................................96 
3.4 Conclusions....................................................................................................... 96 
3.4.1 Importance of the dynamics.................................................................97 
3.4.2 Insights to strengthen SNM .................................................................98 
3.4.3 Final remarks .....................................................................................100 
4 Energy policy......................................................................................................... 101 
4.0 Introduction..................................................................................................... 101 
4.1 Actors, interests, visions and agendas............................................................. 102 
4.1.1 Government........................................................................................103 
4.1.2 Wind industry.....................................................................................104 
4.1.3 Energy intensive industry ..................................................................105 
4.1.4 Non-Government Organisations and the Community .......................106 
4.1.5 Summary ............................................................................................107 
4.2 Protecting renewable energy........................................................................... 107 
 ix 
4.2.1 Creating a demand .............................................................................108 
4.2.2 Expectations about the effects of MRET ...........................................111 
4.2.3 Debate about the intent of MRET......................................................112 
4.2.4 Design of MRET................................................................................117 
4.2.5 Summary ............................................................................................120 
4.3 Emerging uncertainty in the market for wind power ...................................... 122 
4.3.1 Supply: Competition in the REC market ...........................................122 
4.3.2 Demand: Uncertain future of MRET .................................................124 
4.3.3 Summary ............................................................................................127 
4.4 Increasing the demand for wind power? ......................................................... 128 
4.4.1 AusWEA’s MRET campaign – building legitimacy .........................128 
4.4.2 MRET review.....................................................................................130 
4.4.3 Summary ............................................................................................142 
4.5 Ongoing uncertainty........................................................................................ 143 
4.5.1 AusWEA’s post MRET review campaign.........................................143 
4.5.2 White paper on energy .......................................................................145 
4.5.3 State-based renewable energy targets and national emissions trading
 147 
4.5.4 Summary ............................................................................................149 
4.6 Conclusions..................................................................................................... 150 
4.6.1 Importance of the dynamics...............................................................150 
4.6.2 Insights to strengthen SNM ...............................................................154 
4.6.3 Final remarks .....................................................................................163 
5 Wind power and the electricity sector ................................................................ 164 
5.0 Introduction..................................................................................................... 164 
5.1 Actors, interests, visions and agendas............................................................. 166 
5.1.1 System managers ...............................................................................167 
5.1.2 Network Service Providers (NSPs)....................................................169 
5.1.3 Wind industry.....................................................................................169 
5.1.4 Government........................................................................................170 
5.1.5 Summary ............................................................................................171 
5.2 Understanding mismatches and their implications ......................................... 172 
5.2.1 Risks, barriers and the need for a mutual fit ......................................173 
 x 
5.2.2 Technical solutions, social barriers....................................................177 
5.2.3 Focused learning and finding a positive perspective .........................179 
5.2.4 Summary ............................................................................................181 
5.3 Getting wind issues on high-level problem agendas....................................... 181 
5.3.1 MRET review.....................................................................................182 
5.3.2 Energy White Paper ...........................................................................183 
5.3.3 Ministerial Council on Energy...........................................................184 
5.3.4 The significance of high-level recognition ........................................184 
5.3.5 Summary ............................................................................................185 
5.4 Technological embedding: wind power forecasting ....................................... 186 
5.5 Institutional change for a mutual fit: standards and procedures ..................... 188 
5.5.1 WEPWG and WETAG ......................................................................189 
5.5.2 South Australia...................................................................................194 
5.5.3 Discussion and summary ...................................................................199 
5.6 Attempts to find a mutual fit: wind farms and network infrastructure ........... 200 
5.6.1 Revenue cap .......................................................................................201 
5.6.2 Regulated asset...................................................................................202 
5.6.3 Co-operative or shared connection ....................................................203 
5.6.4 Government grant ..............................................................................205 
5.6.5 Discussion and summary ...................................................................205 
5.7 Conclusions..................................................................................................... 206 
5.7.1 Importance of the dynamics...............................................................206 
5.7.2 Insights to strengthen SNM ...............................................................210 
5.7.3 Final remarks .....................................................................................222 
6 Planning, development and the community ....................................................... 223 
6.0 Introduction..................................................................................................... 223 
6.1 Actors, interests and agendas.......................................................................... 224 
6.1.1 Government........................................................................................225 
6.1.2 Wind industry.....................................................................................226 
6.1.3 Community and NGOs ......................................................................227 
6.1.4 Summary ............................................................................................227 
6.2 Mismatches and inadequacies......................................................................... 228 
6.2.1 A policy vacuum in Victoria..............................................................229 
 xi 
6.2.2 Community attitudes to wind power..................................................234 
6.2.3 Summary ............................................................................................244 
6.3 Adapting the planning framework .................................................................. 244 
6.3.1 The Victorian wind energy policy and planning guidelines ..............246 
6.3.2 Who is the decision maker? ...............................................................248 
6.3.3 Which issues are and are not considered?..........................................249 
6.3.4 How are issues assessed? ...................................................................251 
6.3.5 Managing trade-offs...........................................................................256 
6.3.6 Discussion and summary ...................................................................258 
6.4 Adapting wind farm development .................................................................. 259 
6.4.1 Best practice guidelines and accreditation.........................................260 
6.4.2 Landscape assessment........................................................................262 
6.4.3 Bird risk assessment standards...........................................................264 
6.4.4 Responding to community opposition ...............................................265 
6.4.5 Looking for less controversial locations ............................................267 
6.4.6 Community Consultation ...................................................................268 
6.4.7 Discussion and Summary...................................................................272 
6.5 Discussions and conclusions........................................................................... 274 
6.5.1 Importance of dynamics.....................................................................274 
6.5.2 Insights to strengthen SNM ...............................................................278 
6.5.3 Final remarks .....................................................................................293 
7 Conclusions............................................................................................................ 295 
7.0 Reflecting on the research questions............................................................... 295 
7.1 Summary of findings....................................................................................... 296 
7.1.1 Actions, actors and dynamics ............................................................296 
7.1.2 Challenges..........................................................................................303 
7.1.3 Responding to the weaknesses identified in SNM.............................313 
7.2 Generalization of findings............................................................................... 320 
7.3 Significance of the findings in the broader context ........................................ 322 
7.4 Future research directions ............................................................................... 324 
7.5 Final remarks .................................................................................................. 325 
8 References.............................................................................................................. 327 
 
 xii 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1 – Multi-Level Model (MLM) with emphasis on structure (Geels, 2002a)....13 
Figure 2 – Multi-Level Model (MLM) with emphasis on dynamic interaction (Kemp 
et al., 2000) ..................................................................................................................13 
Figure 3 – Grid-connected wind power in Australia (AusWEA, 2007b) ....................23 
Figure 4 - The multilevel model of transitions (Geels, 2002b)....................................43 
Figure 5 – Dynamics and Positive feedbacks in socio-technical change.....................61 
Figure 6 – Installed capacity of grid-connected wind power in Australia (AusWEA, 
2007b) ..........................................................................................................................84 
Figure 7 – Mandatory Renewable Energy Targets until 2020...................................111 
Figure 8 – Estimated costs of electricity generated using wind, black coal and natural 
gas (Mallon and Reardon, 2004)................................................................................144 
Figure 9 -  Consultant’s decision-making model as illustrated by the planning panel 
(Smith and Jacka, 2002c)...........................................................................................256 
Figure 10 – Locations of formal wind farm proposals in Victoria (refer to Table 17 for 
details) (Map based on VicMap, 2005)......................................................................269 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 - Strategic niche management of experiments with transport innovations 
(Weber et al., 1999) .....................................................................................................16 
Table 2 – Lessons from the SNM workbook (Weber et al., 1999)..............................17 
Table 3 –  Snapshots of grid-connected wind power in Australia: 1997 and 2007 .....26 
Table 4 – Factors contributing to the lock in of socio-technical regimes ....................36 
Table 5 – Disrupting forces..........................................................................................39 
Table 6 - Niche patterns and characteristics (based on Geels, 2002b, Grablowitz et al., 
1998, Hoogma et al., 2002)..........................................................................................45 
Table 7 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks ..................68 
Table 8 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks..............................................70 
Table 9 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks ..................98 
Table 10 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks............................................99 
 xiii 
Table 11 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks ..............152 
Table 12 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks..........................................155 
Table 13 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks ..............207 
Table 14 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks..........................................211 
Table 15 – An illustration of the actors, opinions and levels of debate around wind 
power in Australia......................................................................................................236 
Table 16 – Examples of trade-offs in Victorian wind farm planning ........................239 
Table 17 – Wind farm proposals in Victoria .............................................................270 
Table 18 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks ..............275 
Table 19 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks..........................................279 
Table 20 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks ..............297 
Table 21 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks..........................................303 
Abstract 
1 
Abstract 
In the past few decades, society has made increasing efforts to become more 
sustainable by introducing or promoting new technologies such as renewable energy, 
electric vehicles, and green buildings. Often, there are significant challenges to 
introducing new technologies because existing infrastructure, institutions, social 
groupings, and behaviours have co-evolved with and consequently support incumbent 
technologies – a condition known as lock-in. As the saying goes, you can’t fit a square 
peg in a round hole. 
To support efforts to introduce new technologies, researchers have developed 
conceptual frameworks that aim to increase our understanding of socio-technical 
change – i.e. to help actors find a mutual fit between square pegs and round holes. 
One promising framework is Strategic Niche Management (SNM); however despite 
its strength as an ex post analytical tool and the initial enthusiasm of researchers, there 
is little evidence that SNM has been used in its intended form: to guide experiments 
with new technologies.  
The aim of this thesis is to make SNM more usable for those introducing new 
technologies by responding to four weaknesses identified in existing literature: a weak 
link between the conceptual framework and action, the vague role of actors, an 
inadequate appreciation of issues of consensus and limits of influence, and an 
inadequate appreciation of the challenges that actors may face. This aim is achieved 
by identifying promising insights via a literature review and testing the applicability 
of them on a case study of wind power in Australia. 
The literature review identifies a range of dynamics that have been linked to positive 
feedbacks in the development of new technologies and associated socio-technical 
change. These are: stimulating demand, increasing use, learning and articulation, 
increasing functionality, decreasing costs, decreasing uncertainty, embedding and 
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alignment, increasing legitimacy, attracting actors, and strengthening expectations and 
visions. The thesis argues that these dynamics can be used to provide a better link 
between theory and action. The review also identifies particular actor roles – such as 
niche manager, macro actor, prime mover, and dedicated network builder – and 
actions that actors in these roles may take. These roles and actions are linked to the 
dynamics just mentioned. I also review literature to understand better issues related to 
consensus and limits of influence; a particularly useful concept in this regard is 
resource interdependency. Finally, the review identifies a number of challenges to 
encouraging the dynamics with the aim of helping actors to anticipate problems in the 
introduction of new technologies. The relevance of this approach and applicability of 
these insights are tested by comparing them to a case study of wind power in 
Australia. 
The case study explains changes and attempts to change related to grid-connected 
wind power in Australia between about 1997 and 2007. It is an interesting case to 
study because over that time period there was significant socio-technical change: for 
example, installed grid-connected wind farm capacity grew from about 1 MW to 
almost 900 MW, an industry and industry association formed, there were 
unprecedented changes in energy policy, new high-level actor groups formed to 
oversee the grid-integration of wind power, Governments amended planning schemes, 
and public opinion about wind power was increasingly articulated. These changes and 
related attempts to change are explained using SNM and other relevant concepts 
identified in the literature review. 
The case study shows that the dynamics identified in the literature review were all 
relevant in the wind power case, and provides more specific examples of the actors 
that can encourage them and how they might do so. The case study also shows that 
most of the challenges identified in the literature review were relevant to wind power 
in Australia and indicates possible strategies that actors might use to manage these 
challenges. The case also reveals additional challenges related to transitional 
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strategies, legitimacy of the technology and consensus. These findings are discussed 
in detail at the end of the empirical Chapters (3, 4, 5 and 6) and summarised in the 
final chapter. These findings are intended to help actors to foster technologies for 
sustainability. 
Future work could test the usability of the findings in practice, increase the 
applicability of the findings by applying them to other cases, further explore the 
concept of legitimacy in socio-technical change, and further explore the number of 
tensions identified in SNM and the wind power case. I intend to adapt and apply the 
framework and lessons to green buildings in my current role as a building services 
engineer and green building consultant. 
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1 Introduction 
"Are we on a sustainable energy path? Not unless we make considerable 
changes." 
OECD (2001) 
1.0 Context and research aim 
Developed nations are currently operating in an unsustainable manner (IEA, 2001b, 
OECD, 2001). Governments and communities are becoming increasingly concerned 
about issues like climate change and access to water, and they recognise that vital 
technological systems such as electricity, transport, and water supply need to change. 
However, this presents a formidable challenge. Incumbent technologies are embedded 
in a web of socio-technical elements that supports the incumbents and discourages 
alternatives. We cannot simply replace “troublesome” technologies with more 
“sustainable1” versions because new technologies need to be compatible with existing 
infrastructure, enabling technologies, regulations and cultural practices. As the saying 
goes, you can’t fit a square peg into a round hole. Researchers have named this 
condition “lock-in” and regard it as a problem because it makes it difficult for society 
to respond to issues like climate change and to move in a more sustainable direction 
(Cowan and Hulten, 1996, Kline, 2001, Rip and Kemp, 1998, Unruh, 2000, 2002). 
In recent decades, researchers have tried to develop methods for overcoming lock-in. 
A promising body of theory and practice is Strategic Niche Management (SNM) 
                                                 
1 I do not attempt to define what constitutes a sustainable technology because it is a socially constructed 
concept whose acceptance depends on the actors involved. There is a parallel to the concept of 
“appropriate development” which is explored in Chapter 6 in relation to wind power in Australia. Wind 
power is widely regarded as a technology that can help society be more sustainable and the 
development of wind power in Australia is therefore a good case study. 
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(Hoogma et al., 2002, IEA, 2003, Unruh, 2006, Weber et al., 1999). SNM provides 
actors’ with a conceptual framework for socio-technical change and suggestions for 
action. In proverbial terms, SNM is a way of understanding why a square peg won’t 
fit into a round hole and suggests how actors can influence the direction of change to 
achieve a mutual fit. 
While the body of theory has proven to be a valuable analytical tool for ex post 
analysis, there is little evidence that it has been used in its intended form: to guide the 
practice of introducing new technologies. Researchers have posed a number of 
possible reasons for this, including: because the conceptual framework is weakly 
linked to specific actors and tangible action, because the SNM suggestions do not 
adequately consider the limited ability of actors to influence change, and because the 
SNM suggestions do not adequately identify the range of challenges that actors may 
face. These issues will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. If these 
weaknesses can be addressed, SNM may become more useful to actors introducing 
new technologies. 
The research aim was to improve SNM as a guide for action by responding to these 
weaknesses using existing literature and a case study of wind power in Australia. 
Initial studies showed that the wind power case could be explained using the SNM 
framework (Healey, 2004, Healey and Bunting, 2002). These studies also indicated 
that the wind power case could be used to test the relevance and applicability of the 
insights from existing literature that responded to the weaknesses in SNM. 
The remainder of this chapter presents the research design (including research 
questions, thesis aims, principles for case study research, and the empirical research 
strategy), reviews SNM and shows the weaknesses noted previously, provides an 
introduction to the wind power case, and explains how the thesis will meets its aims. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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1.1 Research design 
1.1.1 Research questions and thesis aim 
Four questions guided the research that is presented in this thesis. They were: 
What weaknesses have researchers identified in SNM that hinder its use as a 
guide for action? 
The opening section indicated an answer to this question and Section 1.2 will provide 
a more detailed answer based on existing literature. 
What insights are available from existing literature that can provide an initial 
response to the weaknesses identified? 
This question is answered in Chapter 2 where I review relevant literature and propose 
initial responses to the weaknesses identified. 
How applicable are these initial responses to the case of grid-connected wind 
power in Australia between 1997 and 2007? Does the case offer any additional 
insights that can be used to respond to the weaknesses? 
These two questions are answered in the empirical Chapters (3 to 6) and the 
concluding chapter (7). 
The aim of this thesis is to answer these questions by showing that:  
- There are at least four weaknesses that hinder the use of SNM as a guide for 
action: a weak link between the conceptual framework and tangible action, the 
vague role of actors in SNM, an inadequate treatment of consensus and 
influence, and an inadequate appreciation of the challenges that actors might 
face. 
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- The existing literature offers a range of insights that can be used to provide an 
initial response to these weaknesses by: creating more tangible links between 
the conceptual framework and action through the concept of positive 
feedbacks, identifying typical actor roles, acknowledging the difficulty of 
consensus and the limited influence of actors, and by identifying specific 
challenges that actors might face. 
- Many of these insights are supported by the case of wind power in Australia 
and that the case offers additional insights. These insights are organised in two 
tables, one that focuses on actors and actions, and the other that focuses on 
actions and challenges. These tables are created in Chapter 2 using existing 
literature, reflected on throughout the empirical chapters, and revised in the 
final chapter. This provides continuity throughout the thesis and a clear link 
between the aims, literature review and empirical material. The final versions 
of the two tables can form the basis for further research into the practice of 
SNM. 
1.1.2 Principles for case study research 
Four principles of case study research were used to guide the research structure (Yin, 
2003).  
The first principle is to ensure construct validity (Yin, 2003): Are the types of changes 
that are to be studied specific and relevant to the objectives of the study? How have 
changes been measured and do the measures accurately reflect the changes? At an 
overall level, I have adhered to this principle by maintaining explicit links between 
the research aims, the data that is presented and analysed, and the conclusions. The 
tables of actors and actions, and actions and challenges provide organisation and 
continuity throughout the thesis. At a more detailed level, I have used a range of 
quantitative and qualitative data to illustrate the changes that have occurred (or not) 
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related to grid-connected wind power in Australia between 1997 and 2007. Section 
1.3 will introduce the empirical changes and Chapters 3 to 6 will analyse them from a 
theoretical perspective. 
The second principle is to ensure internal validity (Yin, 2003): Does the study 
sufficiently show causality? Are any inferences made by the researcher correct, are 
alternate inferences possible, have alternates been considered? The case had feedback 
loops between different dynamics rather than independent and dependent variables. I 
identified and explained the dynamics and the relationship between them at an 
aggregated level by using strategies recommended by (Yin, 2003), including: time-
series analysis, pattern-matching with existing theory, and explanation-building. I was 
also able to discuss issues and “test” assumptions with key actors at annual wind 
power conferences between 2002 and 2005 and during interviews with key actors 
(Cameron, 2005, Coates, 2005a, Flynn, 2005, Maddox, 2005, Mallon, 2005, 
Wheatley, 2005). 
The third principle is to ensure external validity (Yin, 2003): how generalise-able are 
the study’s findings beyond the immediate case study? Being a single case, I can only 
tentatively generalise the findings. The final chapter will discuss the limitations to 
generalisation further. 
The fourth principle is to ensure reliability (Yin, 2003): Would another researcher, 
using the same research design and methods, draw the same conclusions? To ensure 
that data collection and analysis was reliable, a case-study database was compiled 
with over 2000 entries including media articles, Government and industry reports, 
Hansard entries2, conference presentations, and interviews. Using 1090 of the 
                                                 
2 Hansard is the name given to the verbatim record of Federal and State Government parliamentary 
debates. 
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database references, I produced a timeline and identified the key themes and issues. 
These key themes and issues were then explained, providing an empirical testing point 
for the insights from the existing literature. Chapters 3 to 6 test the theoretical insights 
against the case. 
These four principles have provided a quality check for this research.  
1.1.3 Empirical research strategy 
The case study of wind power in Australia required the collection of a large amount of 
empirical material. Advice from Yin (1994) is that different types of material have 
different strengths and weaknesses. Three main types of material were used in this 
study because of their availability and complementary nature: documentation 
(including the internet), interviews, and direct observation. 
Documentation was the primary source of information for the case study. This was for 
two reasons. First, because of the strengths identified by Yin (1994): that it is stable 
and can be reviewed repeatedly, it can be reviewed unobtrusively, it often contains 
exact details, and collectively it can provide a broad coverage. The second reason was 
because of availability. During the case study period, there were many relevant 
Government policy reviews with hundred of public submissions, planning panel 
reports, research reports, media releases, letters-to-the-editor, websites and conference 
proceedings. These provided an excellent insight into the events I wished to study.  
Documentation can have weaknesses however, including the potential for inadvertent 
bias in the selection of documents to review, unknown bias of the document author, 
and restricted access (e.g. due to commercial confidentiality or a lack of trust). To 
mitigate these weaknesses, interviews and direct observation were also used. 
I conducted formal and informal interviews with a number of people. The strengths of 
interviews are that they can be targeted and provide greater insight into events (Yin, 
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1994). Formal semi-structured interviews were conducted with: Karl Mallon, Rick 
Maddox, and Grant Flynn who all played key roles in the Australian Wind Energy 
Association; Megan Wheatley of the Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria, which 
was involved in the development of the Victorian wind farm planning guidelines; 
Bruce Cameron of the National Electricity Market Management Company, which 
undertook significant work on the grid integration of wind power; and, Sarea Coates 
of the Australian Greenhouse Office, who was also extensively involved in the grid 
integration of wind power. I also conducted informal interviews with a number of 
other people, including Craig Wilson of the Victorian Department of Sustainability 
and Environment, Peter Cowling of wind turbine manufacturer NEG-Micon, Hugh 
Outhred and Iain MacGill of the University of New South Wales, Craig Oakeshott of 
the South Australian Electricity Supply Industry Planning Council, and David Mercer, 
Tim Le Roy, and Tim Farrell who were opposed to wind farms in their local areas.  
Interviews also have their potential weaknesses (Yin, 1994), including bias in the 
questioning or answering, or poor recall of the interviewee, so the third source of 
material used was direct observation. Between 2002 and 2006, I attended six wind 
power conferences, two renewable energy conferences, a number of issue-specific 
forums, and an anti wind farm protest, which gave me insight into the concerns and 
activities of the wind industry and community. 
These three data sources provided a range of primary and secondary information 
which, as this thesis will show, enabled this thesis to identify and explain the major 
changes related to grid-connected wind power in Australia between 1997 and 2007.  
The next section will now address the first research question by reviewing SNM and 
highlighting the weaknesses to which this thesis responds. 
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1.2 SNM: Fostering socio-technical change 
1.2.1 Background 
SNM grew out of research into the causes of lock-in and strategies for fostering new 
technologies using insights from evolutionary economics, constructive technology 
assessment, and sociology and history of technology (e.g. Kemp, 1994, Kemp and 
Soete, 1992, Rip, 1995, Schot et al., 1994, Schot and Rip, 1996, van den Belt and Rip, 
1987). These researchers recognised that there had been many technological 
transitions throughout history and sought to understand the dynamics and mechanisms 
involved. A number of seminal SNM publications resulted from 16 case studies of 
attempts to introduce transport innovations such as electric vehicles, car sharing, and 
bike hiring schemes (Schot et al., 1999). The results of this research were a conceptual 
framework to help people who foster new technologies to understand better what they 
were doing and a workbook to help the design and implementation of experiments 
with transport innovations (Hoogma et al., 2002, Schot et al., 1999, Weber et al., 
1999). The conceptual framework has generated considerable research interest for ex 
post analysis because of a number of strengths (Grablowitz et al., 1998): it is 
comprehensive, it captures the complexity of “real life”, it is a multi-stakeholder 
approach, and it helps actors to understand the factors that influence the introduction 
of a new technology. However, there is little evidence that SNM has been put into 
practice in the design and implementation of real world “experiments” with new 
technology. 
The next section introduces the underlying conceptual framework of SNM, which will 
be used later to help explain the wind power case and also as a foundation for 
responding to the SNM weaknesses identified. Following that, I summarise the 
suggestions offered by SNM and then highlight the strengths which justify why it is 
worth investing effort to develop SNM further. Finally, the section identifies some 
weaknesses that hinder SNM’s use as a guide for action. 
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1.2.2 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework for SNM is based around the so-called multilevel model 
(MLM) (Raven, 2004). In essence, the MLM suggests that there are patterns in socio-
technical change which occur at different “levels” of coherence and embedded-ness. 
In the MLM, a technology is analysed as a socio-technical “configuration that works” 
(Rip and Kemp, 1998) rather than as an isolated artefact. For example, cars are 
analysed as part of a broader socio-technical regime of road and refuelling 
infrastructure, the layout of cities, manufacturing and maintenance facilities, and 
driver expectations. 
From an actor perspective, the MLM is a structurational model which understands that 
actors are enabled, constrained and guided by existing structures (Russell and 
Williams, 2002). Actors form expectations, build problem agendas, and take actions 
which result in the persistence or change of cognitive, social, institutional and 
technological structures (Rip and Kemp, 1998, van Lente and Rip, 1998). In making 
decisions and taking actions, actors are guided, enabled and constrained by the 
existing structures, and are influenced by their expectations and visions of the future 
(Araujo and Harrison, 2002, Hughes, 1987, Rosenberg, 1976, van de Poel, 1998, 
2003, van Lente and Rip, 1998). The MLM recognises that the relative importance of 
structure and agency depends on the particular case. 
The model has been illustrated in different ways, depending on whether emphasis is 
placed on its structure (refer to Figure 1) or the dynamic interaction between the 
levels (refer to Figure 2).  
As the figures show, the multilevel model has three basic levels, the micro level of 
niches, the meso level of regimes, and the macro level of socio-technical landscapes. I 
will explain the model starting at the regime level. 
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Figure 1 – Multi-Level Model (MLM) with emphasis on structure (Geels, 
2002a). 
 
Figure 2 – Multi-Level Model (MLM) with emphasis on dynamic interaction 
(Kemp et al., 2000) 
A socio-technical regime for a particular technology represents the actor groups, roles, 
scientific knowledge, engineering practices, skills and procedures, institutions and 
infrastructure associated with that technology, i.e. the “configuration that works” 
(Kemp et al., 1998, Rip and Kemp, 1998, Verbong and Geels, 2007). For example, 
Hoogma et al (2002) have described a regime for transportation based around the 
internal combustion engine that includes vehicles, the cultural status of vehicles, road 
infrastructure, refuelling stations and maintenance. Essentially, the term regime is 
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used to describe the technological, technical, institutional, and socio-political status 
quo for that technology. A socio-technical regime exists to the extent that its 
constituent technologies, conventions and rules continue to be used, followed and 
adhered to by actors. 
In contrast, the micro level of niches represents a variation to the regime, usually a 
smaller domain of application, and less mature, less coherent, and not so well 
embedded in terms of the performance of the technology, the stability of stakeholder 
relationships and the development of complementary institutions and infrastructure 
(Geels, 2002a, Hoogma, 2000, van den Belt and Rip, 1987, van den Ende and Kemp, 
1999). A niche can be made up of one or more “experiments” with the new 
technologies (Raven, 2004, Weber, 2003). At this niche level, actors must put in 
considerable effort and resources to learn about and develop or modify material, 
institutional, social and cognitive structures because there is only limited past 
experience that they can draw from (Geels, 2004c). To continue the transport 
example, a demonstration project with electric vehicles could be considered as an 
experiment or niche depending on the size of the project (Hoogma et al., 2002).   
The niche is able to exist because of some form of “protection” – a set of conditions 
which provide a socio-technical “space” to test “configurations that might work” 
(Hoogma et al., 2002, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Kemp and Soete, 1992). 
Protection could occur through Government sponsorship or subsidies, or a company 
decision to accept higher costs or to fund a demonstration project. SNM refers to this 
as technological protection (Hoogma, 2000, Kemp et al., 1998, Weber et al., 1999). 
Alternatively, protection could come from user preferences, where the advantages of 
the technology outweigh the disadvantages only for specific users or in limited 
locations (Kemp et al., 1998). SNM refers to this as market protection (Hoogma, 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
15 
2000, Kemp et al., 1998, Weber et al., 1999)3. The distinction between technological 
protection and market protection is not always clear however, with some 
technological protection having competitive elements (Hoogma, 2000)4. 
The third level of the model is the socio-technical landscape. Its role is to impose 
limiting conditions (e.g. geography, distribution of resources, laws of nature) and a 
certain level of contingency (e.g. war, energy prices, environmental problems, societal 
values) on the possible directions of socio-technical change for the socio-technical 
regime or niche (Geels, 2002a). 
In the model, change is understood as follows. A regime may be or become semi-
coherent because of technological limitations, unsatisfied demands, unanticipated 
effects or the imposition of new requirements (Kemp, 1994, Kemp et al., 2000). 
Actors may begin to question the institutions, technologies and taken-for-granted 
assumptions of the regime, creating opportunities for new technologies (Kemp, 1994, 
Summerton, 1994). At the same time, technologies that had been maturing within a 
niche may become more widespread and stimulate positive feedbacks, resulting in 
new technological and social interrelationships and a new “configuration that works” 
(Rip and Kemp, 1998). 
This overview of the MLM is sufficient to allow me to present the suggestions of 
SNM and to highlight some weaknesses that hinder its use as a guide for action. The 
model and transition processes will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
3 Early SNM works categorised niches on the basis of protection rather than categorising the protection 
itself; for example, Weber et al (1999) refer to technological and market niches. This approach has 
since been criticised and more recent SNM works tend to use these categories for protection (e.g. 
Raven, 2005). 
4 As Chapter 3 will show, Australia’s Mandatory Renewable Energy Target is a good example. 
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1.2.3 Guide for experimenting with new technology 
According to the SNM workbook, SNM is (Weber et al., 1999 p.9):  
The creation, development and controlled break-down of test-beds (experiments, 
demonstration projects) for promising new technologies and concepts with the 
aim of learning about the desirability (for example in terms of sustainability) and 
enhancing the rate of diffusion of the new technology.  
Table 1 - Strategic niche management of experiments with transport 
innovations (Weber et al., 1999) 
 Suggestions 
Choose a technology or concept which is as close as possible to the existing 
regime, but which allows to induce more radical changes later on.  
1. Identifying a 
new technology 
or concept To prevent becoming locked-in to one technology, seek to keep open a variety of 
technological options.  
Keep the experiment sufficiently broad in terms of partners (users, suppliers, 
government, operators) and have committed partners in the team. 
A successful experiment need not be conducive to niche formation. An 
unsuccessful experiment need not prevent niche formation. 
Explore which types of market pressures could be operational in the experiment. 
2. Designing an 
experiment 
Create opportunities for the active involvement of pioneer users in the early phase 
of an experiment, and of mass users in its later phase. 
Create opportunities for discussing results of the experiment with groups that are 
not actively involved in the experiment but are affected by it. 
Monitor the vague and tacit expectations and visions of participants and articulate 
them specifically. 
Seek broad coverage of opportunities for learning about new implications of a 
technology. 
3. Implementing 
an experiment 
Reflect upon existing mobility patterns and changes that the new technology may 
bring about in relation to the mobility objectives pursued. 
Be aware of changing requirements in terms of supporting network structure in the 
course of the progress and scale-up of the experiment. 
Consider which kinds of complementary policies could be conducive, needed or 
detrimental to the experiment. 
Look for opportunities to replicate an experiment and try to keep the experiences 
stored in a network. 
4. Expanding 
the experiment 
to a niche 
The technology or concept needs to be customised when the pioneer market turns 
into a mass market. 
Seek to establish productive and smart ways of protecting an experiment. 
Seek to establish productive and smart ways of protecting a niche as part of the 
prevailing transport network. 
5. Review of the 
protection of an 
experiment 
When phasing out a niche development process, try to enrol the established 
network into the development of other options for addressing similar problems. 
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The aim of the workbook is to help actors to understand better how to stimulate niches 
so that they result in a change to the dominant regime. The main advice consists of an 
SNM process, which consists of five phases and 17 issues as summarised in Table 1, 
and a series of 15 lessons related to the practice of SNM as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Lessons from the SNM workbook (Weber et al., 1999) 
1. Well chosen small innovations can lead to unexpected opportunities which can have major 
impacts upon the existing transport regime. 
2. Modular projects allow for changes to be made in light of the experience gained. 
3. Committed partners increase the chances of project success. 
4. Balance the drive for high-risk, high reward project innovation with a low-risk, more 
conservative incremental strategy. 
5. Governmental financial support of experiments may sometimes have ambiguous effects. 
6. Incorporate high profile users within the experimental partner network. 
7. Prepare pre-emptive strategies to deal with possible opposition to the project before they 
occur. 
8. The expectations of all parties need to be continuously articulated to ensure co-ordination of 
partner activities. 
9. When designing a new experiment, seek out and utilise previous relevant experience. 
10. Experiments should be used to question underlying assumptions at all levels; these include 
technology options, technology diffusion strategies, and effects upon patterns of mobility. 
11. At all stages within a project, chose a management style which maximises operational 
effectiveness. 
12. Complementary measures, external to the experiment, might be required to achieve project 
goals. 
13. Seek out independent observers to assess the extent of the project’s success. 
14. Overprotection of a technology can unrealistically raise expectations of its potential and draw 
attention away from a poorly devised experiment. 
15. Monitor carefully potential barriers to co-operation between partners in an experiment, 
especially if they have competing stakes and are prone to free-riding. 
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These suggestions are just some of the insights provided by SNM, the following 
section discusses further why it is worthwhile developing SNM. 
1.2.4 Strengths of SNM 
From a practical perspective, the main strengths of SNM are its explanatory power 
and versatility. This is illustrated by the increasing number of investigations, 
including this thesis, that use SNM or the multi-level model to explain stasis and 
change related to, for example: technological development in the Netherlands, electric 
vehicles, aircraft, horse-drawn carriages, sailing ships, car sharing schemes, combined 
heat and power, wind power, and bio-energy (Geels, 2002b, Healey, 2004, Healey and 
Bunting, 2008, Hoogma, 2000, Hoogma et al., 2002, Kemp et al., 2000, Raven, 2005, 
Schot, 1998, Weber and Hoogma, 1998). 
From a theoretical perspective, it enables researchers to satisfactorily respond to a 
number of challenges, identified by Russell and Willaims (2002) amongst others, that 
are faced by those trying to explain socio-technical change: defining analytical 
boundaries, recognising the influence of structure and agency, recognising the 
influence of technology and society, being able to explain periods of stasis and 
change, and recognising the influence of regularity and contingency. 
Structurally, SNM meets these challenges by offering a defined, yet flexible mental 
model of socio-technical change, as shown earlier (Geels, 2002a, Grablowitz et al., 
1998). Conceptually, SNM recognises that: socio-technical change involves multiple 
stakeholders (Grablowitz et al., 1998); that technology, institutional structures and 
society are mutually shaping (Rip and Kemp, 1998, van Lente and Rip, 1998); that 
cognitive processes of expectations and visions play an influential role (Schot, 1998, 
Weber, 2003); that socio-technical change is situated in a broader context (Geels, 
2002a, Rip and Kemp, 1998); that cost cannot adequately explain the emergence of 
radically new technologies (Healey and Bunting, 2008, Schot, 1998); and that 
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rational-actor based theories inadequately explain outcomes during periods of radical 
change5 (Geels, 2004d). These conceptual viewpoints are supported by a large body 
of literature. 
SNM is not alone having the conceptual perspectives just mentioned. Concepts such 
as technological systems (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000) 
and techno-institutional complex (Unruh, 2000, 2002, 2006) are similar. The 
difference with SNM is that, to my knowledge, it has undergone more development 
towards turning the above conceptual perspective into a guide for action (e.g. Schot et 
al., 1999, Weber et al., 1999). The issue, and the motivation for this thesis, is that 
these efforts to make SNM a guide for action have not yet been successful. A number 
of possible reasons have been identified in the literature and will be discussed in the 
next section. 
1.2.5 Weaknesses in SNM as a guide for action 
One of the guiding research questions was “What weaknesses are there in SNM that 
hinder its use as a guide for action?”. This thesis identifies and responds to four 
weaknesses from existing literature. 
The first is that there is a weak link between the conceptual framework of SNM and 
action. For example, during the development of SNM, Grablowitz et al (1998) noted 
the following issues with SNM: it does not provide concrete objectives, it is highly 
complex, and actors felt that the SNM approach was too structured to be of value in 
the real world. Caniels and Romijn (2006) argue that SNM has not yet succeeded in 
                                                 
5 Rational actor based theories are useful during periods of stability when actors display consistency in 
their decisions of the ‘best’ option. However, during periods of radical change, uncertainty and 
inexperience make it difficult for actors to know what the “ best ” options are (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). 
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linking theory to action and that it still does not provide “concrete management 
principles”. They also criticise some of the SNM lessons, for example they regard the 
suggestion to choose a management style which maximises operational effectiveness 
(Table 2, 11) as banal. A further weakness noted by Raven (2005) is that there was 
insufficient distinction between individual experiments, which were the focus of 
SNM, and niches, which represent a higher albeit still immature level. This thesis 
proposes that a stronger link can be made between the conceptual framework of SNM 
and concrete action by placing greater emphasis on dynamics that encourage positive 
feedbacks (or increasing returns to adoption) at the niche level (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, Kemp, 1994, Unruh, 2000, 2002).  
A second weakness is that the role of actors in SNM remains vague. For example, the 
SNM workbook states that it is aimed at people involved in experiments with new 
technologies as well as those dealing with longer-term transformations – this is a very 
broad group, and it is left up to the reader to determine how it might apply to them. 
Also, SNM publications state that a “niche manager” is required to oversee the SNM 
process (Grablowitz et al., 1998, Kemp et al., 1998), however little advice is given on 
exactly what the niche manager is supposed to do except for practicing SNM. It is 
also unclear as to whether niche management is best undertaken by a single central 
actor or by a distributed network of actors (Kemp et al., 1998). Caniels and Romijn 
(2006 p.2) provide further criticism of the workbook:  
One is told to "Keep the experiment sufficiently broad in terms of partners 
(users, suppliers, government, operators) and have committed partners in the 
team" (p. 39). But how does one go about involving stakeholders who are 
evidently of key importance to the experiment, but who do not show any interest 
in joining the network? And how does one keep one's partners motivated when 
the experiment does not yield quick results, and there is no money for adequate 
compensation of their efforts? How does one treat important stakeholders who 
wish to leave the process midway? These tend to be the sort of questions that 
practitioners managing SNM experiments are likely to come up against. 
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This thesis proposes that the role of actors can be made more explicit by identifying 
typical niche roles that relate to encouraging positive feedbacks and to define an 
approach for identifying which regime actors may be a useful contributor in the actor-
network. 
A third weakness, and one that is also related to actors, is that SNM does not 
adequately address the difficulties of reaching consensus, or the ability of actors to 
influence others. This is visible right from the aim of SNM (presented earlier) which 
is to both learn about the desirability of the new technology and to enhance its 
diffusion. It seems presumptuous for actors to enhance the diffusion of a technology 
when the public or government may question the desirability of that technology. 
Berkhout et al (2004) are particularly critical of what they regard as a tendency in 
SNM literature to assume that actors will easily reach consensus about the most 
desirable direction of progress. Possibly the most explicit reference in SNM to issues 
of consensus is lesson number 7 in Table 2, which recommends that actors prepare 
pre-emptive strategies to deal with opposition. This shows that there is an opportunity 
for SNM to be far more helpful to actors seeking to introduce new technologies. A 
related issue is that SNM says little about the ability of actors to influence others, or 
of one actor’s power relative to another (Smith et al., 2005). As Caniels and Romijn 
(2006 p.2) rhetorically ask: “… how does one go about involving stakeholders who 
are evidently of key importance to the experiment, but who do not show any interest 
in joining the network?”. Those introducing new technologies are also likely to meet 
resistance from actors who have a large investment in the regime. This thesis proposes 
that issues of consensus and limited influence can be more explicitly incorporated in 
the framework for action and the possible challenges (see next weakness). 
The fourth weakness, and one related to the first, is that the research that led to SNM 
did not adequately appreciate the challenges that actors would face in stimulating 
niche development. As Hoogma et al (2002 p.195) noted: 
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…we were certainly over optimistic about the potential of SNM as a tool for 
transition. … The positive circles of feedback by which a technology comes into 
its own and escapes a technological niche are far weaker than expected and 
appear to take longer than expected (five years or more). There are lead times 
and decision-making and existing ownership structures that act very much as an 
inhibiting factor. 
Chapter 2 will show that there are more challenges to positive feedbacks than lead 
times, and decision-making and ownership structures. This thesis proposes that actors 
could be more aware of possible challenges if a more comprehensive list was 
produced that linked the challenges to the positive feedbacks. 
I will test the proposed responses to these weaknesses using the case study of wind 
power in Australia. The following section provides an introduction to the case and it is 
discussed in further detail in Chapters 3 to 6. 
1.3 An opportunity for learning: Wind power in Australia 
1997 – 2007 
From the late 1980s, when one of the first grid-connected wind turbines was installed 
in Victoria, until the late 1990s, there was very little development of wind power in 
Australia. In contrast, between 1997 and 2005 there was rapid growth which appeared 
to slow in 2006 and 2007 (see Figure 3). Why did this occur?  
There were two main reasons for the rapid growth after 19976. The first was 
government policies that guaranteed demand for renewable energy. During the 1990s, 
climate change became more prominent on the political agenda and there was 
increasing pressure for the greater use of renewable energy sources. In 1997, State 
                                                 
6 For an explanation of the path of wind power between the 1980s and early 2000s, see Bunting (2003). 
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Governments introduced consumer-based green power schemes and the Federal 
Government proposed a mandatory renewable energy target (MRET)7. Both of these 
measures supported grid-connected wind power and other renewables, although 
MRET was the most influential because of the higher price that could be made from 
renewable energy8. For the first time there was a guaranteed minimum demand for 
renewable energy. 
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Figure 3 – Grid-connected wind power in Australia (AusWEA, 2007b) 
The second reason was that restructuring of the electricity sector increased 
independent access to the grid. Up until the late 1990s, the electricity sectors in each 
State were controlled by State-owned monopoly electricity commissions who relied 
                                                 
7 Australia has three levels of government: federal, state and local. For further details, refer to 
www.australia.gov.au/Our_Government. 
8 This is based on an informal discussion with David Rossiter, the Renewable Energy Regulator at the 
2004 AusWEA Tradewinds forum in Melbourne. The actual premiums paid for wind generated 
electricity are not publicly available.  
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predominantly on their indigenous coal and to a lesser extent gas and hydro resources. 
They generally showed little interest in wind power, although many other actors were 
strong supporters (Bunting, 2003). During the 1990s the electricity sectors in 
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia were restructured and 
by the end of the decade had become the so-called National Electricity Market 
(NEM)9. The grids were interconnected, operation was managed by a not-for-profit 
company – the National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) – 
owned by the State Governments, competition was introduced in generation and retail, 
and network infrastructure remained regulated monopolies. There was unprecedented 
access to the grid for independent firms. 
These opportunities enabled more than just a rise in the number of wind farms; they 
also enabled an Australian wind industry to form, including local manufacturing 
facilities and export capabilities. Without these factors, MRET in particular, there 
probably would not have been an Australian wind energy industry to study. 
While the introduction of MRET and electricity industry restructuring can explain 
why the sudden growth began in the late 1990s, they cannot explain why it grew at the 
rate it did or developed in the way that it did. Consider this, in 2001, the fledgling 
Australian wind industry suggested that there would be 2000 MW of wind farms 
installed by 2005 (IEA, 2001a). As Figure 3 shows, only about 700 MW was actually 
achieved. Furthermore, as Table 3 shows, the increase in installed capacity was only 
                                                 
9 Australia has a total of six states (those listed, Tasmania and Western Australia) and two self-
governing territories (the Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory). The Australian Capital 
Territory is part of the NEM because it is connected to the NSW network. Tasmania joined the NEM 
when an undersea cable to Victoria was completed in 2005. Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory remain independent due to their remoteness (i.e. >1000km from the nearest part of the 
National Electricity Grid). 
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one of a number of significant changes that occurred related to grid-connected wind 
power in Australia during that period. 
We need a more comprehensive understanding of wind power in Australia if this case 
is to be used to test advice on the introduction of new technologies. This thesis 
explains four facets of the case. 
The first is industry development, which is covered in Chapter 3. This facet provides 
an overview of the growth of the industry, the key actors and their visions. The 
Federal Government’s MRET policy created a market for wind power, enabled the 
increasing use of wind power, attracted actors to the industry and even led to 
manufacturing facilities being established. In terms of scope, the thesis analyses 
industry development nationally because it was the Federal Government’s MRET 
policy and the national demand for equipment and services that contributed to the 
growth of the industry. 
The second is energy policy, which is covered in Chapter 4. This facet is explained 
because it was a key reason for why a wind industry was able to form and 
consequently was a major focus of activity for the Australian Wind Energy 
Association. As noted, it was the Federal Government’s MRET policy that created a 
demand for wind power. As the wind industry grew, it sought to influence MRET and 
other government policy in a more favourable direction. In terms of scope, the thesis 
analyses energy policy nationally because MRET was a national policy. 
The third is grid integration, which is covered in Chapter 5. This facet is explained 
because the electricity market is the domain of application for grid-connected wind 
power. It was also an area of significant activity as Chapter 5 will show. 
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Table 3 –  Snapshots of grid-connected wind power in Australia: 1997 and 
2007 
 Aspects 1997 2007 
Installed < 1 MW 890 MW with a further 600 MW reported to by under 
construction. 
Proposed  Approximately 5 MW Estimated to be > 3000 MW 
Typical 
scale 
<1MW Wind farms typically between 30 MW and 100 MW in 
capacity. 
C
ha
pt
er
 3
 Wind 
industry 
Development undertaken 
by companies with links 
to existing electricity 
sector. 
Wind power did not have 
a voice independent of the 
renewable energy 
industry. 
Estimated 10 people 
employed. 
Industry made up of companies with links to previous 
electricity sector, international companies, and new local 
entrants in roles throughout the supply chain. 
Wind power has a voice independent of renewable energy 
industry—AusWEA (until mid-year only). 
Local manufacturing of some wind farm components such 
as towers. 
Local manufacturing of nacelles and blades up until 2006 
and 2007 respectively. 
Estimated approx 900 people employed. 
C
ha
pt
er
 4
 Market Accredited Green Power 
just established. 
Promise of MRET. 
Accredited Green Power. 
MRET no longer considered useful. 
Victoria and NSW have Renewable Energy Targets. 
Promises of emissions trading. 
C
ha
pt
er
 5
 
Grid 
integration 
Place in the grid was 
uncertain.  
Wind power not 
considered a legitimate or 
significant source of 
energy or capacity. 
Changes made to wind farm development and to grid 
operation.  
A national wind power forecasting system being 
developed.  
A dialogue exists between electricity industry and wind 
industry, and there is a high-level committee to oversee 
grid integration.  
Wind power is recognised as a provider of energy and a 
limited provider of peak capacity.  
Planning 
controls or 
development 
guidelines 
Wind farms were not 
recognised in planning 
schemes except for one 
isolated exception. 
Most State Governments have wind farm specific planning 
controls or guidance for their assessment.  
Some Local Governments have their own planning 
controls. 
AusWEA have best practice guidelines for wind farm 
development and protocols for bird risk assessment and are 
developing guidelines regarding landscape impact in 
partnership with the Australian Council of National Trusts. 
C
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Community 
attitudes 
Limited knowledge of 
wind farms; generally 
thought of in simplistic 
terms as an 
“environmental” or 
“sustainable” technology. 
Increasing polarisation; still regarded by many as an 
“environmental” or “sustainable” technology, but also very 
strong opposition in some areas (e.g. South Gippsland, 
Victoria), to the extent that some people are opposed to any 
wind farm. 
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As the level of wind related activity rose, efforts were made to integrate wind power 
into the electricity grid. This has involved changes to wind farms, to grid operating 
procedures and the development of new technologies. In terms of scope, the case 
study focuses on the National Electricity Market because it applies to the largest grid 
in Australia and it is where there has been the most activity related to wind power. 
The fourth is planning and the community, which is covered in Chapter 6. This facet 
of the case is explained because wind farms were highly controversial in some parts 
of Australia and consequently a major area of activity for Government, the wind 
industry and the public. As the level of wind related activity rose, community 
opposition to wind farms grew and a variety of development guidelines and planning 
provisions were developed. There was considerable debate about the sustainability of 
wind farms and how desirable they were. In terms of scope, the case study focuses on 
Victoria because that is where there has been the greatest opposition to wind farms 
and consequently the greatest public and political scrutiny. Isolated examples from 
South Australia are also used. 
By explaining these facets of the case, I can be confident that the empirical material is 
a valid testing ground for the theoretical insights that might improve SNM. 
1.4 Thesis structure 
The remainder of this thesis is set out as follows. The next chapter, Chapter 2, 
provides concepts that help to explain the wind power case and identifies insights that 
could be used to respond to the identified weaknesses of SNM. 
Chapters 3 to 6 then present the empirical material on industry development, energy 
policy, grid integration, and planning and the community. The end of each of the 
chapters reflects on how applicable the insights from Chapter 2 are on the case and on 
whether the case reveals any additional insights.  
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Chapter 3 explores industry development, showing how the wind industry in Australia 
grew in terms of installed wind farm capacity, size of wind farms, and the growing 
and diversifying actor network. It shows how a market opportunity such as MRET can 
attract actors to a new technology. Chapter 4 then explains why markets for renewable 
energy have formed or ceased to create a demand and the corresponding growth, 
stasis or decline of the Australian wind power industry. Chapter 5 explores the third 
theme by explaining why wind farm development and grid operation have both 
changed, why a wind power forecasting system is being developed at considerable 
cost, and why wind farms are now regarded by electricity system managers as a 
legitimate generation technology. It illustrates how a new technology and an existing 
regime can be mismatched and how actors try to find a path to a mutual fit. Chapter 6 
explores the fourth theme by explaining the growth of articulated (and at times 
polarised) opinion about wind power and the development of planning protocols and 
development guidelines. The chapter shows that a lack of consensus may initially 
come from conflicting values, misinformation, or fear of the unknown, but that as 
actors respond to each other, controversy can seem to take on a life of its own. It also 
shows how a strong lack of consensus can hinder the formation of positive feedbacks. 
The final chapter, chapter 7, summarises the findings from the theoretical and 
empirical chapters and combines these into a set of tentative suggestions for actors 
who are trying to foster new technologies. It will also discuss the limits to 
generalisation and where this research fits into the broader context. 
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2 Understanding socio-technical change 
2.0 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to improve SNM as a guide for action by identifying relevant 
insights from existing literature and testing them against the wind power case. This 
chapter contributes to this aim in two ways. First, it introduces concepts from the 
MLM and SNM that will help to explain the wind power case. Second, it identifies 
insights from existing literature that can help to strengthen SNM in the areas noted in 
Chapter 1. 
The chapter begins by reviewing concepts that will help to explain the case, including 
momentum and lock-in in Section 2.1, and disruption and responses in Section 2.2. It 
then presents a model of socio-technical change in Section 2.3 and explores the 
possible development paths for new technologies. In Sections 2.4 to 2.7, the thesis 
then identifies insights that might help to strengthen the identified weaknesses of 
SNM. Section 2.4 reviews literature on actor roles, consensus and limits of influence 
in socio-technical transitions. Section 2.5 then reviews literature on dynamics and 
positive feedbacks that contribute to the development of niches into regimes, which is 
expected to be able to create a stronger link between concepts and action. Section 2.6 
furthers this exploration into positive feedbacks by identifying actions that can help 
encourage them. Finally, Section 2.7 identifies challenges that actors have faced in 
previous attempts to introduce new technologies and links them to the dynamics and 
positive feedbacks identified in Section 2.5. 
2.1 Momentum in socio-technical regimes 
A key concept in understanding socio-technical change is, to borrow from Newton, 
momentum. It can help to explain the dynamic stability of socio-technical regimes, 
why they seem to possess an inertial resistance to change, and present systemic 
barriers to new technologies, a condition known as lock-in. This will help me to 
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explain many of the challenges that were faced by actors in the wind power case. My 
explanation of momentum begins with stability. 
2.1.1 Stability 
In the MLM, technology is understood to become functional when it is linked with 
other social and material elements. Examples include infrastructure, complementary 
technologies, contractual relationships between actors, habits or cultural practices, 
formal institutional arrangements, education, visions and problem agendas. The 
potential linkages are numerous and the existence and relative strength of particular 
links will depend on the technology in question.  
To appreciate the extent of such linkages, try this thought experiment. Imagine what 
would be required to change automobiles from right-hand drive to left-hand drive (or 
vice-versa depending on which country you are in). It would require a change in car 
design and construction, in manufacturing facilities, in road signage, in driver habits, 
in new driver training, and in the layout of buildings and cities (e.g. driveways, 
freeway on/off ramps). As Rip and Kemp suggest, technology should be thought of as 
more than just an artefact, it should be thought of as a “configuration that works” (Rip 
and Kemp, 1998). 
More than just being linked, these elements are aligned, i.e. they work together to 
form a (semi-) coherent socio-technical regime as described in Chapter 1 (Rip, 1995, 
Rip and Kemp, 1998). This alignment becomes apparent when you consider situations 
which would not work well. For example, a diesel fuelled car in a city where the local 
refuelling stations only sold petrol. A left-hand side drive car in a country that drives 
on the right-hand side. Or, to move away from transport, a Nintendo game console 
would be useless if you could only get Play station games. This is the situation for 
wind power in Australia. The existing electricity regime is based around coal, gas and 
hydro, which, as the chapter will show, have different characteristics to wind power. 
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This static view relates to the hierarchical representation of the MLM in Chapter 1. In 
that representation, regimes are the relatively stable socio-technical status quo, while 
niches can be thought of as fledgling regimes, struggling to grow and become more 
stable.  
The dynamic alignment, formation, continuation, or destruction of these linkages is a 
key part of the concept of momentum. 
2.1.2 Momentum 
A major challenge in social studies of technology (SST) has been how to explain the 
relative influence on socio-technical change of technology, social and institutional 
structures and actors (agency). A popular concept has been that of momentum10. In 
this school of thought, technology, social and institutional structures and actors are 
regarded as mutually shaping in that actors construct technology, institutional 
structures, and build relationships, and that existing technologies, institutional 
structures, and actor relationships create opportunities and constraints on activity and 
shape perceptions of the future (Geels, 2004a, Hughes, 1987, 1994, Rip and Kemp, 
1998, Russell and Williams, 2002, van Lente and Rip, 1998). Actors are contributors 
to socio-technical momentum and may be entrained by it (Garud and Karnøe, 2003, 
van Lente and Rip, 1998). 
An illustration of momentum, admittedly with deterministic undertones, is provided 
by Hughes (1983 p.140) who describes the development of alternating current 
electricity systems: 
                                                 
10 Hughes introduced the idea of socio-technical momentum in response to the technological 
determinism versus social construction dichotomy (Hughes, 1994), however the underlying idea that 
technology and society are mutually shaping is also applicable to the structure versus agency 
dichotomy (van Lente and Rip, 1998). 
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“Men and institutions developed characteristics that suited them to the 
characteristics of the technology. And the systematic interaction of men, ideas, 
and institutions, both technical and nontechnical, led to the development of a 
supersystem - a sociotechnical one-with mass, movement and direction. An apt 
metaphor for this movement is “momentum”. … The momentum initially came 
mostly from an aggregate of manufacturers who invested heavily in resources, 
labor, and manufacturing plants in order to produce the machinery, devices, and 
apparatus required by the new system; later, educational institutions taught the 
science and practice of the new technology; then research institutions were 
founded to solve its critical problems; and all the while a growing number of 
engineers, skilled labourers, appliers of science, managers, and other persons 
invested their experience and competence in the new polyphase universal 
system.” 
If we use the momentum metaphor heuristically, we can find further analogies to help 
organise our understanding. 
In the Newtonian sense, momentum is the product of velocity (speed and direction) 
and mass; in the socio-technical sense quasi-equivalent elements can also be found. I 
suggest that mass is related to the size of the socio-technical regime, i.e. number of 
actors, market penetration of the technology, amount of infrastructure, related 
institutional structures etc. Speed is related to positive feedbacks in a recursive 
process of adoption and adaptation – adoption of the technology and mutual 
adaptation between the technology, infrastructure, and actors (Rip and Kemp, 1998, 
Rogers, 1995, Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt, 2001). This process can take on a self-
reinforcing character known as increasing returns to adoption, where “...a technology 
becomes more attractive the more is adopted, which further stimulate its adoption.” 
(Kemp, 1994 p.1031). It is these self-reinforcing positive feedbacks which I suggest 
should be the focus of actors who want to foster technologies for sustainability.  
Direction can be viewed as the trajectory or “problem/solution” agenda for a 
technology or system, i.e. the notion of “progress” and the way that actors define 
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problems  and potential solutions (Dosi, 1982, Geels, 2004b, c, Kemp et al., 1998, 
Nelson and Winter, 1982, Sine and David, 2003). Researchers have used a variety of 
concepts to help describe and explain the direction of socio-technical change, 
including: paradigms (Dosi, 1982), regimes (Nelson and Winter, 1982), institutional 
logics (Sine and David, 2003), and policy, technical or problem agendas (Bridgman 
and Davis, 2000, Geels, 2004b, Kemp et al., 1998, van Lente and Rip, 1998, van 
Merkerk and Robinson, 2006). SNM (e.g. Kemp et al., 1998) built primarily on the 
work by Dosi, Nelson and Winter, however the important point is that change can be 
characterised by a direction which is apparent in actor behaviour, institutions, policy 
etc.  
The direction of progress may be guided by particular principles or visions (Geels, 
2002b, van de Poel, 1998) such as reducing costs or maximising profits (Rosenberg, 
1969), increasing efficiency (van de Poel, 1998), increasing reliability, safety, or 
security (Levin, 1977), or achieving a particular “mission” e.g. the Dutch storm 
barriers (van de Poel, 1998) or putting man on the moon. Guiding principles that were 
important in the wind power case were low cost electricity in energy policy, 
technological neutrality in the electricity market, and appropriate development in 
wind farm planning. 
Actors may have expectations about how these guiding principles or visions can be 
achieved and may formulate plans or agendas for action (van Lente and Rip, 1998, 
van Merkerk and Robinson, 2006). For example, costs might be expected to decrease 
through economies of scale, and economies of scale may be limited by the 
performance of particular components; so developing these components might be 
viewed a beneficial course of action (Hughes, 1987, Levin, 1977, Nelson and Winter, 
1982, Rosenberg, 1969). 
This discussion of direction should not be interpreted as actors alone directing socio-
technical change. If the direction of progress becomes widely shared and embedded in 
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material, institutional or social structures – the possibilities may become promises 
(van Lente and Rip, 1998) and the technology may appear to determine society 
(Hughes, 1994). The direction of change is also influenced by larger events, such as 
wars, natural disasters, resource shortages, and by what is physically possible – the 
socio-technical landscape in the MLM. Moreover, there will be competition between 
actors for different outcomes. Thus, while actors can influence the direction of 
change, the actual direction has an emergent quality, depending not only on actors’ 
problem agendas but also on existing structures, uncontrollable events and the 
interaction and competition between actors (Hoogma, 2000, Rip, 1995, Russell and 
Williams, 2002). 
As momentum builds – that is as a socio-technical mass forms, adopting and mutually 
adapting, with a particular direction of “progress” – a certain degree of material, 
institutional and social irreversibility may emerge11. This can be beneficial because it 
encourages alignment between socio-technical elements, focuses the attention of 
actors and helps them prioritise actions, reduces uncertainty, builds trust between 
actors, and allows routinisation of activities (David and Rothwell, 1996, Foray, 1997, 
Rip and Kemp, 1998, Russell and Williams, 2002, Walker, 2000). However, as the 
next section will discuss, it can also cause difficulties in responding to pressure for 
change. 
2.1.3 Lock-in 
As momentum builds, and material, institutional and social structures become more 
mutually adapted and self-reinforcing, it becomes increasingly difficult to change the 
direction of a socio-technical regime or to introduce a new technology. The next 
                                                 
11 Perceived as irreversible in the short and medium term, but not necessarily irreversible in the long 
term. 
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section will discuss why actors might want to do this. This section summarises how 
the processes of adoption and mutual adaptation can create systemic barriers to new 
technologies. This condition is referred to as lock-in (Cowan and Gunby, 1996, 
Unruh, 2000). 
The degree to which a socio-technical configuration is locked-in and the relative 
importance of different factors vary from case to case, but examples from SNM and 
other literature provides a comprehensive list of possible factors which are 
summarised in Table 4. I will illustrate how these factors can create barriers to 
alternatives with the stories of the compact fluorescent light (CFL) and locomotives in 
Britain. 
The story of the compact fluorescent light (CFL) provides an illustration of how 
factors such as those listed in Table 4 can hinder the introduction of a new technology 
(Menanteau and Lefebvre, 2000). The attraction of the CFL is that it is significantly 
more energy efficient than incandescent globes; however proponents of the CFL faced 
a number of challenges. Consumers were used to the “warm” light of incandescent 
globes and perceived the light of CFLs as “cold” (Menanteau and Lefebvre, 2000). 
Also, the increased size and mass of the early generations of CFLs meant that there 
were not necessarily compatible with existing light fittings (Menanteau and Lefebvre, 
2000). 
Another example is that of the locomotives in Britain around the turn of the last 
century (Frankel, 1955). Around 1900, Britain could not take advantage of the more 
powerful and economical locomotives that were in use in the USA. The reason was 
that Britain’s rail system was based on a narrow gauge, meaning that the tracks, 
tunnels and stations were unable to accommodate the larger, more powerful 
locomotives (Frankel, 1955). 
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Table 4 – Factors contributing to the lock in of socio-technical regimes 
Factors Description 
Technological  - Incumbent technologies have benefited from scale and learning economies; whereas the new technology may be relatively expensive and immature 
(Kemp and Soete, 1992).  
- The need to be compatible with existing infrastructure, maintenance and 
manufacturing facilities, and complementary technologies (Frankel, 1955, 
Hoogma et al., 2002, Menanteau and Lefebvre, 2000). 
Government 
policy and 
regulatory 
framework 
- Incumbent actors may be able to strongly influence debates by controlling 
information, having significant lobbying capabilities or close contacts with 
important decision-makers (Bunting, 2003, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, 
Kemp, 1994, Pierson, 2000, Sine and David, 2003, Walker, 2000).  
- Organizational structures and established relationships between firms may 
make it difficult for new firms to enter the market (Glynn, 2002).  
- Actors may be reluctant to break existing agreements because of financial 
penalties or the potential for a loss of trust (Walker, 2000). 
- New technologies may not be recognised in, or be compatible with, the 
existing institutional framework (Kemp, 1994) 
Economic - There may be sunk costs, un-recouped investments and decommissioning costs associated with the existing technologies (Beardshaw et al., 1998, 
Harrigan, 1981, IEA, 2001b, Porter, 1976).  
- Those facing the costs of switching may not be those able to capture the 
benefits (Foray, 1997, Kemp and Soete, 1992, Levinthal, 1998, Pierson, 
2000). 
Cultural and 
psychological 
 
- Incumbent technologies may be the benchmark against which alternatives are 
assessed (Glynn, 2002, Kemp, 1994, Kemp et al., 1998, Menanteau and 
Lefebvre, 2000, Pierson, 2000, Rogers, 1995). 
- The incumbent technology may have a stronger symbolic meaning than the 
alternative (Barnes et al., 2004, Hoogma et al., 2002, Rogers, 1995). 
- Negative experiences with one new technology may result in actors being 
reluctant to try other alternative technologies (Rogers, 1995).  
- Actors may have personal reasons for staying with the incumbent 
technology, such as pride, fear of failure, or loyalty to workers (Porter, 
1976).  
- Actors may be unwilling to adopt new technologies that reduce their 
independence or their control of expertise and knowledge, or they may be 
unwilling break old habits or to learn new skills (Barnes et al., 2004, Hoogma 
et al., 2002). 
Demand - Users may not be able to accurately articulate their wants or needs for a new technology (Rip, 1995). 
- New technologies may require users to learn new skills (David, 1985). 
Undesirable 
social and 
environmental 
effects 
- The new technology may have undesirable social and environmental impacts 
(Hoogma et al., 2002, IEA, 1998). 
- There may be a disproportionate or inequitable distribution of costs, risks and 
benefits (Kemp and Soete, 1992), and those for the new technology may be 
apparent, while those for the incumbent technology may be relatively 
unnoticed or accepted. 
As these examples illustrate, although the factors are listed separately in Table 4, they 
do not act discretely (Hoogma et al., 2002, Unruh, 2002). The combined effect of 
these factors means that technological alternatives seem to compete not just against 
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incumbent technologies, but against the socio-technical regime in which incumbents 
are embedded (Smith, 1998).  
The challenge for SNM and this thesis is how to overcome these barriers to enable 
new technologies to develop. 
2.1.4 Discussion and summary 
This section has provided background to the concepts of stability, alignment, 
momentum and lock-in and has shown how they relate to the MLM. Stability comes 
from aligned linkages between different socio-technical elements. Stability is dynamic 
and niches and regimes can possess momentum, with a socio-technical mass, speed 
related to positive feedbacks, and direction based on the (emergent) definition of 
problems and potential solutions. As momentum builds, a certain level of 
irreversibility can occur. The mutual shaping or co-evolution of technologies, actors, 
and institutions can create a semi-coherent, self-reinforcing socio-technical regime 
which presents systemic barriers to new technologies and possesses an inertial 
resistance to change. 
With an understanding about why it is difficult to change, the next section will look at 
why actors may want to implement change. 
2.2 Pressure for change 
Socio-technical regimes can possess momentum and be resistant to change or the 
introduction of new technologies. However, we know that socio-technical systems do 
change and that new technologies do become widespread; the question is how does 
this occur? This section explains how the momentum of socio-technical regimes can 
be disrupted, causing actors to question the regime and potentially creating an 
opportunity for new technologies. 
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2.2.1 Disrupting socio-technical regimes 
The momentum of socio-technical regimes may be disrupted by many different 
forces. Disruptions serve as catalysts for action, potentially slowing or halting positive 
feedbacks, de-legitimizing parts of the regime and possibly causing actors to look in 
new directions (Berkhout, 2006, Kemp, 1994, Sine and David, 2003, Summerton, 
1994). Because of the linkages within socio-technical regimes, change is more likely 
to involve complex causal chains than to be from single events (Araujo and Harrison, 
2002, Raven, 2005, Unruh, 2002, Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
Possible disruptions can be categorised in various ways (c.f. Kemp, 1994, Unruh, 
2002); the important point is that the disruption misaligns elements of the regime and 
becomes part of actors’ problem agendas (Brooks, 1986, Geels, 2004b, Unruh, 2002). 
The literature can be organised into three categories – problems related to the 
technology, misalignment with other parts of the socio-technical regime, and changes 
in the landscape. These are not discrete categories and as shown in Table 5, there is 
overlap and interaction between them.  
These disrupting forces can prompt actors to question the status quo. In the wind 
power case it has been a combination of climate change, diminishing economies of 
scale, and increasing environmental concern by the public that has brought the 
dominant coal-fired power stations into question. However, as the next section will 
show, not all actors may respond in the same way. 
2.2.2 Responding to disruption 
When faced with pressure to change, Rotmans et al (2001 p.20) suggest that actors 
may take one or more of the following approaches: 
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Table 5 – Disrupting forces 
Category Disruption Description 
Failing 
performance 
The technology no longer performs the task for which it was 
designed (Brooks, 1986), e.g. insects becoming resistant to 
pesticides (Cowan and Gunby, 1996) 
Accidents Serious accidents, such as the Hindenburg airship disaster (Geels, 
2002b) or Chernobyl and 3 mile Island nuclear reactors. 
Unsolvable 
“bottleneck” 
Some component or feature of the technology or socio-technical 
system limits progress and cannot be resolved with available 
knowledge or resources (Hughes, 1987). 
Cumulative 
nuisance 
The use of the technology may be creating a cumulative nuisance, 
e.g. manure in city streets from horse powered transportation (Kemp 
and Soete, 1992). 
Limited 
(future) 
potential 
Development along a particular path is (perceived as) limited in the 
present or near future, e.g. diminishing economies of scale, market 
saturation, or simply by what is physically possible (Kemp, 1994, 
Levin, 1977, Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Resource 
shortages 
Real or perceived resource shortages, such as wood for train 
sleepers, oil shocks, water (Brooks, 1986, Kemp and Soete, 1992, 
Martin, 1996, Rosenberg, 1969). 
Completed 
mission 
Where a trajectory is mission driven, for example electrification of a 
region, completion of that mission may bring uncertainty about 
where to head next (Booth, 2000). 
Problems 
related to the 
technology 
Strategic 
games 
Firms may engage in strategic and competitive games in an attempt 
to get ahead of competitors (Geels, 2002b, 2004b). 
Recognition 
of issues 
Scientists may become aware of negative impacts from a particular 
technology or technological system, such as CFCs and the hole in 
the ozone layer (Glynn, 2002) or greenhouse gases and climate 
change (Brooks, 1986). It may take a “focusing” event such as large-
scale forest deaths in relation to acid rain for this recognition to 
move onto a problem agenda  (Unruh, 2002). 
Changing 
actor 
preferences 
Users may change their ideas about a technology and its impacts due 
to the existence of alternative options to fulfil the same function or a 
change in the function to be fulfilled (Cowan and Hulten, 1996, 
Geels, 2004b, van de Poel, 2000), for example “green” buildings.  
Changing 
industry 
structure 
Governments may become influenced by new ideologies – for 
example, state-owned monopolies versus competitive markets –
resulting in the restructuring of industries. Governments may seek to 
reduce the influence of unions on an industry. 
Misalignment 
with other 
elements of 
regime 
Changing 
regulation 
Governments may seek to limit or control negative impacts of a 
technology through new regulations, for example CFCs (Glynn, 
2002), greenhouse gas emissions, or other pollutants (Brooks, 1986, 
Cowan and Hulten, 1996, Geels, 2004b)  
Unexpected 
discrete 
events 
Events such as major natural disasters or wars may alter the 
trajectory (Brooks, 1986). 
Long-term 
or latent 
impacts 
The effects of some technologies or systems may only present 
themselves as long-term trends, for example climate change, or after 
a significant delay, for example asbestos-related cancer (Brooks, 
1986) 
Changes in 
the landscape 
Long-term 
social trends 
Long-term social trends such as environmental values or political 
economic thought (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000). 
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They may take a defensive approach (seeking to discredit other actors), a 
reactive approach (of system improvement) or an innovative approach by 
contributing actively to a transition. They may even do all three in the course of 
time. 12 
To appreciate better why some actors might be resistant to change, it is useful to 
characterise different types of change, for example: conservative and radical (e.g. 
Hughes, 1987); end of pipe, continuous and discontinuous (Unruh, 2002); and normal, 
transitional, and transformational (Rycroft and Kash, 2002). Despite the different 
labels, researchers generally attribute similar characteristics to similar innovation 
patterns. These categorizations can be simplified into a continuum with conservative, 
continuous, and normal at one end and radical, discontinuous, and transformational at 
the other. In such a simplification, the conservative end tends to involve small 
changes, marginal improvements, conducted within the existing network of actors in a 
relatively routine manner. In contrast, the radical end tends to involve large changes, 
the possibilities of large improvements, new actor networks, a relatively large degree 
of trial-and-error learning, and a relatively high degree of uncertainty (Hughes, 1987, 
Rycroft and Kash, 2002, Unruh, 2002). 
Many actors advocate that radical or system level innovation is required to shift 
existing socio-technical regimes towards a more sustainable course (Geels et al., 
2004, Hawken et al., 1999, Kemp, 1994, OECD, 2001). Others, such as Goncz et al 
(2006) advocate a balance between radical and incremental change – in their words, 
between innovation and durability. Others again argue that radical change could be 
achieved by the culmination of incremental change towards a different trajectory 
(Rotmans, Kemp, van Asselt et al., 2001, Verbong and Geels, 2007). Part of the 
difficulty in understanding what these various authors advocate is that what one 
                                                 
12 Smith et al (2005) note that some actors, such an an environmental regulator, may simultaneously be 
creating the pressure for change and co-ordinating efforts by other actors to change. 
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considers radical may not be considered radical by another (Berkhout et al., 2004, 
Ehrnberg, 1995). 
Despite the differences of opinion there is broad agreement that current socio-
technical regimes cannot be made sustainable simply through band-aid type solutions 
and that significant change is required, whether through large radical steps, or 
incremental steps in a new direction. Unfortunately, research suggests that incumbent 
actors generally favour approaches that involve the least change to the socio-technical 
regime because they typically have lower upfront cost and less uncertainty and risk; 
therefore, using Unruh’s labels, they tend to favour end of pipe over continuous, and 
continuous over discontinuous (Brooks, 1986, Kemp and Soete, 1992, Norberg-Bohm 
and Rossi, 1998, Unruh, 2002). In contrast, radical change, particularly within a large 
socio-technical regime, entails greater uncertainty, higher upfront costs, requires new 
actor networks, and will probably be competence destroying (Kash and Rycroft, 2002, 
Kemp and Soete, 1992, Kline, 2001, Tushman and Anderson, 1986, Unruh, 2002). 
This thesis looks at how to make the process of change towards a more sustainable 
regime more manageable. 
2.2.3 Discussion and Summary 
This section has provided background on the concepts of disruption and on 
characterizing change. It has shown that the momentum of socio-technical regimes 
can be disrupted by various “forces” relating to the technological regime, the other 
elements of the socio-technical regime, or changes in the broader socio-technical 
landscape. These “forces” can misalign parts of the socio-technical regime and cause 
actors to question the status quo. Actors may respond to disruption in a variety of 
ways, they may try to dismiss the need for change or discredit those advocating 
change, they may react to the pressure for change, or they may innovate in response to 
the pressure for change. In simple terms, change can be characterised as conservative 
and radical. Research shows that incumbent actors tend to favour incremental 
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approaches, while many actors argue that more radical change, or at least incremental 
change with a new direction, is required. 
With this background of stability and change, the next section will present Frank 
Geels’ model of socio-technical transitions that has become popular within SNM. 
2.3 Socio-technical transitions 
The introduction of new technologies can be part of a longer term socio-technical 
transition. Indeed, many hope that renewable energy technologies such as wind power 
will transform fossil-fuel based electricity supply and the related distribution network. 
It is useful to have a mental model of the transition process and this section presents a 
model developed by Geels which is based on the concepts discussed so far. The 
section begins with the model and follows this with a discussion of the possible 
development paths for new technologies. This will later help to explain the current 
and possible future path of wind power in Australia. 
2.3.1 A conceptual model of socio-technical transitions 
The MLM and the concepts presented in this chapter can be combined into a model of 
socio-technical transitions. The model summarises the discussion so far; it should be 
regarded as a heuristic tool rather than a map of the future because transitions are very 
complex. Figure 4 shows a model of transitions from Geels (2002a, 2002b, 2004d). 
During periods of stability, dominant socio-technical configurations are dynamically 
stable. Users are happy with the features and performance of the technology, 
designers and producers have a clear idea about how the technology can be improved 
(i.e. a direction of “progress”), complementary technologies are available, specialised 
training is available for the design and/or use of the technology, and there may be few 
negative impacts (or few that people are aware of or regard as unacceptable). In such 
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cases, the configuration may possess “momentum”. New technologies may face 
systemic barriers to their uptake. 
This thesis focuses here, on 
positive feedbacks in the 
development of the niche 
 
Figure 4 - The multilevel model of transitions (Geels, 2002b) 
 “Momentum” may be disrupted by various forces, resulting in misalignment within 
the regime and pressure for change (Kemp, 1994, Kemp et al., 2000). Actors may put 
the problem on their formal or informal agendas for action (Geels, 2004c). Some 
actors may dismiss the need for change, others may try to adapt the regime to the new 
pressure; others may begin to fundamentally question the dominant technologies, 
practices and conventions. A window of opportunity may open for new technologies 
(Berkhout et al., 2004, Kemp, 1994, Summerton, 1994).  
Some new technologies may be developed as a result of the disruption. Others may be 
in use in another location, or have been developed in the past but not yet come into 
common use. Thus, some new technologies may be in a position to take advantage of 
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this opportunity, others not. There may be resistance to the new technology because of 
its threat to the status quo or potential negative impacts.  
The figure shows the new technology transforming the existing regime, but this 
should be viewed as a special case rather than the norm. As the next section will 
discuss, not all new technologies succeed, and those that do don’t necessarily 
transform the existing regime and system.  
2.3.2 Development paths for new technology 
There many possible development paths for a new technology. Initially, the 
technology may be reliant on specific protection, or may be used only in limited 
domains of application locations; this could continue in the long-term. Alternatively, 
the new technology may become integrated into the existing system (Hoogma et al., 
2002). If, however, the dynamics at both the niche and regime level support change, 
then a more radical transformation could take place with the new technology 
becoming an integral part of the new regime (Weber and Hoogma, 1998). Table 6 
summarises the possible development states for a technology. 
From an SNM perspective, the shift from experiments to transformation is one 
characterised by increasing levels of stabilization and structuration13, a change from 
specific protection against the regime to more general protection that is an accepted 
part of the regime, and an increasing level of use in different applications and 
locations (Geels, 2002a, 2004b, Hoogma, 2000, Raven, 2005). 
 
                                                 
13 That is a shift from actors having to put in considerable effort to learn about and establish new ‘rules’ 
and codified knowledge, to the ‘rules’ and codified knowledge beginning to structure and guide the 
activities of actors. 
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Table 6 - Niche patterns and characteristics (based on Geels, 2002b, 
Grablowitz et al., 1998, Hoogma et al., 2002) 
Pattern Description 
Experiments The niche and new technology exist in the context of an existing regime and 
landscape, and are reliant on some form of protection. 
Extinction The novel technology fails to attract support and remains an R&D option only. 
Branching and 
specialization 
The niche and new technology have developed sufficient momentum so as to 
become self-sustaining, possibly in market niches, allowing some technical 
specialization and exploration of new functions. 
Integration The niche and new technology have developed sufficient momentum and 
compete with or have become integrated with the existing regime. 
Transformation  The niche and new technology have developed sufficient momentum and have 
become the basis for a new socio-technical regime. 
In a simpler, but no less useful perspective, Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) differentiate 
between only two basic stages: a formative one and a market expansion one. The 
formative one (cf. introduction/experimentation) is characterised by high uncertainty 
in terms of the technology, markets, and regulation, and there may be many entrants 
with competing designs for the technology (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). In the 
market expansion stage the niche becomes self-sustaining, driven by its own 
momentum and no longer reliant on repeated intervention14 (Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). 
2.3.3 Discussion and summary 
This section has combined the key concepts used in the MLM and those introduced in  
                                                 
14 Karl Mallon (2006), who held key roles in the Australian Wind Energy Association, similarly 
suggests that the goal of introducing a new technology is for it to be self-sustaining. 
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this chapter into a heuristic model of socio-technical transitions. It has also presented 
possible development paths for a new technology and highlighted typical 
characteristics of states along the way. This model and the development paths will 
help me to explain the wind power and also provides a context for the following 
discussion about fostering technologies for sustainability. 
2.4 Actors in niche development 
Actors are a very important part of niche development and socio-technical change. As 
noted previously, it is actors who “build” material, institutional and social structures, 
albeit constrained and enabled by existing structures. Two weakness of SNM related 
to actors are that the link between actions and actors is not well defined (Caniels and 
Romijn, 2006, Grablowitz et al., 1998) and that SNM underplays the difficulty of 
consensus, including actors’ limited abilities to influence the direction of change 
(Berkhout et al., 2004, Smith et al., 2005). This section begins responding to these 
weaknesses, first by reviewing literature on the role of actors in niche development, 
then by reviewing literature on consensus and controversy. The issue of actors’ ability 
to influence others is investigated in both sections; in the first in terms of actors’ 
abilities to attract or engage others, and in the second in terms of actors’ abilities to 
respond to disagreements. These reviews will identify insights that may strengthen 
SNM and will be tested against the wind power case. 
2.4.1 The role of actors 
The SNM workbook provides a variety of advice regarding actors involved with the 
introduction of new technologies: it recommends that there be a broad range of 
committed partners, that there be a network (niche) manager, and that the network 
also engage with actors who are not involved but are affected by the new technology 
(Weber et al., 1999). While this is useful, it says little about what these actors should 
be trying to do and about the challenges of attracting actors who should be involved 
but show no interest (Caniels and Romijn, 2006). 
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An initial review of literature indicated that there are two complementary approaches 
that could be used to provide more detail about the role of actors. The first is to 
identify more specific roles that can help to develop the niche. These will later be 
linked to actions. The second is to understand better issues associated with the broader 
network of actors that may be required to achieve a mutual fit between the new 
technology and the existing socio-technical regime. 
2.4.1.1 Niche roles and activities 
SNM and related literature describe various roles for actors that may help to develop a 
niche. SNM emphasizes the role of niche manager, who is the actor that takes 
responsibility for the co-ordination of niche activities, setting up projects, and 
enrolling and aligning actors (Grablowitz et al., 1998, Kemp et al., 1998). Grablowitz 
et al (1998) state that a niche manager is different to a facilitator, who is an actor who 
tries to combine stakeholders’ interests and allocate responsibilities. Kemp et al 
(1998) suggest that a wide variety of actors could be niche manager, including policy-
makers, regulatory agencies, local authorities, non-government organisations (NGOs), 
community groups, private companies, industry associations, or independent 
individuals. 
Some of these niche manager responsibilities are also highlighted and elaborated on 
by other researchers. For example, Rip (1995) advocates the use of a macro-actor in 
the introduction of new technology; a macro-actor being one that can take a long-term 
view and facilitate the alignment of activities; for example large companies, consortia, 
or Government actors. The niche manager responsibility of enrolling actors is similar 
to what Elzen et al (1996) describe as the role of dedicated network-builder; actors 
who are prepared to put in the effort to make links, provide opportunities for 
interaction between actors, and enrol other actors into the network. Hoogma (2000) 
contrasts these to reactive network builders who operate essentially within the 
framework provided by the dedicated network builders. The role of network-builder is 
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important because actors can bring knowledge and resources, they can enlarge and 
fill-in gaps in the niche for example in the supply chain, they can help to generate and 
sustain positive feedbacks, and they can help to legitimise the new technology 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004).  
Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) offer another view of actors from their studies of the 
introduction of renewable energy technologies. They describe the role of prime-
movers who they say are actors that raise awareness, undertake investment, provide 
legitimacy, and diffuse the new technology. As is true of many of these roles, 
Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) note that prime-movers need not be single actors, but 
could be organised networks of small actors. 
A further role comes from the work of Deuten (2003), who studied the production of 
knowledge in emerging regimes for reinforced concrete, paint, video cassettes, and air 
traffic control. He states that trans-local or cosmopolitan knowledge is an essential 
element in the emergence of a regime; that is knowledge which “…can move between 
locations without great difficulty and … which transcends local specificities…” 
(Deuten, 2003 p.51). Examples include best-practice standards, rules-of thumb, and 
routine procedures. He cites three requirements for the production of trans-local 
knowledge: social strategies such as alliances, trust and dominance; technical devices, 
such as metrology, standards, and instruments; and circulation and aggregation of 
knowledge by actors (Deuten, 2003). The last of these is of particular interest here and 
he suggests that professional societies, industry associations, research institutes, and 
government agencies are typically in a position to facilitate the aggregation of 
disparate local practices (local knowledge), into a shared body of knowledge that is 
generally applicable and can be used to guide local practices (trans-local knowledge) 
(Deuten, 2003). 
Many of these researchers note the potential role of Government in the introduction of 
new technology. SNM publications note that Government could be the niche manager 
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(Kemp et al., 1998). Rip (1995) notes that Government could act as the macro-actor, 
while Deuten (2003) notes that Government could help to develop trans-local 
knowledge. Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) highlight the importance of Government 
actors in terms of institutional alignment, attracting actors, and providing 
“…powerful, predictable and persistent pricing policies to create favourable 
conditions for investors …” (protection in SNM terms). Government therefore 
appears to potentially play a significant role in the fostering of sustainable 
technologies. 
In summary, the literature suggests that actors wanting to foster new technologies may 
benefit from undertaking activities associated with alignment, enrolling other actors, 
network-building, sharing information, investment, legitimacy, and trans-local 
learning. 
2.4.1.2 Wider actor network 
Researchers note that a wide range of other actors may be required to successfully 
develop a niche into a regime: Kemp et al. (1998) describe SNM as a collective 
endeavour, Garud and Karnoe (2003) argue that technological development involves 
distributed agency, and Smith et al (2005) argue that regime shifts involve negotiation 
between resource inter-dependent actors. Nielssen and Elle (2000 p.406), provide an 
example from the study of infrastructure systems where they note that: 
…many actors have influence on the systems, and no one actor is controlling the 
development. Some actors have influence on the legislative basis; others have 
influence on regulation, planning, operation, and the public debate on issues 
relating to flow management. …One should also be aware that actors who do not 
have a formal role might have a considerable influence due to their role on the 
political arenas. 
Thus, some actors are likely to be involved because they have an interest in the 
technology itself, while others may be involved (or may need to become involved) 
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because the technology affects some aspect of the socio-technical regime that they 
have an interest in or are responsible for. 
One actor group that is often referred to is that of “users”; however the suggestion that 
users should be more involved is problematic for two reasons. The first is that 
involving users is not necessarily beneficial. As Shove (2003) notes, there are 
arguments in the literature for both more inclusive innovation on the basis that it may 
lead to more robust and sustainable outcomes, and for more exclusive innovation on 
the basis that people do not necessarily behave in a sustainable manner if given an 
option. The second reason is that the term user is vague. Rohracher (2003) notes that 
the user depends on the technology in question. He also notes that there can be 
different users throughout the life-cycle of a technology, for example “…the installer 
of a ventilation system is a user of this technology only during the implementation 
phase, whereas the occupant of a building … is a user when the building is complete.” 
(Rohracher, 2003 p.179) There can also be different levels of remote-ness for users. 
Following Clark and Montini (1993), Rohracher (2003) describes “implicated users”, 
who are actors that may be affected by a technology but are not represented in the 
design of it. The wind power case touches on a number of these conceptualisations of 
the user as other than as a traditional consumer. As the empirical chapters will show, 
the “users” of wind power are wind farm developers and/or investors, with the public 
being the remote end-users of a wind farms fungible product – electricity15. 
Moving back to the range of actors that may be involved, researchers note that actors 
may seek to influence the path of the new technology or niche to suit their interests 
                                                 
15 The development of green power schemes can be seen as a move to make electricity less fungible by 
creating a stronger link between how it was generated and the end-user. In the Australian Green Power 
scheme, this link is strengthened using Government accreditation of generators and annual auditing of 
retailers and generators. 
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(Garud and Karnøe, 2003, Rip, 1995). It is here that some researchers are particularly 
critical of SNM’s inadequate treatment of the difficulty of reaching consensus about 
the way forward (Berkhout et al., 2004, Smith et al., 2005). 
To be fair, SNM does acknowledge that actors may have different expectations of the 
future and advises niche managers to monitor the expectations and visions of actors in 
the network (Weber et al., 1999). Other SNM publications recommend that actors 
strengthen expectations in three ways (Hoogma, 2000, Kemp et al., 1998): by making 
them more robust, i.e. shared by a larger and more diverse number of actors; by 
improving their quality, i.e. making them more realistic, as opposed to optimistic or 
pessimistic, through testing of expectations; and, by making them more specific, i.e. 
making it clearer what the next steps are in the development of the new technology or 
niche.  
While useful, this underplays the challenges of reaching consensus between a range of 
actors, or the fact that the goal may actually be to outlast opponents, rather than to 
reach agreement. On this latter point, some researchers suggest that a certain level of 
disagreement is a good thing because it can prompt learning and stimulate change 
(RESOLVE, 2000, Rip and Talma, 1998). We need to further investigate the 
challenges of reaching consensus, or conversely why actors might disagree. 
Disagreement could occur in various ways and between various actors. It could occur 
within the niche actor-network because, as the wind power case will show, even if 
actors within the niche share a vision, they may be competing to stake their individual 
claims in the fledgling market. It could also occur between the niche actors and 
regime actors; in fact a certain level of disagreement between niche and regime is 
almost inevitable given that the niche actors may be trying to delegitimise the regime 
(Rotmans, Kemp, van Asselt et al., 2001). This niche/regime disagreement could be 
further segregated into competitors and non-competitors. For example, niche actors 
may be in direct competition with some of the regime actors, such as wind farm and 
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coal-fired power station operators, or electric vehicle and internal-combustion vehicle 
manufacturers. In such cases, niche actors may be competing with regime actors not 
just for markets, but also for influence over the institutional framework (Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2004). The goal here may not be consensus, but rather to outlast the 
competitors. Alternatively, niche actors may disagree with non-competitors such as 
infrastructure managers or regulators over appropriate standards for the new 
technology. Here the goal may ultimately be consensus, at least in part because there 
may not be another option. Or there could be disagreement between niche and 
landscape actors, for example over undesirable effects of the new technology, such as 
between wind farm developers and local communities. 
Niche and regime actors may be able to influence the path of development in any 
number of ways, such as by: controlling information, lobbying decision makers, 
having an established relationship with decision-makers, having the ability to coerce 
others, having the ability to keep issues off the agenda, having the ability to keep 
people ignorant so that they suffer disadvantage, or by using or avoiding particular 
goods or services (Bunting, 2003, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Kemp, 1994, Pierson, 
2000, Sine and David, 2003, Smith et al., 2005, Walker, 2000). 
SNM could become more useful by explicitly acknowledging these challenges and 
also by including strategies or references to strategies for exerting influence. This is 
explored further in the next section. 
2.4.2 Consensus and disagreement 
To understand better issues related to consensus and disagreement, this section 
reviews bodies of literature including that on SNM and socio-technical change, 
consensus building (Adler et al., 2000, Bingham, 2003, RESOLVE, 2000), case 
studies of technical controversies (Nelkin, 1979), patterns in technology and 
controversy (Cambrosio and Limoges, 1991, Rip and Talma, 1998), and facility siting 
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(Dear, 1992, Wolsink, 1994). Of particular interest are how the structure of consensus 
and disagreement can be understood, why disagreements might occur, and possible 
strategies and pitfalls. 
2.4.2.1 Understanding the structure of disagreement 
The literature has at least two competing views on the structure of disagreements and 
controversies. Dear, for example, suggests that controversies are fights between two 
sides (Dear, 1992). In contrast, Cambrosio and Limoges (1991) state that portraying 
controversies as two opposed “sides” is an oversimplification. They, along with Rip 
and Talma, argue that while there is a difference between those directly related to the 
introduction of technology and those not, and one can identify typical proponents and 
opponents, in reality there will be a diverse range of views, even within groups 
supposedly on the same “side” (Cambrosio and Limoges, 1991, Rip and Talma, 
1998). Cambrosio and Limoges (1991) suggest that actor groups cannot be specified 
before the fact; rather that they form and stabilise as part of the controversy process. 
They, along with Rip and Talma, suggest that the proponent/opponent dichotomy is a 
construct of actors (e.g. participants, journalists, researchers) trying to simplify and 
find order in a complex social environment (Cambrosio and Limoges, 1991, Rip and 
Talma, 1998). 
There is similar division over how controversies end. Literature on mediation and 
consensus building implies that the end is (or should be) consensus. In contrast, Dear, 
and Cambrosio and Limoges argue that controversies do not necessarily end with 
consensus; rather that the “winner” tends to be the one with the greatest stamina 
(Dear, 1992) and the “loser” the one who decides it is too “expensive” in terms of 
resources or credibility to continue to fight (Cambrosio and Limoges, 1991). This 
raises an interesting question for providing guidance on the introduction of new 
technologies: should actors strive for consensus, as implied in SNM, or simply to 
outlast opponents? Perhaps the answer depends on whether or not the actors are in 
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direct competition as noted previously (e.g. wind turbine generators vs coal-fired 
generators). 
Overall, researchers tend to agree that controversies are complex events—multi-actor, 
multi-discipline, non-linear—characterised not just by an exchange of information, 
but also by a social setting, actor networks and alignments, political manoeuvring, and 
the use of symbolism and normative ideals (Adler et al., 2000, Cambrosio and 
Limoges, 1991, Rip and Talma, 1998). 
An approach that I will test to help understand the highly controversial aspects of the 
case – in particular the planning aspects – is to analyse who is the decision maker, 
what issues they consider, how they consider them, and how they manage trade-offs. 
2.4.2.2 Understanding possible causes of disagreement 
The literature offers a range of views on possible causes of disagreement and 
controversy. Some researchers emphasise the fault of particular actor groups, for 
example Dear (1992) suggests that opposition could be the result of “self interested, 
turf-protectionist behaviour”, while others suggest that controversy can stem from a 
blindness or arrogance on the side of proponents, i.e. from assumptions that the 
technology is desirable and that opponents are ignorant (Rip and Talma, 1998, Schot, 
2003, Schot and Rip, 1996). Other researchers present a less blame-focused view, 
suggesting causes such as: disagreement over the distribution of costs, risks and 
benefits16; competing ideologies or interests; differing goals or values; misinformation 
or a lack of information; and differing frameworks for evaluating or assessing 
                                                 
16 RESOLVE (2000) notes that conflict over large dams often results from a clash between 
geographically broad benefits and locally concentrated detriments. There is a similar situation with 
wind farms (Elliott, 2003), such as the mitigation of climate change vs landscape impact. 
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information (Adler et al., 2000, Brooks, 1996, Kemp and Soete, 1992, Nelkin, 1979, 
RESOLVE, 2000, Wolsink, 1994). 
As noted earlier, SNM acknowledges that actors may have different expectations 
about things like the best solution to particular problems and the actions of other 
actors (e.g. competitors, regulators, consumers). The literature offers further insights 
into how different expectations can lead to disagreement. 
In a stable regime, expectations will be well aligned and the direction of progress 
defined; however, for a new technology there will be relatively large levels of 
uncertainty regarding the performance of the new technology, potential market, user 
wants and needs, and its technological and institutional needs (Borup et al., 2006, 
Hoogma, 2000, Kemp et al., 1998, Rosenberg, 1976, van Lente and Rip, 1998). With 
such uncertainty, it is unsurprising that actors may have different expectations or that 
actors may have expectations that turn out to have been incorrect. Borup et al (2006) 
note that because of the uncertainty and differing expectations, “contestation and 
conflict may be very high”. 
Obviously, expectations are not always positive. Brooks (1996), for example, notes 
that actor groups may allocate the burden of proof differently for a new technology; 
for some it may be “guilty” until proven “innocent”, whereas for others it may be 
“innocent” until proven “guilty”. Alternatively, expectations may become negative 
after poor performance, or because of uncertainty about government policy. The latter 
was true in the wind power case. There may be an element of hype associated with the 
technology due to optimistic enthusiasm or as a strategy to attract other actors; this 
hype may fade if the marketed benefits or performance levels are not reached (Borup 
et al., 2006, Garud and Karnøe, 2003, Geels, 2002b, Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
Another area where SNM could be improved with regards to consensus is in relation 
to visions of the future. A number of SNM/MLM publications, as well as other 
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researchers, place a high value on visions, stating that: they can help to attract, align 
and co-ordinate actors (Berkhout, 2006, Weber, 2003); they allow “configurations that 
could work” to be hypothetically tested and in doing so can reduce uncertainty about 
their desirability and how they might be achieved (Berkhout, 2006, van den Ende and 
Kemp, 1999, van Lente and Rip, 1998, Weber, 2003); they can provide a reference 
point for setting targets and monitoring progress (Smith et al., 2005); and they can act 
as heuristic devices to help define problems or a direction of “progress” i.e. the 
difference between what is and what could be (Berkhout, 2006, Smith et al., 2005, van 
Lente and Rip, 1998). While the benefits of visions are highlighted within SNM 
publications, other than Weber (2003), relatively little attention is given to the 
contested nature of visions. 
A number of authors note that visions are not objective, amoral entities. Visions 
embody a normative idea of change, i.e. of what is desirable, and a sense of how this 
can be achieved (Berkhout, 2006, Eames et al., 2006, Russell and Williams, 2002, 
Weber, 2003). The normative dimension may come from an abstract notion such as 
sustainable development, the information society or the hydrogen economy, but these 
can be difficult to operationalise in a consensual manner (Eames et al., 2006, Weber, 
2003). A technology may play a key role in a particular vision because it seems 
consistent with the normative aspect of that vision; however, this may not remain so. 
The technology or the way it is used may deviate from what was envisaged due to 
politics or economics (Russell and Williams, 2002). As some authors note, visions can 
often be vague, and this vagueness may make them widely attractive; however, when 
a vague vision is made specific in a local setting, the different interpretations can 
become apparent and may result in conflict (Berkhout, 2006, Eames et al., 2006, 
Smith et al., 2005, Weber, 2003). 
The development of specific visions for major socio-technical systems such as energy 
supply or transport is a very political activity (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Weber, 
2003). There are often competing visions of the future, including business as usual 
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(Weber, 2003). Some actors may try to create associations between the technology 
and vague visions which are readily seen as “good” or “bad” in the hope of attracting 
actors to their cause (Berkhout, 2006, Rip and Talma, 1998). Proponents may portray 
the technology as synonymous with “progress” or “sustainability”, and, if successful, 
opponents are forced to declare themselves against the desirable ideal or develop their 
own version (Rip and Talma, 1998). On the other hand, opponents may use emotive 
labels such as “Frankenfoods” as a description for genetically modified foods, or 
“Triffids” as a description for wind farms, to create associations of fear or uncertainty. 
Once attached, a label can be very difficult to remove (Rip and Talma, 1998).  
The degree to which different actor groups can influence an organised or diffuse 
vision-building process will depend on their level of political influence (e.g. size, 
legitimacy, organization) (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Weber, 2003). Some visions 
may possess greater legitimacy than others because of the legitimacy of the actors 
who spread it, or because of some intrinsic sense that the vision is in line with 
contemporary values (Berkhout, 2006). 
This review suggests that SNM could be improved by more explicitly recognising the 
possible causes of disagreement and the significance of these will be tested against the 
wind power case. 
2.4.2.3 Strategies and pitfalls for dealing with disagreement 
The literature also offers some strategies and pitfalls with regards to disagreement; 
however whether a particular action should be regarded as a strategy or a pitfall 
appears to depend on whether the goal is consensus or outlasting opponents. 
If trying to achieve consensus, then the literature recommends that actors recognise 
that while controversies may seem technical in nature, they are more often the result 
of differing values (Adler et al., 2000, Harding, 1998, Nelkin, 1979). Bingham (2003) 
suggests that one of the most important things is to focus on actors’ interests rather 
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their positions. RESOLVE (2000) highlights the advice of Susskind (1990), which 
includes strategies such as participatory processes, building trust, compensating 
negative impacts, guaranteeing safety standards, and making communities better off. 
For consensus building, a pitfall appears to be for proponents to consider themselves 
as (technically) enlightened, and opponents as ignorant or irrational and to attempt to 
educate them (Rip and Talma, 1998, Schot, 2003). Researchers suggest that 
information alone is unlikely to prevent or settle a controversy, particularly as it is 
often gathered during an adversarial process and therefore regarded with scepticism 
(Adler et al., 2000, Bingham, 2003, Cambrosio and Limoges, 1991). 
One pitfall or strategy that highlights the tension between goals of consensus and 
outlasting is that of labelling other actors. Wolsink (1994) states that actors will find 
consensus more difficult to achieve if they imply that opponents are irrational or 
selfish. From an outlasting point of view, no one appears to argue in favour of 
labelling; however it was apparent from the literature and the wind power case that 
actors have used it as a strategy to attack the credibility of others. A common 
pejorative label is NIMBY (Not In My BackYard), which implies that opponents have 
a selfish disrespect for a common good and can therefore be disregarded by decision-
makers or other members of the public (Wolsink, 1994). Another common label is 
“vocal minority”, which suggests that opponents have unrepresentative views and 
may be used in conjunction with surveys showing widespread support for a 
technology17. Other labels may be used to imply that proponents are greedy or purely-
profit motivated (Schot, 2003). 
Rip and Talma note that diffuse group formation and the use of labels can lead to 
stereotyping and self-reinforcing inclusion/exclusion behaviour (Rip and Talma, 
                                                 
17 Wolsink (1994) argues that it is only when people are faced with an actually project that they really 
consider the implications of the technology and its desirability. 
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1998), i.e. if you’re not with us you’re against us. At such times, it may become 
difficult for actors to maintain an intermediate position (Rip and Talma, 1998). 
Brooks (1996) notes that at the extremes, actors may become so fortified in their 
views that for proponents, no further proof of a technology’s efficacy or benign-ness 
is necessary, whereas for opponents no proof will be enough (vice-versa for 
undesirable impacts). Thus, if the controversy turns into a war of credibility, it may 
become increasingly difficult to work towards consensus. 
2.4.3 Discussion and Summary 
This section began by identifying possible roles for niche actors. The main finding 
was that actors could help to foster new technologies by undertaking activities 
associated with alignment, enrolling other actors, network-building, sharing 
information, investment, legitimacy, and trans-local learning. I will later attempt to 
link these to more specific actions. The section then highlighted the wide variety of 
actors that may ultimately be required to engage with the new technology and that 
they may not necessarily agree. A particularly useful insight here is that it is unlikely 
that any one actor will be in a position to successfully undertake all the learning and 
embedding activities required to develop a niche into a regime. As such, a variety of 
actors will most likely be required, each with their own interests and abilities to 
influence the path of development. The section then further reviewed investigated 
consensus and disagreement, noting that they can be multi-faceted, rather than for and 
against. It also identified a range of reasons why actors might disagree and possible 
strategies and pitfalls. These insights about actors and consensus will be more 
explicitly incorporated into the proposed improvements to SNM.   
2.5 Understanding positive feedbacks 
Researchers have show that positive feedbacks are an important part of building 
momentum and working towards the self-sustaining state described in Section 2.3.2. 
This thesis argues that greater focus on positive feedbacks can help to bridge the gap 
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between the evolutionary basis of SNM and the day-to-day activities of actors and 
links in with the earlier findings of the roles that actors could play. This approach will 
be tested with the wind power case. 
A review of literature on the generation and diffusion of innovation, evolutionary 
economics, SNM/MLM, and Social Shaping of Technology, suggests that a range of 
positive feedbacks are important in building momentum. The results of this review are 
summarised in Figure 5. Section 2.6 will discuss how actors might encourage these 
dynamics and positive feedbacks, and Section 2.7 lists challenges that they may face 
based on existing literature. 
Figure 5 is an attempt to simplify the complex interactions and dynamics which 
researchers have identified in socio-technical change (primarily in relation to the 
introduction of technology, rather than at R&D). The explanation arbitrarily begins at 
expectations and visions, although there is not one definite first step. 
1. Expectations and visions 
Actors may have a particular vision of the future, vague or specific, and expect that a 
particular technology will help them to realise the vision (van den Belt and Rip, 1987, 
Verheul and Vergragt, 1995). They may stimulate demand for the new technology 
through some form of protection (see 2). These expectations and visions may attract 
other actors to support the technology (Berkhout, 2006). The visions and expectations 
shape and are shaped by existing markets or protection measures, and social, material 
and institutional structures (Borup et al., 2006, Hoogma et al., 2002, Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, Kemp and Soete, 1992, van Merkerk and Robinson, 2006). 
Expectations also influence the direction of “progress” by influencing the “problem 
agenda” of issues to be tackled and consequent activities, which, in turn, shapes 
expectations about where development is going (Borup et al., 2006, Hoogma, 2000, 
Raven, 2005, van Lente and Rip, 1998). 
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Refer to text for details 
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1. Expectations 
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Figure 5 – Dynamics and Positive feedbacks in socio-technical change 
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2. Stimulating demand 
The demand or opportunity for a new technology may initially come from a 
contemporaneous competitive advantage, compatibility with specific user needs, a 
strategic decision, expected environmental, social or economic benefits, or through 
chance events (Arthur, 1989, David, 1985, Hoogma et al., 2002, Walker, 2000). This is 
an important dynamic because new technologies and existing socio-technical regime will 
be poorly matched, creating systemic barriers to new technology, which can’t become 
mutually supporting without the new technology being in use (Herbig et al., 1995, 
Hoogma, 2000). Hoogma (2000) likens this to the chicken and egg dilemma. This 
demand can provide an initial impetus for dynamics of adoption and mutual adaptation. 
Demand for the technology could occur through Government sponsorship or subsidies, or 
a company decision to accept higher costs or to fund a demonstration project. SNM refers 
to this a technological protection (Hoogma, 2000, Kemp et al., 1998, Weber et al., 1999). 
Alternatively, demand could come from user preferences, where the advantages of the 
technology outweigh the disadvantages for particular users or in limited locations (Kemp 
et al., 1998). SNM refers to this as market protection (Hoogma, 2000, Kemp et al., 1998, 
Weber et al., 1999). The distinction between technological protection and market 
protection is not always clear however, with some technological protection having 
competitive elements (Hoogma, 2000); a good example is Australia’s MRET, which 
creates a demand for renewable energy, but many technologies are competing within this 
protected market. Jacobbson and Bergek (2004) refer to such markets as a nursing or 
bridging markets. The demand may increase the use of the technology, it may attract 
actors because of the business opportunity, and increase the legitimacy of the technology 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
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3. Increasing use 
Increasing use of the technology can have a number of flow-on effects. It can lead to 
increased functionality through network economies (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), decreased 
costs through economies of scale (Arthur, 1988), and enable actors to learn about the new 
technology and how it might fit with the socio-technical regime. It may also increase the 
benefits of using that technology, in the case of wind power a greater reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions and increased regional investment and employment. However, 
increasing use may also have undesirable social or environmental effects (Kemp et al., 
1998) and it is often the way that a technology is socio-technically embedded that 
determines the “sustainability” of a technology (Rohracher, 2003). 
4. Learning and articulation 
The initial market or protection creates a socio-technical “space” where actors can learn 
about “configurations that might work” – about mismatches and inadequacies between 
the technology and the regime, about opportunities created by the new technology and 
about how to articulate requirements better (Arthur, 1988, Hoogma et al., 2002, 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Rip, 1995). This can lead to increased performance and 
functionality, lower costs, reduced uncertainty, and form the basis for cognitive, social, 
institutional or technological embedding. When considered in this way, events which 
may initially seem like setbacks may focus innovative activity and result in a more robust 
socio-technical configuration in the long-run (Brooks, 1986, Karnøe and Garud, 1998). 
SNM recommends that learning be broad in scope, including: the technology itself, the 
institutional framework, cultural and psychological meaning, the market or domain of 
application, industry needs, complementary technologies and expertise, and social and 
environmental effects (Geels, 2004c, Hoogma et al., 2002, Weber et al., 1999). 
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SNM and other literature also refers to the mode of learning, although use different 
labels: learning and re-learning (IEA, 2003), single and double loop (Deuten, 2003, 
Hoogma, 2000), and first and second order (Hoogma et al., 2002, Schot and Rip, 1996). 
In essence single-loop or first order learning seeks to find better ways to achieve existing 
visions and objectives related to the technology. Double-loop or second order learning 
questions underlying assumptions and values regarding the technology, its use and the 
context of its use (Hoogma, 2000, Hoogma et al., 2002, Schot and Rip, 1996). According 
to Weber (2003), double-loop learning is problem rather than technology orientated.  
Another characterisation is the level of applicability of the learning; whether it is only 
locally applicable (the local level), or at whether it is widely applicable but less locally 
specific (the trans-local level)18 (Deuten, 2003). 
5. Increasing functionality 
With increasing use and learning, the technology may become more functional or actors 
may be able to increase its performance (Arthur, 1988, Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Kemp 
and Soete, 1992). The technology may yield system or network economies (David, 1985, 
Katz and Shapiro, 1985), where the technology becomes more useful, functional, or 
better supported the more users or producers there are. This could be a direct effect 
related to a physical network, for example the telephone, fax machine or e-mail. 
Alternatively, it could be an indirect effect related to the availability of complimentary 
software or hardware, for example as for computers, game consoles, and video players, or 
the availability of after sales service or skilled operators. 
                                                 
18 James Fleck (1994) states that to implement successfully a new technology in a company requires a 
combination of local practical knowledge and generic technology knowledge. 
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6. Decreasing costs 
Costs for the technology may decrease due to scale and learning economies (Arthur, 
1988, Ibenholt, 2002, Kemp and Soete, 1992) and through lower uncertainty leading to 
lower investment risk premiums (Arthur, 1988). This can make the technology more 
competitive with the incumbent technology. In some cases, the incumbent technology 
may become more expensive, for example through the imposition of carbon emissions 
trading or because of dwindling primary resources (e.g. oil). 
7. Reducing uncertainty 
Meijer et al (Meijer et al., 2007a, b) note that there can be many sources of uncertainty in 
the introduction of a new technology, including: the features of the technology and its fit 
with existing infrastructure, the availability of resources, the actions of competitors, the 
actions of suppliers, consumer demands and requirements, and Government policy. 
Learning and embedding can reduce the uncertainty about the new technology, the 
market for the technology, and the fit between the technology and the existing socio-
technical regime. This can increase the legitimacy of the technology. As noted, this can 
also lead to lower costs. The expected or envisioned direction of progress may become 
more specific and widely supported. 
8. Increasing legitimacy 
Legitimacy helps to enrol other actors (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). Increasing levels of 
legitimacy may attract more actors to the niche and make it easier for niche actors to 
justify or lobby for a more supportive institutional framework (Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). 
Chapter 2 – Understanding socio-technical change 
66 
9. Embedding and alignment 
Actors’ expectations and visions, and the results of actors learning about the new 
technology can become embedded in social, institutional and technological structures19 
(Barnes et al., 2004, Frankel, 1955, Glynn, 2002, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Kemp, 
1994, Rycroft and Kash, 2002, Unruh, 2000, Winner, 1982). This can reduce uncertainty 
by building a certain degree of irreversibility (Rip and Kemp, 1998). This embedding 
attracts and aligns actors and helps them to prioritise their efforts, produces robust visions 
and expectations of the future, build trust, and achieve learning economies, which can 
stimulate further development (David and Rothwell, 1996, Foray, 1997, Hoogma et al., 
2002, Hughes, 1994, Raven, 2005, Rip and Kemp, 1998, Walker, 2000). 
10. Attracting actors 
Actors play many important roles in stimulating positive feedbacks. They bring 
knowledge, skills and resources which help develop the technology/niche and related 
visions and problem agendas, they allow greater specialisation, and they also increase the 
legitimacy of the technology/niche which helps when advocating for change to the 
regime (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). The actors can develop new knowledge related to 
the production, use, impacts, infrastructure and institutional needs for the new technology 
which can be translated into action, embedded in procedures, standards, organizational 
and institutional arrangements, infrastructure etc. (Hoogma et al., 2002). Actors may be 
attracted to the niche by the opportunity for commercial gain, because of a perceived 
                                                 
19 Examples of social structures include new actor groups or partnerships between existing groups. 
Examples of institutional structures include government support measures, regulations, planning provisions 
and education. Examples of technological structures include dominant designs, infrastructure and 
complementary technologies. 
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strategic advantage, to develop new knowledge, because it appears consistent with their 
values, or because of the increasing legitimacy of the technology or persuasive visions of 
the future (Berkhout, 2006, Hoogma et al., 2002, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, van 
Merkerk and Robinson, 2006, Weber, 2003).  
2.6 Stimulating positive feedbacks 
With this understanding of important dynamics in niche development and the earlier 
discussion about the role of actors, Table 7 suggests which actors might be best placed to 
encourage the dynamics just described and examples of how they might do so. The table 
is used at the end of each empirical chapter to test and organise findings in relation to the 
importance of the dynamics, which actors could encourage them, and how they might do 
so. 
Taken by themselves, these suggestions for who-could-do-what are an idealisation. They 
do not reflect the significant challenges that actors may face when attempting to 
encourage the dynamics. To be more useful to actors, they can be complemented by a list 
of challenges. 
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Table 7 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks 
Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how  
Stimulating 
demand 
To overcome the 
chicken and egg 
dilemma  
(Hoogma, 2000) 
Macro-actors 
- Government 
- Large companies 
- Nursing or bridging markets (Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2004) 
- Regulations such as California ZEV 
legislation (Schot et al., 1994) 
- Demonstration projects (Hoogma, 2000) 
Increasing 
use 
To gain benefits 
from the 
technology 
- Users 
 
- Purchasing the technology 
Increasing 
alignment 
To create a 
“configuration that 
works” (Rip, 1995, 
Rip and Kemp, 
1998). 
 
 
Initiated by macro-
actors 
- Government 
- Industry 
associations 
- Large companies 
- Consortia 
- Industry standards and best practice 
guidelines  
- Stable relationships between actors (e.g. 
through MOU) 
- Established routines, procedures, and 
operating practices 
- Financial investments  
- Construction of new infrastructure 
- Enacting of new legislation or other 
stable institutional structures. 
(Deuten, 2003, Hoogma et al., 2002, Raven, 
2005, Rip, 1995, Rycroft and Kash, 2002, 
van den Belt and Rip, 1987) 
Decreasing 
cost 
(relative to 
incumbents) 
To be competitive 
incumbents 
without protection 
(Hoogma et al., 
2002, Kemp, 
1994).  
- Manufacturers 
- Government 
- Investors 
- Scale economies (Kemp, 1994, Kemp 
and Soete, 1992) 
- Learning economies (Kemp, 1994, 
Kemp and Soete, 1992) 
- Lower investment risk premiums due to 
reduced uncertainty. 
Increasing 
functionality 
To better meet the 
need it is targeted 
towards. 
- Designers 
- Manufacturers 
- Users 
- Increased utility per unit cost 
- Increased reliability 
- Better integrated into network (e.g. 
electricity or communications) (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985) 
- Better articulated user requirements 
(Rip, 1995) 
Increasing 
legitimacy  
To encourage more 
positive 
expectations about 
the support or use 
of the technology 
(Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, 
Verheul and 
Vergragt, 1995). 
- Prime movers 
such as large 
companies 
- Investing in the technology (Jacobsson 
and Johnson, 2000) 
- Creating strong positive links with a 
problem to be solved (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004) 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how  
Reducing 
uncertainty 
To encourage 
investment in the 
technology and 
other 
complementary 
institutional and 
technological 
structures 
- Government 
- Investors 
- Industry 
association 
- Technology 
developers 
- Stable market (continuity in 
protection/market) (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004);  
- Clear direction of progress (e.g. visions 
and problem agendas) (Weber, 2003);  
- Embedding and alignment (Hoogma et 
al., 2002);  
- Standardization of interfaces with 
existing technologies or infrastructure 
(Rycroft and Kash, 2002);  
- Making expectations more robust and 
realistic  (Hoogma, 2000, Kemp et al., 
1998) 
- Trans-local learning (Deuten, 2003) 
Learning 
and  
articulation 
To better 
understand how a 
mutual fit might be 
found between the 
new technology 
and the existing 
regime, to reduce 
costs and better 
meet user 
requirements, and 
to reduce 
uncertainty 
(Deuten, 2003, 
Hoogma et al., 
2002, Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2004). 
 
Local knowledge 
- Designers 
- Manufacturers 
- Government 
- Users 
 
Trans-local 
knowledge 
- Industry 
associations 
- Professional 
societies 
- Consultants 
- Government 
- Learn how to address the mismatches 
and inadequacies between the new 
technology and the existing socio-
technical regime (refer to earlier 
discussion on lock-in for examples) 
(Hoogma et al., 2002, Weber et al., 
1999). 
- Learn about how to do things better 
(first order learning) and also about the 
underlying values and assumptions 
regarding that domain of application 
(second order learning) (Hoogma, 2000, 
Hoogma et al., 2002, Schot and Rip, 
1996, Weber, 2003). 
- Trans-local knowledge is encouraged by 
processes of circulation and aggregation 
consultants gathering experience by 
working on many different projects, 
professional journals or newsletters, and 
conferences and workshops  (Deuten, 
2003, Hoogma, 2000). 
- For tacit learning to be retained there 
needs to be continuity of the network 
because experiences and lessons may be 
forgotten if an actor network no longer 
supports the technology (Raven, 2005). 
Attracting 
actors 
To build support, 
increase 
legitimacy, and fill 
gaps in the supply 
chain (Hoogma et 
al., 2002, 
Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, 
Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000). 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
- Prime movers 
such as large 
companies 
- Create robust, specific and high quality 
expectations of economic, 
environmental, or social benefits  
- Provide stability and continuity in the 
opportunity (i.e. protection or market) 
(Borup et al., 2006, Hoogma et al., 
2002, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, 
Raven, 2005, van Merkerk and 
Robinson, 2006) 
 
Chapter 2 – Understanding socio-technical change 
70 
2.7 Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks 
A weakness of SNM is that it offers limited insight into the challenges that actors might 
face when trying to stimulate positive feedbacks (Hoogma et al., 2002). 
The discussion of lock-in in Section 2.1.3 showed that there are more factors than lead 
times, decision-making, and ownership structures that can inhibit positive feedbacks. 
Existing literature reveals many challenges which can be related back to the dynamics 
discussed in the previous section. The SNM workbook notes some challenges and 
suggests some strategies for managing them. These are all summarised in Table 8. At the 
end of each empirical chapter, the table is used to test and organise findings on challenges 
to encouraging dynamics and where possible, identify strategies for managing these 
challenges. In some cases, the analysis supports or illustrates some of the challenges 
summarised here from existing literature. In other cases, the analysis highlights a 
challenge that was not identified in this literature review. 
Table 8 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks 
Challenge 
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Possible strategy 
The final working 
configuration of the 
technology and associated 
institutional structures 
may be uncertain (Weber 
et al., 1999). 
  ?   ?  ?   
“Modular projects allow 
for changes to be made in 
light of the experience 
gained” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
Niche may not develop 
because key niche actors 
do not get sufficiently 
involved (Weber et al., 
1999). 
        ?  
“Committed partners 
increase the chances of 
project success” (Weber et 
al., 1999). 
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Possible strategy 
“Balance the drive for 
high-risk, high reward 
project innovation with a 
low-risk, more 
conservative incremental 
strategy” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
     ?  ?   
 
Actors may have different 
motivations and levels of 
commitment to a 
technology or 
demonstration project 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
        ? ? 
“The expectations of all 
parties need to be 
continuously articulated to 
ensure co-ordination of 
partner activities” (Weber 
et al., 1999). 
Repeated problems may 
occur when setting up an 
experiment with a new 
technology (Weber et al., 
1999). 
  ?        
“When designing a new 
experiment, seek out and 
utilise previous relevant 
experience” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
Tensions between 
volunteer-based and 
professional management 
of a technology 
experiment (Weber et al., 
1999). 
        ?  
“At all stages within a 
project, chose a 
management style which 
maximises operational 
effectiveness” (Weber et 
al., 1999). 
The experiment with the 
new technology may not 
stimulate the desired 
change because it does not 
penalise existing 
(undesirable) behaviour 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
 ?      ?   
“Complementary 
measures, external to the 
experiment, might be 
required to achieve project 
goals” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
“Overprotection of a 
technology can 
unrealistically raise 
expectations of its 
potential and draw 
attention away from a 
poorly devised 
experiment” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
?         ? 
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Possible strategy 
Balance between 
providing protection and 
maintaining incentive to 
innovate (Kemp et al., 
1998) 
?          
 
Excessive growth before 
technology, industry or 
demand have stabilised 
(Karnøe and Garud, 1998) 
?          
 
Users may lack the skills 
to use the new technology 
(David, 1985) 
 ?       ?  
 
Excessive instability in the 
existing socio-technical 
regime (Raven, 2005). 
     ?  ?   
 
Institutional change tends 
to be slow, and difficult 
unless there is a social 
mandate (Unruh, 2002) 
       ?   
 
New technology may be 
significantly more 
expensive and be less 
effective than existing 
options (Kemp and Soete, 
1992) 
?   ? ?      
 
Established technology 
may be characterised by 
increasing returns 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000) 
    ?     ? 
 
Mismatches with existing 
infrastructure (Frankel, 
1955) 
   ?    ?   
 
Mismatches with existing 
operating procedures or 
behaviours of use (Barnes 
et al., 2004, Kemp, 1994) 
   ?    ?   
 
Perceived or actual 
problems with the 
trajectory (Gutting, 1984) 
     ? ?   ? 
 
Poorly articulated demand 
or user requirements 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000, Rip, 1995) 
 ?  ?  ?   ?  
“Incorporate high profile 
users within the 
experimental partner 
network” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
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Possible strategy 
Incorrect expectations 
about future markets 
because of unforeseen 
changes, optimism, 
functional or substitutional 
thinking, or assumptions 
of a static or malleable 
context (Geels and Smit, 
2000) 
?     ?     
“Seek out independent 
observers to assess the 
extent of the project’s 
success” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
Balance between 
maintaining flexibility for 
learning whilst reducing 
uncertainty and building 
alignment through 
embedding (Hoogma et 
al., 2002) 
  ?   ?  ?   
 
Local search processes 
(i.e. too similar to existing 
regime) (Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000) 
  ?        
 
Competition with 
incumbent actors to gain 
influence over the 
institutional framework 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). 
?  ?     ?   
 
Ambiguous or 
antagonistic behaviour by 
incumbent actors 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004) 
     ?   ?  
 
Balance between having a 
network with low 
diversity, which will reach 
agreement easily, but risks 
becoming insular, and a 
network with high 
diversity, which may have 
greater representation of 
views, but struggle to 
reach consensus (Hoogma, 
2000, Verheul and 
Vergragt, 1995, Weber et 
al., 1999). 
       ? ?  
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Possible strategy 
Balance between the 
interests of firms (wanting 
to stake their claim in a 
new market) and the 
interests of the industry 
(co-operating to tackle 
systemic barriers) (Weber 
et al., 1999). 
       ? ?  
“Monitor carefully 
potential barriers to co-
operation between 
partners in an experiment, 
especially if they have 
competing stakes and are 
prone to free-riding” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
Hype associated with the 
technology may fade if the 
marketed benefits or 
performance levels are not 
demonstrated (Borup et 
al., 2006, Garud and 
Karnøe, 2003, Geels, 
2002b, Verbong and 
Geels, 2007). 
?   ?   ?  ? ? 
 
Undesirable societal or 
environmental effects 
(Kemp et al., 1998)       ?  ? ? 
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
Inequitable distribution of 
risks and benefits (Kemp 
and Soete, 1992, 
RESOLVE, 2000) 
        ?  
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
Difficult for actors to 
think long-term when their 
short-term future is 
uncertain (Rip, 1995) 
     ?  ?  ? 
 
Actors allocate the burden 
of proof differently with 
respect to benefits and 
detriments (Brooks, 1996) 
        ? ? 
 
Beware of over-
simplifying controversy 
into for and against 
(Cambrosio and Limoges, 
1991, Rip and Talma, 
1998). 
       ? ?  
 
Lack of trust (Bingham, 
2003)        ? ? ? 
Focus on the interests of 
the actors involved, rather 
than their positions 
(Bingham, 2003). 
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Possible strategy 
Difficulty of embedding 
vague visions in a 
consensual manner 
(Berkhout, 2006, Eames et 
al., 2006, Smith et al., 
2005, Weber, 2003). 
?     ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Weak connectivity 
between actors (Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2004) 
  ?      ?  
 
Niche actors may be 
fragmented and lack 
political power, rather 
than being a cohesive, 
unified advocate for the 
new technology 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004, Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001). 
?      ? ? ?  
 
Government or company 
policies to support the 
technology may be 
intermittent, ambiguous, 
send conflicting messages 
or lack a long-term vision 
(Garud and Karnøe, 2003, 
Hoogma et al., 2002, 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004, Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001, Raven, 
2005, Verbong and Geels, 
2007, Weber et al., 1999) 
?     ?  ? ? ? 
 
Repeated problems may 
occur when setting up an 
experiment with a new 
technology (Weber et al., 
1999). 
  ?        
“When designing a new 
experiment, seek out and 
utilise previous relevant 
experience” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
The final working 
configuration of the 
technology and associated 
institutional structures 
may be uncertain (Weber 
et al., 1999). 
  ?   ?  ?   
“Modular projects allow 
for changes to be made in 
light of the experience 
gained” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
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Possible strategy 
“Balance the drive for 
high-risk, high reward 
project innovation with a 
low-risk, more 
conservative incremental 
strategy” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
     ?  ?   
 
Niche may not develop 
because key niche actors 
do not get sufficiently 
involved (Weber et al., 
1999). 
        ?  
“Committed partners 
increase the chances of 
project success” (Weber et 
al., 1999). 
Actors may have different 
motivations and levels of 
commitment to a 
technology or 
demonstration project 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
        ? ? 
“The expectations of all 
parties need to be 
continuously articulated to 
ensure co-ordination of 
partner activities” (Weber 
et al., 1999). 
Tensions between 
volunteer-based and 
professional management 
of a technology 
experiment (Weber et al., 
1999). 
        ?  
“At all stages within a 
project, chose a 
management style which 
maximises operational 
effectiveness” (Weber et 
al., 1999). 
The experiment with the 
new technology may not 
stimulate the desired 
change because it does not 
penalise existing 
(undesirable) behaviour 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
 ?      ?   
“Complementary 
measures, external to the 
experiment, might be 
required to achieve project 
goals” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
“Overprotection of a 
technology can 
unrealistically raise 
expectations of its 
potential and draw 
attention away from a 
poorly devised 
experiment” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
?         ? 
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Possible strategy 
Balance between 
providing protection and 
maintaining incentive to 
innovate (Kemp et al., 
1998) 
?          
 
Excessive growth before 
technology, industry or 
demand have stabilised 
(Karnøe and Garud, 1998) 
?          
 
Users may lack the skills 
to use the new technology 
(David, 1985) 
 ?         
 
Excessive instability in the 
existing socio-technical 
regime (Raven, 2005). 
       ?   
 
Institutional change tends 
to be slow, and difficult 
unless there is a social 
mandate (Unruh, 2002) 
       ?   
 
New technology may be 
significantly more 
expensive and be less 
effective than existing 
options (Kemp and Soete, 
1992) 
?    ?      
 
Established technology 
may be characterised by 
increasing returns 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000) 
    ?      
 
Mismatches with existing 
infrastructure (Frankel, 
1955) 
   ?       
 
Mismatches with existing 
operating procedures or 
behaviours of use (Barnes 
et al., 2004, Kemp, 1994) 
   ?       
 
Perceived or actual 
problems with the 
trajectory (Gutting, 1984) 
     ? ?   ? 
 
Poorly articulated demand 
or user requirements 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000, Rip, 1995) 
 ?  ?  ?     
“Incorporate high profile 
users within the 
experimental partner 
network” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
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Possible strategy 
Incorrect expectations 
about future markets 
because of unforeseen 
changes, optimism, 
functional or substitutional 
thinking, or assumptions 
of a static or malleable 
context (Geels and Smit, 
2000) 
?     ?     
“Seek out independent 
observers to assess the 
extent of the project’s 
success” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
Balance between 
maintaining flexibility for 
learning whilst reducing 
uncertainty and building 
alignment through 
embedding (Hoogma et 
al., 2002) 
  ?   ?  ?   
 
Local search processes 
(i.e. too similar to existing 
regime) (Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000) 
  ?        
 
Competition with 
incumbent actors to gain 
influence over the 
institutional framework 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). 
?  ?     ?   
 
Ambiguous or 
antagonistic behaviour by 
incumbent actors 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004) 
     ?   ?  
 
Balance between having a 
network with low 
diversity, which will reach 
agreement easily, but risks 
becoming insular, and a 
network with high 
diversity, which may have 
greater representation of 
views, but struggle to 
reach consensus (Hoogma, 
2000, Verheul and 
Vergragt, 1995, Weber et 
al., 1999). 
        ?  
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Possible strategy 
Balance between the 
interests of firms (wanting 
to stake their claim in a 
new market) and the 
interests of the industry 
(co-operating to tackle 
systemic barriers) (Weber 
et al., 1999). 
        ?  
“Monitor carefully 
potential barriers to co-
operation between 
partners in an experiment, 
especially if they have 
competing stakes and are 
prone to free-riding” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
Hype associated with the 
technology may fade if the 
marketed benefits or 
performance levels are not 
demonstrated (Borup et 
al., 2006, Garud and 
Karnøe, 2003, Geels, 
2002b, Verbong and 
Geels, 2007). 
?   ?   ?  ? ? 
 
Undesirable societal or 
environmental effects 
(Kemp et al., 1998)           
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
Inequitable distribution of 
risks and benefits (Kemp 
and Soete, 1992, 
RESOLVE, 2000) 
        ?  
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
Difficult for actors to 
think long-term when their 
short-term future is 
uncertain (Rip, 1995) 
     ?  ?  ? 
 
Actors allocate the burden 
of proof differently with 
respect to benefits and 
detriments (Brooks, 1996) 
        ? ? 
 
Beware of over-
simplifying controversy 
into for and against 
(Cambrosio and Limoges, 
1991, Rip and Talma, 
1998). 
       ? ?  
 
Lack of trust (Bingham, 
2003)        ? ? ? 
Focus on the interests of 
the actors involved, rather 
than their positions 
(Bingham, 2003). 
Chapter 2 – Understanding socio-technical change 
80 
Challenge 
D
em
an
d 
U
se
 
Le
ar
ni
ng
 
Fu
nc
tio
na
lit
y 
C
os
t 
U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 
Le
gi
tim
ac
y 
A
lig
nm
en
t 
A
ct
or
s 
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
Possible strategy 
Difficulty of embedding 
vague visions in a 
consensual manner 
(Berkhout, 2006, Eames et 
al., 2006, Smith et al., 
2005, Weber, 2003). 
?     ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Weak connectivity 
between actors (Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2004) 
  ?      ?  
 
Niche actors may be 
fragmented and lack 
political power, rather 
than being a cohesive, 
unified advocate for the 
new technology 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004, Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001). 
?      ? ? ?  
 
Government or company 
policies to support the 
technology may be 
intermittent, ambiguous, 
send conflicting messages 
or lack a long-term vision 
(Garud and Karnøe, 2003, 
Hoogma et al., 2002, 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004, Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001, Raven, 
2005, Verbong and Geels, 
2007, Weber et al., 1999) 
?     ?  ? ? ? 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
This chapter sought to provide a detailed understanding of socio-technical change that 
can be used to explain the wind power case and to identify insights that may be able to 
strengthen SNM. 
It began by providing background information on key concepts in socio-technical change, 
including stability, alignment, momentum, lock-in, and disruption, and on different types 
of socio-technical change and possible responses to disruption. It then showed how these 
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are related, as in Geels’ model of socio-technical transitions and identified possible 
development paths for new technologies. These concepts will help to explain the wind 
power case and they also provided a theoretical context for the discussion on positive 
feedbacks. 
The chapter then focused on fostering technologies and on the weaknesses in SNM. First, 
it focused on possible roles for actors and issues related to consensus and controversy. I 
highlighted the importance of actors in socio-technical change and made a preliminary 
assessment of the roles particular actors could play. The findings of this review will be 
tested in the empirical chapters. The chapter then took a more detailed look at 
disagreement and controversy, finding that they were complex, multi-faceted 
phenomenon, with a variety of possible causes, and that the end may either be consensus 
or when some of those involved decide it is too costly to continue. This review will help 
to explain the wind power case and was incorporated into the later sections of the chapter 
on stimulating positive feedbacks and challenges that actors may face. The sections on 
positive feedbacks and challenges were built up from an extensive review of existing 
literature and will be tested in the empirical chapters. 
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3 Industry development 
3.0 Introduction 
The late 1990s was a time of unprecedented opportunity for wind power in Australia. 
Independent generators could more easily connect to the grid because of electricity 
sector restructuring, and the promise of a mandatory renewable energy target (MRET) 
and consumer based green power schemes meant that projects could be financially 
viable.  
This opportunity led to a period of significant socio-technical change. Between 1997 
and 2007 installed wind capacity grew from less than 1 MW to almost 900 MW, 
many new actors joined the field, manufacturing facilities were established, 
employment grew, and an Australian Wind Energy Association was formed. 
However, there was also considerable uncertainty over how well MRET would 
support wind power in terms of the size and duration of the market, and, by 2007, 
some of this positive momentum was disrupted with the scheduled closure of two 
wind-specific manufacturing facilities and the merger of the Australian Wind Energy 
Association with another NGO. 
As the chapter explains these changes, it provides examples of why dynamics such as 
stimulating demand, increasing use, increasing legitimacy, and attracting actors can be 
important in the introduction of new technologies and identify which actors were in a 
position to encourage them. The chapter also identifies challenges to encouraging 
these dynamics. 
The chapter begins by reviewing the increasing use of wind power. This includes the 
trends in installed wind farm capacity and wind farm size and the estimated 
environmental and economic benefits that went along with this growth. This 
illustrates that the increasing use of a new technology is important because it can 
provide increasing environmental and economic benefits. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 then 
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review the range of actors that were attracted to wind power in Australia and why. To 
explain “why”, the motivations of these actors are linked to the legitimacy of wind 
power for that actor group. Section 3.2 analyses the growth of the wind industry itself, 
first with an overview, then with a focus on two important sub-groups – the Australian 
Wind Energy Association (AusWEA) and manufacturers. AusWEA were influential 
in setting the agenda for the wind industry in Australia. Manufacturers were 
significant because one of the goals of the industry was to establish local 
manufacturing. Section 3.3 analyses the broader network of actors that were attracted 
to wind power for a range of environmental, economic, and technical reasons. The 
most influential actor groups, as will become apparent in later chapters, were 
Governments, electricity system managers, and NGOs and the community. The 
chapter concludes by summarising why particular dynamics were important, which 
actors were able to encourage them, and reviewing the challenges to stimulating these 
dynamics. 
3.1 Wind farms 
As noted in Chapter 1, the installed capacity of wind power grew from less than 1MW 
in 1997 to almost 900 MW in 2007, with a further 600 MW reported to be under 
construction (See Figure 6). The growth in installed capacity came from a 
combination of more wind farms, more turbine per wind farm, and larger turbines 
(AusWEA, 2007b). As Figure 6 shows, the number of wind farms in Australia 
increased, with typically two or three installed each year except for 2005 which had 
five. The more significant trend was that the capacity of the wind farms installed 
increased as developers tried to capture economies of scale, growing from typically 
less than 25 MW until 2002, to typically 50 – 90 MW from 2004.  
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Figure 6 – Installed capacity of grid-connected wind power in Australia 
(AusWEA, 2007b) 
With the increase in installed capacity came an increase in the claimed benefits: 
energy production and greenhouse gas abatement, capital investment and 
employment. 
The estimated energy production and greenhouse abatement from grid-connected 
wind farms grew significantly. In 1998 energy production was estimated to be just 
over 10 GWh/year (IEA, 1999). In 2004/5, energy production was estimated to be 
1400 GWh/year20 – 140 times that of 1998 – and greenhouse abatement of 1.9 million 
                                                 
20 As a percentage of total primary energy demand, wind/solar’s (not reported separately) contribution 
grew from less than 0.09% in 1995/96 to about 0.15% in 2005/06 (ABARE, 2007, DPIE, 1997), solar 
making up a very small proportion of this figure. This shows that the growth in wind power was part of 
a wider growth in energy demand, but that the growth in wind/solar was greater than the wider growth. 
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tons CO2/year21 (AusWEA, 2005d). In 2006, greenhouse emissions abatement was 
estimated to be 2.8 million tons CO2/year (IEA, 2006). 
The growth in investment and employment were also very large. The estimated 
contribution of wind power goods and services to the Australian economy in 1995/96 
was estimated to be less than AUS$1 million (DPIE, 1997). In 2005, the estimated 
capital investment in wind power was AUS$1.2 billion (IEA, 2006). Employment 
related to wind power grew from an estimated 10 people in 1995/96 (DPIE, 1997), to 
an estimated 904 in 2005 (AusWEA, 2005d). 
As this and the other empirical chapters will show, these benefits had direct links to 
the legitimacy of wind power for a range of actors, which in turn led to wind power 
becoming embedded in visions and problem agendas, social groupings, technological 
systems, and institutions. 
3.2 Wind industry 
Between 1997 and 2007, many actors were attracted to the wind industry in Australia 
because of its increasing commercial legitimacy (c.f. IEA, 2000, 2001a, 2005). 
Largely this legitimacy resulted from the business opportunity created by MRET, 
complemented by other industrial, political and social features of Australia which 
Governments promoted extensively. There was an influx of new actors to the 
industry, the formation and later demise of a wind power industry association, the 
establishment and later closure of manufacturing facilities, and the building of a wider 
support network. The next section will provide an overview of these events. Two 
important actor groups within the wind industry were the Australian Wind Energy 
                                                 
21 Greenhouse abatement is approximately proportional to energy production, so I would expect that the 
increase in greenhouse abatement would have been similar. I will discuss the debate around the 
greenhouse abatement due to wind farms further in Chapter 6. 
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Association (AusWEA) and manufacturers. Following the overview, the influence of 
these two actor groups will be discussed further. 
3.2.1 Overview 
The change in the Australian wind industry between 1997 and 2005 was dramatic, 
although the momentum slowed between 2005 and 2007. In the late 1990s, the 
industry was limited to manufacturers of small wind turbines, agents for international 
wind turbine manufacturers, and companies with close ties to the former state-owned 
electricity utilities who developed and operated the few installed wind farms (Peck, 
1999, Redding et al., 1999). By 2003, a large number of international companies had 
commercial operations in Australia and in some cases had also committed to 
manufacturing facilities (AusWEA, 2003c). At Australian wind power conferences it 
was common to see international presenters trying to develop business in Australia  
(e.g. Fludder, 2002, Fourie, 2002a, b, Ivison and Ehlert, 2002, Mensberg, 2003).  
The number of Australian electricity companies with a commercial interest in wind 
power also grew. Companies such as Hydro Tasmania and Pacific Hydro played key 
roles in attracting wind turbine manufacturers to Tasmania and Victoria. There were 
also new entrants who were not previously involved with wind power overseas or 
electricity in Australia. Notable examples include Michelago, who are primarily a 
gold mining company and Haywards, AirRide and Keppel Prince who are steel 
fabricators that made significant investments in facilities to produce towers for wind 
turbines (ASX, 2001, 2002, AusWEA, 2005d). 
These actors were attracted by the increasing commercial legitimacy of wind power in 
Australia. For example, Vestas, one of the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturers 
and an early investor in local manufacturing facilities, noted that Australia met its 
criteria for establishing such facilities, which included (Anderson, 2003, Fourie, 
2002a): a sufficiently large and stable market, broad support base, political and 
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economic stability, established infrastructure, well developed legal and financial 
systems, safety for workers, and the availability of required skills and resources. 
Governments recognised the importance of these types of factors and promoted them 
extensively: wind power was already a mature technology i.e. low technological 
uncertainty (DITR, 2002); MRET had created a market for the application of this 
mature technology; and Federal, State and Local Governments promoted factors such 
as their excellent wind resources, established electricity infrastructure, skilled 
workforce, R&D and manufacturing capabilities, proximity to domestic and Asian 
markets, transport infrastructure, strong economies, transparent political and legal 
systems, and the support offered by Government and the public (Australian Project 
Developments and Moore Consulting, 2003, Braithwaite, 2004, Government of South 
Australia, c2002, Invest Australia, 2003, 2004, SEAV, c2003, Williamson, 2002b).  
The wind industry and the broader supporter network had two main visions for wind 
power in Australia: the first was to achieve particular levels of installed capacity, and 
the second was for projects to have higher levels of Australian content. 
Actors began setting targets for installed capacity from about 2000. In that year 
AusWEA and Greenpeace set a target of 1000 MW by 2010, then in 2001 increased 
the target to 5000 MW following positive early growth (Greenpeace and AusWEA, 
2001). If met, this target was expected to create enough demand to sustain 4 turbine 
blade manufacturing facilities (AusWEA, 2003g). Other actors had similar visions, 
including Stanwell Corporation’s reported company target of developing 450 MW of 
wind farms (Courier Mail, 2001), and State Government targets in NSW and Victoria 
of 1000 MW of installed capacity each (SEAV, 2003, Williamson, 2002b). 
The other industry goal was to increase the Australian content in projects. Typically, 
the Australian-source proportion of projects was reported to be about 50% and the 
industry goal was to increase this to 90% by 2010 (AusWEA, 2005d, IEA, 2004, 
2005). Local manufacturing facilities for wind turbine components played a key role 
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in this vision. The industry expected that local manufacturing would contribute to 
positive feedbacks whereby costs decreased and wind farm development became 
more economically feasible (Hydro Tasmania, 2002d, Sinclair Knight Merz, 2001c). 
For many years this appeared to be progressing well, with nacelle-assembly and blade 
manufacturing plants established by Vestas in Wynyard, Tasmania and Portland, 
Victoria. However, as will be discussed shortly, by the end of 2007 both of these 
plants were scheduled to close. Local manufacturing is discussed further in Section 
3.2.3. 
3.2.2 Australian Wind Energy Association (AusWEA) 
One influential actor within the industry was the Australian Wind Energy Association 
(AusWEA). AusWEA formed in 2000 to provide a direction and voice for the 
industry. 
From 2000 to 2007, AusWEA’s membership grew and diversified. It matured from a 
volunteer organisation to a public not-for-profit company with several employees, and 
its membership grew to 216 corporate members by the end of 2003 (Anthony, 2003, 
AusWEA, 2004g, 2005d). Based on my anecdotal observations at wind power 
conferences between 2002 and 2005, the most common attendees were initially those 
with a direct interest in wind farms such as developers and turbine manufacturers; in 
later years the membership diversified to include actors from all parts of the wind 
farm supply chain. 
The existence of AusWEA meant that wind power in Australia had a voice 
independent from other renewable energy technologies, a network for developing an 
agreed problem agenda, and a means of capturing and articulating trans-local learning. 
In terms of a voice, AusWEA was a strong advocate for wind power in Australia and 
lobbied Government and engaged with the media and public on a range of energy 
policy, grid integration, and planning issues as will be discussed in later chapters 
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(AusWEA, 2005d). In terms of creating a problem agenda, the AusWEA board 
identified issues which they saw as threats to the industry and sought resources to 
respond (AusWEA, 2004g, 2005d, Flynn, 2005, IEA, 2004, 2005, 2006). AusWEA 
received funding from Government and its own members to run a variety of projects, 
including: developing best practice guidelines for wind farm development, 
campaigning for beneficial changes to MRET, and participating in discussions about 
grid integration. These are discussed further in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In terms of trans-
local learning, AusWEA produced codified knowledge such as best practice 
guidelines for wind farm development, guidelines on landscape impact assessment, 
and on risk assessment for birds. AusWEA also held annual conferences and seminars 
at which the growing and diversifying wind industry shared their local and overseas 
experiences (AusWEA, 2004g, 2005d). 
While there was rapid growth between 1997 and 2005, between 2005 and 2007 the 
momentum slowed primarily because the demand for renewable energy had waned as 
Chapter 4 will examine further. In late 2007 the wind industry lost its independent 
voice when AusWEA merged with the Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
(BCSE) to form the Clean Energy Council22 (AusWEA, 2007a, Warren, 2007). In a 
newspaper article, Dominique La Fontaine, who had been CEO of AusWEA and was 
to be CEO of the new body, stated that it was important that the clean energy industry 
spoke with one voice (Warren, 2007). This reflected the difficulty that these industries 
had experienced when trying to lobby Government for more supportive energy 
policies and the need to provide a more unified voice. 
                                                 
22 The Clean Energy Council represents so-called clean energy technologies such as gas, wind, hydro, 
biomass, solar, geothermal and co-generation. See http://cleanenergycouncil.org.au/ for further details. 
Chapter 3 – Industry development 
90 
3.2.3 Local manufacturing 
In the late 1990s, Australia did not have any wind-specific manufacturing for large 
grid-connected wind turbines, although towers for turbines were typically made 
locally on a project-by-project basis (IEA, 2001a, 2002). By 2005, there were two 
wind-specific facilities and a number of others which produced wind turbine 
components amongst their other business, however by the end of 2007 the wind-
specific facilities were scheduled to close (AusWEA, 2005d, IEA, 2006, Myer, 2006, 
Topsfield and Murphy, 2007). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of wind turbine manufactures were 
investigating the possibilities for joint ventures and licensing (DITR, 2002, IEA, 
2001a, 2002). Because of Australia’s late entry to the wind power field, Government 
and industry did not expect that Australia could challenge the dominant wind turbine 
producing countries by developing its own technology (DITR, 2002). Instead the 
strategy was to form partnerships with overseas firms wanting to set up in Australia 
(DITR, 2002). This approach gave Australia access to mature wind power technology 
and reduced the risk for overseas manufacturers by guaranteeing them a certain level 
of demand for turbines. Two initially successful examples of the partnership approach 
were those between Hydro Tasmania and Vestas, and between Pacific Hydro and 
NEG-Micon. NEG-Micon was later bought out by Vestas (Meldrum, 2004)23. In both 
cases, the wind farm developers guaranteed 100+ MW orders for turbines on the 
proviso that local manufacturing be established (Adair, 2002c, Fourie, 2002b). The 
Vestas nacelle plant saw an investment of $15 million in the Tasmanian town of 
Wynyard, resulted in about 80 jobs and began production in July 2003 (AusWEA, 
                                                 
23 Other partnerships which formed but had not resulted in manufacturing facilities at the time of 
writing were the Notus Energy (Ivison and Ehlert, 2002) and the Victorian Wind Energy Network 
(Theophanous, 2004a). 
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2004g, Vestas, 2003). Work began on the NEG-Micon/Vestas blade factory in the 
Victorian town of Portland in mid-2004 and the factory opened in August 200524 
(AusWEA, 2005d, Theophanous, 2004b, 2005b).  
Unfortunately for the wind industry, these were short-lived success stories. The 
Wynyard nacelle plant closed at the end of 2006 with a reported loss of about 65 jobs, 
and at the time of writing, the Portland blade factory was scheduled to close at the end 
of 2007 with a reported loss of 130 jobs (Franklin, 2007, Myer, 2006, Topsfield and 
Murphy, 2007). Vestas and other industry commentators blamed the closures on the 
Federal Government’s refusal to raise MRET (discussed further in Chapter 4), while 
the Government blamed the fact that the wind power market had moved on and the 
facilities were designed to produce technology that was now obsolete (Macfarlane, 
2006). The full story is unclear because counter to the lack-of-demand argument, the 
Victorian Government established a Victorian Renewable Energy Target in 2007 (See 
Section Chapter 4), and counter to the obsolete-technology argument, there appeared 
to be nothing preventing Vestas from upgrading their facilities if the business case 
made sense. 
Despite the closure of the Wynyard and Portland facilities, there are some lasting 
success stories. Steel fabricators have benefited significantly from the increase in 
wind farm development because they have been able to manufacture wind turbine 
towers as an expansion of their existing business. For example, Air Ride Technologies 
in South Australia, Haywards Engineering in Tasmania, and Keppel Prince in Victoria 
all received multi-million dollar orders to build towers for projects (AusWEA, 2004g) 
                                                 
24 The Portland facility was linked to a controversial project known as the Portland Wind Energy 
Project. The project involved four wind farms, some of which were on sites that were regarded as 
uniquely scenic. The project was only granted planning approval on the basis that a manufacturing 
facility would be established and bring local employment (Delahunty, 2002c, Smith and Jacka, 2002c). 
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and Keppel Prince won a contract to export towers to New Zealand (IEA, 2004). At 
the time of writing, Keppel Prince was employing about 150 people for wind power 
related work and was expecting to grow further (Howard, 2007). 
3.2.4 Wind industry summary 
Between 1997 and 2005, the commercial legitimacy of wind power in Australia grew 
because of the business opportunity created by MRET, the maturity of wind power 
technology, the wind resource, and the social, technical, and institutional 
infrastructure. Actors from a range of backgrounds joined the Australian wind 
industry, filling out the wind farm supply chain. The Australian Wind Energy 
Association (AusWEA) formed to provide the industry with an independent voice, a 
problem agenda and a means of developing and sharing trans-local knowledge. 
However, from 2005 to 2007, this momentum slowed, with the scheduled closure of 
two wind-specific manufacturing facilities and the merger of AusWEA and the BCSE. 
3.3 Broader actor network 
In addition to the growing industry, there was also a growing broader network of 
actors who had some involvement with wind power. The main groups of actors in this 
broader network were Government at all levels, electricity system managers, and 
NGOs and the community. The next sections will discuss each of them and their 
relevance. 
3.3.1 Government 
Government at all levels supported the growing wind industry. They actively sought 
the economic benefits of a local wind industry by trying to attract investment and 
generate local jobs. Governments’ saw wind power as a means for economic 
development, environmental benefits, a means of diversifying energy resources, and 
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possibly a way of improving their public image (e.g. Allen Consulting Group, 2003, 
DOI and DSE, 2005, Invest Australia, 2004, Invest Victoria, 2005). 
Federal and State Governments were also active in supporting institutional and 
technological change, for example wind resource mapping (Thwaites, 2004, 
Williamson, 2002b), a wind energy forecasting system and the grid integration of 
wind power (see Chapter 5), and AusWEA’s industry development projects and 
research into landscape impacts (See Chapter 6). 
Local government played a lesser role than Federal or State Government, but some 
were particularly active at trying to encourage the wind industry to set up 
manufacturing in their municipality. Again their interests were economic and 
environmental. Two prominent examples are the Glenelg Shire Council and the Ararat 
Shire Council, both in Victoria. Glenelg was a strong supporter of the Portland Wind 
Energy Project, which was linked to the establishment of a blade manufacturing 
facility. Ararat was a strong supporter of the Challicum Hills wind farm and following 
its construction, began promoting an area just outside Ararat as a wind energy 
precinct (Braithwaite, 2004). 
Politically, wind power gained legitimacy as a technology worth supporting. This was 
most apparent at the State Government level with the introduction of state-based 
renewable energy targets (see Chapter 4) and grants for grid connection and 
legislation to make connection more affordable (See Chapter 5). However, the Federal 
Government did provide significant funding for wind power related activities, notably 
$14 million for a wind power forecasting system (see Chapter 5), and for some of 
AusWEA’s industry development projects as noted earlier. Chapter 4 will discuss the 
factors that contributed to the political legitimacy of wind power. 
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3.3.2 Electricity system managers 
Electricity system managers were another influential actor group that became 
involved with wind power. From their perspective, the technical legitimacy of wind 
power increased because the level of installed capacity grew to the point that wind 
farm output could no longer be ignored as it had been historically. This was reflected 
in changes in grid operating and forecasting procedures, and the development of the 
wind energy forecasting system (See Chapter 5). 
Wind power became socially embedded in the grid with the formation of the Wind 
Energy Policy Working Group (WEPWG) and the Wind Energy Technical Advisory 
Group (WETAG) by the Ministerial Council on Energy25 (MCE). These groups, as 
Chapter 5 will discuss further, were formed to oversee the integration of wind power 
into the National Electricity Market. 
3.3.3 NGOs and Communities 
A third influential and quite broad actor group was NGOs and the community. As the 
level of wind power activity grew, so too did the level of articulated opinion about 
wind power. 
For some actors, the social legitimacy of wind power grew and they expressed support 
for wind power and lobbied in favour of wind farms or for more favourable policies. 
Actors in this group include: environment NGOs such as Greenpeace (Greenpeace 
and AusWEA, 2001), Environment Victoria (2004), and Friends of the Earth (FOE, 
                                                 
25 The MCE is chaired by the Federal Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources, and consists of 
State and Territory ministers responsible for energy, as well as observers from New Zealand and Papua 
New Guinea. The Council was created by CoAG in 2001 to provide national consistency in energy 
policy which has historically been decided at the state level. See www.mce.gov.au for further details. 
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2003); and the Portland Progress Association (2003). As Chapter 5 will show, the link 
between wind power and sustainability remained strong for a large number of actors. 
Wind farms even began appearing in the background of advertisements unrelated to 
energy, for example TV ads for McDonalds and Listerine26.  
However, for some other actors, the social legitimacy of wind power decreased and 
they questioned the link between wind farms and sustainability. In many cases, local 
residents had negative expectations about wind farm proposals, expecting them to be 
noisy and unsightly, and were sceptical of claims about local employment. This was 
fuelled in some cases by wind industry optimism (or hype or spin depending on your 
point of view) regarding the noisiness of turbines and likely employment levels that 
would result. For example, a conclusion from an early wind power workshop was that 
noise was not longer an issue because modern turbine technology was relatively quiet 
(Victorian Coastal Council, 1999) and sentiments such as this were promoted within 
the industry (Adair, 2002a, Harding, 2002). However, one early wind farm in Victoria 
was plagued by noise issues (Buttler, 2004b, Leongatha Star, 2003, Strong, 2003). 
Another example was employment, particularly in relation to the Portland Wind 
Energy Project (PWEP) which was linked to the development of a manufacturing 
facility. The developer, Pacific Hydro, turbine manufacturer NEG-Micon (later taken 
over by Vestas), and Local and State Government representatives stated that between 
100s and 1000s of jobs would be created, although the subtleties about direct vs 
indirect jobs, about temporary construction vs permanent jobs, and about local vs 
regional or state jobs were not always explained (Brumby, 2003, Harding, 2002, 
Norgate, 2002, Punton, 2002, Sinclair Knight Merz, 2001a). The final number of jobs 
                                                 
26 The use of wind turbines in advertising is not a new phenomenon. Bunting (2003) notes that 
electricity utilities have often used wind power in their magazines, annual reports and promotional 
material. The difference here is that wind power was becoming more prominent in advertising 
completely unrelated to energy. 
Chapter 3 – Industry development 
96 
was in the order of hundreds rather than thousands and as noted earlier the blade 
manufacturing factory was scheduled to close by the end of 2007 with none of the 
blades manufactured there reported to have been used in Australia (Howard, 2007). 
Victorian wind power critic Tim Le Roy stated that claimed employment benefits 
such as these created false hope in local communities (Le Roy, 2003a). 
3.3.4 Broader network summary 
As wind power grew, a wide network of actors became involved with wind power in 
some way. The political legitimacy of wind power grew for reasons which Chapter 4 
will examine further. The technical legitimacy grew because wind farm output could 
not longer be ignored, as Chapter 5 will discuss further. The social legitimacy grew 
for some people because they sought the environmental and economic benefits that 
wind farms can have. The symbolic link between wind power and sustainability was 
generally strengthened with wind farms appearing in advertisements unrelated to 
energy. For other people, generally in communities near projects or proposals, the 
legitimacy of wind power decreased and they disputed the symbolic link between 
wind power and sustainability. Chapter 6 will examine further the social legitimacy 
and the symbolism of wind power.  
3.4 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate and explain the significant changes in 
relation to the installed capacity of wind power and the actors involved. In doing so, I 
have also tested the insights from Chapter 2 in terms of positive feedback dynamics, 
which actors were in a position to encourage these dynamics, and challenges for 
actors to anticipate. This final section will highlight these findings. 
Chapter 3 – Industry development 
97 
3.4.1 Importance of the dynamics 
The chapter showed that the dynamics of stimulating demand, increasing use, 
increasing legitimacy, and attracting actors can be important in the introduction of a 
new technology. These are summarised in Table 9 and the following text. 
The chapter showed that stimulating demand was important because it attracted actors 
such as developers, manufacturers, investors and other service providers to the wind 
power supply chain for the technology. In this case, demand was most strongly 
influenced by the Government, which will be explored further in Chapter 4. Attracting 
actors to the supply chain enabled increased use of the technology. 
The chapter showed that increasing use of the technology was important because it 
yielded greater benefits from the technology. In this case it was higher levels of 
greenhouse abatement, capital investment and employment. Increasing use can also 
lead to increasing legitimacy for the technology because actors can see it in use. It 
was actors in the supply chain, such as developers and investors who had the most 
direct influence on increasing use. 
The chapter showed that increasing legitimacy was important because if actors do not 
consider a technology legitimate then they are unlikely to be attracted to it. The 
exception to this is when they are actively opposed to the technology. In this facet of 
the case, Government actors marketed a range of features to attract actors to wind 
power in Australia. I touched on the finding that actors measure legitimacy according 
to their interests and Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will provide further analysis on this issue. 
Finally, the chapter showed that attracting actors is important because it can enable 
increasing use of the technology and, if the actor network is broad enough, the mutual 
adaptation of the technology and the various social, technological and institutional 
aspects of the socio-technical regime. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will show this in further 
detail. 
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This chapter supports the inclusion of these dynamics in a framework for introducing 
new technologies and provides examples of actors who may be in a position to 
encourage them.  
Table 9 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks 
Dynamic Why? Suggestions of 
who 
Examples of how  
Stimulating 
demand 
To enable increasing 
use, create a business 
opportunity, and 
attract actors. 
- Government - Create a market such as MRET for the 
new technology or for the product of 
the technology (electricity sourced 
from renewable energy) 
Increasing 
use 
Gain environmental 
and economic 
benefits 
- Developers 
- Investors 
- Installing wind farms 
- Investing in wind farms 
Increasing 
legitimacy  
To attract actors. - Government 
- Large 
companies 
- Developers 
- Creating markets such as MRET. 
- Promoting resources, industry 
capabilities, and stable investment 
environment 
- Strong positive links with a problem to 
be solved e.g. climate change 
- Increasing installed capacity of wind 
farms 
Attracting 
actors 
To enable increasing 
use and to enable the 
technology and all 
parts of the socio-
technical regime to 
become mutually 
adapted. 
- Government 
- Industry 
associations 
- Developers 
- Stimulate demand for renewable 
energy 
- Create a commercial opportunity 
- Create robust, specific and high quality 
expectations of economic, 
environmental, or social benefits 
- Increase the legitimacy of wind power 
3.4.2 Insights to strengthen SNM 
The events analysed in this chapter have shown that a range of actors were attracted to 
wind power for different reasons. We can learn from these events to strengthen SNM 
and I have summarised the challenge identified in Table 10. The numbers in brackets 
(Chapter-reference number) in the table provide a cross-reference to more detailed 
discussion in the subsequent text and in the final chapter27. 
                                                 
27 This level of organization may seem excessive in this chapter because it discusses one challenge. In 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I discuss many more challenges and so to provide consistency throughout the 
literature review and empirical chapters I have retained the format in this chapter. 
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Table 10 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks 
Challenge 
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Possible strategy 
(3-1) Actors measure the 
legitimacy of a technology 
by different factors 
depending on their 
interests 
      ?  ?  
Business actors may 
measure legitimacy based 
on the market opportunity, 
the availability of 
resources, and level of 
uncertainty. Niche actors 
could try emphasising 
these aspects.  
3.4.2.1 (3-1) Actors measure the legitimacy of a technology based on their 
interests 
Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) note that a lack of legitimacy for a new technology can 
hinder positive feedbacks, however they provide little detail on how actors measure or 
might increase legitimacy. In this chapter I highlighted that business actors, 
Governments, system managers, and the public all measured the legitimacy of wind 
power differently. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will discuss how Governments, system 
managers and the public respectively measured legitimacy. From this facet of the case 
we gained insight into how business actors might measure legitimacy. 
Business actors measured the legitimacy of wind power in Australia based on a 
number of factors, including: the technical and commercial maturity of the technology 
(i.e. low uncertainty), the market opportunity, the wind resources, the level of political 
uncertainty and risk, and the manufacturing skills and capabilities. These could be 
summarised more generally as market opportunity, the availability of resources (in 
this case wind, materials, skilled labour, transportation etc), and low perceived 
technological, market and political uncertainty. This suggests that niche actors could 
more effectively attract actors by emphasising particular information to particular 
actors groups. The final chapter will discuss this further. 
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3.4.3 Final remarks 
This chapter has shown and explained the significant changes that occurred in relation 
to wind farm capacity and actors between 1997 and 2007. These events illustrated 
why four of the ten dynamics identified in Chapter 2 may be important goals in the 
introduction of new technology. The events also revealed a possibly useful lesson for 
introducing new technologies. The final chapter will return to these findings in 
conjunction with those from the other empirical chapters. 
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4 Energy policy 
4.0 Introduction 
The late 1990s was a time of unprecedented opportunity for wind power in Australia. 
The promise of a mandatory renewable energy target (MRET) and consumer based 
green power schemes meant that projects could be financially viable. As noted in 
Chapter 3, installed wind capacity grew from less than 1 MW to almost 900 MW, 
many new actors joined the field, manufacturing facilities were established, and 
employment and the Australian wind energy industry grew. However, there was also 
considerable uncertainty over how well MRET would support wind power because of 
its limited size and duration, and, by 2007, Victoria and New South Wales had 
implemented state-based renewable energy targets to maintain demand for wind 
power. 
This chapter will explain these changes and other related attempts to change. In doing 
so, the chapter illustrates why dynamics such as stimulating demand, decreasing cost, 
reducing uncertainty, learning and articulation, and attracting actors are important 
dynamics in the introduction of new technologies. The chapter also identifies which 
actors were in a position to stimulate these dynamics and identifies a range of 
challenges to encouraging these dynamics. 
The chapter begins by introducing the main actor groups involved and outlining their 
interests, visions and problem agendas. This helps to explain the roles that different 
actors played in the various issues. It shows that actors were focused on a number of 
mismatches and inadequacies, although how these were defined as problems 
depended on actors’ interests and visions.  
Following this, the chapter analyses the creation of MRET in the late 1990s, 
examining the Federal Government’s vision, the main design features, and how 
different actors tried to influence these design features to suit their interests better. 
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Many of the significant events later in the chapter can be linked back to events and 
decisions from the early days of MRET. The remaining three empirical sections then 
examine three significant episodes in the life of MRET and the wind industry. Section 
4.3 focuses on the first two years of MRET when there was uncertainty in the supply 
of and demand for renewable energy certificates (RECs) – the currency of MRET. 
This section shows how market uncertainty can hinder positive feedbacks. Section 4.4 
focuses on the legislated review of MRET that was held in 2003, a time when the 
future of MRET was in question. Of particular interest are AusWEA’s efforts to build 
the legitimacy of wind power and influence the institutional framework, and the 
MRET review panel’s findings in terms of the effect of MRET and how it could better 
support renewable technologies. The final empirical section, Section 4.5, focuses on 
the years following the MRET review, when the Federal Government considered the 
MRET review panel’s recommendations as part of its climate change strategy for the 
energy sector. During this time, AusWEA continued to try to build the political 
legitimacy of wind power. While they were unable to persuade the Federal 
Government that MRET should be increased, they did have success at the state level 
with the Victorian and New South Wales Governments developing state-based 
schemes to maintain industry momentum. Section 4.5 further shows how actors might 
build the political legitimacy of a technology. The final section tests the insights from 
Chapter 2 in terms of dynamics, actors and challenges. 
4.1 Actors, interests, visions and agendas 
There were four main actor groups involved with energy policy and industry 
development, namely: the government at all levels, the wind industry, energy 
intensive industry, and NGOs and the community. These groups were focused on a 
number of common issues, primarily related to their expectations about the effects of 
MRET or possible designs of MRET, however the way that they defined “problems” 
varied depending on their interests. They also had different levels on influence on the 
final outcomes. I will summarise their interests, visions and problem agendas so that 
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we can better understand their involvement in the events discussed later in the 
chapter.  
4.1.1 Government 
Federal and State Governments played significant roles in energy policy, although 
they each had different agendas. 
Between 1997 and late 2007, Australia had a Liberal/National party coalition Federal 
Government. This Federal Government was primarily interested in good economic 
management (or their perception of it) and this can be seen in many of their energy 
policy decisions. For example, the initial proposal of MRET was politically and 
economically motivated as much as it was environmentally, because it was a part of 
the Government’s strategy for negotiating higher emissions targets for Australia at the 
Kyoto COP28. Another example is their Energy White Paper released in 2004, which 
noted that  “…low-cost reliable electricity is a source of competitive advantage for 
Australia.” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004 p.42). The Government sought to 
maintain this advantage and support energy intensive industries (e.g. minerals and 
resource sectors), which led to limited support for renewables which were more 
expensive than incumbent energy sources. In line with this economic focus, once a 
wind industry began to form in Australia, a Federal Government agency, Invest 
Australia, actively promoted wind power in Australia to overseas companies and 
investors, such as wind turbine manufacturers (REAA Implementation Report, 2001, 
Invest Australia, 2003, 2004). As a consequence, the Federal Government’s problem 
agenda was improving the efficiency of the economy, or particular sectors, and 
supporting energy intensive industry by not harming Australia’s competitive 
                                                 
28 Despite Australia being granted a higher Kyoto target than other counties – 108% of 1990 emissions 
– the Liberal/National Coalition Government subsequently refused to ratify the treaty. 
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advantage of low energy prices. In late 2007, the incumbent Liberal/National 
Coalition was replaced by a Labor Government. One of the first actions of the new 
Government was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Franklin and Ryan, 2007).  
State Governments also had economic motivations, in their case related to attracting a 
new industry to within their borders and creating new jobs. Moreover, wind power 
was seen as a way of reducing greenhouse emissions and diversifying the sources of 
electricity supply (DOI and DSE, 2005). As a result of these interests, the problem 
agendas of State Governments related to how to attract wind farms or manufacturing 
to their state (Allen Consulting Group, 2003, Invest Victoria, 2005), advocating for 
more favourable energy policies at the federal level (SEDA, 1998b, Victorian 
Government, 2003), investigating state-based renewable energy targets and emissions 
trading (MCE, 2006), and in the case of Victoria and NSW, developing state-based 
renewable energy target (NSW Government, 2006, Office of the Premier, 2005b, 
Theophanous and Thwaites, 2005). 
4.1.2 Wind industry 
The wind industry was another significant actor in energy policy. By wind industry I 
mean the whole supply chain involved in wind farm development, including turbine 
manufacturers, developers, consultants and investors. At a collective level, as seen in 
the activities of the Australian Wind Energy Association (AusWEA), the interests of 
the wind industry were self-promotion and continued growth supported by MRET or 
other suitable energy policies. In the context of this chapter, the problem agenda for 
the wind industry, as set by the Australian Wind Energy Association, was advocating 
for more favourable design of MRET. AusWEA had limited ability to achieve this 
however, because it was relatively new to the political landscape in Australia and 
wind power has less political legitimacy influence than energy intensive industry. 
Chapter 4 – Energy policy 
105 
At an individual level, wind farm developers and turbine and other related technology 
manufacturers were focused on the business opportunity and increasing the local 
content of projects to develop their business and build local support. They were also 
interested in the environmental benefits of wind power to varying degrees; a few 
actors had a long history with promoting renewable energy in Australia, while others 
were only recently drawn to the field by the business opportunity29. The problem 
agendas of the firms in the wind industry focused on issues which threatened project 
or business viability such as: the demand for wind turbines, finding buyers for 
electricity and RECs, obtaining finance for projects, obtaining planning approval, and 
negotiating acceptable terms for grid connection. 
4.1.3 Energy intensive industry 
The third significant group of actors were energy intensive industries including 
aluminium, steel, paper, petrochemical, and concrete. Australia has many such 
industries which rely on low cost energy as noted previously. Industry sources30 claim 
that energy intensive industry constituted 12% of GDP, 12% of full-time employment, 
and 20% of capital investment in 2001/2002 (EIMWG, 2003). The contribution of 
these industries to the economy and their long history in Australia meant that they 
were relatively influential with the Federal (Liberal/National) Government. 
Energy intensive industries were concerned about anything that could increase the 
cost of electricity, such as MRET (EIMWG, 2003). They argued that they were 
                                                 
29 See Bunting (2003) for a discussion of the actors that were involved with wind power in Australia 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. 
30 In 2002, the Federal Government formed industry working groups from 5 sectors to provide advice 
on strategies for responding to climate change. One of these groups represented energy intensive 
manufacturing and included representatives from the following industries: aluminium, paper, cement, 
plastics and chemicals, petroleum, and electrical and electronic goods (EIMWG, 2003).  
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competing on the international market and/or against imports in the Australian market 
and that therefore they could not pass on any cost increases to customers. Their 
problem agenda was on minimising the price of electricity, for example, by lobbying 
against the existence of MRET or for a design of MRET which would minimise costs. 
4.1.4 Non-Government Organisations and the Community 
The final significant group of actors were NGOs and the community. This is a diverse 
actor group and covers many interests. For simplicity in this chapter, they can be 
divided into those who supported wind power and those who did not, although this is 
an oversimplification as Chapter 6 will argue. 
Those who supported wind power included environmental NGOs – such as 
Greenpeace, the Climate Action Network of Australia (a collection of NGOs), the 
Australian Conservation Foundation, and the World Wildlife Fund – local progress 
associations, such as the Portland Progress Association, and some individuals. The 
reasons were a mixture of environmental and economic. The problem agenda for these 
actors was how to support wind power or specific projects more effectively. This was 
achieved primarily through lobbying of policy-makers, although as we will see they 
did not appear to have a high level of influence with the Liberal/National Federal 
Government. 
Those who opposed wind power included local “landscape guardian” groups and 
individuals. Their interests were in preventing or limiting a local project or projects. 
They saw energy policy as a means of achieving this because grid-connected wind 
power was economically viable only because of MRET. Thus, their problem agenda 
related to how to influence energy policy so that it would no longer support wind 
power or so that it would discourage wind farms from areas where there was not 
community support. 
Chapter 4 – Energy policy 
107 
4.1.5 Summary 
There were four significant actor groups involved with energy policy: Federal and 
State Government, the wind industry as a collective and as individual firms, energy 
intensive industries, and NGOs and the community. The main reasons for supporting 
or opposing wind power or energy policy which supported wind power were 
economic and environmental, with the Federal Government also having political 
motivations for the creation of MRET and the Victorian Government also citing 
diversification of electrify supply as a reason for supporting wind power.  
4.2 Protecting renewable energy 
The rapid growth of wind power in Australia began from the promise, then, about 
three years later, the commencement of MRET. This scheme created, for the first 
time, a guaranteed demand for grid-connected renewable energy in Australia; it 
provided a “space” for wind power to be tested and enabled a niche for wind power to 
form.  
This section explains why the Federal Government created MRET and provides some 
background on the development process and the final form of MRET. I then examine 
three topics which were influential in the events of later years. First I show what 
different actors expected the effects of MRET to be. This is significant because it 
helps to explain why they sought to influence its design as they did. Second, I analyse 
the tensions within the two main objectives of the legislation – greenhouse abatement 
and industry development – and show how the balance between them shifted during 
the development of MRET. This is significant because it was the cause of ongoing 
uncertainty for the wind industry. Third, I review the main design features of MRET 
and show how actors sought to influence its design. 
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4.2.1 Creating a demand 
Throughout the 1990s, climate change became an increasing international concern. In 
December 1997, developed nations were set to meet in Kyoto for the 3rd Conference 
of the Parties (COP-3)31. It was here that nations agreed upon emissions reduction 
targets for the period 2008-2012, the so-called Kyoto Protocol. Australia was 
intending to argue that its emissions target should be higher than measured emissions 
from 1990 – this was in contrast to the majority of countries who were going to be 
required to reduce their emissions32. The Government’s position on the Kyoto targets 
is evident in the speeches of the then Federal Minister for Resources and Energy, 
Warwick Parer and the Government’s economic focus is shown well in a speech from 
August 1997 (DPIE, 2006 p.197): 
“The Government recognises the importance of growing, competitive and 
efficient minerals, energy and agricultural sectors to the Australian economy. 
Therefore, we are seeking a Kyoto outcome that is equitable, efficient and 
environmentally effective, while safeguarding Australia's particular economic 
and trade interests.” 
To help its negotiating position, in the lead up to the Kyoto Conference the Federal 
Government released Safeguarding the future – Australia’s response to climate 
change (Howard in Australia, 1997 p.10,924, Commonwealth of Australia, 1997). 
MRET was one of a number of beyond-no-regrets policies that were well received by 
the international reviewers (Zhou et al., 1999). 
                                                 
31 The COP is the governing body established under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. The COP meets annually to review international efforts on climate change.  Further 
information is available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php.  
32 There has been extensive criticism of the Government’s Kyoto position and its reliance on economic 
modelling that was heavily funded by fossil fuel and energy intensive industry interests 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman, 1998, Lyster, 2004, Senate ECITARC, 2000a).  
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Unsurprisingly, the renewable energy industry’s response to MRET was positive. 
Public support for renewable energy technologies (including wind power) had 
provided social protection for many years with renewable energy technologies 
generally regarded as desirable. However, it was not until MRET that there was 
significant technological protection – for the first time there would be a guaranteed 
market for grid-connected renewable energy in Australia. As John Abba of the 
Sustainable Energy Industry Association commented during the development of 
MRET, “This is the largest commitment to renewable energy to date by any 
Australian Government.” (Australia, 2000a p.1) The Government expected that 
MRET would increase investor confidence (Hill, 1999); unfortunately for the wind 
industry, as we shall see in later sections, this confidence lasted only a few years. 
MRET went through an extensive and tumultuous 2-year design process involving 
numerous consultations with the public, industry and interests groups, consultants’ 
reports, a Senate enquiry and parliamentary debate. The public consultations and 
various reports associated with this process provide an excellent insight into what 
actors expected the effects of MRET would be and how they sought to influence the 
design of MRET to suit their interests better. There were many contentious issues in 
this process, including which biomass sources should be eligible and whether solar 
hot water and coal-seam methane should also be eligible. My discussion focuses on 
those issues which had a significant impact on wind power. 
The design process began in early 1998 with the formation of the Renewables Target 
Working Group (RTWG), which contained representatives from the Federal and State 
Governments and industry. Soon after, the RTWG  released an issues paper (RTWG, 
1998). Submissions came predominantly from the renewable energy industry and 
supporters, the existing electricity industry, and energy intensive industries such as 
aluminium and there was significant debate about the objectives and design of MRET. 
This will be discussed further in later sections. At the time of this consultation, an 
Australian wind industry did not exist. A few individuals and firms had an interest in 
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wind power, but there was no voice independent of the broader renewable energy 
industry33. The recommendations of the RTWG passed through the Council of 
Australian Governments34 (CoAG) before being turned into draft legislation by the 
Federal Government. The draft legislation underwent a Senate enquiry in 2000 and 
was finally passed by parliament in late 2000. 
In essence, the legislation as it was enacted created a market for so-called Renewable 
Energy Certificates (RECs) by requiring that wholesale buyers of electricity annually 
surrender RECs in proportion to their electricity purchases. The size of the total target 
is increased each year until 2010 and then held constant until 2020 (refer to Figure 7). 
Eligible renewable energy generators, including wind farms, are able to create one 
REC per MWh of energy generated. As a result of MRET, renewable energy 
generators are able to receive income from the sale of the electricity and the RECs 
they produce. For the cheaper renewable energy technologies, this additional income 
stream bridges the gap between the cost of generating electricity and the price for 
which it can be sold35.  
                                                 
33 At that time the renewable energy industry was represented by a number of groups, including the 
Sustainable Energy Industries Council of Australia, the Solar Energy Industries Association of 
Australia, and the Renewable Energy Industries Association (DPIE, 1997). 
34 CoAG is made up of the Prime Minister, the State Premiers, and the President of the Australian 
Local Government Association. See www.coag.gov.au for further details. 
35 Because different technologies have different generation costs, MRET does not provide equal 
protection to all eligible technologies. For example, generating electricity with photovoltaics is 
significantly more costly than the price that the energy can be sold. The income available from the sale 
of RECs is insufficient to bridge this gap. 
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Figure 7 – Mandatory Renewable Energy Targets until 2020 
4.2.2 Expectations about the effects of MRET 
The views of renewables supporters and energy intensive industry diverged on the 
expected effects of MRET. 
Many renewables supporters expected that MRET would provide a significant boost 
to the renewable energy industry and wind power in particular. Australia was known 
to have good wind resources and wind power was regarded as a modular36 and mature 
technology (DITR, 2002). Supporters expected MRET to lead to the installation of 
between 500 MW and 900 MW of wind farm capacity, a very large amount compared 
to the less than 10 MW that was installed at the time (IEA, 1999, 2000). Even before 
the annual targets began, MRET stimulated wind farm activity (IEA, 2001a). For 
                                                 
36 Wind farms are easily scalable depending on the number of turbines used and projects can therefore 
be adapted to local environmental and market conditions. 
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example, the deciding factors behind Victoria’s first wind farm at Codrington in the 
late 1990s were the positive expectations of the developer and electricity retailer 
about MRET (Flynn, 2005). 
Many actors, from Government to consultants to industry analysts, also expected 
MRET to provide benefits for wind power such as scale and learning economies, local 
manufacturing37 and decreasing investment risk, all leading to a lower cost for wind 
generated electricity (Australia, 1997, 2000a, IEA, 1999, 2000, MMA, 1999, Redding 
et al., 1999, RTWG, 1999, SEDA, 1998a). However, as Section 4.2.4 will discuss, 
many renewables actors argued that higher targets and incentives for compliance were 
required to encourage these benefits. 
While renewable and wind actors were optimistic about a future with MRET, energy 
intensive industries such as aluminium, mining and minerals, and pulp and paper were 
concerned about the impact on the cost of electricity because retailers were expected 
to pass on the cost of purchasing RECs. As we shall see shortly, these industries 
formed a powerful lobby group against MRET. 
4.2.3 Debate about the intent of MRET 
The objectives of MRET as written in the legislation that created it – the Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 – are:  
- To encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources, 
                                                 
37 Local manufacturing was seen as particularly important because at the time developers were 
vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations when importing turbines (IEA, 1999). Research by Redding 
(1999) conducted for the Renewables Target Working Group suggested that a demand of about 50 MW 
per annum was required to sustain local manufacturing. 
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- To reduce emissions of greenhouse gases  
- To ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable.  
However, the intent of the measure as taken from the Prime Minister’s announcement 
of the scheme, the RTWG issues paper38, and the explanatory memorandum for the 
bills was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and develop the renewable energy 
industry (Australia, 1997, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, RTWG, 1998, 1999). 
While these goals seem compatible, there was a tension between them. 
From actors at large, the goals of MRET received a mixed reception. There was 
debate over the use of MRET as a greenhouse measure because energy intensive 
industry actors argued that it was not a cost effective way to do so. There was also 
debate over MRET’s design for industry development because there was a tension 
between supporting existing and new renewable generation. These debates had 
ongoing significance, as Section 4.3 will show. The greenhouse abatement debate 
occurred again during the CoAG energy market review in 2002 with energy intensive 
industry and electricity retails lobbying against MRET on the grounds that it was not a 
cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse emissions. One of the recommendations from 
this review was that MRET be replaced with emissions trading. The industry 
development debate created uncertainty about the supply of RECs in the early years of 
MRET because existing hydro generators were able to create large numbers of RECs. 
This was claimed to have slowed investment in wind power projects. The following 
sections discuss these debates in more detail. 
                                                 
38 The RTWG also noted that in order to develop globally competitive industries, the industries would 
have to be able to compete on their own merits without Government intervention (RTWG, 1999). 
Although this comment most likely came from a purely economic perspective, it has parallels with the 
notion of the niche becoming self-sustaining (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
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4.2.3.1 Greenhouse abatement 
In response to the RTWG issues paper, actors generally acknowledged or supported 
the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but a rift emerged on whether MRET 
was the best way to achieve this.  
The renewable energy industry, environment groups and some individuals supported 
the idea of MRET and favoured a policy designed to maximise renewable energy 
industry development. Their focus was on how to design MRET to best support 
renewables (e.g. SEDA, 1998b, SEIAA, 1998, Southern Hydro, 1998).  
In contrast, actors with interests in fossil fuels or energy intensive industry typically 
acknowledged the need to reduce greenhouse emissions or support renewable energy, 
but opposed MRET because they expected that it would unnecessarily increase the 
cost of electricity. They argued that this would harm their competitive position in 
international markets (e.g. Caltex, 1998, Coutts, 1998, Filmer, 1998). As noted 
previously, these actors were politically influential because of their place in the 
Australian economy and they had a noticeable influence on Federal Government 
energy policy in later years. The RTWG acknowledged that MRET would have an 
impact on these industries and discussed the possibility of exempting energy intensive 
industry from the scheme, so that they were not subjected to higher electricity costs 
and could remain competitive in international markets. However, the RTWG noted 
that it would be difficult to determine who should be entitled to an exemption and that 
granting exemptions would increase the costs of the measure for other consumers 
(RTWG, 1999). 
The split of opinion over MRET as a greenhouse measure continued throughout the 
development process. A Senate committee set up in 2000 to examine the proposed 
legislation reported that a majority of the submissions it received supported MRET, 
but that large users of electricity were “highly critical” (Senate ECITARC, 2000b). 
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Ultimately, no exemptions were granted to energy intensive industry39. The divide 
between renewables actors and energy intensive industry continued and in subsequent 
years created significant uncertainty about the future of MRET. 
4.2.3.2 Industry development 
There was also debate about the balance between industry development and 
greenhouse abatement. As stated at the beginning of the section, industry development 
was not an explicit objective of the legislation despite it being a clear intent of the 
Prime Minister’s promise. Instead, the objective became broader: additional 
renewable energy generation.  
For the RTWG, MRET was primarily an industry development mechanism, and a 
long-term greenhouse response (RTWG, 1999). However over the course of MRET’s 
development, the emphasis shifted to supplying additional renewable energy and 
short-term abatement. While the objectives of industry development and greenhouse 
abatement are superficially compatible, it became apparent during the design process 
that there was a tension between the objectives and between short-term vs long-term 
abatement. The RTWG report shows that this tension arose early in the design 
process; they debated that if the main intent of MRET was to develop new industries 
(i.e. which could lead to long-term greenhouse abatement), then the existing share of 
renewables was unimportant and existing renewables such as hydro should not be 
included because they did not require industry support40 (RTWG, 1999). On the other 
hand if the main intent of MRET was short-term greenhouse abatement by increasing 
                                                 
39 The only exemptions were for entities on grids of less than 100 MW in capacity or those generating 
electricity for their own use. Refer to the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 for details. 
40 In an assessment of Australia’s renewable energy industries for the RTWG, Redding (1999) noted 
that large hydro was already a technically and commercially mature technology. 
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the level of renewable generation, then existing renewables were important and large 
hydro should be included because any decrease in existing renewable generation 
would have to be made up with new, more expensive renewable generation (RTWG, 
1999). 
This tension between the objectives was also evident to the Senate committee which 
held an inquiry into the proposed MRET legislation in 2000 (Senate ECITARC, 
2000b). The committee postulated that because MRET was expected to be less 
effective at reducing greenhouse emissions than a carbon-focused policy, the primary 
focus was on industry development (Senate ECITARC, 2000b). However, the 
committee did not make any recommendations about the inclusion of existing hydro. 
The legislation that was passed allowed renewable generators that existed before 1997 
to create RECs if their annual output was above a baseline determined from their 
historical output. 
The balance between the two objectives was never unambiguously defined and the 
final design has a mixture of features which inconsistently favour one over the other. 
For example, the focus on renewable energy (as opposed to co-generation or other 
energy efficiency initiatives) suggests that renewable energy industry development 
was the priority of MRET, yet the inclusion of existing renewables weakens this link. 
Similarly, the inclusion of existing renewables suggests that greenhouse abatement 
was the priority, however the fact that MRET makes no distinction between the 
emissions intensity of different technologies (e.g. biomass vs wind, see Senate 
ECITARC, 2000b) weakens this link.  
The inclusion of existing hydro was, at least in part, a move by the Government to 
reduce the potential cost increase faced by energy users (primarily energy intensive 
industry) (Kemp, 2002, RTWG, 1999). It also had the effect of lowering the level of 
protection and causing uncertainty in the REC market because existing large-scale 
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hydro power stations were able to create a large volume of relatively cheap RECs41.  
As later sections will show, this was claimed to have reduce investment in wind 
projects and the debate about the eligibility of existing hydro continued over the 
following years. 
4.2.3.3 Summary 
These debates about the use of MRET as a greenhouse measure and about its design 
for industry development were significant during the two and a half year design 
process and were the source of subsequent debates in the following years. They show 
a significant lack of consensus between actors. In the first instance, incumbent energy 
intensive industry actors opposed any increase in electricity prices and therefore 
opposed MRET, while renewable energy actors supported MRET because it created a 
guaranteed demand. In the second instance, the division was within renewables actors 
– between hydro and non-hydro renewables. The tension between the two seemingly 
complementary objectives of greenhouse abatement and industry development, later 
diluted to “additional renewable energy”, showed the uncertainty over which should 
be the primary goal. These debates led to uncertainty during the first few years of 
MRET which Section 4.3 will discuss further. 
4.2.4 Design of MRET 
From an SNM perspective, MRET combines elements of market and technological 
protection in that it created a market, but only specific technologies are eligible to 
                                                 
41 After the first 21 months of operation, the Renewable Energy Regulator reported that of the RECs 
created to December 2002, approximately 37% were from hydro, 22% from solar hot water, 12% from 
bagasse, and 11% from wind (www.orer.gov.au/publications/2002/index.html). At the end of 2006, 
approximately 34% came from hydro, 21% from wind, 20% from solar hot water and 9% from bagasse 
(www.orer.gov.au/publications/2006-administrative-report.html). 
Chapter 4 – Energy policy 
118 
participate in this market. The level of “protection” depended on amount of income 
that renewable energy generators receive from RECs. This was affected by a number 
of design features including the balance between the demand for RECs (annual 
targets) and supply (eligible technologies), the mechanisms used to ensure that a 
market was created (compliance mechanisms), and the length of time over which 
income from RECs could be received (duration of the market). These main design 
parameters were the source of much debate during the design of MRET and show that 
the ultimate design was shaped to minimise risk and cost for energy users. It was also 
during the design of MRET that a requirement for a review was introduced into the 
legislation42. 
The protagonists and arguments in these policy design debates were unsurprising 
given the discussion in the previous sections. Renewable energy supporters wanted a 
policy that maximised the expected price for RECs and they were critical of proposals 
that might reduce the REC price. For example, they argued for or supported a higher 
2010 target, a linear phase in of interim targets, the exclusion of existing large 
hydro43, and high penalties for actors who did not meet their annual targets (Australia, 
2000a, b, Senate ECITARC, 2000b). They argued that designs such as these would 
better stimulate industry development and enable wind power manufacturing to be 
established in Australia (Australia, 2000a, Senate ECITARC, 2000b). In contrast, 
energy intensive industry supported policy design that would minimise the expected 
costs of MRET: for example, a fixed rather than a percentage target, lower targets, 
lower penalties for not meeting annual targets, and flexibility mechanisms such as 
                                                 
42 The MRET was review held in 2003 and is discussed further in Section 4.4. 
43 The renewables industry was divided on this issue, with hydro actors arguing that existing hydro 
should be eligible because it could provide a low cost source of RECs by upgrading existing assets 
which were up to many decades old. Non-hydro renewables actors argued that existing large hydro 
should be excluded because it did not require industry support. 
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being able to make-up shortfalls in annual targets in the following year and being able 
to bank unused RECs for use in later years  (AAC, 2000, Australia, 2000b, Senate 
ECITARC, 2000b). 
Throughout these debates the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO), who were 
involved with drafting the legislation, supported the design of the scheme. They 
justified the target by stating that Australia was the only country with a mandatory 
target and that it already had a relatively large proportion of renewables (Senate 
ECITARC, 2000b). They supported the dual-linear phase-in because they expected it 
to lower the overall cost of MRET by increasing the fluidity of the REC market, 
enabling low cost RECs created in early years to meet the targets towards 2010, and 
giving time for liable parties to gain experience in sourcing RECs (Senate ECITARC, 
2000b). At the Senate inquiry in 2000, Phil Harrington of the AGO referred to UK 
experience which indicated that high initial targets would result in lower domestic 
content because overseas firms and technology would be used to meet the initial 
demand (Australia, 2000b). The AGO supported the proposed level of the shortfall 
charge at $40 per REC not acquitted, stating that this value was based on economic 
modelling (See MMA, 1999) and was an attempt to balance supporting renewables by 
creating a demand for RECs while at the same time controlling the overall cost of the 
scheme (Australia, 2000b); in SNM terms the AGO was trying to balance protection 
and pressure. The Senate committee noted that there was an “uncomfortable tension” 
between the use of the charge as a compliance incentive and as a cost cap because as a 
compliance incentive it should be set high, while as a cost cap it should be set low  
(Senate ECITARC, 2000b). 
The final design of MRET had a target as shown earlier in Figure 7. The constant 
target between 2010 and 2020 was a design feature proposed by the RTWG who 
noted that if proponents developing projects close to 2010 had only a few years to 
recover their investment, then the cost of RECs to make those projects viable would 
be very high (RTWG, 1999). The shortfall charge was left at $40/MWh. The final 
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design also required a comprehensive review to be held within 3 years of MRET's 
commencement (Senate ECITARC, 2000b). The review was intended to enable first-
order learning about how to achieve the objectives of the policy more effectively; 
however by 2003 when the review was held, it also contained a significant element of 
second-order learning (i.e. learning about the underlying goals and assumptions) 
because the 2002 CoAG energy market review panel had recommended that MRET 
be abolished on the grounds that it was not cost-effective. The CoAG review will be 
discussed in Section 4.3, while the MRET review will be discussed in Section 4.4. 
4.2.5 Summary 
The purpose of this section was to provide background on MRET and to highlight two 
key points; first, that the promise and creation of MRET created a protected space for 
renewable energy in Australia and initiated positive feedbacks, and second, that this 
process was highly contentious and characterised by a lack of consensus. 
The Federal Government promised, and then created MRET for economic, 
environmental, and political reasons. The initial promise attracted renewables actors 
and shaped their expectations in positive ways, creating optimism about investment 
and development. In contrast, the promise of MRET negatively shaped the 
expectations of energy intensive industry actors, who feared that MRET would 
increase electricity prices and harm their international competitiveness. 
We also saw that there were debates over the intent and design of MRET; these 
debates were significant because they reappeared in later years and created much 
uncertainty for renewables actors as Section 4.3 will show.  
With respect to the intent, the debates were about how to best implement the vague 
notions of greenhouse abatement and industry development. In terms of greenhouse 
abatement, renewables actors argued in favour of MRET, stating that it was a long-
term greenhouse measure, while fossil fuel and energy intensive industry actors 
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argued against it because they claimed that prescribing the technologies to be used 
was not a cost-effective way to reduce emissions. In terms of industry development, 
there was an unresolved tension over whether the 2% target was a means for long-
term greenhouse abatement through industry development or for short-term 
greenhouse abatement to be achieved at the lowest cost which meant including 
existing renewable generators. This issue was hotly debated by hydro actors and other 
renewables actors; hydro and some other actors argued that they should be included 
because otherwise the proportion of renewables might decrease as old plant was 
decommissioned, and non-hydro renewables and other actors arguing that they should 
not be eligible because hydro did not require industry development and that it would 
weaken the support for other technologies. 
With respect to the design of MRET, actors debated a number of key features that 
shaped how well MRET supported renewables, in particular the size and phase-in of 
the targets, which technologies should be eligible to create RECs, the compliance 
mechanism, and the duration of the targets. In summary, renewables supporters 
typically argued for design features which would increase the level of protection, for 
example higher targets, the exclusion of existing hydro, and higher penalties for non-
compliance which they viewed as a punishment for non-compliance. In contrast, 
energy intensive industry actors typically argued for design features which would 
minimise the expected increase in the cost of electricity and in doing so decrease the 
level of protection, for example, lower targets, more eligible technologies, and lower 
penalties for non-compliance which they viewed as a cap on costs. Ultimately, MRET 
was designed to support renewables in a way that was palatable to energy intensive 
industry44, for example fixed targets, flexibility in meeting the targets each year, 
                                                 
44 There was little criticism from electricity retailers during the development of MRET, presumably 
because it was just going to be an administrative burden and they would pass on the cost of RECs to 
their customers.  
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banking of certificates, the inclusion of existing hydro, and a fixed penalty not linked 
to CPI. A review was also included because actors felt that many of the design 
decisions were best resolved with operational experience. In its implemented form, 
MRET protected renewables by creating an income stream (RECs) in addition to the 
sale of electricity. This meant that projects could be financially viable and as shown in 
Chapter 3, this spurred the rapid growth in wind power. 
4.3 Emerging uncertainty in the market for wind power 
The promise and introduction of MRET resulted in a significant level of wind farm 
activity and positive expectations; however this was dampened within the first year of 
operation. By the end of 2002, actors were uncertain about the supply for RECs due to 
the eligibility of existing large hydro, and about the demand for RECs due to a 
recommendation from a Government-appointed panel that MRET be abolished. This 
uncertainty affected investment decisions related to wind power as the next section 
will now discuss. 
4.3.1 Supply: Competition in the REC market 
Soon after MRET began, it became apparent that existing hydro generators were able 
to create large numbers of RECs by upgrading existing assets, although some 
suggested that they were receiving a windfall without any real increase in output (e.g. 
AEA, 2002). This became known as the base-lines issue, because these hydro 
generators had to generate above a confidential baseline set by the Office of the 
Renewable Energy Regulator45. This issue gained prominence in mid 2002 when the 
                                                 
45 This requirement to generate above a baseline applied to all renewable generators existing before 
1997, the focus on large scale hydro was because it made up the vast majority of existing renewable 
generators and was able to create relatively low cost RECs. 
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then Australian EcoGeneration Association46 released a report which claimed that no 
new projects would be required until 2008 because existing hydro generation could 
create all the RECs that were needed until that time (AEA, 2002) .  
In hindsight this did not occur47, but at the time this caused great concern amongst 
other renewables actors, including wind farm developers, who were trying to get their 
projects off the ground. The Federal Government responded with a media release 
stating that existing and new generators had a role to play in meeting MRET (Kemp, 
2002). This did not placate non-hydro actors. The concern of the wind industry was 
evident in a 2002 Senate inquiry into administrative amendments for MRET. Despite 
the review being focused on administrative matters, the main issue raised by 
submitters was that of baselines and the eligibility of existing generation48 (Senate 
ECITA Legislation Committee, 2002). The Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria 
note that there was still an undefined balance between the objectives of industry 
development and greenhouse abatement (SEAV, 2002b). 
Many wind proponents went on the offensive, citing the base-lines issue as a major 
flaw in the MRET legislation (Pacific Hydro, 2002d), claiming that it made it difficult 
for developers to reach financial closure (AusWEA, 2002f, NEG Micon, 2002), and 
that it created uncertainty about investment in local manufacturing facilities (NEG 
                                                 
46 In 2002, the Australian EcoGeneration Association merged with the Sustainable Energy Industry 
Association to become the Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE). In 2007, the 
BCSE merged with AusWEA to form the Clean Energy Council. 
47 I can only speculate at why this was the case. Partly it could have been because of an extended 
drought leading to less water available for hydro generation. It could also have been because of a 
business strategy of hydro actors, or simply that the projections were based on incorrect assumptions. 
48 Another issue raised was the level of the target. The Senate committee noted that such issues were 
outside its scope and more appropriately dealt with in the upcoming MRET review (Senate ECITA 
Legislation Committee, 2002). 
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Micon, 2002). Turbine manufacturer NEG-Micon noted that it the issue could create a 
negative feedback loop whereby the wind industry would not reach the “critical mass” 
required to establish local manufacturing, leading to a continuing reliance on more 
expensive imports, which in turn would hinder the development of projects and limit 
employment benefits (NEG Micon, 2002). 
In contrast, Hydro Tasmania (2002d), who operates about one third of Australia’s 
hydro capacity and is also a wind farm developer, responded that MRET had enabled 
it to upgrade its aging hydro assets and improve the efficiency of the hydro 
generators. They also noted that REC prices and industry investment were both 
greater than expected before MRET began and that there was sufficient demand to 
support a nacelle assembly factory in Tasmania, linked to one of Hydro Tasmania’s 
projects (Hydro Tasmania, 2002d). 
The baselines issue was not resolved during 2002 and was debated further at the 2003 
MRET review which will be discussed in Section 4.4.2. 
4.3.2 Demand: Uncertain future of MRET 
The other, arguably more significant source of uncertainty during 2002 was the 
possibility that MRET might be abolished. During 2002, an independent panel was 
appointed to review stationary energy arrangements in Australia; this was known as 
the CoAG energy market review. The energy market review did not assess the 
performance of MRET, but did assess options for reducing greenhouse emissions 
from electricity supply and the likely costs and benefits (Energy Market Review - 
Issues Paper, 2002); the review was effectively second-order learning because it 
questioned existing greenhouse policies for the stationary energy sector. 
An interesting feature of submissions to this review was the different perspectives of 
renewables and energy intensive actors. Renewable interests argued for more 
favourable design of MRET and did not consider its existence under threat – they saw 
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the review as first-order learning, i.e. how to achieve existing objectives more 
effectively. For example, Hydro Tasmania (2002c), the Renewable Energy Generators 
Association (REGA, 2002), and AusWEA (2002e) stated that MRET had generated 
some momentum and that changes were needed to build this further (discussed further 
in Section 4.4). In contrast, energy intensive industries and electricity retailers saw the 
review as an opportunity for second-order learning. They were critical of MRET and 
other existing greenhouse measures stating that they were not least-cost because they 
specified particular fuel sources, that they involved costly and complex reporting, and 
that they were fragmented because they were inconsistent between states (e.g. AAC, 
2002b, APIC, 2002, NRF, 2002). 
In hindsight, renewables actors had a difficult task at this review given the make-up of 
the panel. The panel members had backgrounds in the coal, oil and gas industries and 
in economic and industrial reforms, and the panel was chaired by Warwick Parer who 
was the Minister for Resources and Energy between 1996 and 199849 and who also 
had a long history with coal50(CoAG, c2002). 
The review panel concluded in line with the electricity retailers and energy intensive 
industries. In its draft report, the panel presented three criticisms of existing 
greenhouse measures, including MRET (Parer et al., 2002b). First, the panel felt that 
they were poorly targeted because they specified technologies or fuel sources rather 
than greenhouse gas abatement. They stated that the only rationale for supporting 
renewable energy was to conserve fossil fuels and that this was not an issue for 
Australia because of its abundant fossil fuel resources (Parer et al., 2002b). Second, 
the panel concluded that the measures were uncoordinated because electricity market 
                                                 
49 Parer was Minster when the Kyoto COP-3 was held in 1997. 
50 Parer was even accused of a conflict of interest (dismissed by the Prime Minister) in 1998 because 
his family trust owned shares in coal mining companies while he was minister (Australia, 1998a, b). 
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participants operating at a national level had to comply with a number of measures, 
increasing regulatory complexity and compliance costs (Parer et al., 2002b). Third, 
the panel concluded that the measures created uncertainty because energy market 
participants had to estimate likely future costs of greenhouse compliance from 
multiple schemes and conservatively factor this into investment costs (Parer et al., 
2002b). The result was that some investments would not go ahead which perhaps 
should have and that the prices charged for those that did would be higher to cover the 
expected costs of greenhouse compliance (Parer et al., 2002b). 
In place of MRET and other schemes, the panel proposed an economy wide emission 
trading system from which energy intensive industries were exempt until international 
competitors introduced similar schemes. If this had been put into effect, it would have 
removed the specific protection from renewables, replaced it with a more general 
form of protection, and exempted those industries which were major contributors to 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
While many supported the introduction of emissions trading, the recommendation to 
abolish MRET drew outrage from renewable energy supporters. Actors criticised the 
panel for not acknowledging the industry development objectives of MRET (BCSE, 
2002b, Pacific Hydro, 2002c) and stated that the abolition of MRET would cripple the 
wind industry in Australia (AusWEA, 2002d, Hydro Tasmania, 2002b). AusWEA 
(2002d) argued that renewable energy should be supported as part of a long term 
strategy to reduce greenhouse emissions and that fossil-fuel based strategies, such as 
sequestration, would not be least cost in the long term. Wind actors from various parts 
of the supply chain commented that even if MRET was not ultimately abolished, the 
mere recommendation by such a high-level panel had increased investment 
uncertainty (ANZ Infrastructure Services, 2002, Babcock & Brown, 2002, Hydro 
Tasmania, 2002b, Pacific Hydro, 2002c). 
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At the other extreme, the Australian Aluminium Council felt that the panel had not 
gone far enough and stated that CoAG should “… quickly agree to a moratorium on 
all new or expanded greenhouse measures in the energy sector (including the review 
of MRET)” (AAC, 2002a p.3). The Australian Coal Association went even further, 
stating that it was “surprised” that the panel did not also recommend the abolition of 
other State measures which subsidised renewable energy and energy efficiency (ACA, 
2002). 
In its final report, the CoAG review panel acknowledged that abolishing MRET 
would affect investments made to date and recommended that those projects which 
had reached financial closure be paid a subsidy equivalent to what they would have 
received (Parer et al., 2002a). In response to the accusation that they had ignored the 
industry development objectives of MRET, the panel argued if the Government 
wished to support renewable energy then this should occur outside of the energy 
market (Parer et al., 2002a). At the end of 2002, MRET and the wind industry faced 
an uncertain future. 
4.3.3 Summary 
In the first two years of MRET there was a rapid rise in wind farm related activity, but 
also a high level of uncertainty about the supply of RECs from existing hydro 
generators and the continued existence of MRET following the recommendation from 
the CoAG energy market review that it be abolished. This uncertainty in the supply of 
and demand for RECs affected the wind industry as developers found it difficult to 
obtain long-term contracts for the sale of RECs and electricity, and in turn to find 
investors and reach financial closure. This in turn hampered the positive feedbacks of 
scale and learning economies. It also created uncertainty for turbine manufacturers 
who were looking to establish facilities in Australia. The uncertainty slowed the 
momentum of wind power in Australia. 
Chapter 4 – Energy policy 
128 
4.4 Increasing the demand for wind power? 
Leading into the 2003 MRET review, the Australian wind industry was in a state of 
uncertainty. The CoAG review panel’s recommendation to abolish MRET was 
making many firms nervous. Would MRET continue? By this time AusWEA had 
grown significantly, become more politically savvy and engaged in lobbying. It 
embarked on what was to become known as the 10x10 campaign – a 10% MRET by 
2010. This campaign and the MRET review are analysed in this section. 
4.4.1 AusWEA’s MRET campaign – building legitimacy 
Throughout 2003, AusWEA spearheaded an extensive campaign for the retention and 
increase of MRET51. Put simply, AusWEA (2002a) argued that while MRET had 
enabled an industry to form, it was insufficient to enable the industry to become self-
sustaining. In AusWEA’s view, the MRET framework was good, but the targets were 
too low and the expansion of existing hydro had reduced the available market for 
wind (AusWEA, 2002a). AusWEA advocated a target of an additional 10% of 
renewables or about 30,000 GWh by 2010, 20% or about 70,000 GWh by 2020, and 
further targets out to 2050 (AusWEA, 2002a). 
AusWEA’s specific objectives in this campaign were simple, first, to reduce 
opposition and increase public support for wind farms amongst project stakeholders 
and the general public, and second, to secure MRET and achieve an increase in the 
                                                 
51 AusWEA was not the only organisation that mounted a campaign to maintain and raise MRET. 
However, from the outside at least, it appeared to be the most extensively orchestrated campaign, 
including enrolling a large number of other actors – the 10 x 10 coalition as will be discussed shortly. I 
suggest that this occurred because there was latent local support for wind power and the world-wide 
growth meant that once there was a market opportunity in Australia, the industry was able to mobilise 
quickly. An additional factor was that key actors in AusWEA at that time, such as Karl Mallon, had 
experience in political lobbying and energy policy (Mallon, 2006). 
Chapter 4 – Energy policy 
129 
targets (Mallon, 2003, 2006). Karl Mallon (2006), one of the key actors in the 
campaign for AusWEA, stated that these objectives came as a result of the increased 
opposition to wind projects in the media and the opportunity that the review provided 
for more favourable policy design. Initially, AusWEA’s MRET objective had been to 
raise the target, however after the CoAG review recommendation to abolish MRET, 
AusWEA also had to fight for MRET to be retained (Mallon, 2006). 
In formulating their campaign, AusWEA expected that public opinion would be 
important to politicians (i.e. that political legitimacy was linked to social legitimacy) 
and also sought advice from a political consultant who interviewed 12 key policy-
making actors (Mair, 2003, Mallon, 2006). One of the main areas of attention was 
building the social legitimacy of wind power by responding to reported opposition to 
wind farms and by emphasising links between wind power and sustainability. They 
did this in a number of ways. They sought to operationalise a vision of “appropriate 
development”; they began producing educational information and responding to 
newspaper articles and letters-to-the-editor; and they began engaging with groups on 
key issues such as landscape and bird impacts. These activities will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. As part of their campaign they commissioned surveys and 
highlighted the public support with wind power (Australian Research Group, 2003, 
AusWEA, 2003a, AusWEA et al., 2003). 
Another focus was on building support for an increase to MRET. AusWEA facilitated 
a large and diverse actor network who supported a 10% MRET for 2010 using a 
website and regular newsletters; this became known as the 10x10 coalition (AusWEA 
et al., 2003). The website enabled people to easily submit a short statement to the 
review panel supporting an increase to MRET (See Appendix 3 of Tambling et al., 
2003). 
Another priority was building a business case for wind power. AusWEA released 
reports on the regional employment and investment that could come from wind power 
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(AusWEA, 2003c, g, Passey, 2003), estimated the costs of a higher MRET and argued 
that they were acceptable (AusWEA, 2003d, Reardon and Mallon, 2003), and argued 
that the public was willing to pay to support renewable energy (Australian Research 
Group, 2003). In their submission to the MRET panel, they emphasized that wind 
farms have multiple economic benefits and that an increased MRET was required to 
continue to bring costs down (AusWEA, 2003g). The push for economies of scale was 
present in this message with AusWEA arguing that the targets must be raised to 
enable local manufacturing of more than wind turbine towers. Their claim was that 
this would decrease costs and increase local benefits resulting from local employment 
and investment. They also argued that increased targets would take pressure off 
windier but more controversial sites, however the logic of their argument was 
questionable – more sites would be required to meet a higher target, but why wouldn’t 
higher targets attract more developers and still create the intense competition for 
sites? 
AusWEA’s goal was to build the legitimacy of wind power and in doing so to build 
support for wind power from the public, the MRET panel and Government. As we 
shall see they had some success, but not what they had hoped for. 
4.4.2 MRET review 
The MRET review began in earnest in March 2003 with the announcement of the 
panel (Kemp and Macfarlance, 2003). The backgrounds of the panel members 
appeared to be more balanced than those on the CoAG energy market review, 
consisting of members with backgrounds in government policy, renewable energy, 
communications and industry (Kemp and Macfarlance, 2003).  
The panel was given detailed terms of reference which in essence asked the panel to 
assess the effects of MRET and review possible design changes (Kemp and 
Macfarlance, 2003). The topics of most significance for wind power were whether 
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MRET should be retained, the effect of MRET to date, how MRET should be refined 
(if it was to be retained), and how any future reviews should be scheduled. The 
panel’s findings provide a good insight into the status of the wind industry at that time 
because of the extensive consultation that was undertaken – 264 written submissions 
and 1000s of submissions from AusWEA’s 10x10 website were received, and the 
panel conducted over 100 face-to-face discussions. The following sections discuss the 
issues noted in turn. 
4.4.2.1 Justification for MRET 
The MRET review was a chance for further second-order learning following the 
CoAG review recommendation that MRET be replaced with emissions trading. 
Familiar arguments were put forward in submissions. Energy intensive industry again 
questioned the cost efficiency of MRET as a greenhouse measure and the panel was 
asked why renewable energy should receive special assistance52 (AIGN, 2003, 
Minerals Council of Australia, 2003, Tambling et al., 2003). Renewables actors and 
supporters offered many reasons why renewable energy technologies warranted 
specific protection and the review panel supported these reasons, including 
(AusWEA, 2003g, BCSE, 2003b, Greenpeace, 2003, Tambling et al., 2003, Victorian 
Government, 2003): 
- To encourage diversity in fuel sources as a part of a risk management strategy 
                                                 
52 The panel also received a number of submissions from groups or residents who opposed wind power 
or specific projects. They argued that wind power had landscape, noise, bird and grid integration issues, 
meaning that wind power was not a sustainable technology and therefore not worth supporting 
(Tambling et al., 2003). The review panel responded that such matters were best dealt with by planning 
and environmental regulation policies and encouraged the public authorities and developers to respond 
to community concerns (Tambling et al., 2003). 
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- As insurance against more stringent greenhouse abatement targets in the future  
- Because of the high level of public support and willingness to bear costs (i.e. 
social legitimacy) 
- Because renewables are not faced with a level playing field given that State 
Governments and consumers paid for the development of existing generation 
technologies and infrastructure, whereas renewables have to pay their own 
way53 
- Renewables have multiple benefits, including employment and regional 
development, which may decrease the need for funding these areas directly. 
- Because Australia needs to invest in renewables now if it wants to realise the 
environmental and economic benefits of them in the future. 
In contrast to the CoAG review panel, the MRET panel emphasized the industry 
development objectives of MRET. While concluding that MRET was justified, the 
panel also stated that MRET should be seen as a temporary measure, as argued by the 
Minerals Council of Australia (2003), one intended to enable the renewables industry 
to become competitive with fossil fuels.  
The panel noted that the Australian wind industry was dependent on MRET and was 
not yet at a stage where it could move from being under the specific protection of 
MRET to the more general protection of emissions trading as proposed by the CoAG 
review panel (Tambling et al., 2003). An emissions-trading scheme was expected to 
speed the cost convergence between wind and incumbents by increasing the cost of 
                                                 
53 I will discuss the issues associated with funding new network infrastructure to wind farms in Chapter 
5. 
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fossil fuel generated electricity, but this would not amount to the same level of 
support as MRET. This is because a much wider range of technologies and energy 
efficiency measures would be able to participate in emissions trading, potentially with 
lower costs that wind power. The panel noted that if emissions trading did eventuate, 
there would need to be a transition from MRET to carbon trading to avoid an increase 
in investment uncertainty (Tambling et al., 2003). 
4.4.2.2 The effect of MRET 
One of the major tasks for the panel was to assess how well MRET had performed to 
date. Their findings show that MRET was stimulating momentum for wind power and 
the following sections frame their assessment in SNM terms. 
Learning and embedding 
MRET had enabled significant learning and embedding. It had created an opportunity 
for actors to learn about “configurations that might work”, for example in terms of the 
grid integration of intermittent generation and planning policies for wind power 
(Tambling et al., 2003). These will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Decreasing cost 
MRET had enabled the wind industry to achieve cost decreases through scale and 
learning economies, increased local manufacturing, and reduced financing risk 
premiums from informational returns54 (Tambling et al., 2003) – although not to the 
point that the industry was self-sustaining55. For the panel, decreasing costs were the 
                                                 
54 The panel also noted that costs were decreasing due to improvements in wind turbine technology, 
although this was largely the result of R&D going on outside Australia (Tambling et al., 2003). 
55 The actual costs of developing a wind farm are not publicly available so the finding of the MRET 
panel is the best information that we have. Rule-of-thumb $/MW-installed have been estimated in 
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most important dynamic associated with supporting renewables. In fact, in the panel’s 
view, the measure for the success of MRET was whether or not renewables became 
competitive with other forms of generation (Tambling et al., 2003).  
Attracting actors 
The panel did not explicitly comment on the increased number of actors involved with 
wind power since MRET began, however it was clear from the number of and content 
of submissions that many actors had been attracted to wind energy in Australia 
because of the opportunity created by MRET. 
Increasing use and functionality 
The panel noted that MRET had enabled the renewable energy industry to grow 
significantly with consequent economic and environmental benefits. For the industry 
as a whole, estimated employment levels had risen from approximately 4000 to 6000 
equivalent full-time positions, and by 2003 an estimated Aus$900 million had been 
invested in projects and over Aus$1 billion worth of investment was committed or 
planned (Tambling et al., 2003). The panel reported that the best estimates for the 
greenhouse abatement as a result of MRET was 0.37 million tons CO2–e in 2001 and 
0.70 million tons CO2–e in 2002 (Tambling et al., 2003). 
In relation to wind power, the panel noted that 17 wind farms had been built since 
1997 and registered under MRET and that as of August 2003, wind farms had 
contributed 11% of the RECs created to date (Tambling et al., 2003). 
                                                                                                                                            
industry publications at about $1500/MW to $2000/MW with no obvious downward trend (IEA, 1999, 
2006, Meier et al., 2002, SEDA, 2002). Similarly, the costs of electricity generated from wind farms 
were not publicised and estimates typically ranged between about $70 /MWh and $120/MWh (Parer et 
al., 2002a, Senate ECITARC, 2000b). 
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Expectations of the future 
While MRET had stimulated positive feedbacks, the momentum was yet not self-
sustaining and the industry’s expectations for the future were not positive. The CoAG 
review and the ongoing MRET review had created uncertainty within the industry. 
The panel received no submissions that MRET as it was would result in a competitive 
renewable energy industry (Tambling et al., 2003). Both submitters and the panel felt 
that under the existing design, MRET would no longer create a demand for renewable 
energy (i.e. cease to provide protection) from about 2007. This was for two reasons 
(Tambling et al., 2003). The first was that they expected that existing generators and 
committed projects as of 2007 could supply all the RECs needed under MRET. The 
second was that in order to obtain finance, project proponents needed in the order of 
15 years to recoup the initial investment and MRET was scheduled to end in 202056. 
The result for the wind industry was that there would not be enough demand to 
support more than one turbine manufacturer in Australia, or to maintain the cost 
reductions associated with scale and learning economies (Tambling et al., 2003). In 
late 2005, Rick Maddox (2005), former vice-president of AusWEA stated that 
developers were having difficulty negotiating purchasing agreements with retailers. 
The panel noted that MRET was not designed in a way that recognised the rates of 
cost decrease and that it needed to be of sufficient duration to enable renewables 
actors to demonstrate that cost convergence would occur (Tambling et al., 2003). 
They proposed a number of design modifications which are discussed next. 
                                                 
56 This later point was recognised to some extent in the design of MRET, although only 10 years of 
constant target between 2010 and 2020 was incorporated based on UK experience with its Non-Fossil 
Fuel Obligation (RTWG, 1999). 
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4.4.2.3 The redesign of MRET 
Based on its consultations and analysis, the MRET panel proposed modifications to 
MRET so that it would more effectively support the renewable energy industry. 
Economic modelling conducted for the panel suggest that wind power would be a big 
winner under the modified MRET, achieving a market share of 41% in 2020, 
compared to 11% in mid 2003 (Tambling et al., 2003). 
With the benefit of their consultations, the MRET review panel were more aware of 
the importance of positive feedbacks than the RTWG had been. The panel noted that, 
in order to achieve industry development, MRET must provide certainty for 
investment, be of sufficient size to enable scale economies, and of sufficient duration 
to enable local manufacturing and learning economies (Tambling et al., 2003); 
although the focus was still on those dynamics associated with cost and to a lesser 
extent on learning and embedding. 
4.4.2.4 Demand 
Many submissions commented on the level of the target. According to the panel 
report, most submissions argued for a higher MRET target, either true 2%57, 4-5%, or 
10%. AusWEA and the advocacy coalition it had formed as part of its MRET review 
campaign was a strong advocate for a 10% target by 2010. Reasons given for higher 
targets included industry development, regional development, employment benefits, 
                                                 
57 The 9500 GWh target of MRET was originally meant to increase the proportion of renewable 
generation in Australia’s electricity supply from approximately 10.2% to 12.2% by 2010 (RTWG, 
1998). However, electricity demand grew more quickly than was expected such that MRET was 
expected only to maintain the proportion of renewables. The Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
estimated that a target of 15,300 GWh was required to achieve a 2% increase (BCSE, 2002a). 
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and comparisons to international targets58 (Tambling et al., 2003). Interestingly, a 
number of fossil-fuel based generators who had diversified their assets to include 
renewables supported an increase in the target (e.g. Delta Electricity, 2003, Origin 
Energy, 2003). Energy intensive industries did not want the target to increase because 
they wanted to avoid any increases in the price of electricity; however, they had 
softened somewhat on the existence of MRET and accepted that the scheme should 
continue in its current form because investment had been made in renewable projects 
in good faith (AAC, 2003, AIGN, 2003, Tambling et al., 2003). 
The panel acknowledged that the target should be raised because without ongoing 
demand for new projects, there would be no incentive for local manufacturing and 
learning economies and the renewables industry would stall (Tambling et al., 2003). 
However, the panel did not support the 10% target by 2010. The panel gave two 
reasons. The panel expected that the sites with the best energy resource and access to 
the grid would be developed first –  particularly for hydro, wind and biomass – 
meaning that if targets were set too high it would create a demand for poorer sites to 
be developed ahead of technology improvements, resulting in excessive costs 
(Tambling et al., 2003). Second, the panel doubted the ability of the industry to 
deliver an increased number of RECs by 2010, because it would take years for the 
Government to enact the changes to MRET and for developers to complete proper 
consultation and planning of new projects (Tambling et al., 2003). 
In formulating new targets, the panel drew on the submission from the Business 
Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE, 2003b). The panel proposed a target of 
                                                 
58 Many submissions argued that MRET was low by international standards, but the panel found that 
few international targets were mandatory, or if they were, they would still result in a lower or 
comparable proportion of renewables as Australia has (Australia starting from 10% renewables) 
(Tambling et al., 2003).  
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20,000 GWh by 2020, which was then held constant until 2035 to provide sufficient 
duration for projects in 2020 to recoup their investment (Tambling et al., 2003). 
Modelling conducted for the panel suggested that wind would contribute at least 40% 
of MRET under the panel’s proposal and, based on information from AusWEA and 
the BCSE, the panel expected that its proposal would create sufficient demand to 
support two wind turbine blade manufacturing facilities (MMA, 2003, Tambling et 
al., 2003). 
Supply 
The panel considered a range of issues related to the supply of RECs and existing 
hydro, although they took it as given that existing hydro would continue to be eligible 
to create RECs. The most significant issue in the context of this thesis was that of 
baselines as discussed in Section 4.3.1. The panel concluded that the existing method 
for calculating baselines was appropriate and recommended no change. They did 
however recommend that baselines be published to increase the transparency of the 
REC market. They also recommended that there be a time-limit for creating RECs 
after the eligible electricity has been produced (Tambling et al., 2003). Both of these 
measures were expected to reduce uncertainty on the supply-side of the REC market. 
Compliance 
The shortfall charge was again debated at the MRET review. Renewables actors and 
investors argued as they had previously for the shortfall charge to be linked to 
inflation, while energy intensive industry argued for it to remain as it was (AIGN, 
2003, AusWEA, 2003g, Minerals Council of Australia, 2003, Tambling et al., 2003). 
Interestingly, the panel noted that retailers were attaching a value to good public 
image by indicating a willingness to pay more than the shortfall charge for RECs 
(Tambling et al., 2003). This suggests that there was social protection associated with 
MRET which might have had a financial value should there have been an insufficient 
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supply of RECs. As it turned out, there were sufficient RECs such that the price was 
always below the shortfall charge (Tambling et al., 2003). 
The panel recognised that in order to reach the higher targets they had proposed for 
2020, the shortfall payment would have to be adjusted to reduce the investment 
uncertainty that liable parties might choose to pay the penalty rather than buy RECs 
(Tambling et al., 2003). They also were aware that if the charge was set too high, then 
it would increase the costs of the scheme and reduce pressure on industry to reduce 
costs (Tambling et al., 2003) – they showed awareness of what SNM refers to as the 
need to balance protection and pressure. They recommended that the charge remain at 
$40/MWh and that it be indexed to inflation between 2010 and 2020. The panel 
expected that the declining real value of the charge before 2010 and after 2020 would 
put pressure on renewables to innovate and reduce costs, while the link to inflation 
between 2010 and 2020 would enable REC prices to rise high enough to support 
projects. 
Duration 
The length of the scheme was again discussed with a number of submitters stating that 
MRET would cease to be useful after about 2007 in part because contracts of 15 years 
were needed (Tambling et al., 2003). As noted earlier, many submissions argued that 
higher targets and a longer duration were required for renewables to become cost 
competitive with incumbent technologies. In contrast, some actors, such as the 
Minerals Council of Australia (2003) stated that MRET needed to have a set 
timeframe to indicate to proponents of renewables the time they have to become 
competitive. 
The panel acknowledged that the renewables industry required more time to 
demonstrate that it could be cost competitive, but also that renewables actors should 
regard MRET as a temporary measure (Tambling et al., 2003). In proposing a new 
level for the target, the panel recognised the need to take the duration of the scheme 
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required59 (Tambling et al., 2003). In proposing higher targets for 2020, the panel also 
recommended that projects be guaranteed a demand for RECs for 15 years, thus the 
new end date for the scheme would be 2035. 
Future reviews 
The need for any future reviews of MRET was also discussed. Some actors were 
strongly against future reviews because of the uncertainty that they created (CVC 
Reef, 2003)60. AusWEA suggested another review in 2006 for the purpose of 
reviewing the target upward if electricity demand had risen faster than expected, but 
noted that actors should be assured that the targets would not be reduced or abolished 
to avoid increasing investment uncertainty (AusWEA, 2003g). Delta Electricity61 
similarly recommended that any future reviews should be limited in scope such they 
would not reduce the target or the shortfall charge (Delta Electricity, 2003). 
The Panel noted that the CoAG and MRET reviews had created uncertainty, which 
had harmed investor confidence and led to the delay of projects which otherwise 
might have proceeded (Tambling et al., 2003). However, the panel also noted that 
reviews were a useful way to ensure that policies were operating as intended and that 
                                                 
59 This had been noted in the submission from the Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE, 
2003b) 
60 CVC Ltd is a venture capital company who manage the Renewable Energy Equity Fund (REEF), 
which was set up to increase private investment in renewable energy technologies 
(www.cvc.com.au/cvcr/index.php). The fund portfolio includes a two-turbine, 1.3 MW wind farm in 
New South Wales. 
61 Delta Electricity was formed in the mid 1990s as a result of the restructuring of the NSW electricity 
sector. It has over 4000MW of generation capacity, which is predominantly fossil fuel based, however 
they do have renewable energy assets and were looking to develop the Gunning wind farm 
(www.de.com.au).  
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government objectives were being met (Tambling et al., 2003). In SNM terms, this 
illustrates the tension between learning and embedding. 
The panel sought to balance the need for learning against avoiding uncertainty. Their 
approach was to identify situations when learning might be required, so-called 
triggers; they identified two such situations: if an emissions trading scheme was set up 
(i.e. significant change in the policy context) or if greater that 15% of liabilities was 
met using the shortfall charge in two consecutive years (i.e. if MRET was no longer 
meeting its objectives) (Tambling et al., 2003). 
4.4.2.5 MRET review summary 
The MRET review panel made a number of recommendations which it expected 
would more effectively support the renewable energy industry in the long term. It did 
not recommend an increase in the 2010 target as AusWEA desired, however it did 
recommend that targets increase until 2020. It responded to the uncertainty regarding 
the inclusion of existing hydro by recommending that the baselines be made available 
to the public. It also recognised and responded to two tensions. The first, the tension 
between protection and pressure, arose in relation to the shortfall charge. The panel 
recognised that too high a charge would reduce the incentive for the renewables 
industry to innovate and decrease costs, however they also realised that if the charge 
was too low then it would not provide the protection required. Their final 
recommendation was to keep the charge at the existing level of $40/MWh, but to 
index it to inflation between 2010 and 2020 to assist in meeting the recommended 
higher target in 2020. The second tension, one between learning and embedding, arose 
in relation to the need for future reviews. The panel recognised that the potential for 
change to MRET (i.e. learning how to make MRET more effective) created 
uncertainty for the renewables industry, however the panel also noted that reviews 
were a valuable part of verifying policy. Their recommendation was to link reviews to 
Chapter 4 – Energy policy 
142 
triggers for learning, in particular if targets were not being met or if an emissions 
trading scheme was introduced. 
4.4.3 Summary 
Throughout 2003, AusWEA ran an extensive campaign aimed at increasing public 
support and convincing the Government to retain and improve MRET. The campaign 
was a strategic one, with AusWEA recognising that the technological protection of 
MRET was based on the social and political legitimacy of renewables. AusWEA tried 
to operationalise its vision of appropriate development, began producing educational 
material and responding to criticism in the media, and engaged with key stakeholders 
on landscape and bird impacts (discussed further in Chapter 6). They also built a large 
and diverse network of actors supporting an increase of MRET to a 10% (increase) 
target by 2010, the so-called 10 x 10 coalition. These socially-focused activities were 
complemented by politically-focused activities. AusWEA obtained information from 
a political consultant on what Government actors considered important and focused 
their efforts. They promoted links between wind power and desirable ideals such as 
sustainability, drought-proofing cash crop, and regional development. A key focus 
was making the business case for the wind industry, arguing that the industry would 
become competitive with incumbent technologies if it was given the right support. 
AusWEA’s efforts were somewhat successful at the MRET review. 
The MRET panel found a number of reasons why MRET should be retained. The 
panel also acknowledged that MRET as it was had stimulated the development of the 
wind (and other renewables) industry, but that without modification MRET would 
cease to be useful before these industries could become self-supporting. The panel 
made a number of recommendations to MRET, not exactly as AusWEA desired, but 
likely to be beneficial none-the-less; the main design recommendation being higher 
targets between 2010 and 2020. As the next section will discuss, the Government did 
not support the panel’s findings. 
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4.5 Ongoing uncertainty 
The period between 2003 and 2007 was a time of ongoing uncertainty for the wind 
industry. The MRET panel presented its report to the Government in September 2003 
and it was released to the public in January 2004. AusWEA continued its efforts to 
build the political legitimacy of wind power while the Federal Government considered 
the panel’s recommendations. In mid 2004 the Government released its climate 
change strategy for stationary energy; MRET would be retained but not increased or 
extended. The future for the wind industry looked grim, however AusWEA did have 
some success at the State-level, with the Labor-led62 governments of Victoria and 
NSW developing their own renewable energy target for political, economic, 
environmental and energy security reasons. 
4.5.1 AusWEA’s post MRET review campaign 
Following the public release of the MRET review panel’s report in January 2004, 
AusWEA continued its lobbying campaign. The objectives for AusWEA were the 
same as for the MRET review; MRET needed to be raised for the wind industry to 
survive. AusWEA continued to try to increase the legitimacy of wind power in the 
eyes of the government.  
One strong message from the MRET review panel was that in order to justify support, 
renewables industries needed to demonstrate that costs would decrease and the 
competiveness of the industries would improve. In its MRET review submission, 
AusWEA had listed how MRET was enabling costs to decrease, but it had not 
estimated when costs would be comparable to incumbent technologies. Mallon and 
Reardon (2004) attempted to address this. They reviewed a number of recent reports 
                                                 
62 At this time, there was the unusual situation in Australia that the Liberal/National party was in power 
at the Federal level, however the Labor party was in power in all the states and territories.   
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on the relative present and future costs of wind power, black coal and combined cycle 
gas turbines in Australia. Their conclusion was that wind generated electricity in 
Australia could be cost competitive with combined cycle gas turbines between 2010 
and 2015, and with black coal at around 2020. The way the report was written showed 
that the wind industry was aware of the political nature of energy policy – they 
emphasized that high growth rates were required to maintain decreasing cost and that 
the actual costs for fossil fuel could be higher because environmental externalities had 
not been included in their analysis. In contrast, they placed relatively little emphasis 
on things which might increase the cost of wind power, for example infrastructure and 
grid management costs. 
 
Figure 8 – Estimated costs of electricity generated using wind, black coal 
and natural gas (Mallon and Reardon, 2004) 
AusWEA also continued to highlight local and overseas industry successes in terms of 
installed capacity, jobs, and investment (AusWEA, 2004a, d, k) and the potential 
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investment and employment opportunities that would be lost if MRET was not raised 
(AusWEA, 2004a, f, i)63. AusWEA also was part of a group which commissioned a 
study into scenarios for a “clean energy future”. This study presented a vision in 
which wind power supplied 20% of Australia’s electricity by 2020 (Saddler et al., 
2004). 
AusWEA’s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful at persuading the incumbent 
Liberal/National Federal Government whose Energy White paper stated they would 
not raise MRET (discussed next section). It was of little consequence that AusWEA’s 
efforts did have an effect on the major opposition Labor party who promised a 5% 
MRET if elected (AusWEA, 2004e); the incumbent government was re-elected at the 
end of 2004. AusWEA’s efforts did however have a positive effect at the state level as 
the next two sections will discuss further. 
4.5.2 White paper on energy 
The wind industry waited with bated breath during the first half of 2004 as the Federal 
Government developed its climate change strategy for energy, which included the fate 
of MRET.  
In June, the Government released its Energy White Paper, Securing Australia's 
Energy Future and stated that MRET would not be raised (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2004). The Government objected to the cost of the MRET panel’s 
recommendation for a 20,000 GWh target in 2020 – they expected the 
recommendation to double the cost of MRET to electricity consumers compared to 
the existing 9500 GWh target for 2010 (Kemp, 2004a). The Government’s interests in 
                                                 
63 The job map created by AusWEA clearly shows how politically motivated its efforts were; the map 
presented employment in the wind industry by federal electorate. 
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energy policy were clear: Australia has cheap, abundant fossil fuel resources which 
provide cheap electricity and are therefore a source of competitive advantage that 
should be exploited for the benefit of energy intensive industry (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2004, Kemp, 2004b). 
The main winners from the white paper were “low emissions technologies”, with 
$500 million promised to support industry-led large-scale demonstration projects of 
low emissions technologies (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). There were 
accusations of elitism following the leaking of notes from a secret meeting between 
the Government and representatives from energy intensive and fossil fuel companies  
(Notes of LETAG meeting, 2004, Fowler, 2004, The Age, 2004); but the Federal 
Government remained firm. The Government stated that it was supporting renewables 
by addressing technical and regulatory barriers, in the case of wind power in the form 
of $14 million for a wind energy forecasting system (Kemp, 2004b). Also, the 
Government did take action to reduce the uncertainty in the supply of RECs, by 
setting time-limits for their creation and requiring that the baselines of existing 
generators be published, and in the demand for RECs by re-affirming its commitment 
to MRET (Kemp, 2004b). These were of little consolation to the wind industry. 
The response of renewables supporters was predictable: outrage (e.g. AusWEA, 
2004h). The Government’s refusal to increase MRET was expected to cripple the 
Australian wind industry (AusWEA, 2005d, Gearing, 2004, Greenblat, 2004, Hoare, 
2004, Mallon, 2004, Mitchell, 2004b, Whinnett, 2004). The $500 million for low-
emissions technologies was expected to be of little use to wind power and more use to 
fossil-fuel based projects64 (IEA, 2005). The development of wind farms was 
                                                 
64 The wind industry’s expectations were largely accurate. The recipients of the first round grants were 
3 CO2 sequestration projects (one linked to gas extraction and two linked to coal-fired power stations), 
a 154 MW solar collector project, and a project to dry brown coal to make the combustion process 
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expected to cease by about 2007 because there would be no more demand for RECs 
(IEA, 2005). 
4.5.3 State-based renewable energy targets and national emissions 
trading 
AusWEA’s campaign was unsuccessful in terms of MRET; however, the wind 
industry’s efforts to increase the political legitimacy of wind power had influenced 
State Governments. State Government energy ministers were critical of the Federal 
Government’s position. They noted that the renewables industry would stall without 
higher targets, leading to a lost opportunity for investment and export, and in the 
subsequent months they began to discuss state-based emissions trading and renewable 
energy targets (Day, 2004, MCE, 2006, Office of the Premier, 2005a, Office of the 
Premier et al., 2004). 
At the time of writing, the Victorian and New South Wales Governments had both 
implemented state-based targets, VRET and NRET respectively.  
VRET was announced by the Victorian Premier, Steve Bracks, at the World Wind 
Energy Conference held in Melbourne in November 2005, where he also reaffirmed 
the Government’s vision of 1000 MW of wind capacity in Victoria by 200665 (Office 
of the Premier, 2005b). AusWEA welcomed the promise of a state-based target 
(AusWEA, 2005f).  
                                                                                                                                            
more efficient and to sequester the CO2 emitted. See the Australian Greenhouse Office website for 
further details (www.greenhouse.gov.au/demonstrationfund/#roundone). 
65 At the end of 2007, there was about 480 MW of wind power installed in Victoria (AusWEA, 2007b). 
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The Victorian and NSW Governments gave a variety of reasons for creating VRET 
and NRET, many of which were consistent with AusWEA’s campaign message, 
including: to prevent the local wind industry collapsing; to boost economies in 
regional areas; to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; to reduce network losses and 
offset the need for network enhancements; and, to help diversify energy supplies (DOI 
and DSE, 2005, NSW Government, 2006, Office of the Premier, 2005b, Theophanous 
and Thwaites, 2005).  
VRET began at the start of 2007 with a target of 3274 GWh by 201666 (ESC, 2007) 
and the NSW Government aimed to start NRET in 2008 with a target of 7,250 GWh 
by 2020 (NSW Government, 2006). Both VRET and NRET67 are similar to MRET in 
their operation (ESC, 2007, NSW Government, 2006). 
 The long-term effects of VRET and NRET on the wind industry were unclear at the 
time of writing. However, as former CEO of AusWEA, Dominique La Fontaine, 
noted when Vestas announced the closure of the Portland blade factory, the 
uncertainty about MRET and the unfulfilled expectations of higher targets meant that 
actors would be much more cautious in their investment decisions (Howard, 2007). 
The second half of 2007 held further promise for the wind industry, although with 
unknown effects at the time of writing. First, following increasing international 
concern about climate change and the costs of inaction, the Liberal/National Federal 
Government announced that it would develop a national emissions trading scheme 
                                                 
66 This target was estimated to be equivalent to 10% of Victoria’s electricity consumption in 2016. 
67 Interestingly, trade-exposed energy-intensive industry will be exempted from any cost increases due 
to NRET (NSW Government, 2006). 
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with an intended start date around 201068. Then, at the November 2007 federal 
election, the opposition Labor party came to power, ending over a decade of 
Liberal/National rule. One of the first actions of the new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, 
was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Franklin and Ryan, 2007). As noted, the impact for 
the wind industry is unknown at the time of writing, however it is clear that without 
MRET and the positive feedbacks of adoption and mutual adaptation that it enabled, 
their would not be an Australian Wind industry that could benefit. 
4.5.4 Summary 
Following the MRET review, AusWEA continued to try to build the political 
legitimacy of wind power. They focused on economic aspects because they were the 
Federal Government’s primary concern. For example, AusWEA quantified when 
wind might become cost competitive with coal and gas, and emphasized local and 
overseas industry success stories and the opportunities that would be lost if MRET 
was not raised. 
AusWEA’s efforts were unsuccessful at getting MRET raised, however the 
Government did promise to retain MRET, to make changes to reduce uncertainty in 
the supply and demand for RECs, and to provide $14 million towards the 
development of a wind power forecasting system. The focus of the Government’s 
climate change strategy for stationary energy was to be so-called low emissions 
technologies, which the wind industry correctly expected would largely be fossil-fuel 
generators. 
                                                 
68 See the following websites for more details www.pmc.gov.au/publications/emissions/index.cfm and 
www.pmc.gov.au/climate_change/emissionstrading/index.cfm  
Chapter 4 – Energy policy 
150 
AusWEA’s efforts had some unintended success at the state level, with State 
Government’s promising to investigate their own renewable energy targets for 
economic and environmental reasons and Victoria and NSW implementing schemes. 
The long-term effects of VRET and NRET were unknown at the time of writing, 
however they appear to be insufficient to support local manufacturing of blades given 
that Vestas announced the closure of the Portland blade factory after VRET began 
(Howard, 2007). The future for the wind industry is uncertain, however the promise of 
national emissions trading and a change to a Labor Federal Government offer some 
hope for the future. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate and explain the significant changes or 
attempts to change related to energy policy. In doing so, I have also tested the insights 
from Chapter 2 in terms of positive feedback dynamics, which actors were in a 
position to encourage these dynamics, and challenges for actors to anticipate. This 
final section will highlight these findings. 
4.6.1 Importance of the dynamics 
This facet of the case has illustrated why stimulating demand, decreasing cost, 
reducing uncertainty, increasing political legitimacy, learning and articulation, 
attracting actors and strengthening expectations are important dynamics in the 
introduction of new technologies. This is summarised in Table 11 and discussed 
further in the following text. 
The chapter showed that stimulating the demand for renewable energy using a 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target had the following effects, it: enabled increasing 
use of wind power, from less than 10 MW up to almost 900 MW; attracted actors 
because of the business opportunity and environmental benefits of the new 
technology; and, provided the initial impetus for adoption and mutual adaptation 
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(discussed further in Chapter 5 and 6). The Federal Government, and later the 
Victorian and NSW State Governments, were in a position to impose mandatory 
renewables targets. 
The chapter showed that reducing costs was important because Government support 
was conditional on renewables becoming cost competitive with incumbents so that 
they could survive on its own. The Federal Government was unwilling to provide on-
going financial support because it did not agree with the business case for supporting 
the wind industry. The higher costs of renewables made them a target for opposition. 
The actors with the most direct influence on costs were turbine manufacturers and 
developers in terms of scale and learning economies, and investors in terms of the risk 
premium they placed on their investments. The Government had an impact on the 
latter in terms of the uncertainty regarding MRET. 
The chapter showed that reducing uncertainty was important because high uncertainty 
hindered other dynamics such as: increasing the commercial legitimacy of wind 
power, attracting actors, increasing use in terms of investment decisions, and 
decreasing costs in terms of investment risk premiums. The main source of 
uncertainty in this chapter was associated with MRET, and as such the Government 
had the most direct influence on it. 
The chapter showed that increasing political legitimacy was important because 
Federal Government actors did not consider renewables to be worth supporting by 
expanding MRET because they expected the costs to outweigh the benefits and that 
other technologies could deliver greater benefits for similar costs. The actors with the 
most direct influence on political legitimacy in this chapter were industry associations 
such as AusWEA and BCSE, and large companies from within the wind industry, 
such as turbine manufacturers and developers. 
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Table 11 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks 
Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Stimulating 
demand 
To enable 
increasing use, 
create a business 
opportunity, attract 
actors, and initiate 
adoption and 
mutual adaptation. 
- Government - Create markets for the new 
technology such as MRET or 
for the product of the 
technology (electricity 
sourced from renewable 
energy) 
Decreasing 
cost 
To become 
competitive with 
incumbent 
technologies 
without the need 
for on-going 
assistance and to 
remove cost as a 
reason for 
opposition. 
- Manufacturers 
- Developers 
- Government 
- Investors 
- Scale economies 
- Learning economies 
- Lower investment risk 
premiums  
- Supply chain improvements 
such as local manufacturing 
 
Increasing 
(political) 
legitimacy  
To encourage 
positive 
expectations about 
the support of the 
technology. 
- Large 
companies 
- Industry 
associations 
- Manufacturers 
- Developers 
- Demonstrate benefits such as 
greenhouse abatement, 
capital investment and 
employment 
- Demonstrate decreasing 
costs 
- Provide a strong business 
case for industry support 
- Strengthen links to positive 
symbols or visions (e.g. 
sustainability, drought-
proofing farms, regional 
development) 
Reducing 
uncertainty 
To remove hurdles 
to increasing the 
technology’s 
commercial 
legitimacy, 
attracting actors, 
increasing use in 
terms of 
investment 
decisions, and 
decreasing costs. 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
(AusWEA) 
- Stable market (continuity in 
protection/market);  
- Clear direction of progress 
(e.g. visions, problems and 
potential solutions);  
- Embedding in visions of the 
future (e.g. wind is part of 
the response to climate 
change), actor groups and 
institutional arrangements;  
- Financial investments. 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Learning and  
articulation 
To better 
understand how to: 
reduce costs, 
reduce uncertainty, 
increase 
legitimacy, have 
justified goals, and 
better achieve 
goals. 
 
 
- Designers 
- Developers 
- Manufacturers 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
- Consultants 
- Company R&D 
- Tacit learning from an 
accumulation of experience 
- Reflecting on past 
experiences 
- Government policy reviews 
consulting a range of 
stakeholders with a 
distinction between reviews 
focused on what the goals 
should be and reviews 
focused on how to more 
effectively achieve existing 
goals. 
- Research by relevant 
professionals (e.g. political 
relations consultant) 
Attracting 
actors 
To build support, 
increase 
legitimacy, and to 
provide all the 
links in the supply 
chain. 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
- Designers 
- Developers 
- Manufacturers 
- Investors 
- NGOs 
- Foster robust, specific and 
high quality expectations of 
economic, environmental, 
and/or social benefits, for 
example: 
- Create a market opportunity 
such as MRET 
- Emission-free characteristics 
of wind power 
- Boost regional economies 
through investment, 
employment, and income. 
 
Strengthening 
expectations 
To attract actors 
and reduce 
uncertainty. 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
- Design policies with 
unambiguous goals 
- Carefully manage second-
order learning processes such 
as policy reviews which 
question the justification for 
existing goals or policies. 
The chapter showed that learning is important in a range of areas. For example, the 
MRET review panel learnt about how the Government could better support 
renewables and AusWEA learnt how to build the political legitimacy of wind power. 
Many different actor groups were in a position to learn, the most significant being the 
Government in terms of energy policy and AusWEA (and other submitters to the 
CoAG and MRET reviews) in terms of lobbying. 
The chapter showed that attracting actors is important because they helped to increase 
the political legitimacy of wind power. Two highly influential actors in attracting 
others were the Federal Government through the creation of MRET and AusWEA 
through its network building in the MRET campaign. 
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Finally, the chapter showed that strengthening expectations was important because it 
helped to reduce uncertainty and attract actors. This was illustrated by negative 
example in this case, where the ambiguous policy objectives of MRET and the 
second-order learning of the CoAG energy market review created negative 
expectations of the future for wind actors. The actor who had the greatest influence on 
actors’ expectations was the Government in terms of MRET. 
This chapter supports the inclusion of these dynamics in a framework for introducing 
new technologies. 
4.6.2 Insights to strengthen SNM 
The events analysed in this chapter have shown that the creation of a market for new 
technologies can stimulate a range of positive feedbacks. It has also shown that 
uncertainty regarding the future demand for the new technologies can hinder these 
feedbacks, reducing their ability to become self-sustaining. We can learn from these 
events to strengthen SNM. I have used a similar style of table to that in Chapter 2 to 
arrange the challenges because many of them relate to more than one dynamic (See 
Table 12). Those challenges and strategies identified in Chapter 2 that are supported 
by this facet of the case are shown in the table in italic text, along with those 
challenges and strategies that have come from this case. The numbers in brackets 
(Chapter-reference) in the table provide a cross-reference to a more detailed 
discussion in the following text and the final chapter. 
4.6.2.1 (4-1) Competition with incumbent actors 
Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) note that actors may be competing with incumbent 
actors to influence the institutional framework. This was seen in this facet of the case. 
Renewables actors and energy intensive industry actors were competing with each 
other to influence the design of MRET and the Federal Government’s climate change 
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strategy for stationary energy. The opposing viewpoints of these groups was not 
surprising given that MRET enabled renewables to be financially viable by essentially 
increasing the cost of electricity. 
The energy intensive industry actors already had a large amount of political 
legitimacy and they had access to key decision makers because of their long history 
and perceived importance in the Australian economy. To counter this, AusWEA 
sought to focus their limited resources in a strategic manner. They engaged Mair 
(2003) to interview policy-makers to understand what they saw as important and 
targeted their message for greatest impact. AusWEA also responded to the comments 
of the MRET review panel about where more information was required in terms of 
decreasing costs. While these efforts were not successful with the Federal 
Government, they did have some success with the Victorian and New South Wales 
Governments who both developed state-based Renewable Energy Targets. 
Table 12 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks 
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Possible strategy 
(4-1) Competition with 
incumbent actors to gain 
influence over the 
institutional framework 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). 
?      ? ? ?  
Increase the political 
legitimacy of the new 
technology. 
(4-2) Government or 
company policies to 
support the technology 
may be intermittent, 
ambiguous, send 
conflicting messages or 
lack a long-term vision 
(Garud and Karnøe, 2003, 
Hoogma et al., 2002, 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004, Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001, Raven, 
2005, Verbong and Geels, 
2007) 
?    ? ?  ? ? ? 
Actors creating protection 
could more carefully 
consider the objectives of 
the protection measure and 
in particular whether they 
complement each other or 
come into conflict when 
applied in detail. 
Proponents of the new 
technology can advocate 
for more consistent 
protection and undertake 
risk management 
strategies to limit the 
impact of the uncertainty. 
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Possible strategy 
(4-3) Protection may not 
be linked to dynamics 
such scale and learning 
economies or local 
manufacturing, including 
international markets, 
technology or R&D (wind 
power case) 
?    ?      
Actors creating protection 
could define up front how 
the success of the 
protection measure will be 
measured. Note that the 
use of a target is likely to 
shift the measure of 
success to whether or not 
the target is met and away 
from learning and positive 
feedbacks. 
(4-4) Balance between 
providing protection and 
maintaining incentive to 
innovate (Kemp et al., 
1998) 
?          
Actors creating market-
based protection measures 
like MRET may find that 
economic studies of 
different options for the 
compliance mechanism 
can inform the design of 
the policy. Note that the 
compliance mechanisms 
may be viewed differently 
by different actors (i.e. as 
a penalty for non-
compliance or as a cap on 
costs). See also (Lauber, 
2004, Mitchell, 1995). 
(4-5) Balance between 
maintaining flexibility for 
learning whilst reducing 
uncertainty and building 
alignment through 
embedding (Hoogma et 
al., 2002)   ?   ?  ?   
Possible strategies for 
actors, particularly those 
who creating protection or 
in control of the 
institutional framework, 
are to establish triggers for 
when learning should 
occur, such as when there 
is a change in context or 
objectives are no longer 
being achieved, or to limit 
the potential for change 
for example by limiting 
the scope of the learning. 
(4-6) Actors measure the 
legitimacy of a technology 
depending on their 
interests (wind power 
case) 
      ?  ?  
Governments may 
measure legitimacy on the 
basis of: articulated 
popular support (or low 
levels of opposition), a 
large advocacy coalition 
or support constituency, a 
strong business case for 
industry support, and the 
contribution of the 
technology to existing 
policy objectives. 
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Possible strategy 
(4-7) New technology may 
be significantly more 
expensive and have lesser 
performance than existing 
options (Kemp and Soete, 
1992) 
?   ? ?      
Actors could seek to 
reduce costs through scale 
and learning economies, 
local manufacturing or 
other improvements in the 
supply chain, and reducing 
uncertainty for investors. 
They may also be able to 
increase the cost of 
incumbents by arguing for 
the inclusion of 
externalities (e.g. carbon 
impact). 
(4-8) Niche actors may be 
fragmented and lack 
political power, rather 
than being a cohesive, 
unified advocate for the 
new technology 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004, Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001). 
?      ? ? ?  
Actors may be able to 
increase their political 
influence by joining forces 
with other actors with 
common interests. This 
can give the technology or 
class of technologies an 
independent voice, it can 
focus and align the 
opinions of actors, it can 
facilitate the creation and 
articulation of trans-local 
knowledge and it can help 
to set a clear problem 
agenda. 
(4-9) Incorrect 
expectations about future 
markets because of 
unforeseen changes, 
optimism, functional or 
substitutional thinking, or 
assumptions of a static or 
malleable context (Geels 
and Smit, 2000) 
?     ?    ? 
“Seek out independent 
observers to assess the 
extent of the project’s 
success” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
 
Actors could become more 
aware of assumptions in 
their expectations of the 
future, such as those 
identified by Geels and 
Smit (2000), and consider 
alternative possibilities as 
part of a risk management 
strategy. 
(4-10) Local search 
processes (i.e. too similar 
to existing regime) 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000) 
       ?  ? 
No strategy identified. 
(4-11) Balance between 
first-order learning and 
second-order learning 
  ?   ?  ?   
No strategy identified 
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4.6.2.2 (4-2) Government policies ambiguous 
A variety of authors have identified the detrimental role that Government policy can 
have in the development of new technology (Garud and Karnøe, 2003, Hoogma et al., 
2002, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001, Raven, 2005, 
Verbong and Geels, 2007). In this case, there was ambiguity over the balance between 
MRET’s non-complementary objectives: greenhouse abatement and industry 
development (or additional renewable energy). The original intent of MRET was 
presented as industry development and long-term abatement, however during 
MRET’s development there was a shift towards short-term abatement and additional 
renewable energy. The tension between the two objectives was never resolved and 
actors tended to interpret the balance to suit their interests. This was a significant 
contributor to the uncertainty that resulted. As Weber et al (1999 p.31) note, “…it is 
important to be clear about the objectives to be pursued.” When designing support 
policies, actors could review the objectives of the protection with a particular view to 
understanding whether the objectives are complementary or may come into conflict. 
Proponents of the new technology can advocate for unambiguous policy and limit the 
impact of uncertainty through risk management strategies. 
4.6.2.3 (4-3) Protection not linked to positive feedbacks 
A challenge that came from this case was that support measures may not be well 
linked to the positive feedbacks that they should stimulate. The goal of MRET, as 
seen by the RTWG (1999) who were involved in its initial design, was to create a 
renewables industry which could exist free from government support – i.e. to possess 
self-sustaining momentum. When MRET was developed, there was some appreciation 
of how it might contribute to positive feedbacks, primarily in relation to scale and 
learning economies and local manufacturing. During the MRET review there was 
greater appreciation of how MRET was contributing to positive feedbacks. In 
recommending modifications, the MRET review panel noted that the original design 
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would not enable wind power to become cost competitive with incumbent 
technologies because the level of the target as originally set was insufficient to 
support significant scale economies and local manufacturing, and the duration of the 
original design was insufficient to support learning economies. While it would be 
difficult to know before the fact exactly how much and for how long support would be 
required to enable a niche to be self-sustaining, greater emphasis could be placed on 
understanding the links between policy and the stimulation of positive feedbacks. 
4.6.2.4 (4-4) Balancing protection and pressure to innovate 
Kemp et al (1998) note that there is a tension between protecting a new technology 
and maintaining pressure for actors to innovate. We saw this tension in this chapter in 
relation to the design of the compliance mechanism – the shortfall charge. Both the 
original designers and later the MRET review panel used economic modelling to 
understand an appropriate level for the shortfall charge. They also looked at the 
implications of different designs, for example making the charge a multiple of the 
REC price so that it was always higher (i.e. not a cap) vs a fixed value (i.e. a cap), and 
linking the charge to inflation (providing a relatively constant level of protection) vs 
holding it constant (providing a decreasing level of protection in real terms). Such 
studies can help policy makers better understand how to balance protection and 
pressure. Finding the balance can be complicated by the possibility that actors may 
view the compliance differently; for some it may be a penalty to punish non-
compliance, while for others it may be a cap on costs. 
4.6.2.5 (4-5) Balance between learning and embedding 
Hoogma et al (2002) note that there is a tension between learning and embedding. We 
saw this tension in this chapter in relation to the CoAG energy market and MRET 
reviews. From the events surrounding these reviews it appears that second-order 
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learning can create greater uncertainty than first-order learning because it involves 
questioning underlying objectives. 
The MRET panel acknowledged the risk of learning through policy reviews, in this 
case investment uncertainty. They also noted the benefits of reviews as an 
accountability mechanism for Government policy. To balance learning and 
embedding, the panel proposed that reviews only occur in the future if either of two 
triggers occur, i.e. if there is a need for (first-order) learning. The triggers were if 
there was a significant change in the policy context (emissions trading) or if the 
objectives of MRET were no longer being met. Some submitters to the review 
suggested that if there were to be further reviews in the future, then they should be 
limited in scope so as to minimise the uncertainty e.g. no chance of decreasing the 
level of protection. 
4.6.2.6 (4-6) Actors measure the legitimacy of a technology depending on 
their interests 
Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) note that a lack of legitimacy for a new technology can 
hinder positive feedbacks, however they provide little detail on how actors might 
increase legitimacy. In this chapter we gained some insight into how Government 
actors might measure the legitimacy of a new technology. 
The Federal Government measured the legitimacy of wind power according to its 
economic credentials and the business case for supporting the industry. State 
Governments also measured legitimacy based on the business case for industry 
support, but also on the environmental, energy-diversity, and regional development 
benefits. 
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4.6.2.7 (4-7) New technology more expensive than incumbent technologies 
Kemp and Soete (1992) note that a possible barrier to a new technology is that it is 
more expensive than existing options. The greater the cost difference between the new 
and the existing technologies, the greater the magnitude and duration of protection 
that will be required to enable the new technology to become cost-competitive. Actors 
could seek to reduce costs through scale and learning economies, local manufacturing 
or other improvements in the supply chain, and reducing uncertainty for investors. 
They may also be able to increase the cost of incumbents by arguing for the inclusion 
of externalities (e.g. carbon impact). 
4.6.2.8 (4-8) Niche actors may lack political power 
Researchers have noted that a challenge for those introducing a new technology is that 
they may lack political power because they are fragmented, rather than being a unified 
advocate for the new technology (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001). This facet of the case supports this finding.  
AusWEA formed after MRET was announced (but before it began) and had many 
benefits. First, it gave wind power a voice that was independent of the broader 
renewables industry. Second, it focused and aligned the opinions of those actors with 
an interest in wind power, as shown in the MRET campaign, which although 
unsuccessful with the Federal Government, was successful with the Victorian and 
NSW Governments. Third, it facilitated the creation and articulation of trans-local 
knowledge through its research, publications, and conferences. Fourth, AusWEA set a 
clear problem agenda for the wind industry, something which will be discussed 
further in later chapters. However, being a unified advocate for a new technology does 
not necessarily bestow actors with political influence, it only increases their chances 
of having influence. 
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4.6.2.9 (4-9) Incorrect expectations about the future 
Geels and Smit (2000) found that actors may have what turn out to be incorrect 
expectations about the future because of they are culturally biased, focus on current 
technological trajectories, frame the introduction of the new technology as a 
substitution of the old, or assume that the social context is static or easily malleable. 
To counter this in experiments with transport innovation, the SNM workbook 
suggests that actors use independent observers to help assess the success of projects 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
In this case we saw that in some cases, the wind industry’s expectations of the future 
of MRET were incorrect. For example, Vestas’ decisions to invest in wind-specific 
manufacturing facilities were linked to their expectations that there would be 
sufficient demand for wind turbines. In the end, the market was insufficient and the 
facilities were closed. Actors could become more aware of assumptions in their 
expectations of the future, such as those identified by Geels and Smit (2000), and 
consider alternative possibilities as part of a risk management strategy. 
4.6.2.10  (4-10) Search for new technologies too similar to existing 
regime 
Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) note that the introduction of new radical technologies 
can be hindered if actors search for technologies that are similar to those in the 
existing regime. We saw the effect of this local searching in this chapter in relation to 
the Federal Government’s Energy White Paper which predominantly supported fossil-
fuel based technologies. The chapter did not identify any particular strategy for 
overcoming this. 
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4.6.2.11 (4-11) Balance between first-order learning and second-order 
learning 
A number of researchers make a distinction between first and second order learning 
(or single and double loop, or learning and re-learning) (Deuten, 2003, Hoogma, 
2000, Hoogma et al., 2002, IEA, 2003, Schot and Rip, 1996). However less is said 
about finding a balance between the two. In this case we saw a mixture of first and 
second order learning. Examples of first order learning were the design of MRET and 
later the MRET review, and the learning of AusWEA about how to influence 
Government policy more effectively. Examples of second order learning were the 
CoAG energy market review, and consequently the MRET review in terms of 
justifying MRET. 
We saw that second-order learning about MRET – in terms of the CoAG review – 
created great uncertainty. We also saw from the literature review in Chapter 2 that 
excessive first order learning would probably encourage lock-in because underlying 
objectives would rarely be questioned. This suggests that a balance is required 
between first and second order learning; however at this stage I can only recommend 
that actors be aware of this and that it be studied further in the future. 
4.6.3 Final remarks 
This chapter has shown and explained the significant changes and attempts to change 
that occurred in relation to energy policy in Australia between 1997 and 2007. These 
events showed why seven of the ten dynamics identified in Chapter 2 are important 
goals in the introduction of new technology, identified a range of actors who were 
most able to influence these dynamics, and identified a range of challenges and 
possible strategies. I will return to these lessons again in the final chapter. 
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5 Wind power and the electricity sector 
5.0 Introduction 
Between the late 1990s and 2005, actors such as electricity system managers, 
Governments and the wind industry, invested considerable resources and effort into 
integrating wind power into the grid. The resulting changes covered a range of areas. 
There was increasing use of wind power in the National Electricity Market (NEM), 
from about 10 MW in the late 1990s to about 700 MW by 200769. As the chapter will 
show, there was increased legitimacy of wind power as a generation technology, with 
system managers acknowledging that wind farms can provide generation capacity and 
energy in contrast to the earlier, more dismissive views of the electricity sector70. 
There was extensive embedding of wind power, cognitively in new knowledge and 
problem agendas, socially in the interaction of the wind industry and system managers 
and the formation of high-level working groups, technologically in the development 
of a wind power forecasting system, and institutionally in the technical standards and 
operating procedures of the NEM and the way that wind farms are developed71. There 
                                                 
69 The 2007 figure is different to that presented in earlier chapters because it is for the NEM only. The 
NEM covers Queensland, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, South Australia 
and Tasmania. It does not cover WA or NT, which combined had about 190 MW of wind power 
installed by 2007. 
70 State-based electricity utilities had previously made some investigations into wind farms driven by 
isolated concerns such as energy security and political pressure, however once these concerns passed so 
too did the interest in wind power. In general wind power was not regarded favourably because if its 
intermittency (Bunting, 2003, Healey and Bunting, 2008). 
71 Another change was the development of various embedded generation guidelines. These related to 
more than just wind generation and had a less significant impact on wind farm development than the 
other issues presented in this chapter. Those interested in this topic can refer to the following 
documents (BCSE, 2003a, 2004, CRA, 2002, 2003, 2004, ESC, 2003, 2004a, b, ESCOSA, 2003, 
2004a, 2005a, IPART, 2005). 
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were also significant attempts by Government and Network Service Providers (NSPs) 
to develop new network infrastructure to support wind farms, prompted by the 
mismatch between the wind resource and the existing infrastructure. These efforts to 
fund new network infrastructure were not particularly successful, leading to changes 
in where wind farms were proposed. 
The chapter will explain these changes and attempts to change and in doing so will 
show examples of how a new technology and an existing socio-technical regime can 
be mismatched and how they can become mutually adapted. This facet of the case 
shows the importance of decreasing uncertainty, increasing legitimacy, strengthening 
expectations, increasing embedding and alignment, learning, and attracting actors. 
The chapter also identifies which actors were in a position to stimulate these dynamics 
and identifies a range of challenges to encouraging these dynamics. 
The chapter begins by introducing the main actor groups involved and outlining their 
interests, visions and problem agendas. This introduction helps to explain the roles 
that different actors played in the various issues. It shows that actors were focused on 
a number of mismatches and inadequacies, although how these were defined as 
problems depended on actors’ interests and visions. 
Sections 5.2 to 5.5 then take a chronological look at grid integration issues because 
these issues involved a limited number of actors in a relatively centralised setting. 
Section 5.2 begins from 2003, the events of which laid the foundation for the changes 
that were to come. It was in this year that grid integration issues became prominent on 
the problem agendas of many actors. System managers and the Australian Greenhouse 
Office (AGO) undertook research, articulated their concerns and put forward possible 
solutions. There was social change as system managers and the wind industry began 
to interact and debate the issues. 
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Section 5.3 then analyses how wind issues made it onto the problem agendas of higher 
level Government actors, something which was directly related to later technological 
and institutional embedding of wind power within the NEM. Section 5.4 reviews the 
technological embedding with the development of a national forecasting system; a 
complementary technology which was thought necessary to bridge the gap between 
wind power and the existing regime. It also shows that the speed at which the system 
could be developed was too slow to alleviate the concerns of system managers. 
Section 5.5 reviews the institutional embedding, specifically that related to the NEM 
operating procedures and technical standards, and to generator licences in South 
Australia. Section 5.5 shows that the rate of institutional change was too slow to 
alleviate system managers’ concerns and as an interim measure wind farms in South 
Australia were forced to act more like traditional generators, with a consequent cost to 
wind farm operators. The final empirical section, Section 5.6, departs from this 
chronological analysis to look at the attempts by various actors to expand the network 
infrastructure. No successful way of funding significant new infrastructure was found 
causing developers, particularly in South Australia, to adapt the way they developed 
wind farms. The final section tests the insights from Chapter 2 in terms of dynamics, 
actors and challenges. 
5.1 Actors, interests, visions and agendas 
There were four main actor groups involved in the grid integration of wind power: 
system managers, network service providers (NSPs), the wind industry and 
government. 
While they each had different interests, visions and problem agendas, each of which 
will be discussed shortly, they had similar foci; namely overcoming the mismatches 
between wind power and the existing electricity sector. Compared to traditional 
energy sources (coal, gas, hydro), wind energy resources are in different locations, 
have different operating characteristics, and are harnessed using different technologies 
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(e.g. Outhred, 2003c). These differences led to mismatches between wind power and 
the existing socio-technical regime because the socio-technical regime had coevolved 
with traditional fuel sources and technologies72. As the chapter will show, this in turn 
led to increased risks of system disruption and higher costs for wind farm developers. 
The problem agendas that the actors developed in response to these mismatches 
depended on their interests. The discussion begins with system managers. 
5.1.1 System managers 
One important actor group was that of system managers. In this group I include the 
National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO), the South 
Australian Electricity Supply Industry Planning Council (ESIPC), and the Essential 
Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA). 
NEMMCO is a non-profit company that was set up to manage the operation of the 
National Electricity Market and is governed by the participating State Governments73. 
NEMMCO’s interests were in maintaining system security, reliability and quality, but 
also in upholding the principles of the NEM such as technological neutrality. 
Environmental concerns are not an explicit part of the NEM. NEMMCO’s main 
concern was that wind power might harm the robustness of the system because of the 
                                                 
72 For example, a report into the grid integration of wind power by the high-level Wind Energy Policy 
Working Group, along with submissions responding to the report, noted that large amounts of 
intermittent generation, including wind power, had not been envisaged when the National Electricity 
Code was written (NRG, 2005, Suzlon, 2005, TXU, 2005b, WEPWG, 2005). A number of respondents 
to the report noted that the integration issues were not specific to wind, but common to all intermittent 
generators (Electranet, 2005b, Transgrid, 2005, VENCorp, 2005). 
73 Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory, and 
Tasmania (NEMMCO, 2004b) 
Chapter 5 – Wind power and the electricity sector 
168 
NEM was not designed and operated to cope with large levels of intermittent 
generation. As a consequence, their problem agenda was focused on better 
understanding the implications of large levels of wind power and ensuring that this 
would not increase the risk of system disruption to an unacceptable level. NEMMCO 
and the wind industry were at times on opposite sides of a debate, but NEMMCO was 
not opposed to wind power as such, rather they were concerned about how wind 
power would affect the risk of system disruption. How wind power affected the risk of 
system disruption was a function of the rate and location of wind farm development, 
the resilience of existing infrastructure and generators, and the rate at which 
technological and institutional change could occur. 
The other significant system manager actors, ESIPC and ESCOSA, were from South 
Australia, the state where grid integration issues were most prominent because of the 
excellent wind resource, low population density (hence fewer planning issues than 
Victoria), and relatively weak network infrastructure (ESIPC, 2001). 
ESIPC is a South Australian government body whose role is to monitor the electricity 
supply industry in South Australia. Their interests were in the price, reliability and 
security of electricity in South Australia. Their problem agenda was to understand the 
implications of wind power in South Australia, initially for their own reasons, but 
later in a more significant way following a request from the Essential Services 
Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA). Like NEMMCO, ESIPC were concerned 
about the impact of wind power on the risk of system disruption, rather than being 
opposed to wind power. 
ESCOSA, as its name suggests, is the South Australian essential services commission 
and had interests in the price, reliability and security of electricity in that state. While 
they are a government body, I am including ESCOSA as a system manager because 
generators in South Australia require a generator license from ESCOSA. ESCOSA’s 
problem agenda in relation to this role related to the high rate at which it was 
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receiving license applications compared to the slow rate at which the NEM was 
adapting to the increasing level of wind power. They became a significant actor 
around 2004 when they proposed measures to limit the level of wind power in South 
Australia until broader changes could be made. 
As the chapter will show, there was a fundamental difference of opinion between 
system managers and the wind industry over whether system mangers were being 
proactive or over-reacting to possible issues. 
5.1.2 Network Service Providers (NSPs) 
Another important actor group was that of Network Service Providers (NSPs). In 
Australia’s restructured electricity sector, distribution and transmission are regulated 
monopoly businesses. The interests of NSPs were managing network voltages and 
power flows within limits, and, where possible, the expansion of their networks. 
NSPs, particularly in South Australia, were concerned about the ability of their 
networks to handle the additional power input from wind farms. 
NSPs were involved in the attempts to provide new network infrastructure for wind 
farms and also in debates regarding the grid integration of wind power. The problem 
agenda of the NSPs differed by state. In South Australia, Electranet saw wind power 
as an opportunity to significantly expand its network and sought permission from the 
regulator to do so. In other States, where grid integration issues were less pressing, 
there was a lower level of involvement from NSPs, although they made submissions 
to the various reviews of NEM operation and participated in the high-level working 
groups. 
5.1.3 Wind industry 
A third important group of actors was the wind industry, both as individual developers 
and as a collective. 
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Individual project developers had interests in the viability of their projects. Their 
problem agendas related to issues that could reduce the profitability or viability of 
their projects, for example difficulties or increased costs for network connection, or 
expected costs or limitations associated with the changes proposed by system 
managers. 
Collectives such as AusWEA and the BCSE had interests in the success of their 
members. Their problem agendas tended to be at a higher level than those of project 
proponents, advocating on their behalves to system managers or government actors 
when changes were proposed. Initially, the wind industry was relatively passive on 
grid integration issues because lobbying the Federal Government on retaining and 
extending MRET was a higher priority. AusWEA and the BCSE also tended to have a 
more short-term perspective than other actors because they expected that the 
uncertainty with MRET and some of the changes suggested by system managers 
could harm the short-term viability of the industry. 
5.1.4 Government 
The final important actor group was the Government. State and Federal Government 
departments, parliaments, and agencies all played significant roles. 
At the federal level, the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) played a significant 
role. Its interest was in the greenhouse benefits of wind power and in the long-term 
viability of the industry, as opposed to the short-term survival of the industry which 
was more the concern of AusWEA. The AGO became involved because they felt that 
there was no other wind-supporting actor taking a holistic view of the situation 
(Coates, 2005a). The AGO’s problem agenda related to understanding grid integration 
issues for wind power and achieving institutional and technological change to 
integrate wind power.  
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At the national (multi-state) level, the most significant actor was the Wind Energy 
Policy Working Group (WEPWG). This group was formed in 2004 by the Ministerial 
Council on Energy (MCE)74 with the purpose of overseeing the grid integration of 
wind power. WEPWG consisted of policy-makers from each electricity jurisdiction 
(Duffy, 2004). Their problem agenda was largely driven by the concerns of system 
managers about the expected decrease in network robustness with large levels of wind 
power. As the chapter will show, the involvement of policy-makers enabled greater 
opportunities for the institutional embedding of wind power. 
At the individual state level, the most active government was that of Victoria. They 
had an interest in supporting the wind industry for economic, environmental and 
energy security reasons. Their problem agenda related to supporting projects by 
lowering the cost of grid connection. 
5.1.5 Summary 
There were four significant actors groups in the grid integration of wind power – 
system manager, NSPs, the wind industries, and governments – who had different 
interests and problem agendas. The most prominent interests were in the robustness of 
the grid, the long-term viability of the wind industry for environmental, economic or 
energy security reasons, and the short-term viability of projects. The interplay of these 
actors and interests, enabled and constrained by the existing socio-technical regime, 
shaped the search for a mutual fit as the following sections will now show. 
                                                 
74 The MCE is chaired by the Federal Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources, and consists of 
State and Territory ministers responsible for energy, as well as observers from New Zealand and Papua 
New Guinea. The Council was created by CoAG in 2001 to provide national consistency in energy 
policy which has historically been decided at the state level. See www.mce.gov.au for further details. 
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5.2 Understanding mismatches and their implications 
Many of the institutional and technological changes related to the grid integration of 
wind power between the late 1990s and 2005 occurred in 2004 and 2005. That said, 
all of the significant events during those two years had their foundation in cognitive 
and social change that occurred 2002 and 2003; it was during these years that the 
wind industry and system managers began to interact, debate issues and define 
problems. 
In 2002, system managers became increasingly concerned about the grid integration 
of wind power because the installed capacity of wind farms was growing to the point 
that its effect on the system could no longer be ignored. In previous years, these actors 
had noted wind farms and proposals in publications such as annual reports, however 
in 2002 they began noting that the risk of system disruption might increase if large 
levels of wind power were installed (cf. ESIPC, 2000, ESIPC, 2001, 2002). Over the 
course of 2002, system managers articulated their concerns in annual reports and at 
conferences and, along with the AGO, set about trying to understand grid integration 
issues (e.g. Arnott, 2002a, Arnott, 2002b, c, ESIPC, 2002).  
By the end of 2003, although not obvious at the time, the ground-work had been laid 
for later changes. During that year, the AGO, ESIPC and NEMMCO had all released 
reports and AusWEA had organised a one-day forum on grid issues75. By the start of 
2004, the concerns of NEMMCO and ESIPC, which I will discuss shortly, were 
widely known, there was interaction between the wind industry, the AGO, and system 
                                                 
75 AusWEA also planned to form a working group to propose solutions to gird management (AusWEA, 
2004g p.13, IEA, 2004 p.73-74), but I could not find any evidence that this happened or if it did that it 
was of any significance. For example, no mention of it was made of the work of the grid working group 
at the AusWEA conferences I attended each year, nor was any input from an AusWEA working group 
mentioned by NEMMCO, ESIPC or the AGO. 
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managers, and a great deal had been articulated about grid integration issues. As well 
as raising awareness and building knowledge, this learning also brought wind/grid 
integration issues to the attention of higher-level government actors, which was a 
significant step in the development of a national forecasting system and institutional 
change. The next section will review the significant of events of 2003. 
5.2.1 Risks, barriers and the need for a mutual fit 
In early 2003, NEMMCO, ESIPC and the AGO all released reports regarding the grid 
integration of wind power. The way actors approached this knowledge building 
depended on their interests and problem agendas. NEMMCO and ESIPC had a risk-
focused perspective, while the AGO was focused on barriers to the wider use of wind 
power. The following sections discuss each in turn. 
5.2.1.1 NEMMCO: Intermittent generation in the NEM 
In early 2003, NEMMCO released their concerns in a report on intermittent 
generation in the NEM76. Their main concerns were that large levels of wind power 
could increase costs and the risk of disruption by increasing the error in the 
supply/demand balance and by harming network voltages and power flows 
(NEMMCO, 2003).  
Feedback from the wind industry to NEMMCO’s presentations in 2002 had indicated 
that the real problems with the grid integration of wind power were not technical, they 
were responsibility and cost. For example, at an AusWEA conference discussion in 
2002, the wind industry noted were there were technical solutions to NEMMCO’s 
                                                 
76 NEMMCO used the term intermittent generation rather than wind generation because they 
understood that these issues were not isolated to wind power, it was just that wind power was the first 
intermittent generator likely to be used in the NEM on a relatively large scale. 
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concerns, but that developers were reluctant to accept any measures which would 
reduce project profitability or viability (AusWEA, 2002c, NEMMCO, 2002). 
NEMMCO’s 2003 report discussed possible solutions to its concerns and broached 
the issue of who would be responsible and who should pay the cost of integration 
(NEMMCO, 2003). 
In an interview, Bruce Cameron of NEMMCO stated that the wind industry had been 
slow to engage with NEMMCO’s concerns (Cameron, 2005). For example, the 
NEMMCO report welcomed comment from stakeholders, but by mid-year they had 
received only one submission (Ravalli, 2003). This can be explained by relative 
priorities, rather than recalcitrance on the part of the wind industry. As shown in the 
previous chapter, MRET was top of the wind industry’s problem agenda during 2003 
and 200477. Moreover, as of 2003, grid operation issues were generally not affecting 
the viability of projects. With limited resources, developers and AusWEA were 
unmotivated to engage with system managers. 
5.2.1.2 ESIPC: Wind power in South Australia 
ESIPC, like NEMMCO, had a risk-focused perspective on the grid integration of wind 
power. The ESIPC report described computer modelling that they had used to 
understand the impact of wind farms on network interconnectors, other generators in 
South Australia, and the state’s load factor, and to estimate the level of greenhouse 
gas reductions per MW of installed wind farm capacity (ESIPC, 2003b).  
                                                 
77 Sarea Coates (2003) of the AGO also made this observation at the 2003 AusWEA conference. 
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Possibly the most significant outcome from ESIPC’s investigation was a method for 
estimating the contribution of wind farms to peak capacity78. This was a sign that 
wind power was gaining technical legitimacy because historically the generation 
capacity of wind farms had been disregarded by system managers (Bunting, 2003) or 
treated as “negative demand” rather than as a component of supply. ESIPC had 
developed this method because it was concerned that the rapid growth in wind power 
would make their forecasts of required capacity less accurate (ESIPC, 2001, 2002). In 
their view, wind power could no longer be disregarded. 
The report said little about ESIPC’s longer-term problem agenda, however its annual 
report later that year indicated that ESIPC would be investigating penetration limits 
for wind generation in South Australia (ESIPC, 2003a). As Section 5.5.2 will discuss, 
this became a very controversial issue. 
5.2.1.3 AGO: Understanding technical and commercial barriers 
While system managers were focused on the risks of wind power in the network, the 
AGO was focused on technical and commercial barriers to wind power. The AGO 
wanted to understand the technological and institutional changes that would be 
required, both in the way that wind farms were developed and the operation of the 
NEM, for wind power to be successfully integrated into the grid. 
The AGO’s report was written by Hugh Outhred, an Associate Professor in electrical 
engineering at the University of New South Wales and a long time advocate of wind 
power79. Outhred (2003c) highlighted the differences between the technology and 
                                                 
78 In simple terms, peak capacity is the amount of generation available to provide energy at the time of 
greatest demand. 
79 For an indication of Outhred’s long involvement with wind power, see Bunting (2003). 
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resource characteristics of wind power compared to traditional generators, differences 
which contributed to the mismatches and concerns discussed previously. He 
acknowledged the concerns of system operators and also that there may be penetration 
limits for wind power. 
Overall, Outhred (2003c) identified five key grid integration issues: the uncertainty of 
wind farm output; voltage and frequency disturbances during starting, operation, and 
stopping of wind turbines; potential problems in frequency and voltage management; 
potential problems with fault management in networks near wind farms; and, 
difficulties for developers in capturing economies of scale in network connection. He 
went on to recommend changes to enable wind to be better integrated into the grid. 
To Government and system managers he recommended a range of changes to the 
NEM so that it would be better suited to wind power, including (Outhred, 2003c): the 
development of wind power forecasting; the development of planning protocols that 
balanced encouraging diversity of location against cooperation in connection80 ; and, a 
review of the National electricity code with regard to wind energy. To the wind 
industry he recommended that developers use state-of-the-art wind turbine designs 
and control strategies so that wind farms would be able to withstand network 
disturbances (Outhred, 2003c). This was to make wind farms better suited to the 
NEM. In essence, Outhred was setting out a path of mutual adaptation. 
5.2.1.4 Discussion 
These reports from NEMMCO, ESIPC and the AGO raised the profile of grid 
integration issues significantly and laid a foundation for the significant events that 
                                                 
80 Co-operative connection, where wind farms jointly connect to the network, will be discussed further 
in the Section 5.6. 
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occurred in later years. In fact they raised the profile of the issues so much that some 
became concerned that they might be used against wind power in energy policy 
decisions (Coates, 2005a). As the chapter will discuss shortly, there is a fine line 
between raising issues to get them onto a high-level agenda and these issues being 
used against the new technology. 
5.2.2 Technical solutions, social barriers 
Following the release of the NEMMCO, ESIPC and AGO reports, grid integration 
issues moved higher up the wind industry’s problem agenda. At the annual AusWEA 
conference in mid 2003, AusWEA held a one-day81 forum (perhaps optimistically) 
titled “Creating Wind-Grid Solutions” to bring the wind industry and the authors of 
the reports together. 
The speakers at the forum can be categorised into three basic groups. First, there were 
speakers from NEMMCO, ESIPC, and the AGO, who highlighted their various 
concerns (e.g. Coates, 2003, Oakeshott, 2003, Ravalli, 2003). Second, there were 
speakers from the wind industry and service providers who spoke on their experiences 
in countries with large levels of wind power (Mensberg, 2003, Nicholson, 2003, Scott, 
2003a). Third, there were speakers from the wind industry and service providers who 
spoke of the technologies available to alleviate system managers’ concerns (Davey, 
2003, Katzfey, 2003, Mensberg, 2003, Muttik, 2003). A number of actors advocated 
wind power forecasting, which became the focus of significant work in 2004 (Coates, 
2003, Outhred, 2003b, Scott, 2003a). 
                                                 
81 The growing importance of grid integration issues is illustrated by the larger amount of time and 
number of speakers dedicated to these issues at AusWEA’s 2003 conference (i.e. a whole day) 
compared to 2002 (a few hours). 
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As I watched these presentations, a lack of consensus was apparent at two different 
levels. On a social level, actors disagreed on the value of NEMMCO raising its 
concerns before any of the issues had materialised. For example, Ric Brazzale (2003) 
of the BCSE suggested that NEMMCO was over-reacting, whereas Paul Ravalli 
(2003) of NEMMCO suggested that NEMMCO was being diligent and proactive.  
On a technical level, actors disagreed on the ability of the NEM to accommodate large 
levels of wind power. A number of actors from the wind industry implied that the 
large-scale use of wind power should be feasible in Australia because the technical 
issues had already been solved overseas. In interviews, both Sarea Coates (2005a) of 
the AGO and Bruce Cameron (2005) of NEMMCO felt that some actors in the wind 
industry failed to appreciate the differences between the NEM and grids in other 
countries; in particular the large spans and relatively low capacities of the network 
infrastructure. That said, there was a clear message from the wind industry and service 
providers that technical solutions were available to alleviate NEMMCO’s concerns, 
albeit at a cost which wind farm developers were reluctant to accept.  
It appeared from the presentations and discussion that the real problems were social 
and institutional, rather than technical. For example, Nicolaj Mensberg (2003) of 
turbine manufacturer NEG-Micon noted that the key issues were getting agreement 
between stakeholders and finding common goals (i.e. aligning interests and visions). 
Nigel Scott (2003b) of wind power consultants Garrad Hassan noted that a key issue 
was getting the necessary policy level decisions made (i.e. institutional embedding). 
Sarea Coates (2003) noted that it would take a number of years to successfully 
implement the institutional change necessary for the grid integration of wind power, a 
situation which had implications for South Australia as Section 5.5 will show, and that 
the competitive nature of the fledgling industry was a hindrance to cooperative action. 
This last point was also noted during the MRET review which will be discussed 
shortly. 
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Overall, the forum had enabled actors to develop mutual understanding, but they still 
did not agree on the need for action, who would be responsible, and who would pay. 
5.2.3 Focused learning and finding a positive perspective 
In the second half of 2003, the AGO continued to build and diffuse knowledge. Two 
issues were high on its problem agenda: the limited knowledge about how diversity of 
location could reduce wind integration issues and the potential for the risk-focused 
perspective of system managers to be used against wind power. 
5.2.3.1 Diversity in wind farm locations 
One of the main issues about integrating wind farms into the grid was their 
intermittent output. Throughout 2003, a number of actors had noted that the 
intermittency of wind farm output would be reduced by diversity in wind farm 
locations (e.g. Arnott, 2002a, ESIPC, 2002, Outhred, 2003c). The problem was that 
no one knew to what extent because developers were unwilling to share operational 
data because of its commercial value. To build knowledge in this area, the AGO 
engaged researchers from the CSIRO to estimate the effects of diversity using public 
domain wind data. The researchers, Davy and Coppin (2003), investigated the level of 
intermittency in the output of hypothetical wind farms in South Australia, Victoria 
and New South Wales when taken by state and aggregated across all states. They 
found that the aggregated output was less intermittent for periods up to 10 days, but 
that variations due to weather patterns that operated over longer periods, such as 
changing seasons, were not significantly reduced (Davy and Coppin, 2003). The 
implication was that some integration issues may not be as problematic as first 
thought, however they reiterated the importance of forecasting systems to assist in the 
prediction of wind farm output (Davy and Coppin, 2003).  
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5.2.3.2 An opportunity-focused perspective 
In the lead-up to the MRET review, Sarea Coates, Craig Oakeshott (author of the 
ESIPC report) and Hugh Outhred were concerned that grid integration issues could be 
used as arguments against MRET by actors opposing wind power (Coates, 2005a). 
This was a valid concern because during the MRET review some local community 
groups cited grid integration issues as reasons not to support wind power or raise 
MRET (e.g. TVCG, 2003). In response, the AGO commissioned Outhred to produce 
an opportunity-focused rather than risk-focused report82 (Coates, 2005a).  
Outhred (2003a) tried to estimate the wind penetration levels that could be “readily 
accepted” into the NEM; readily accepted meaning that technical solutions were not 
prohibitively expensive. In essence he was presenting a vision of a mutual fit and 
using the differences between what could be and what was to indicate beneficial 
actions. He estimated that the NEM could readily accept 8000MW of wind farms 
provided that: this capacity was reached over about a 10 year period; there was 
sufficient geographic diversity and any local network constraints were overcome; 
advanced wind turbine technology and control systems were used; and, that 
forecasting systems were in place (Outhred, 2003a). He expressed concern that these 
conditions did not appear to be occurring, particularly with regard to geographic 
diversity and the turbine technology and control systems being used. 
While showing that a mutual fit was possible, this assessment was also somewhat 
ominous; the distribution of the 8000 MW did not match the wind resource. 
Queensland and New South Wales could accept thousands of megawatts of wind 
                                                 
82 Coates, Oakeshott and Outhred also reportedly made presentations to the MRET panel, explaining 
that the grid integration issues were not insurmountable, but that they needed high-level attention 
(something that will be discussed in Section 5.3) (Coates, 2005a). 
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power, but had relatively few proposals, whereas South Australia had thousands of 
megawatts proposed but was estimated to have the capacity to readily accept only 500 
MW (Outhred, 2003a). 
5.2.4 Summary 
Over the course of 2002 and 2003, the wind industry, AGO, and system managers 
began to interact more over grid integration issues. The concerns of system managers 
became widely known and in some cases solutions proposed. However, in general, the 
wind industry was reluctant to accept the proposed solutions because they were 
expected to harm the viability of projects. 
The interaction of actors enabled them to share knowledge and it laid the foundation 
for more significant institutional and technological changes that were to come. A 
number of actors had noted the value of forecasting wind power output and 
NEMMCO had begun work on forecasting (discussed shortly), something which was 
to become the first major embedding activity in the following years. As well as 
building knowledge, the investigations and interactions also brought grid integration 
issues to the attention of high-level government actors, something which had 
significant consequences in later years and is discussed in the next section.  
5.3 Getting wind issues on high-level problem agendas 
One significant consequence of the learning and articulation discussed in the previous 
section was that grid integration issues gained high-level recognition. During 2003 
and 2004, wind power became much more prominent in energy policy: the MRET 
review was held; the Federal Government released its energy white paper; and, the 
Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) set-up the Wind Energy Policy Working 
Group. These events in turn played important roles in later events such as the 
development of a wind power forecasting system and proposed changes to the 
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institutional arrangements of the NEM. The significance of the MRET review, Energy 
White paper and formation of WEPWG is reviewed below. 
5.3.1 MRET review 
The MRET review was a significant energy policy event, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, but the MRET panel’s report also made recommendations which helped to 
place grid integration issues on high level problem agendas. Although not receiving 
any official written submissions from the AGO, NEMMCO, or ESIPC, the MRET 
panel was aware of their concerns about the grid integration of wind power and the 
work that was being done83 (Tambling et al., 2003). 
In relation to forecasting, the panel noted that wind generation was forecast overseas 
and that the expertise to do so was available in Australia, but that individual 
generators did not have the capability to perform the required weather modelling 
(Tambling et al., 2003). Without stating so explicitly, they were advocating a 
centralised rather than a decentralised forecasting system. At that time, as the chapter 
discuss shortly, NEMMCO were proposing a decentralised forecasting system at least 
in part because they were limited in what they were permitted to propose by the 
existing institutional arrangements of the NEM.  
The panel also stated that wind patterns needed to be better understood and noted that 
developers were reluctant to share data because of its commercial value84 (Tambling 
et al., 2003). For developers, there was a tension between protecting their own 
                                                 
83 Sarea Coates (2005a) stated in an interview that she, Hugh Outhred and Craig Oakeshott (ESIPC) 
had made presentations to the panel. 
84 In an interview, wind farm developer and former AusWEA president Grant Flynn (2005) estimated 
that it costs in the order of $50,000 to perform wind resource monitoring. 
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interests by keeping the data confidential, and helping the industry by sharing it.  The 
panel encouraged developers to share wind resource information, stating that the lack 
of data was hindering research that would support the further integration of wind 
power (Tambling et al., 2003). 
The panel recommended that the AGO urgently initiate a co-operative process 
between stakeholders (i.e. facilitate social change) to address: barriers to wind farms 
providing generation forecasts to NEMMCO; the low availability of independent 
advice for stakeholders on the various issues; and research into maximising the 
benefits of wind power in Australia (Tambling et al., 2003). The panel emphasized 
that the NEM needed to incorporate increasing levels of renewable energy, but also 
highlighted that the renewables industry had to participate in this process by sharing 
information (Tambling et al., 2003) i.e. the search for a mutual fit required the 
participation of new and incumbent actors. Finally, the panel recommended that the 
Australian Government, and State and Territory Ministers investigate impediments to 
renewable energy in the NEM (Tambling et al., 2003).  
The flow-on effect from this high-level recognition was very significant, including 
funding for a wind forecasting system and the formation of a high-level working 
group. 
5.3.2 Energy White Paper 
The MRET report was publicly released at the start of 2004, with the Government 
stating that it would consider the findings as part of developing a climate change 
strategy for stationary energy (Hill, 2004). In June 2004, the Government released the 
strategy, a key aspect of which was a pledge that $14 million would be provided over 
5 years to develop a wind forecasting system (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). 
This will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4. 
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5.3.3 Ministerial Council on Energy 
Also in the first half of 2004, the Ministerial Council on Energy, at the request of 
South Australia’s representatives, agreed to establish the Wind Energy Policy 
Working Group (WEPWG) with the task of considering grid-integration issues for 
wind power in the NEM (Coates, 2005a, Conlon, 2005, Duffy, 2004, MCE, 2005). 
While the minutes of the MCE meeting do not mention the MRET panel report, it 
would have helped to justify the need for WEPWG.  
With the creation of WEPWG, the response to grid integration issues became more 
coordinated and the inclusion of policy makers widened the possible courses of 
action. WEPWG in turn asked NEMMCO to establish a Wind Energy Technical 
Advisory Group (WETAG) made up of industry stakeholders such as NEMMCO, the 
wind industry, NSPs, retailers, incumbent generators, and large energy users (Duffy, 
2004). With the formation of these groups, the social interaction between the 
electricity sector and wind power industry was formalised into a group with direct 
access to policy makers. These groups began in-depth consideration of the issues and 
will be discussed in more detail in a later sub-section. 
5.3.4 The significance of high-level recognition 
It is not clear whether this higher level recognition by the MRET panel, the Federal 
Government and the MCE was necessary for the grid integration of wind power. 
During an interview, Sarea Coates (2005a) suggested that the formation of WEPWG 
was very important because NEMMCO was taking a risk by proactively investigating 
wind issues. Her view was based on the fact that NEMMCO is funded via fees paid by 
NEM participants who are predominantly fossil-fuel generators and who may have 
perceived NEMMCO’s activities unfavourably. In contrast, Bruce Cameron (2005) 
stated that NEMMCO was operating within the scope of the technology neutral 
principle of the NEM because if a technology has the potential to impact the operation 
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of the market or system stability, or if a technology is being unfairly treated, then 
NEMMCO has a mandate to investigate.  
Regardless of their views on the necessity of this higher-level recognition, both 
Coates and Cameron agree about its significance. Coates (2005a) stated that the 
timing of the MRET review and the Energy White paper were fortunate in relation to 
concerns about wind power. The findings of the MRET review panel helped to justify 
the AGO’s involvement and to get high-level recognition of the need for action, while 
the development of the Energy white paper provided an opportunity for significant 
funding (Coates, 2005a). Cameron (2005) acknowledged that the WEPWG process 
provided NEMMCO with a specific request to investigate issues and recommend 
actions to policymakers. Policy makers had not previously been involved which had 
restricted the available options. Before WEPWG and WETAG, actors had focused on 
learning and articulating, whereas after the formation of these groups, actors were 
able to focus on making specific changes (Cameron, 2005). 
As the chapter will show shortly, a number of WETAG recommendations required 
policy level change which reinforces the importance of involving high-level actors. 
5.3.5 Summary 
By 2004, grid integration issues had reached the problem agendas of high-level actors, 
and their responses had a significant role in the technological and institutional 
changes that occurred later. The Federal Government’s Energy White Paper provided 
$14 million in funding for the wind power forecasting system, the major example of 
technical embedding of wind power into the NEM. The MCE’s decision to set-up 
WEPWG and WETAG institutionalised the interaction between system managers and 
the wind industry, and led to proposals for institutionally embedding wind power into 
the NEM. These technological and institutional changes will be discussed in the 
following two sections. 
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5.4 Technological embedding: wind power forecasting 
Throughout 2003, many actors had noted the value of being able to forecast wind 
farm output (e.g. AusWEA, 2003e, Coates, 2003, Davy and Coppin, 2003, Outhred, 
2003b, Scott, 2003a, Tambling et al., 2003). Forecasting was also high on 
NEMMCO’s problem agenda because it was a fundamental process in the technical 
and commercial operation of the NEM (Cameron, 2005). 
Under the National Electricity Code as it was, intermittent generation, such as wind 
power, was effectively treated as negative demand, rather than as a contributor to 
supply. NEMMCO forecast demand in order to determine the level of scheduled 
generation required; wind farm output reduced the level of demand, but was not 
individually forecast (NEMMCO, 2003). This illustrates the low level of technical 
legitimacy that wind power historically had as a generation technology. 
NEMMCO’s concern was that as the level of wind generation increased, so would the 
error in demand forecasts, dispatched generation, frequency control ancillary services 
(supply-demand balancing), and market prices (Cameron, 2005, NEMMCO, 2003). 
When I spoke with Bruce Cameron in late 2005, he said that NEMMCO had already 
observed increasing error in regional demand forecasts (Cameron, 2005). 
With forecasting high on NEMMCO’s problem agenda, they engaged the CSIRO in 
late 2003 to assess the feasibility of forecasting wind farm output in Australia. The 
CSIRO report stated that wind generation could be forecast at timescales of 30 min to 
7 days ahead with known levels of uncertainty, but that forecasting in shorter or 
longer timescales was more difficult (Coppin and Katzfey, 2003). Based on the 
CSIRO investigation, NEMMCO released a report in early 2004 detailing proposed 
changes it intended to submit to the National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) 
later in the year (NEMMCO, 2004a). Under this proposal, NEMMCO would forecast 
and publish aggregate wind farm output up to six hours ahead, based on real-time data 
provided by wind farm operators, and wind farm operators would be responsible for 
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forecasting output greater than six hours ahead on a rolling basis (NEMMCO, 2004a, 
c). If implemented, this proposal would increase the cost of operating a wind farm. 
This decentralised system was considered to be the best system that NEMMCO could 
propose without policy-level change (Cameron, 2005, Coates, 2005a). NEMMCO 
could not propose a centralised forecasting system, such as advocated by the MRET 
panel, because it would have been in danger of breaching the “technology neutral” 
objective of the NEM (Cameron, 2005, Coates, 2005a).  
The proposed code changes were submitted to the National Electricity Code 
Administrator (NECA) midyear (NEMMCO, 2004c). NECA received 11 
submissions; almost all acknowledged the importance of forecasting and publishing 
wind data, but only ESIPC supported NEMMCO’s proposal. The concerns of the 
others varied in detail, but for developers the main concern was the cost that would be 
imposed on wind farms (NECA, 2004). They argued that NEMMCO could more 
accurately and cost-effectively perform the same forecasting centrally (NECA, 2004). 
The AGO highlighted the $14 million promised in the Federal Government’s Energy 
White Paper for wind power forecasting which would be coordinated by the AGO 
(NECA, 2004). NECA acknowledged the importance of forecasting, but decided that 
NEMMCO’s proposal was insufficiently developed and could potentially conflict 
with the upcoming work of the AGO. The proposed changes were not passed (NECA, 
2004). 
From mid 2004, the AGO, in conjunction with the Federal Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources, began developing Australia’s Wind Energy Forecasting 
Capability. It is to be a centralised system for use in the all the major electricity grids 
of Australia, intended to be at the level of world’s best practice, and with the costs to 
be shared between government and industry (Coates, 2005b, Jende, 2005). As of early 
2005, the timeline was for a pilot system to be in place during 2006, with a fully 
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functioning system in place and optimised during 2007 and 2008 (Coates, 2005b). 
This timeline did not alleviate NEMMCO’s concerns. 
The WEPWG report released in March 2005 noted that the forecasting system would 
not be in place soon enough for NEMMCO and that in the interim NEMMCO would 
undertake basic forecasting (WEPWG, 2005). In essence, wind power forecasting, a 
complementary technology which actors had identified as being important for 
achieving a mutual fit, could not be developed fast enough. As of late 2005, 
NEMMCO was forecasting output from wind farms in SA and Tasmania using 
relatively simple methods for short time-frames and investigating options to purchase 
a commercially available forecasting system (Cameron, 2005, NEMMCO, 2005a).  
As these events show, by 2007 wind power was technologically embedded in the 
NEM. 
5.5 Institutional change for a mutual fit: standards and 
procedures 
During 2004 and 2005, the foundation was laid for significant changes to be made to 
the operating procedures and technical standards of the NEM. The MCE had formed 
WEPWG, who in turn had formed WETAG. These groups began formally 
investigating the issues and the result of this process was specific recommendations 
for change. However, as with the forecasting system, the changes would not take 
place quickly enough to alleviate concerns. In this case it was ESIPC and ESCOSA in 
South Australia who remained concerned and felt compelled to develop interim 
measures; measures which would limit the development of wind power in South 
Australia in the short term. The following sections will discuss the WEPWG and the 
ESIPC/ESCOSA episodes.    
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5.5.1 WEPWG and WETAG 
WEPWG and WETAG were formed in early 2004, conducted investigations during 
that year, and released their report in March 2005. The report noted that, to that time, 
wind farms had been accommodated on a case-by-case basis without significant 
difficulty; however, system managers were becoming increasingly concerned by the 
levels of capacity expected in the near future, particularly in South Australia 
(WEPWG, 2005). Views were still mixed on the value of pre-emptive action; system 
managers felt they were being proactive, while wind actors suggested that they were 
over-reacting and being pessimistic, looking at threats rather than opportunities 
(AusWEA, 2005c, Hydro Tasmania, 2005). 
A number of incumbent actors noted the urgency and importance of change (AGL, 
2005b, ERAA, 2005, NGF, 2005, NRG, 2005, Origin Energy, 2005, TXU, 2005b). 
Origin Energy (2005) noted that uncertainty about grid-integration was affecting 
investment decisions for both wind farms and traditional generators. A number of 
submissions also noted that the relevant changes would take over a year (AusWEA, 
2005c, Pacific Hydro, 2005, VENCorp, 2005), something that had significant 
implications for South Australia as will be discussed shortly. 
The WETAG report created a problem agenda for grid integration issues. Two of the 
high-priority issues, managing network power flows and technical standards, are 
particularly instructive for learning about integrating new technologies into an 
existing socio-technical regime85. Other sections of the report and a number of 
responses illustrate and help to explain the increasing legitimacy of wind power. 
                                                 
85 The other three high priority issues were modelling the effects of wind farms on power system 
operation, disclosure of information by wind farms to the electricity market, and recovering costs for 
maintaining the supply/balance (Regulation Frequency Control Ancillary Services). 
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5.5.1.1 Network power flows 
One of the high-priority issues discussed by WETAG was network power flows. The 
cause of this issue was the mismatch between the wind resource and the grid.  
NEMMCO was concerned that wind power might reduce the security and reliability 
of the network for two reasons related to network power flows (WEPWG, 2005). The 
first was that in some regions, particularly South Australia, total wind farm output 
could exceed the power capacity of the network (NEMMCO, 2005b, WEPWG, 2005). 
The second was that at periods of low demand (e.g. overnight), wind farm output plus 
the minimum economic output from scheduled generators could exceed South 
Australia’s electricity demand and export capability (WEPWG, 2005). 
WEPWG’s proposal was that wind farms become “semi-dispatched” – that wind 
farms become more controllable, more like traditional generators86. This would allow 
NEMMCO to set maximum generation levels for wind farms when the network 
became constrained (WEPWG, 2005). As part of this semi-dispatched proposal, 
NEMMCO would develop new procedures and wind farms would submit prices 
which they would be prepared to accept in exchange for limiting their output, similar 
to how the dispatch process for scheduled generators works (WEPWG, 2005). It was a 
proposal for mutual change. Because the proposal would change the market and 
therefore the investment risk for intermittent generation, WEPWG noted that policy 
level support was required for the proposal to be implemented (WEPWG, 2005).  
Responses to the proposal varied. The wind industry generally acknowledged the 
validity of NEMMCO’s concern, but were reluctant to accept increased costs 
                                                 
86 Electranet, an NSP in South Australia, had anticipated this issue and in 2002 proposed that this issue 
could be mitigated by increasing the capacity of network infrastructure, which was in-line with their 
interests (Electranet, 2002c). 
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(AusWEA, 2005c, Hydro Tasmania, 2005, REGA, 2005). They were unimpressed by 
the offer that they would be paid to decrease output. Hydro Tasmania offered a 
different perspective on the issue – one in which they did not take the incumbents as 
the benchmark. They suggested that the problem was not the variability of wind 
power, but the inflexibility of incumbent generators, and that minimum levels of 
flexibility should be required of all generators (Hydro Tasmania, 2005). 
Other stakeholders in the electricity sector supported the proposal (e.g. ERAA, 2005, 
NGF, 2005, Origin Energy, 2005, TXU, 2005b), and NRG Flinders (2005), an 
incumbent generator in SA, went as far as to suggest that wind farms should 
participate more fully in the dispatch process, just as scheduled generators do. 
At the time of writing, NEMMCO were implementing semi-dispatch arrangements 
(NEMMCO, 2007). 
5.5.1.2 Technical standards 
Another high priority issue discussed by WETAG was technical standards for the 
NEM. This issue related to the mismatch between wind and the institutional 
arrangements of the NEM. 
As noted earlier, the problem was that when the standards were written, they were 
based around incumbent generators and did not anticipate large levels of intermittent 
generation. As a consequence, many standards used technically, commercially or 
connection specific terms that could not be applied to wind farms (WEPWG, 2005). 
System managers were concerned about the potential consequences of connecting 
large levels of wind power to the grid with inappropriate technical standards. There 
was also concern amongst wind actors (and acknowledgement from electricity sector 
actors) that some standards might have be overly prescriptive or stringent (WEPWG, 
2005). 
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WETAG’s proposal was to review the technical standards. However, WETAG also 
noted wind power was not an isolated case and that it would be very difficult to 
ensure that the technical standards were applicable to all future technologies. WETAG 
proposed that technical standards be reviewed every three to five years, guided by set 
principles to limit the scope of possible change and the level of uncertainty for actors 
(WEPWG, 2005). This showed recognition of the need to balance learning and 
embedding. WETAG noted that policy makers would again have to be involved 
because technical standards relate to NEM objectives such as technology neutrality 
and equity between incumbents and new entrants (WEPWG, 2005). 
All submissions supported the need to review the technical standards. However, some 
actors did not support regular reviews because of the uncertainty reviews could create 
for investors (NGF, 2005, Southern Hydro, 2005). This is another example of the 
tension between learning and embedding. These actors wanted “grandfathering” of 
standards for existing generators to be guaranteed (NGF, 2005, Southern Hydro, 
2005), perhaps a way to balance flexibility for learning and embedding. 
NEMMCO (2005b) stated that they had begun the review of technical standards; 
however, AusWEA (2005c) noted that any code changes would take at least a year, 
something which would have significant implications for South Australia as will be 
discussed shortly. 
5.5.1.3 Increasing technical legitimacy of wind power 
The legitimacy of wind power as a generation technology was not discussed in the 
WEPWG/WETAG report, but a number of the proposed changes help to illustrate and 
explain the increasing legitimacy. In essence, the increase in legitimacy and the 
proposed changes occurred because wind power was expected to reach installed 
capacities which meant that it could no longer safely be ignored, as intermittent 
generation had been in the past. 
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Two of the proposed changes, disclosure of wind generation information and 
participation in frequency control ancillary services (FCAS)87, would bestow similar 
responsibilities and requirements on wind power as those placed on scheduled 
generators. This meant that wind farms would have to adapt to the existing regime by 
behaving more like incumbent generators. This showed that wind power was being 
recognised as a generation technology, but that along with this recognition came 
responsibility. 
Another change, forecasting firm capacity, shows even more clearly how the attitudes 
of system managers towards wind power changed. In the 1980s and 1990s, wind 
farms were not considered to add to peak generation capacity for planning purposes 
(Bunting, 2003). System managers dismissed wind power because they felt it could 
not be relied on. In contrast, the WETAG report noted that allowances should be 
made for the contribution of wind generation to peak capacity in the medium-term (2 
years) and long-term (10 years) forecasts. The report noted that ESIPC had estimated 
the peak capacity of wind generation to be in the order of 15% of installed capacity, 
while NEMMCO had also made allowances and would be refining its estimates as 
more data became available (WEPWG, 2005). VENCorp, the network planner in 
Victoria, noted that it was taking the contribution of wind farms into account by using 
the estimates provided by NEMMCO and ESIPC (VENCorp, 2005). 
While wind farms were not necessarily being welcomed by system managers, they 
were being seen as a legitimate form of generation. 
                                                 
87 This is a process where NEM particpants are paid to vary their supply or demand in the short-term in 
order to maintain the supply/demand balance. The costs for this balancing is shared between generators 
and consumers. 
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5.5.1.4 Discussion 
A number of themes emerged from the WEPWG/WETAG process. The changes 
proposed by WEPWG/WETAG required change by wind generation and by the NEM 
– it was mutual adaptation. Wind would be required to become more like incumbent 
scheduled generators by being semi-scheduled, participating in regulation FCAS, and 
providing information to the market; while the NEM would be changed to adapt to 
wind through the creation of a new generation category (semi-dispatched), changes to 
technical standards, and new procedures such as forecasting wind farm capacity.  
The process also illustrated that the inclusion of policy makers will be a vital part of 
achieving this mutual fit (WEPWG, 2005). This suggests that getting wind on a high-
level problem agenda was a very important step. 
While significant steps had been taken towards finding a mutual fit, the rate of wind 
farm development was exceeding the rate at which the regime could adjust. This was 
particularly so in South Australia and led to actors taking more immediate action. 
5.5.2 South Australia 
In 2004, decision makers in South Australia became increasingly concerned about 
grid integration issues. As noted earlier, it was SA’s representatives at MCE who 
instigated the formation of WEPWG. Also, ESIPC were concerned that in the next 
few years South Australia could have amongst the highest levels of wind farm 
penetration in the world and engaged consultants to understand better how other 
countries had dealt with similar issues (ESIPC, 2004, Garrad Hassan, 2005, 
Oakeshott, 2004).  
Most significantly, the South Australian regulator, ESCOSA, who grants generator 
licences in that state, became concerned about the number of applications they were 
receiving from wind farms (ESCOSA, 2004b, Myer, 2004). By November 2004, 
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ESCOSA had granted licenses to about 450 MW of wind capacity and by January 
2005 had received applications for about another 750 MW (ESCOSA, 2005b). To put 
ESCOSA’s concerns in perspective, this total capacity would be about one and a half 
times the capacity that Outhred (2003a) estimated could be “readily accepted” into the 
South Australian grid. In response, ESCOSA asked ESIPC to advise on the impacts of 
wind power on consumers in South Australia in terms of price, quality, and reliability 
(ESIPC, 2005c). This work began with modelling similar to ESIPC’s previous work 
and ended with a set of licensing principles which would shape the development of 
wind power in South Australia over the next few years.   
5.5.2.1 ESIPC report to ESCOSA 
ESIPC released its report at about the same time as the WEPWG report was released 
(ESIPC, 2005c). The report built on ESIPC’s earlier modelling work with the aim of 
understanding the dispatch implications and likely market response of different levels 
of wind farm capacity (ESIPC, 2005c).  
On a positive note for the wind industry, ESIPC (2005c) concluded that power quality 
was being managed by the wind turbines currently being used and the connection 
agreements that had been reached between developers and NSPs. A mutual fit had 
been found in relation to power quality.  
More concerning for the wind industry were the conclusions that, under the current 
arrangements, system security and reliability could be maintained with up to only 
about 500 MW of wind farm capacity, i.e. about the level of the projects already 
granted licences. At higher levels of capacity, ESIPC concluded that changes would 
be required. From a technical perspective, they concluded that state-of-the-art 
forecasting was required and that wind farms would need to accept occasional 
generation limits, similar to the semi-dispatch recommendation of WETAG/WEPWG 
(ESIPC, 2005c). From a market perspective, ESIPC concluded that costs should be 
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allocated on a causer-pays basis and that there should be increased transparency and 
accuracy of information available to market participants (ESIPC, 2005c); this was 
expected to create a market based limit to wind power in South Australia (discussed 
shortly). Broadly speaking, these recommendations were similar to those of 
WEPWG/WETAG.  
Unsurprisingly, the report caused concern within the wind industry because there was 
already almost 500 MW of wind farms with licences granted and thousands more 
proposed, creating the possibility of stranded investment. 
The report did state that there was no firm technical limit to wind farm penetration in 
South Australia provided that appropriate modifications are made to the market and 
network (ESIPC, 2005c). In other words, a mutual fit was possible at almost any level 
of penetration; it would just be a matter of cost. ESIPC suggested that, ideally, at 
increasing levels of penetration, either the cost of connection would make developing 
a wind farm unviable or technological advance would mitigate the integration issues. 
In such a case there would be a market-based limit to wind farm penetration (ESIPC, 
2005c). 
The wind industry was critical of ESIPC’s approach, as it had been with NEMMCO, 
suggesting that ESIPC was looking at threats rather than opportunities (AusWEA, 
2005b). In contrast, incumbent generators in SA supported ESIPC's approach and 
expressed concern about the potential impact of large levels of wind power 
(International Power, 2005, TXU, 2005a). 
In terms of penetration limits, a number of wind and regime actors supported a 
market-based approach (AGL, 2005a, Electranet, 2005a, Mackie, 2005, NRG 
Flinders, 2005). However, actors also noted that it would take years to implement the 
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changes required so that a market-based limit could emerge (NRG Flinders, 2005, 
TXU, 2005a)88. In the interim, it would be necessary to limit generation licences to 
wind farms. Others submissions, from actors who had interests in wind farms, argued 
that generation licences should not be used to arbitrarily restrict participation in the 
NEM (AGL, 2005a, Mackie, 2005).  
The result of this investigation was a rush of license applications, totalling about 500 
MW of capacity (ESCOSA, 2005c). Developers were clearly anxious to ensure that 
their projects were approved before any limits were introduced. 
5.5.2.2 ESCOSA’s licensing principles 
Despite the criticism of ESIPC’s report, ESCOSA’s concluded that ESIPC had 
identified significant risks and had reached appropriately conservative conclusions 
that were consistent with WETAG and were well supported by stakeholders 
(ESCOSA, 2005b). Based on the ESIPC report, and the fact that the WEPWG 
proposals would not be in place for up to 2 years, ESCOSA developed a set of 
licensing principles which it expected would allow development to occur without the 
risks identified by ESIPC (ESCOSA, 2005b).  
ESCOSA proposed and received feedback on 7 principles for wind farm generation 
licences. This feedback was assessed by ESIPC89 and recommendations made to 
ESOCSA.  
                                                 
88 This was also noted by various participants at an AusWEA forum, held in Adelaide in April 2005 to 
discuss the work of ESIPC and WEPWG/WETAG. 
89 The individual submissions were not publicly released, only a report on ESIPCs assessment of the 
submissions was available. 
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In essence, the licensing principles required wind power to adapt to the NEM by being 
more like incumbent generators, giving time for the NEM to be adapted to wind 
power by implementing the changes proposed by WEPWG. Wind farms would have 
to comply with higher than normal access standards until NEM technical standards 
were more applicable to wind farms (ESCOSA, 2005c). Wind farms would have to 
register and participate as scheduled generators, i.e. the same category as traditional 
coal, gas and hydro generators, until the semi-scheduled category was created 
(ESCOSA, 2005c). Wind farms would have to provide forecasts of their outputs and 
co-operate with efforts to develop the national forecasting system (ESCOSA, 2005c). 
And, wind farms would have to participate in regulation FCAS90 (ESCOSA, 2005c).  
According to ESIPC (2005a), the wind industry was critical of these proposals, as it 
had been towards any proposals which would increase the cost or uncertainty 
associated with wind farm development. Responding to this criticism, ESIPC 
acknowledged that the new requirements would impose costs on some wind projects, 
but stated that they were justified because they decreased the risk of system disruption 
at the expected world-leading levels of wind farm penetration (ESIPC, 2005b).  
ESCOSA implemented the licensing principles based on ESIPC’s recommendations 
(ESCOSA, 2005c). The fallout from the application of these principles was unknown 
at the time of writing. 
                                                 
90 Regulation Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) are used continually to correct minor 
deviations and maintain the demand/supply balance. This is in contrast to contingency FCAS which are 
used occasionally to respond to major deviations, such as the loss of a generating unit or major 
transmission line (NEMMCO Power Exchange Operations, 2001). 
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5.5.2.3 Discussion and summary 
The themes which emerge from this episode are similar to those in both the 
WEPWG/WETAG process and the forecasting system. As with NEMMCO’s 
concerns about forecasting, ESCOSA felt compelled to introduce interim measures 
because the path to a mutual fit would take too long. ESCOSA’s proposal required 
wind power to act more like incumbent generators, but in a more crude fashion than 
the WEPWG/WETAG proposal. In the ESCOSA case, the change was less mutual 
adaptation and more wind power conforming to the status quo.  
5.5.3 Discussion and summary 
This section on institutional embedding has further illustrated and explained the 
mismatches between wind power and the existing electricity regime, and also 
explained why the changes occurred as they have. 
Institutional changes were proposed because system managers were concerned about 
the increasing risks of large levels of wind power under existing arrangements. The 
changes proposed charted a course towards a mutual fit. This also illustrated and 
explained the increasing legitimacy of wind power as a generation technology – it 
could no longer safely be ignored. 
As with the forecasting episode, the time expected for the changes to occur was too 
long to alleviate concerns. As a result, interim measures were put in place, measures 
which required wind farms to adapt to the existing NEM. 
As noted a number of times, system managers realised that wind power was not an 
isolated case, but rather a forerunner to a range of new generation technologies. As a 
result, the NEM should be better technically and institutionally equipped to be able to 
accommodate other new generation technologies in the future. 
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5.6 Attempts to find a mutual fit: wind farms and network 
infrastructure 
While mutual adaptation was occurring between wind farms and network operation, 
this was not the case with network infrastructure. Many actors attempted to fund new 
network infrastructure to areas of excellent wind resource, but none were particularly 
successful. The result in South Australia was that wind farm projects were forced to 
move from the areas of best wind resource to those of lesser wind resource which 
were better supported by network infrastructure (ESIPC, 2004). In other states which 
have lesser wind resources, this limited the potential sites for wind farms. 
The mismatch occurred because the layout of the existing network infrastructure had 
co-evolved with traditional generators. Moreover, the grid had a radial design, with 
electrical energy intended to flow from high-voltage to low voltage parts of the 
network; it was not designed for large amounts of distributed (i.e. low voltage 
connected) generation (BCSE, 2004). The result was that the grid did not complement 
the wind resource. 
This was undeniably a significant issue for wind power in Australia. The mismatch 
was noted by a number of actors, most often in relation to South Australia (Electranet, 
2002a, c, ESIPC, 2001, Outhred, 2003a). In their 2001 annual report, ESIPC 
suggested that the weak or non-existent network infrastructure in the areas of best 
wind resource was biggest hurdle for wind power in South Australia (ESIPC, 2001).  
Actors tried at least four different methods of funding new network infrastructure 
between 1997 and 2007. First, an ElectraNet, an NSP in SA applied to the national 
regulator to fund new infrastructure under their revenue cap. Second, there was the 
potential for new infrastructure to be built and become a regulated asset if it passed 
the regulated benefits test. Third, a number of Government actors tried to facilitate co-
operative or shared connection between developers. Fourth, the Victorian government 
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set up grants to help pay for grid connection. The following sections briefly discuss 
each of these in turn.   
5.6.1 Revenue cap 
One of the earliest attempts to overcome the wind/grid mismatch was ElectraNet’s 
proposal to fund extensive network upgrades from its revenue cap.  
Electranet, in its April 2002 application to the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC)91 regarding its revenue cap, proposed a budget of approximately 
$185 million to support wind generation. This was about half of their total application 
(Electranet, 2002b, Meritec, 2002a). 
Electranet suggested that South Australia was on the verge of developing a major new 
industry (Electranet, 2002b). While not discounting that Electranet (or people within 
Electranet) may have been motivated by the greenhouse benefits of wind power, 
Electranet undoubtedly saw an opportunity for a significant expansion to its networks. 
In September, the ACCC released its draft decision. The ACCC (2002a) supported a 
consultant’s analysis (Meritec, 2002a) that the funding to support distributed 
generation should be excluded from ElectraNet's revenue cap. The ACCC (2002a) 
gave the following reasons: the costs of the proposed expansions were high and the 
economic benefits were unclear; the National Electricity Code was ambiguous about 
who should pay for augmentations to support new generation; locational signals 
would be lost if generators were provided with subsidised connections92; and, the 
                                                 
91 The ACCC is a statutory authority set up to ensure fair trading in consumer markets and to regulate 
national infrastructure. See www.accc.gov.au for further details. 
92 This logic could have significant implications for other new technologies with geographically remote 
energy sources, such as geothermal in outback South Australia. It suggests that the grid is no longer to 
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overall size of Electranet capital expenditure program would give them the ability to 
reprioritise projects if necessary. 
The one response from a wind farm developer to this draft decision came from Hydro 
Tasmania, who, along with a number of other wind farm developers, had an interest in 
the Eyre peninsula (Hydro Tasmania, 2002a). This is a sparsely populated area in the 
west coast of South Australia that has a huge potential for wind generation because it 
is exposed to the winds of the roaring 40s (i.e. 40° latitude). Hydro Tasmania was 
very concerned by the draft ACCC decision because ElectraNet had stated in its 
response to the consultant's report that it would not commit to expenditure not 
allowed for in its revenue cap (ElectraNet, 2002). Hydro Tasmania (2002a) stated that 
wind projects could be significantly delayed or cancelled, despite the regions where 
upgrades were planned having the potential for many viable projects.  
The ACCC was unmoved by this criticism and upheld its conclusions (ACCC, 
2002c). At present there are only two wind farms under construction on the Eyre 
peninsula totalling about 130 MW despite there having been proposals for many more 
and a wind resource potential for over 1000 MW  (ESIPC, 2002, 2004). 
5.6.2 Regulated asset 
A second method of funding new infrastructure for wind farms was for it to become a 
regulated asset – i.e. the cost passed onto electricity consumers – by passing the 
regulatory test. 
The regulatory test was developed by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission as a way of deciding whether or not a proposed network infrastructure 
                                                                                                                                            
just connect generation and load, but that it now has a stronger influence on the location of generation 
and load. 
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project resulted in a “net public benefit” (ACCC, 2002b). It was a cost-benefit 
analysis style test based on the principles of economic efficiency and competitive 
neutrality (ACCC, 2002b). 
Both ESIPC (2003b) and the MRET panel (Tambling et al., 2003) noted that the way 
in which costs and benefits were defined and calculated made it difficult for new 
network infrastructure to be constructed without the wind farm having to pay 
significant costs. For example, the benefits that were recognised under the test did not 
include greenhouse abatement – one of the main drivers for wind farms. 
During the period under investigation, there was no evidence that any new network 
infrastructure, primarily intended to support wind farms, passed the regulatory 
benefits test. 
5.6.3 Co-operative or shared connection 
A third method for funding network infrastructure that was proposed (but not tried to 
my knowledge) was for developers of near-by projects to jointly connect to the 
network. This could occur in two ways. The first, which I refer to as co-operative 
connection, is where two or more developers form a consortium and together apply to 
the NSP for connection. The second, which I refer to as shared connection, is where 
two or more wind farms share connection infrastructure but did not work together to 
achieve this. An example would be where one wind farm connects and then another in 
the same region connects, making use of network infrastructure that was installed for 
the first wind farm. 
Co-operative or shared connection held a number of attractions. From a commercial 
point of view there was the potential for economies of scale. Peter Tanner (2002) of 
Transgrid, the NSW TNSP, noted that the per unit cost of connecting 200 MW of 
wind was almost half that of connection 20 MW of wind. From a technical point of 
view, joint connection enabled the NSP to optimise the design of the network with a 
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lower environmental impact than if the network was developed in stages (WEPWG, 
2005). 
Co-operative connection was investigated and discussed by a number of actors, the 
most active being the Sustainable Energy Development Authority in NSW (SEDA, 
2003a, Williamson, 2002a). Despite their efforts, they found that issues of commercial 
confidentiality between developers were a significant barrier (Maddox, 2002c, 
Prichard, 2003, SEDA, 2003b, Williamson, 2002a). WETAG similarly noted that co-
operative connection was difficult because of commercial confidentiality and different 
project timelines (WEPWG, 2005). At the time of writing, no practical way of 
achieving co-operative connection had been found. 
Shared connection was discussed by a TNSP in NEMMCO’s 2003 paper on 
intermittent generation and by WETAG/WEPWG. Both the TNSP and WETAG noted 
that there was no established procedure for an NSP to optimise a connection for a 
group of applicants, to enable connection assets to become shared network assets, or 
to co-fund network augmentation with a proponent if they expected further 
developments in that area in the future (NEMMCO, 2003, WEPWG, 2005). In late 
2004, the Victorian Government passed legislation to try to create such a process. 
The Victorian legislation enabled NSPs to spread the cost of network augmentation 
across multiple wind farms in an area. If there was a significant time lag between the 
first and subsequent connections, or there were no subsequent connections, the NSP 
could seek permission from the Victorian Essential Services Commission to pass the 
cost on to retailers and ultimately consumers (Parliament of Victoria, 2004, 
Theophanous in Victoria, 2004). At the time of writing, no information was publicly 
available on whether NSPs and wind farm developers had made use of this legislation. 
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WETAG noted that these issues of co-operative and shared connection were not 
unique to wind power, but that they were likely to occur more frequently for wind 
projects because of the localised nature of wind resources (WEPWG, 2005).  
5.6.4 Government grant 
The final way in which actors attempted to address the cost of connection was via 
direct subsidy. In 2005, the Victorian State government continued to try to make grid 
connection for wind farms more accessible with the announcement of the Wind 
Energy Support Package (WESP) (Theophanous, 2005a). According to the 
promotional material, WESP “... will provide capital funding to assist with the 
connection of selected wind farms to the State’s electricity network, where these costs 
would otherwise make the investment marginal.” (Regional Development Victoria, 
2005) At the time of writing, no information was publicly available on how many 
applications had been received and which, if any, were successful. 
5.6.5 Discussion and summary 
Despite actors trying many different methods, there was no clearly successful way of 
addressing the mismatch between the wind resource and the existing grid 
infrastructure. The restructuring of the electricity sector, while increasing access to the 
grid and enabling the institutional change discussed earlier, had also brought a greater 
economic focus. The causer or user-pays philosophy meant that wind farms had to 
fund new network infrastructure to areas of high wind resource. Due to the potentially 
high cost of network augmentation, wind developers were forced to adapt to the 
existing regime by looking for locations close to existing infrastructure (ESIPC, 
2004). 
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5.7 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate and explain the significant changes or 
attempts to change related to grid integration. In doing so, I have also tested the 
insights from Chapter 2 in terms of positive feedback dynamics, which actors were in 
a position to encourage these dynamics, and challenges for actors to anticipate. This 
final section highlights these findings. 
5.7.1 Importance of the dynamics 
This facet of the case has illustrated why decreasing uncertainty, increasing use, 
increasing technical legitimacy, strengthening expectations, increasing embedding and 
alignment, learning and articulation, and attracting actors are important dynamics in 
the introduction of new technologies. 
The chapter showed that decreasing uncertainty (or not increasing it) was important 
for developers, investors, Governments and system managers. The actors who had the 
most direct influence on the level of uncertainty for the wind industry were the 
Government in terms of the WEPWG work and ESCOSA’s generator license 
requirements. The actors who had the most direct influence over the level of 
uncertainty for system managers were developers and investors in terms of the likely 
locations and capacities of wind farms. 
The chapter showed that increasing use was important because helped to demonstrate 
performance which in turn increased technical legitimacy. Wind farm developers and 
investors were able to have the most direct effect on increasing use. 
The chapter showed that increasing technical legitimacy was important because it 
attracted actors and enabled embedding of wind power into the existing socio-
technical regime. In this case, the fact that wind power could no longer be ignored 
meant that system managers and NSPs felt the need to embed wind power in 
Chapter 5 – Wind power and the electricity sector 
207 
operating procedures and in a complementary technology – wind power forecasting. 
Developers and investors had a direct influence on technical legitimacy through the 
level of installed wind farm capacity, while Government (AGO) was able to influence 
it through the reports they commissioned on barriers, readily-accepted capacity, and 
diversity. 
Table 13 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks 
Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how  
Increasing 
use 
To build technical  
legitimacy through 
demonstration 
- Developers 
- Investors 
- Install more wind farms 
Increasing 
technical 
legitimacy  
To attract actors 
and enable the 
technology to be 
socially, 
institutionally and 
technologically 
embedded. 
- Developers 
- Government 
- Increasing use 
- Provide operating data for analysis 
Strengthening 
expectations 
To encourage 
alignment in the 
direction of 
progress, to 
encourage 
consensus on the 
need (or not) for 
action, and reduce 
uncertainty. 
- Government 
- System 
managers 
- Investors 
- Developers 
- Gathering operational data to test 
initial expectations 
 
 
Increasing 
alignment 
To increase the 
functionality of 
the new 
technology, 
reduce 
uncertainty, and 
reduce conflict 
between actors.  
 
- Government 
- Industry 
associations 
- System 
managers 
- Network 
Service 
Providers 
- Formation of influential working 
groups such as WEPWG and 
WETAG 
- Technical standards for grid 
connection that are applicable to 
wind power 
- Financial investments  
- Construction of new infrastructure 
- Development of complementary 
technologies such as a wind power 
forecasting system 
- Inclusion of wind power in operating 
procedures, such as forecasting and 
long-term planning. 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how  
Reducing 
uncertainty 
To encourage 
ongoing 
investment in the 
technology and 
other 
complementary 
institutional and 
technological 
structures 
- Government 
- System 
managers 
- Investors 
- Developers 
- Clear direction of progress (e.g. 
visions of wind power in the grid, 
and problem agendas and potential 
solutions);  
- Embedding  of the new technology 
(in an aligned way) in social, 
institutional and technological 
structures;  
- Standardization of interfaces with 
existing technologies or 
infrastructure (e.g. technical 
standards for grid connection); 
- Strengthen expectations 
Learning and  
articulation 
To better 
understand how a 
mutual fit might 
be found between 
the new 
technology and 
the existing 
regime. 
- System 
managers 
- Government 
- Industry 
associations 
- Understanding experiences from 
other locations that have been 
through similar issues. 
- Risk management strategies 
- Understand how the benefits and 
opportunities that the new technology 
may bring can be harnessed. 
- Engage researchers to investigate 
specific issues (e.g. the effect of 
diverse wind farm locations on the  
variability of output) 
Attracting 
actors 
To enable change 
and embedding in 
all aspects of the 
socio-technical 
regime 
 
 
- Government 
- System 
managers 
- Industry 
association 
- NSPs 
- Developers 
- Create robust, specific and high 
quality expectations of economic, 
environmental, or social benefits, for 
example by demonstrating that the 
technology has a noticeable impact 
- Highlight opportunities that may be 
missed if particular actors are not 
involved. 
The chapter showed that strengthening expectations was important because when 
there is uncertainty about the future there may be conflict. For example, system 
managers felt they were being proactive with their investigations into grid integration 
issues before they had arisen. On the other hand, wind supporters felt that system 
managers had pessimistic expectations and were over-reacting, potentially scaring off 
investors. It was only once actors began to gather and analyse operational data that 
they could realistically estimate the likelihood and severity of the risks that system 
managers had identified and create an agreed problem agenda. Actors who were able 
to strongly influence the expectations of others were the Government and system 
managers in terms of the WEPWG process and ESCOSA/ESIPC’s licensing 
principles. Wind farm developers and investors had an influence on the expectations 
of system managers due to the growing number of wind farms, however this was an 
emergent rather than a strategic influence. 
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The chapter showed that increasing embedding and alignment were important because 
they increased the functionality of wind power, they reduced uncertainty, and they 
reduced conflict between actors. In this case, the embedding of wind power –
cognitively in expectations and visions of the future, socially in informal and formal 
actor groups focused on wind issues, institutionally in operating procedures and 
technical standards, and technologically in wind power forecasting – reduced the 
initially uncertain place of wind power in the grid and gave it a distinct trajectory. It 
made wind power more functional in the sense that system managers were able to 
manage generation levels and power flows more effectively. Those with the most 
direct influence on institutional and technological embedding were system managers 
and the Federal Government, while AusWEA, Government and system managers 
were influential at the social level in terms of organising conferences and workshops 
to discuss the various issues. 
The chapter showed that learning and articulation were important because the 
mismatches between wind power and the existing socio-technical regime were 
unprecedented. Even though grid integration issues with wind power had been dealt 
with overseas, the solutions used there were not directly applicable to the local 
situation. Furthermore, how actors define problems will affect the type of learning 
they regard as beneficial. For example, contrast the risk-focused investigations of 
NEMMCO and ESIPC with the opportunity-focused investigations of the AGO. The 
main actors who undertook learning and articulation were system managers, the 
Government (AGO and WEPWG), and AusWEA. 
Finally, the chapter showed that attracting actors to wind power was important 
because it enabled change and embedding. Without the involvement of policy-makers, 
the options for embedding wind power into the electricity regime would have been far 
more limited. The actors who were most able to attract policy-makers were system 
managers and the AGO. 
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This chapter supports the inclusion of these dynamics in a framework for introducing 
new technologies. 
5.7.2 Insights to strengthen SNM 
The events analysed in this chapter have shown that there can be mismatches between 
a new technology and an existing socio-technical regime because the regime has co-
evolved with incumbent technologies. These mismatches can manifest themselves in a 
variety of ways, and actors may have different visions about how the mismatches 
should be addressed – i.e. different visions for a mutual fit – and have different 
expectations about how a mutual fit could best be achieved. 
We can learn from the events analysed to strengthen SNM. I have used a similar style 
of table to that in Chapter 2 to arrange the challenges because many of them relate to 
more than one dynamic (See Table 8). Those challenges identified in Chapter 2 that 
are supported by this facet of the case are shown in the table, along with those 
challenges that have come from this chapter. The numbers in brackets (Chapter-
Number) in the table provide a cross-reference to a more detailed discussion in the 
following text and are also used in the final chapter. 
5.7.2.1 (5-1) Mismatches with existing operating procedures and technical 
standards 
A number of researchers have identified that the introduction of a new technology 
may be hindered by mismatches with existing behaviours, managerial practices, or 
institutional structures (Barnes et al., 2004, Kemp, 1994). In this case, the mismatches 
occurred because wind energy resources in Australia have different characteristics and 
are harnessed using different technologies than traditional coal, gas and hydro 
resources. The institutional framework of the electricity regime has co-evolved with 
these traditional energy resources and is therefore mismatched with wind power in  
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Table 14 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks 
Challenge 
D
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Possible strategy 
(5-1) Mismatches with 
existing operating 
procedures or behaviours 
of use (Barnes et al., 2004, 
Kemp, 1994) 
   ?    ?   
Actors could anticipate 
likely mismatches by 
identifying the similarities 
and differences of the new 
and incumbent 
technologies and 
identifying how these 
characteristics relate to 
existing operating 
procedures or behaviours. 
Note that this strategy may 
encourage substitutional 
thinking (See 4-9) 
(5-2) Mismatches with 
existing infrastructure 
(Frankel, 1955) 
   ?    ?   
Actors could anticipate 
likely mismatches by 
identifying the similarities 
and differences of the new 
and incumbent 
technologies and to 
identifying how these 
characteristics relate to the 
existing infrastructure. 
Note that this strategy may 
encourage substitutional 
thinking (See 4-9) 
(5-3) Actors do not 
necessarily have to have 
opposing interests for 
them to end up on 
opposite sides of a debate. 
       ? ? ? 
Actors could identify how 
their interests overlap with 
others and use this 
common ground as a basis 
for a constructive 
relationship. 
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Possible strategy 
(5-4) Balance between the 
interests of firms and the 
interests of the industry. 
Firms are competing to 
stake their claim in a 
growing industry, but the 
same time they must co-
operate in order to tackle 
systemic barriers which 
affect the whole industry.  
(Weber et al., 1999)        ? ? ? 
“Monitor carefully 
potential barriers to co-
operation between 
partners in an experiment, 
especially if they have 
competing stakes and are 
prone to free-riding” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
 
Actors could look for 
ways of providing 
information in a form that 
is useful to others but 
protects the commercial 
interests of firms, e.g. 
confidentiality 
agreements, providing 
limited amounts of 
information, providing 
information via a trusted 
intermediary (e.g. industry 
association).   
(5-5) Niche may not 
develop because key niche 
actors do not get 
sufficiently involved 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
       ? ? ? 
“Committed partners 
increase the chances of 
project success” (Weber et 
al., 1999). 
 
Actors could try to 
communicate to 
uninvolved actors that 
opportunities, framed in 
terms of the uninvolved 
actor’s interests, will be 
missed if issues are not 
resolved. 
(5-6) Balance between 
getting issues on a high-
level problem agenda and 
maintaining the legitimacy 
of the technology ?      ?   ? 
When trying to attract 
high-level actors or 
funding, actors could try 
to ensure that the issues 
are linked with potential 
solutions, or to at least 
define a promising path 
towards solutions. 
(5-7) Actors measure 
legitimacy depending on 
their interests       ?  ?  
Technical actors may 
measure legitimacy on the 
basis of how effectively 
the technology meets its 
function. 
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Possible strategy 
(5-8) Institutional change 
tends to be slow, and 
difficult unless there is a 
social mandate (Unruh, 
2002) 
       ? ?  
Actors could try to 
increase the political 
legitimacy of the 
technology by making a 
strong business case for 
industry support, 
strengthening links 
between the technology 
and desirable symbols or 
visions, and encouraging 
articulation of support. 
(5-9) Difficult for actors to 
think long-term when their 
short-term future is 
uncertain (Rip, 1995)      ?  ?  ? 
Government actors could 
make efforts to facilitate 
learning and embedding 
even when there is 
uncertainty about the 
future. 
(5-10) Balance between 
maintaining flexibility for 
learning whilst reducing 
uncertainty and building 
alignment through 
embedding (Hoogma et 
al., 2002) 
  ?   ?  ?   
Actors could limit the 
potential for change for 
example by limiting the 
scope of the learning, 
promising transition 
arrangements, or 
grandfathering existing 
requirements. 
(5-11) Path towards 
mutual adaptation may 
require transitional 
strategies 
  ?     ?  ? 
Actors may need to 
implement interim 
policies, operating 
procedures or technologies 
to give the regime time to 
adapt to the new 
technology, and the new 
technology may initially 
have to adapt to the 
existing regime. 
(5-12) Repeated problems 
may occur when setting up 
an experiment with a new 
technology (Weber et al., 
1999). 
  ?        
“When designing a new 
experiment, seek out and 
utilise previous relevant 
experience” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
 
A qualification to the 
workbook advice is that 
actors may need to invest 
resources into 
understanding how 
applicable the lessons 
from other countries or 
previous experiments are 
to the specific case. 
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terms of technical standards and operating procedures (Outhred, 2003c, WEPWG, 
2005). 
Actors introducing a new technology may be able to anticipate mismatches by 
identifying differences between the new and incumbent technologies. The way that 
these features or characteristics of the technologies “connect” to other elements of the 
socio-technical regime – for example, behaviours, contracts, standard engineering or 
managerial practices – would be a good place to start looking for possible 
mismatches. A risk with this strategy is that it could encourage substitutional thinking 
(see 4-9). 
The way that the mismatches can be overcome will vary from case to case. In this 
chapter we saw that actors chose to change the institutional framework so that it was 
better adapted to wind power in terms of technical standards. To overcome the 
“problem” of intermittency, system managers and the Government developed new 
operating procedures and the complementary technology of wind power forecasting. 
5.7.2.2 (5-2) Mismatches with existing infrastructure 
Researchers have identified that the introduction of a new technology may be 
hindered by mismatches with existing infrastructure (Frankel, 1955). In this case the 
mismatch occurred because wind energy resources in Australia are found in different 
locations than traditional coal, gas and hydro resources (Outhred, 2003c, WEPWG, 
2005). The network infrastructure of the electricity regime has co-evolved with these 
traditional energy resources and major load centres and is therefore mismatched with 
wind power. This mismatch was particularly strong in South Australia; the Eyre 
Peninsula in South Australia had the potential for 1000s MW of wind farms, but a 
network capable of support only a few 100 MW (Electranet, 2002c, ESIPC, 2002, 
Meritec, 2002b). 
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Actors could anticipate likely mismatches by identifying the similarities and 
differences of the new and incumbent technologies and to identifying how these 
characteristics relate to the existing infrastructure. A risk with this strategy is that it 
could encourage substitutional thinking (see 4-9). Because infrastructure tends to have 
a high capital cost, proponents may need to attract Government support to develop 
new infrastructure or adapt their practices to the existing infrastructure. Government 
assistance is precedented in Australia at least, with State Governments heavily 
involved in the development of infrastructure for the electricity industry since about 
the 1920s (Allbut, 1958, Boehm, 1955, 1956, Booth, 2000, Saddler, 1981); although 
the extent of involvement has change with the restructuring of the industry (Outhred, 
1998). 
5.7.2.3 (5-3) Actors on opposite sides of a debate do not necessarily have 
opposing interests 
This case showed that actors on opposite sides of a debate do not necessarily have 
opposing interests. For example, the system managers – NEMMCO, ESIPC, and 
ESCOSA – were not opposed to wind power as such; they were trying to keep the risk 
of system disruption at what they considered an acceptable level. System managers 
expected that the introduction of large levels of wind power would increase the risk of 
disruption to unacceptable levels because of the mismatches between wind power and 
the electricity regime. They therefore wanted to manage how wind farms were 
integrated into the grid and, in the case of ESCOSA and ESIPC, limit the level of 
wind power at least in the short term. The wind industry regarded the stance of system 
managers as over-reacting, or risk-focused rather than opportunity-focused. The lack 
of consensus was not over whether there should be wind power in the grid or not; it 
was over issues such as how serious were system managers’ concerns, what should be 
done about them, by when, by whom, and at whose cost? Actors could identify how 
their interests overlap with others and use this common ground as a basis for a 
constructive relationship. 
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5.7.2.4 (5-4) Tension between the interests of firms and the interests of the 
industry 
Researchers have noted that there can be a tension between the interests of firms and 
the interests of the fledgling industry (Weber et al., 1999). We saw this tension in 
regards to developers sharing operational data from wind farms. They were reluctant 
to share data because it was costly to obtain and because sharing it might have put 
them at a competitive disadvantage. System managers, the AGO, and the MRET 
review panel felt that the lack of operational data was hindering efforts to understand 
the likelihood and severity of grid integration issues – something which was to the 
benefit of the wind industry. We also saw the tension in the failed attempts to 
facilitate co-operative grid connection. There was the potential that developers could 
save significant amounts of money, but the issues of commercial confidentiality were 
again a barrier. 
Weber et al (1999 p.78) suggest that actors “…monitor carefully potential barriers to 
co-operation between partners in an experiment, especially if they have competing 
stakes and are prone to free-riding”. We can take this a step further by suggesting that 
actors could look for ways of providing information that is needed for achieving a 
mutual fit, particularly a fit with infrastructure or institutional frameworks, in a form 
that is useful but protects the commercial interests of firms. Examples include using 
confidentiality agreements, providing limited amounts of information, or providing 
information via a trusted intermediary (e.g. industry association). Historically, State 
Governments in Australia have taken such actions to support the fossil fuel industry, 
as illustrated by their large energy or natural resources departments. 
5.7.2.5 (5-5) Key actors not involved 
An insight from the SNM workbook is that the niche may not develop because key 
niche actors do not get sufficiently involved (Weber et al., 1999). The workbook 
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offers little advice to actors other than to reminded them that “Committed partners 
increase the chances of project success” (Weber et al., 1999). 
This case showed that without policy-makers, the options for finding a mutual fit 
between wind power and the existing socio-technical regime would have been more 
limited. We saw that once grid-integration issues made it on to the problem agenda of 
high-level Government actors, it widened the possible options for a mutual fit and 
resulted in funding for the forecasting system. 
This challenge can be considered more broadly, given that a new technology is likely 
to interact with a range of institutional and infrastructure, each of which may be 
controlled by a different actor. Each of these actors may need to become involved if a 
mutual fit is to be found. This challenge highlights that actors are resource 
interdependent and have limited influence by themselves (Smith et al., 2005). 
The challenge for supporters of a new technology is how to get issues onto the 
problem agendas of those in a position to solve them. Actors could try to 
communicate to uninvolved actors that opportunities, framed in terms of the 
uninvolved actor’s interests, will be missed if issues are not resolved. 
5.7.2.6 (5-6) Balance between getting issues on a high-level problem agenda 
and maintaining the legitimacy of the technology 
In this chapter we saw that there was a tension between actors getting grid integration 
issues onto a high-level problem agenda and creating a negative perception. In order 
to convince high-level actors that grid integration issues were something that required 
their attention, they had to show that there was currently (or in the near future would 
be) an unacceptable condition, in this case increased risk of system disruption. Wind 
farm opponents however, used the grid integration issues as arguments against wind 
power or the further expansion of MRET. In this case, the arguments of opponents 
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appeared to have little impact, but it does highlight that actors need to be careful how 
they frame issues. A risk-focused perspective may create a more negative perception 
and decrease legitimacy when compared to an opportunity-focused perspective. When 
trying to attract high-level actors or funding, actors could highlight that the issues 
have potential solutions, or if potential solutions are not yet known, then define the 
path towards identifying solutions. 
5.7.2.7 (5-7) Actors measure legitimacy depending on their interests 
Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) note that a lack of legitimacy for a new technology can 
hinder positive feedbacks, however they provide little detail on how actors might 
increase legitimacy. In this chapter we gained some insight into how technical actors 
might measure the legitimacy of a new technology. 
We saw that historically, wind power had a low standing as a generation technology. 
Its output was regarded as insignificant and was thought of as “negative-demand” 
rather than as supply. It was only once wind power was able to become much more 
wide-spread, and to demonstrate that it could provide large amounts of energy and 
noticeable amounts of capacity, that system managers began to take serious notice. 
Admittedly, in this case system managers took notice because of their concerns about 
risk, but the point remains that wind power was proving itself in the areas that system 
managers regarded as important – energy and power supply.  
Based on this empirical material, I suggest that technical actors may measure 
legitimacy on the basis of how effectively the technology meets its function. The 
challenge for actors introducing new technologies is to similarly show that the new 
technology can make a difference, whether through demonstration, as in this case, or 
through computer modelling or some other means. 
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5.7.2.8  (5-8) Institutional change can be inherently slow 
Unruh (2002) notes that institutional change tends to be inherently slow and that this 
can make it difficult to introduce new technologies. In this wind power case, we saw 
that a number of institutional and technical changes were proposed; however the rate 
that they could be implemented was slower than the rate of wind farm development. 
As a result, the proposals did not alleviate the concerns of ESCOSA and ESIPC and 
led to them introducing interim arrangements that forced wind farms to become more 
like incumbent generators.  
The lesson here is to anticipate that institutional change will take time and begin 
advocating change early, and to get the issues on the problem agenda of policy makers 
and possibly the technology proponents93 as early as possible. Actors could try to 
increase the technical and political legitimacy of the technology by strengthening 
links (e.g. through demonstration) between the technology and established problems 
(e.g. climate change) or its potential role in a desirable visions. To get proponents 
involved, actors may need to highlight why the proponents’ vision is incompatible 
with the current regime. 
A related lesson about the path towards a mutual fit is discussed under 5-11. 
5.7.2.9 (5-9) Difficult for actors to think long-term when their short-term 
future is uncertain 
Rip (1995) noted that actors introducing a new technology may find it difficult to 
consider long-term issues when faced with short-term threats. This was challenge was 
                                                 
93 In this case, NEMMCO was advocating action on integration issues from 2002, however as noted in 
Section 5.2.1.1, the wind industry was more focused on Government energy policy than grid issues.  
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apparent in the wind industry’s limited engagement with grid integration issues during 
2002/2003, when the future of MRET was uncertain. It was only in 2004/2005, when 
grid issues began threatening projects in South Australia, that the wind industry 
became closely involved with grid integration issues. This suggests that uncertainty 
about the future market for a technology may take actors’ focus away from issues 
related to learning and embedding. Government actors could make particular efforts 
to facilitate learning and embedding even when there is uncertainty about the future. 
5.7.2.10 (5-10) Tension between learning and embedding 
Hoogma et al (2002) noted that there is a tension between learning and embedding. In 
this chapter, the tension is illustrated in the recommendations of WEPWG with 
respect to technical standards. WEPWG acknowledged that it would not be possible to 
design technical standards that were applicable to all future generation technologies 
and they proposed periodic reviews to enable regular learning94. While many actors 
supported this, some noted that the possibility of future regulatory changes would 
increase investment risk and reduce investor confidence, making it more difficult to 
develop wind farms (Hydro Tasmania, 2005, NEMMCO, 2005b, NGF, 2005, REGA, 
2005, Southern Hydro, 2005, TXU, 2005b, WEPWG, 2005). 
To try to reduce the uncertainty, WEPWG proposed that the regular reviews be in line 
with established principles so that the scope of possible change would be less 
uncertain. Some respondents suggested that grandfathering of standards at the time a 
generator was connected should be used to reduce investment risk. For actors in the 
future, I suggest that a strategy to meet this challenge is to limit the potential for 
                                                 
94 This observation illustrates why it would be useful for the wind industry in Australia to work 
together with other renewable energy associations and promote a diverse mix of generation 
technologies. As the grid becomes better suited to a wide range of generation technologies, this might 
reduce the problems for wind power.  
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change for example by limiting the scope of the learning, promising transition 
arrangements, or grandfathering existing requirements. 
5.7.2.11 (5-11) Path towards mutual adaptation may require transitional 
strategies 
This chapter showed that the path towards a mutual fit between wind power and the 
existing socio-technical regime required short-term mutual adaptation strategies from 
wind farms and system managers. The institutional changes proposed by WEPWG 
were expected to take too long to alleviate the risks in South Australia. As a result, 
ESCOSA and ESIPC introduced interim arrangements that forced wind farms to 
become more like incumbent generators. Similarly, the major technology and 
operational change – the wind energy forecasting system – was expected to take to 
long to alleviate NEMMCO’s concerns. As a result, NEMMCO made interim 
arrangements so that they could more quickly begin incorporating wind farm 
forecasting into their demand forecasts. The strategy for actors is to anticipate that 
transitional strategies may be required because of the slow rate of adaptation by the 
regime – the new technology may initially have to adapt to the existing regime and 
regime actors may need to implement interim policies, operating procedures or 
technologies to give the regime time to adapt to the new technology. 
5.7.2.12 (5-12) Repeated problems when setting up an experiment 
The SNM workbook notes that actors may face similar issues when setting up 
experiments with a new technology and suggests that they should draw on the 
experiences from previous experiments (Weber et al., 1999). This was applicable in 
the wind power case, with a number of grid integration issues occurring in Australia 
that had occurred and been resolved in countries overseas. A qualification to the 
workbook advice is that actors may need to invest resources into understanding how 
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applicable the lessons from other countries or previous experiments are to the specific 
case. 
5.7.3 Final remarks 
This chapter has shown and explained the significant changes that occurred in relation 
to the grid integration of wind power in Australia. These events illustrated why the 
dynamics of decreasing uncertainty, increasing legitimacy, strengthening 
expectations, increasing embedding and alignment, learning and articulation, and 
attracting actors are important when introducing new technologies. They also provide 
clear illustrations of how a new technology and the existing regime can be 
mismatched, and examples of how the mismatches can be overcome. In this case it 
occurred through a combination of changes to the new technology and how it was 
used, changes to the regime, and the development of complementary technologies to 
bridge the gap between the two. This chapter has also offered insights which can be 
used to strengthen SNM. I will return to these insights again in the final chapter. 
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6 Planning, development and the community 
6.0 Introduction 
Between 1997 and 2007, actors invested considerable resources and effort into developing 
wind farms, supporting or objecting to proposals, and adapting planning and development 
practices. As a result, there were considerable changes related to community attitudes, 
planning, and development practices over that period. Community opinion became 
increasingly articulated and polarised. Government at all levels developed planning guidance 
and planning scheme amendments. The wind industry produced development guidelines and 
began investigating specific issues and developers began adjusting their development 
practices. 
This chapter will explain these changes and other related attempts to change. In doing so, the 
chapter will show examples of why dynamics such as increasing functionality, decreasing 
uncertainty, increasing use, increasing technical legitimacy, strengthening expectations, 
increasing embedding and alignment, learning and articulation, and attracting actors are 
important in the introduction of new technologies. The chapter also identifies a range of 
challenges to encouraging these dynamics, some of which support those identified in Chapter 
2 and others which were identified in this wind power case. 
The chapter begins by introducing the main actor groups involved and outlining their 
interests, visions/guiding principles and “problem” agendas. This helps to explain how the 
actors acted during different events. It shows that actors were focused on a number of 
mismatches and inadequacies, although how these were defined as “problems” varied 
depending on actors’ interests. It also shows that the predominant (vague) vision used by the 
Government and wind industry in responding to these mismatches was “appropriate 
development”. 
Next the chapter presents and analyses the empirical material. These mismatches and 
attempts to find a mutual fit were of a distributed nature and are less suited to a chronological 
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retelling than the events of Chapter 3. Instead, Section 3 begins by analysing the mismatches 
and inadequacies in detail to illustrate how they manifested themselves and why they became 
features on various actors’ problem agendas. Sections 4 and 5 then look at how the 
Government and wind industry responded to the mismatches and inadequacies and tried to 
operationalise “appropriate development”.  
The final section summarises how the dynamics identified in Chapter 2 were important in this 
case and draws out the challenges and strategies that can be used to strengthen SNM. 
6.1 Actors, interests and agendas 
There were three main actor groups involved with wind farm planning and development: 
Governments at all levels, the wind industry, and communities and NGOs. These were not 
homogenous groups and there was a mixture of interests and agendas within and between the 
groups. 
While they each had different interests and problem agendas, which the chapter will discuss 
shortly, they had similar foci. The first was that the existing planning frameworks were 
inadequate for wind power. This was particularly apparent in Victoria where wind farm 
controversy was highest. The second category of mismatch was between how developers and 
some other actors evaluated the trade-offs inherent to many proposals. Where these 
evaluations were significantly different, the result was opposition and controversy. This was 
exacerbated by the inexperience of communities with wind farms and of developers with the 
development process. The opposition and controversy further took on a life of its own as 
actors responded to each other. These mismatches and inadequacies will be analysed in detail 
in Section 3. 
The problem agendas that the various actors developed in response to these “problems” 
depended on their interests which the next sections will discuss, beginning with Government. 
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6.1.1 Government 
All levels of government had some role to play in wind farm planning in Australia.  
The most significant role was played by State Governments who are responsible for planning 
in their respective jurisdictions. In addition to planning, State Governments also had interests 
in energy provision, and economic development. The States were keen to encourage wind 
farm development for economic, energy security and environmental reasons, which were at 
times in tension with protecting sensitive areas. In Victoria, the state which will be the focus 
in this chapter, the Government developed a framework that it claimed would facilitate 
“appropriate development”, which by implication was when environmental, social and 
economic outcomes were balanced (SEAV, 2002a). While the Victorian Government were 
not alone is using this vague vision, Victoria had the most planning controversy and scrutiny, 
and therefore provides the greatest opportunity for learning. 
Local Government in Victoria had a lesser role, with the state wind farm planning framework 
effectively taking decision making power to the state level. The interests of local Victorian 
Governments varied depending on the municipality. Some, such as Glenelg and Ararat were 
very supportive of wind farm development because of economic and environmental reasons. 
In both of these areas, wind farm investment and employment boosted struggling regional 
economies. Other municipalities, such as South Gippsland, were opposed to wind farm 
development, largely due to the impact or expected impact on local amenity. Local 
governments tended to act or lobby to support their interests. 
Federal Government had a role in relation to matters of national and international 
significance (typically migratory and/or endangered species) through its administration of the 
federal Environmental Protection Biodiversity and Conservation Act. While a significant step 
in the planning process for a wind farm, the federal level was a generally a minor influence 
on the path of wind farm development. Later, the Federal Government began developing a 
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national code of practice for wind farm development; however this had not been released by 
late 2007. 
6.1.2 Wind industry 
In this chapter, the wind industry can be thought of as a collective in the form of AusWEA 
and as separate actors groups in the form of development companies (referred to as 
developers). 
AusWEA, according to its mission statement, had an interest in the “sensitive and appropriate 
uptake of wind power”. Thus, AusWEA, like the Victorian Government, used the vague 
notion of appropriate development as a guiding principle. It also had an interest in the 
prosperity of its members and the industry as a whole. AusWEA board members saw the 
potential for controversial proposals to harm the long-term development of wind power in 
Australia. As such AusWEA’s problem agenda consisted of encouraging what it saw to be as 
best practice wind farm development and working with other stakeholders on specific issues 
such as landscape and bird impacts. These two issues were significant because of the level of 
controversy surrounding them, and from a developer point of view, they were the two reasons 
why proposals were denied planning permits in Victoria under that state’s Planning and 
Environment Act95. In the lead up to the MRET review, AusWEA also saw the potential for 
vocal community opposition to lower the legitimacy of wind power with the Federal 
Government. In response, AusWEA took a more active role in responding to letters to the 
editor and producing information to try to prevent the spread of what it perceived as 
misinformation. 
                                                 
95 Energy Equity Corporation’s proposal for Cape Bridgewater near Portland was denied planning permits based 
on the detrimental landscape impacts (VCAT, 1999). Pacific Hydro’s proposal for Yaloak, North West of 
Melbourne, was denied planning permits based on the expected impact on wedge-tail eagles (Jacka et al., 2005). 
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Wind farm developers were not a homogeneous group, with developers having different 
motivations and approaches to development (Maddox, 2005). Some were more 
environmentally motivated than others, although all were ultimately commercially focused. 
Some within the wind industry referred to “cowboy” developers – those somewhat more 
reckless – as a hindrance to wind farm development because they created false expectations 
and generated disappointment or bad publicity (Maddox, 2005, Vawser, 2003). At the top of 
developers’ problem agendas was getting their projects approved. In response to controversy 
and opposition, developers attempted to find less contentious locations and to improve their 
methods of consultation. 
6.1.3 Community and NGOs 
Community and NGOs is a very diverse group encompassing a range of interests; in fact it 
covers most of the multi-dimensional debate about wind power. Some actors had interests in 
protecting their local landscape, wildlife, or economic welfare. Others had interests in 
greenhouse abatement or local economic development. The problem agendas for these 
various groups tended to be influencing the wind industry and Government to protect their 
interests through letters to the editor, submissions to policy reviews or planning panels, and 
protests. As this chapter will show, there was evidence that community opinion, both for and 
against wind power, had an influence on Government decision making. 
6.1.4 Summary 
There were three significant actors groups related to wind farm planning, development, and 
the community – Government at all levels, the wind industry and developers, and community 
members and NGOs. A range of different interests and problem agendas existed between and 
within these groups. The most prominent interests were economic benefit at the industry and 
project level, environmental benefits or avoiding environmental detriment, and social 
harmony. Both Government and AusWEA used the vague vision of “appropriate 
development” to guide and justify their actions. This chapter will show that the interplay of 
 Chapter 6 – Planning, development and the community 
228 
these actors and interests, enabled and constrained by the existing socio-technical regime, 
shaped the search for a mutual fit. 
6.2 Mismatches and inadequacies 
With the rapid rise in wind farm related activity following MRET, it soon became apparent 
that there were mismatches between the existing socio-technical regime and the way that 
wind farms were being developed. One set of mismatches was that the existing planning 
framework could not easily be applied to wind farms and planners were not experienced with 
them, resulting in uncertainty for the wind industry and communities (IEA, 1999, Victorian 
Coastal Council, 1999). Another mismatch was between the way wind farms were developed 
(i.e. locations selected, consultation undertaken etc) and the values of some community 
members. The result of this mismatch was the rise in community opposition to wind farms 
and wind power, although as this section will show, articulated community opinion was 
further influenced by the inexperience of communities and developers, and the way that 
actors responded to each other.  
The mismatches related to the planning framework are best documented in Victoria as a 
result of planning appeals and planning policy reviews, although the development of wind 
farm planning guidance and policies in other states indicates that there were similar 
mismatches and inadequacies elsewhere96. The opposition to some wind farm proposals is 
similarly analysed with a Victorian focus. 
                                                 
96 By 2007, many State governments had planning provisions specific to wind power  (Planning NSW, 2002, 
Planning SA, 2002, SEAV, 2002a), a number of Local Governments had wind farm planning provisions 
(Lithgow City Council, 2003, Macedon Ranges, 2005, Oberon Council, 2005, Wingecarribee Shire Council, 
2002), the Federal Government had wind-specific advice on the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act96 (Environment Australia, 2005), and there was a proposal to develop a national code of 
practice for wind farm siting (AGO, 2006, Sydney Morning Herald, 2007). 
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6.2.1 A policy vacuum in Victoria 
6.2.1.1 Victoria’s first private wind farm proposal97 
In 1997, Energy Equity Corporation (EEC) proposed Victoria’s first private wind farm for a 
location near Portland, on the far west coast of Victoria. At that time, wind farms were not 
acknowledged in Government policy or in planning schemes98. Danny Halstead, former CEO 
of the Glenelg Shire Council where the project was proposed, described the situation as a 
“policy vacuum” (Halstead, 1999). The ensuing events revealed that there was a significant 
mismatch between wind farms and the existing planning framework, and also between the 
ways that the developer, local council, and some members of the local community evaluated 
the trade-offs between benefits and detriments in the project. 
The proposal was for a wind farm on an exposed cape, one of the windiest locations in 
Victoria, and relatively close to transmission lines because there was an aluminium smelter 
near-by. The cape was also recognised as a uniquely scenic area with high landscape value. 
The project was approved by the local Glenelg Shire Council, but appealed at the Victorian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) by residents who lived near the proposed site 
(Hislop et al., 2000, VCAT, 1999, Wilder, 1998). The trade-offs in the proposal are discussed 
further in Section 6.2.2. 
During the VCAT panel’s deliberations, the lack of State Government policy on wind farms 
and greenhouse gas abatement was evident, and the panel was forced to become de facto 
policymakers in these areas (VCAT, 1999). Furthermore, State Government agencies which 
                                                 
97 A wind farm had been proposed in the late 1980s by the former State-owned utility, the State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria, but this project never eventuated. Refer to Bunting (2003) for further details. 
98 The one isolated exception was South Gippsland Shire Council, which had a wind farm related planning 
policy dating from the early 1990s when the State Electricity Commission planned a wind farm in the area. The 
wind farm never eventuated due to a change in State Government, but the planning policy remained. 
 Chapter 6 – Planning, development and the community 
230 
were stakeholders in planning for coastal areas, such as the Victorian Coastal Council and the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management, took a wait-and-see approach (VCAT, 
1999).  
Without policy direction, VCAT had to decide for themselves what the relative values were 
of greenhouse gas reduction and other relevant issues (VCAT, 1999). For the panel, the 
primary issue was the trade-off between greenhouse abatement and the visual impact of the 
proposal (VCAT, 1999). The panel was aware that, in the absence of defined policy, their 
decision had precedent-setting implications – if the greenhouse benefits outweighed visual 
impact on Cape Bridgewater, an area widely regarded as having higher landscape value than 
most other areas along the coast, then developers could argue that wind farms should be 
permitted almost anywhere along the coast (VCAT, 1999). This concern was justified. In a 
2003 proposal at Wonthaggi on the South East coast of Victoria, the proponent’s legal team 
argued that it would be “…inconsistent…” for the planning panel to refuse permits on the 
basis of visual impact because by that time wind farms had been approved for areas of 
“…greater visual significance…” (Jacka and Westwood, 2003). 
Ultimately, the EEC panel found that despite the social, environmental and economic benefits 
of the Cape being difficult to quantify, their preservation outweighed the benefits of a wind 
farm at that location (VCAT, 1999). While the objectors were pleased with this decision, the 
developer and the Glenelg Shire Council were not. Danny Halstead later noted that this 
decision increased development risk for wind farm developers (Halstead, 1999). In response, 
the Glenelg Council, following advice from the Minister for Planning, set about drafting a 
local wind farm planning amendment (Halstead, 1999). 
6.2.1.2 Highlighting the need for wind farm planning guidance 
In 1999, following the EEC decision and with the number of wind farm proposals rising, the 
Victorian Coastal Council (VCC) convened a wind farm workshop to promote discussion 
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about how to develop Victoria’s wind resources and suggest an agenda for action99 (Victorian 
Coastal Council, 1999).  
The workshop highlighted the wind farm planning mismatch, participants noted that there 
was: a lack of siting and design guidelines, limited knowledge about the most promising 
locations, uncertainty about when an environmental effects statement (EES) should be 
required, and uncertainty about how to manage trade-offs (Victorian Coastal Council, 1999). 
The situation created uncertainty for both developers and local communities. For developers 
the uncertainty was whether or not projects would be approved, and, if they were, whether the 
decision would be overturned. For local communities, the uncertainty was where wind farms 
would or could be proposed, how many there were likely to be, and what protections there 
were in the planning schemes. The workshop recommended that wind farm planning be given 
a higher priority on the government’s problem agenda, in particularly that there should be a 
State government body to facilitate wind farm development and that local and state planning 
policies should complement each other (Victorian Coastal Council, 1999). 
6.2.1.3 State Government wind farm planning investigation 
In January 2002, the Victorian State Government announced it would develop state-based 
wind farm guidelines (Thwaites, 2002). This coincided with the planning permit and EES 
hearings for the Portland Wind Energy Project (PWEP), a very large project in the Glenelg 
area100, which was linked to a manufacturing facility. As part of developing the Victorian 
wind farm guidelines, the Government sought advice from the planning panel which was 
formed to make recommendations on the merits of PWEP and the proposed Glenelg wind 
                                                 
99 The VCC’s actual position on wind power at this time was not apparent in the published summary of the 
workshop, although given that they have an interest in protecting coastal areas, it is likely that they would have 
been concerned about the potential impact of wind farms in scenic areas. 
100 The proposal included the location of the former EEC proposal. 
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farm planning amendment (Delahunty, 2003b, Smith and Jacka, 2002a). The findings of this 
panel highlighted three specific ways that wind power and the existing planning framework 
were mismatched: policy drivers, proposal assessment, and statutory drafting. 
In terms of policy drivers, a fundamental mismatch was that the State Planning Policy 
Framework (SPPF) did not provide guidance on renewable energy or the need to make a 
transition towards a more sustainable energy sector (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). The panel 
regarded this as a major policy gap and recommended that a new clause should be included in 
the SPPF, not just specific to wind farms, but one that encouraged the development of energy 
generation facilities which controlled or reduced greenhouse gas emissions (Smith and Jacka, 
2002b). Although the panel was engaged to look specifically at wind power, they recognised 
that wind power was a forerunner rather than an isolated case.  
In terms of assessing proposals, a mismatch was that the SPPF provided little guidance on 
landscape values – a significant issue in the EEC case and others – whereas it provided 
detailed guidance on protecting air quality, water resources, and biodiversity (Smith and 
Jacka, 2002b). They saw this as a major issue for wind energy development because of the 
significance of landscape concerns and the potential conflict between nature-based tourism 
and wind farms (Smith and Jacka, 2002b).  
In terms of statutory drafting, a mismatch was that a wind farm was not a recognised land-use 
in the existing planning definitions. This created considerable uncertainty about the need for 
planning permits and the approval process (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). As a consequence, 
actors could argue that a wind farm should be considered a land-use which best suited their 
interests. For example, in the Portland Wind Energy Project, the developer argued that it was 
an “innomate” (undefined) use, which would allow the wind farm to be built in any zone 
provided a permit was issued (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). Objectors argued that the wind farm 
was “industry”, meaning that at least parts of the proposal would have been prohibited 
because they were proposed for a rural zone (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). The panel concluded 
that inadequate definitions in the planning scheme created an unacceptable development risk 
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(Smith and Jacka, 2002b). The panel again noted that wind power was not an isolated case 
and recommended that definitions be written not just for wind farms, but also for traditional 
power stations, distributed generation facilities, and cogeneration (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). 
6.2.1.4 Discussion 
These examples from wind power planning in Victoria show that there was a mismatch 
between the existing planning framework and wind farms; a situation which created 
uncertainty for both developers and the community. The EEC example also showed the trade-
offs that can be inherent in wind farm development (e.g. greenhouse benefits vs visual 
impact) which, as is shown later in more detail, can make it difficult to operationalise visions 
such as “appropriate development”. These mismatches were not isolated to Victoria, with 
nationally-based supporters and critics of wind farm development bemoaning that planning 
had not kept pace with wind farm development (e.g. Australian Heritage Commission, 2003, 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Roundtable, 2003)101. 
The need for wind farm planning guidance gained prominence on Government problem 
agenda’s in many jurisdictions, and, as a result, a number of Local and State Governments, 
along with the Federal Government, developed wind farm planning guidance (Campbell, 
2006, Environment Australia, 2005, Planning NSW, 2002, Planning SA, 2002). The 
development of the Victorian planning framework for wind farms will be discussed in further 
detail in Section 6.3. 
                                                 
101 The Renewable and Sustainable Energy Roundtable included 14 industry, NGO, Government and research 
groups related to renewable energy, co-generation and energy efficiency. The Australian Wind Energy 
Association was one of the participants. 
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6.2.2 Community attitudes to wind power 
The second category of mismatch was between how developers (and supporters) and some 
other actors evaluated the trade-offs inherent to many proposals. In proposals where these 
evaluations were significantly different, the result was opposition. This was exacerbated by 
the inexperience of communities and developers. The controversy took on a life of its own 
however, as actors responded to each other. Formal and informal actors formed groups, labels 
and stereotypes became used, competing symbolic meanings for wind power were promoted, 
and debates were fought via the media. The result has been a complex multi-dimensional 
debate. 
I will begin by analysing this debate, before taking a closer look at the wind farm planning 
trade-offs, how the inexperience of actors contributed, and how actors responded to each 
other. 
6.2.2.1 A multi-dimensional debate 
The development of wind power in Australia was highly controversial in some cases. Often it 
seemed as if there were two sides in this controversy, those for and those against. However, 
the controversy was far more complex and should be appreciated if we are to satisfactorily 
understand the events. The bias towards polar views can be explained by the observation that 
it was those with strong views who were most motivated to express their opinions. In reality 
the debate was multi-dimensional, occurring at different levels, involving a range of actors, 
with a range of views, a range of experience, and covering many different issues (discussed 
further in Section 6.2.2.2). Table 15 and the following text attempts to illustrate three aspects 
of this complexity, the range of actors typically involved, the spectrum of opinion from 
strongly opposed to strongly supporting, and two levels of debate: project-specific and 
technology-wide. This representation is intended to give an indication of the complexity only 
and the actual events were not as discrete as the table suggests. 
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At the project level, the battles tended to be fought in the planning process. The actors 
typically involved were developers, landowners of the project site, other local residents, local 
progress associations, Local and State Government, NGOs, and non-local individuals with an 
interest in the area. The typical issues included financial loss or gain, local employment, local 
amenity (visual and aural), greenhouse gas abatement, and local flora and fauna. Despite this 
range of interests, the battle was essentially over whether or not a specific project should go 
ahead; this fostered an adversarial for-or-against type situation. These debates often involved 
differences of opinions about how trade-offs between different issues should be evaluated and 
questions about the credibility of the developer or objectors. 
At the technology level, the controversy was about the desirability and sustainability of wind 
power technology. The battles tended to be fought in the media and in the development or 
review of Government energy or planning policy. Actors typically involved at this level 
included AusWEA, spokespeople of groups supporting or opposing wind farms, motivated 
local community members, the Government and political parties, and NGOs. The interests 
that became apparent in these battles included self-preservation (for the wind industry), 
credibility with Government for continued support, and an extension of concerns associated 
with specific projects (e.g. landscape impacts). At this level, the battles were basically over 
whether or not wind power was a "sustainable" technology and one worthy of Government 
support; it was a battle over the social and political legitimacy of wind power with elements 
of second order learning. 
In general, support seemed to be strongest at the technology level, as seen in various surveys 
about the desirability of wind power, although there were also examples of strong project 
specific support, such as the rally in favour of the Portland Wind Energy Project by members 
of the local community. Opposition seemed to be strongest at the project level, although there 
was opposition at the technology level as seen in submissions to the CoAG energy market 
and MRET reviews. 
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Table 15 – An illustration of the actors, opinions and levels of debate around wind power in Australia 
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Survey commissioned by Pacific Hydro of 
Portland and district residents regarding the 
Portland Wind Energy Project which reported that 
88% of people supported the project (Sinclair 
Knight Merz, 2001a). 
Portland Progress Association rally in support of 
the Portland Wind Energy Project (Herald Sun, 
2003, Portland Progress Association, 2003). 
Support for projects at Council or planning panel 
hearings (South Gippsland Shire Council, 2000) 
(Braithwaite, 2003, 2004, Hulls, 2006, Smith and 
Jacka, 2002c) 
Western Coastal Board was opposed to 
the EEC proposal due to visual impact 
and supported the Codrington wind farm 
because of its low impacts (Western 
Coastal Board, 2002). 
 
Opposition to anemometers (VCAT, 2002) 
Various objections to projects at Council or planning panel 
hearings (Jacka and Westwood, 2003, Marino, 2005, 
Melton/Moorabool Leader, 2004, Smith et al., 2004, Smith 
and Jacka, 2002c, South Gippsland Shire Council, 2000, 
VCAT, 1999, 2001) 
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Survey commissioned by AusWEA which reported 
that over 90% of people supported building wind 
farms to meet electricity demand (Australian 
Research Group, 2003). Note that the wording of 
some of the questions was biased because it 
emphasized renewables as “clean” and “non-
polluting”. 
Survey of Victorian residents commissioned by 
Pacific Hydro which reported that 86% of people 
supported building wind farms over coal or gas 
fired power stations and that only 8% of people 
would be less likely to visit a coastal area if it had 
a wind farm (Pacific Hydro, 2002e). 
Various letters to the editor, including one from a 
couple who host wind turbines on their property 
(Crowe and Crowe, 2002) 
A protest in support of wind power on the steps of 
the Victorian Parliament House by a number of 
environment NGOs (Future Energy, 2003). 
 
Australian Council of National Trust 
Submission to the MRET review where it 
argues for the MRET target to be 
gradually increased, along with 
improvements to planning, to enable less 
windy (and less visually significant) sites 
to be viable for wind farms (ACNT, 
2003). 
ACNT partnership with AusWEA to 
develop agreed methods for landscape 
assessment. 
Various articles or letters to the editor in 
which the author acknowledged benefits 
or claimed in-principle support of wind 
power, but argued that a specific proposal 
was inappropriate for specific reasons 
(Dorsch, 2005, Lupton, 2002, Rickard-
Dun, 2001, Serventy, 2004). 
A protest by an estimated 200 people on the steps of 
Victorian Parliament House (Rule, 2003) 
A meeting in South Gippsland town where British 
environmentalist David Bellamy was the guest speaker 
(Bellamy, 2004, Metlikovec and Giles, 2004, Mitchell, 
2004a, Sellars, 2004d) 
Submissions to the CoAG energy market review and the 
MRET review (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006, PCG, 
2002b, TVCG, 2002, 2003) 
Statements by some South Gippsland Shire Councillors 
that the Council should not support any wind farms (South 
Gippsland Shire Council, 2001a, b) 
Formation of landscape guardian community groups  
(Fyfe, 2004, Gibbs, 2004, Griffiths, 2004, PCG, 2002a, 
Prytz, 2004, Tucker, 2004, Webster, 2004). 
Various articles and letters to the editor in which the 
authors do not acknowledge any benefits of wind power 
(Bolt, 2003, Cliff, 2004, Jones, 2004, Stefani, 2003). 
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I suggest that this multi-dimensional debate was largely the result of trade-offs in 
wind farm development, the inexperience of communities and developers, and the 
way and context in which actors responded to each other. The following sections 
analyse each of these further. 
6.2.2.2 Trade-offs in wind farm development 
The trade-offs inherent in many wind farms made it difficult for the Government and 
wind industry to operationalise their vague visions of “appropriate development” in a 
consensual manner. The typical benefits were greenhouse gas reduction, local, 
regional or state economic benefit, and energy diversity. The typical detriments were 
landscape impact, local environmental impact, bird impacts, noise, and local 
economic impact. Table 16 illustrates how these benefits and detriments came into 
conflict in a number of Victorian wind farm proposals. 
To complicate the situation, the benefits and detriments are not evenly or equally 
distributed in space and time. For example, the greenhouse benefits are intangible, and 
are expected to occur in the future at a global level. Economic benefits are tangible 
and occur to the landowners (very local), and possibly at a regional level if some form 
of manufacturing is involved. Landscape and economic detriments (e.g. decreased 
tourism) are tangible and tend to occur at a local level. The result is that lines of 
support and opposition tend to form, potentially leading to polarisation. As Smith et al 
(2004 p.261 - 262) noted in PWEP: 
“Typically the polarisation appears to be between landowner stakeholders who 
will host turbines … and close to medium range surrounding landowners …. 
Opposition tends to be particularly strong from neighbouring landowners who 
have a significant lifestyle component in their landownership, or who consider 
there may be opportunities to use or develop their land in such a way. Divisions 
also tend to take place between those who will view a project in their day to day 
lives (often rural dwellers, who on balance tend to oppose) and those who will 
 Chapter 6 – Planning, development and the community 
238 
not (often urban dwellers, who may place a greater weight on renewable energy 
benefits and support projects perceived as “reasonable” in broader social, 
economic and environmental terms).” 
Table 16 provides examples of trade-offs, but analysis of other wind farm planning 
decisions shows that they occurred to varying degrees in all proposals (Banon et al., 
2005, Harty et al., 2005, Jacka et al., 2005, Jacka and Thatcher, 2005, Jacka and 
Westwood, 2003, Saunders et al., 2006). Despite the prevalence of trade-offs, neither 
the State Government nor AusWEA sought to develop a widely supported process for 
managing trade-offs. As Section 6.3.5 will show, the way in which trade-offs are 
made can lead to different decisions, even when based on the same information. 
6.2.2.3 Inexperience and unfamiliarity 
A further contributor to the controversy was the inexperience of communities and 
wind farm developers. Communities were initially unfamiliar with wind farms and 
their impacts, and when one was proposed in their area they naturally had questions. 
The participants and the VCC wind farm workshop noted that Government, the wind 
industry and NGOs needed to educate the community about wind farms (Victorian 
Coastal Council, 1999). Planning panels and proponents/supporters alike noted that 
fear of the unknown was a common cause for opposition102 (Jacka and Thatcher, 
2005, Jacka and Westwood, 2003, Saunders et al., 2006). 
In some cases, people sought out their own answers. In the Macarthur wind farm case 
some did this in a constructive manner by visiting wind farms that were already in 
                                                 
102 How they made use of this observation differed however; planning panels recommended better 
community consultation (discussed further in Section 6.4.6), whereas in the Bald Hills wind farm case 
the proponent’s legal team suggested that opposition that was of a “generic” and “ill-informed” nature 
could be disregarded (Smith et al., 2004). 
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Table 16 – Examples of trade-offs in Victorian wind farm planning 
Projects Primary benefits Primary detriments Decision 
Greenhouse abatement 
Economic benefits through 
tourism 
Potential economic impact 
on Portland airfield 
(Bridgewater lakes). 
Council rejected proposal on the basis of the impact on 
the airport (Glenelg Shire Council, 1997) 
Greenhouse abatement 
Economic benefits through 
tourism 
Visual impact (Cape 
Bridgewater) 
Council approved proposals for Capes Bridgewater and 
Nelson on the basis of the benefits. (Glenelg Shire 
Council, 1997) 
EEC application in 1997 for 
wind farms near Portland (Cape 
Bridgewater, Bridgewater Lakes, 
and Cape Nelson). 
Greenhouse abatement 
Economic benefits through 
tourism 
Visual impact (Cape 
Bridgewater) 
VCAT rejected the proposal on the basis that the 
greenhouse benefits were outweighed by the visual 
impact (EEC withdrew the Cape Nelson proposal during 
the hearings).  (VCAT, 1999)  
Greenhouse abatement 
Regional economic benefit 
from local manufacturing 
and tourism 
Visual impact (at the Cape 
Bridgewater site) 
Birds (Orange Belly Parrot 
at the Yambuck site) 
Planning panel recommendations: Wind farms at the 3 
Capes to go ahead with design modifications so long as 
the factory was established, otherwise the Cape 
Bridgewater proposal should not proceed. The wind 
farm at Yambuck should not proceed because of the 
potential impact on Orange Belly Parrots. (Smith and 
Jacka, 2002c) 
Pacific Hydro application in 
2002 for wind farms near 
Portland (Cape Bridgewater, 
Cape Nelson, Cape Sir William 
Grant, and Yambuck) plus the 
promise of turbine blade factory. 
Collectively known as the 
Portland Wind Energy Project 
(PWEP). 
Greenhouse abatement 
Energy diversity 
Regional economic 
development 
Visual impact 
Birds 
Minister for Planning decision: Benefits of wind farm 
outweigh the detriments to landscape or OBP. Wind 
farms at all four sites to proceed with design 
modifications (Delahunty, 2002c). 
Pacific Hydro application for a 
wind farm at Yaloak near 
Melbourne  
Greenhouse abatement 
Local economic benefits 
Birds (wedgetail eagle) Proposal rejected by the Minister for Planning (Hulls, 
2005). 
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operation (Saunders et al., 2006). This was not always the case however, and a 
community consultation expert and planning panel noted that people with unanswered 
questions about amenity impacts may seek answers from the internet, where negative 
and spurious information is widely available (Jacka et al., 2005, Jacka and Thatcher, 
2005). For the esoteric aspects of wind farm development, such as grid integration, 
there was the potential for misunderstanding (Jacka and Thatcher, 2005). 
Developers were initially inexperienced at developing wind farms, in communicating 
likely impacts to communities, and in responding to community concerns in design of 
the wind farm (Jacka and Thatcher, 2005, Jacka and Westwood, 2003, Saunders et al., 
2006, Smith and Jacka, 2002c, Young, 2003). For example, planning panels criticised 
developers for poor consultation about key view-sheds and for not transparently 
communicating how they had responded to community concerns in the wind farm 
design process (Jacka et al., 2005, Jacka and Thatcher, 2005, Smith and Jacka, 
2002b). An example which Section 6.4.6 will discuss in more detail is that of Wind 
Power Pty Ltd, who in their first proposal were criticised for their poor consultation 
process and showed improvement in later proposals. 
These issues of inexperience became more prominent on the problem agendas of 
AusWEA and developers. For AusWEA, the concern was that the negative 
perceptions of wind power could harm the social and political support which was 
required for the industry to grow (Maddox, 2003, Mallon, 2003, 2006). For 
developers, the concern was the approval of their projects. Both AusWEA and 
developers responded as Section 6.4 will discuss further. These issues were typically 
not as high on the problem agendas of Government; the higher priority for them was 
developing a planning framework. It has only been once the planning frameworks 
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have developed that they have shifted their attention to improving understanding 
about wind power103 (e.g. SEAV, 2007). 
6.2.2.4 Actors’ perspectives and responses 
The way and context in which actors responded to each other fostered polarisation of 
opinion and increased the complexity of the situation. 
As noted earlier, the debates were typically conducted in the planning process, or via 
the media, creating an adversarial arena for debate from the outset. At the 2003 
AusWEA conference, communications consultation Tara Poole (2003) warned the 
industry that the media generally portrays David vs Goliath type stories which were 
detrimental to wind farm development. The rising reporting of negative issues was 
noted in media surveys commissioned by AusWEA (Mallon, 2002, 2006). 
There was also evidence that actors located the burden of proof in different ways; 
some expected that wind power would be beneficial unless proven otherwise, and for 
others it was vice-versa. For example, the Victorian wind farm planning guidelines 
imply that the benefits are a given, whereas detriments have to be demonstrated 
(SEAV, 2002a p.23): 
“Planning can contribute to the provision of renewable energy by facilitating 
wind energy development in appropriate locations in a manner that 
appropriately balances their environmental, social and economic benefits with 
any demonstrated visual, environmental and amenity impacts.” 
                                                 
103 One exception was the NSW Sustainable Energy Development Authority, who released a wind 
energy handbook in 2002 (SEDA, 2002). In that state, there has been much less wind farm activity and 
planning scheme amendments have occurred more at the Local Government level. 
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Similarly, the former Victorian Minister for Planning, in her assessment of the 
Portland Wind Energy Project (PWEP), suggested that the detriments (or disbenefits) 
were “potential”, whereas by inference the benefits were “actual” (Delahunty, 2002c 
p.3): 
“…it is my assessment that the benefits of PWEP, particularly in terms of 
greenhouse gas abatement, security and diversity of energy supply and regional 
economic development, far outweigh the potential disbenefits.” 
In contrast, for the Australian Council of National Trusts, the benefits must be 
demonstrated (ACNT, 2003 p.1): 
"The ACNT appreciates the threat to Australia’s heritage places from excessive 
carbon emissions, and is supportive of measures to mitigate those effects, 
including the generation of energy from renewable resources, but only when a 
net environmental benefit can be demonstrated." 
Beyond different expectations, there were a number of dynamics which fostered 
polarisation. 
One such dynamic was stereotyping. By this I mean that actors would characterise 
and label those with differing views such that opponents or developers were portrayed 
as homogenous groups, potentially leading to self-reinforcing inclusion/exclusion 
behaviour – if you’re not with us you must be against us. The Western Coastal board 
noted this dynamic of simplification and polarisation in the debate about the Portland 
Wind Energy Project (Western Coastal Board, 2002). 
There are good examples of labelling and stereotyping from either end of the opinion 
spectrum. Many supporters of wind power used labels like NIMBY (Not In My 
BackYard) to describe opponents (Adair, 2002b, Gill, 2001, Halstead, 1999, Poole, 
2003, South Australia, 2003, Vawser, 2003, Weekend Australian, 2003). This label 
marginalised opponents and implied that their concerns were less valid because of 
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self-interest or hypocrisy. Another common type of label used to characterise 
opponents was “vocal minority” or variations thereon (Adair, 2002b, Anthony, 2004e, 
Day, 2002, Gladman, 2004). This label implied that their views were not 
representative and by extension that decision-makers or undecided members of the 
public should disregard them. At the other end of the opinion spectrum, opponents of 
wind farms or wind power used labels and ideas which suggested that developers 
were only profit-motivated (Jones, 2004, PCG, 2002b, Wills, 2002), such as 
“windmill salesmen” or “green shoe developers” (Le Roy, 2003a, 2004b), without 
acknowledging that a wind farm has to be financially viable and that not all 
developers approached the development process in the same way. 
Another dynamic which fostered polarisation was that actors from each end of the 
opinion spectrum tried to link wind power with different vague visions and in doing 
so raise or lower the social and political legitimacy of wind power. Supporters 
associated wind power with sustainability and “appropriate development”, while those 
opposing proposals or wind power portrayed wind farms as industrialisation of rural 
landscapes (Baillieu, 2003, Best, 2003, Fyfe, 2002, Jackson, 2002, Lyon, 2004, 
Mallon, 2006, Planisphere, 2005, Wills, 2002). 
The result of these dynamics was that there was lack of trust between those at either 
end of the opinion spectrum such that actors were sceptical of information put forward 
by those with different views. A good example was the debate over the effect of wind 
farms on land values; local objectors cited the opinions of local real estate agents who 
stated that there was or would be a negative impact on property values (Buttler, 
2004a, Sellars, 2003, 2004a, b), while the wind industry cited studies – mostly 
international studies because of the lack of local data – which stated that there would 
not be a negative impact (Anthony, 2004e, AusWEA, 2003k, 2005a). There is 
ongoing debate about this issue. 
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6.2.2.5 Discussion 
The multi-dimensional debate shows that there were markedly different views 
regarding the desirability of specific wind power projects and also of wind power 
technology. Many different factors contributed to this debate. One contributor was 
differing evaluations of the trade-offs in wind farm development; another was the 
inexperience of communities and developers. Further contributors were that issues 
were often debated in adversarial arenas such as the planning process or the media, 
that actors placed the burden of proof on benefits or detriments differently, and that 
dynamics such as labelling and competing symbolism were commonplace. The result 
was a complex multi-dimensional debate. The controversy made it onto the problem 
agendas of both Government and the wind industry and the remainder of this chapter 
will discuss how they responded to it. 
6.2.3 Summary 
This section has shown that there was a mismatch between the existing socio-
technical configuration and the way in which wind power was being developed, a 
mismatch which manifested itself through uncertainty in the planning process and 
community opposition.  
These conditions had a financial and emotional cost for developers, local communities 
and Government, and, as a result, the mismatches gained prominence on their 
respective problem agendas. Government and wind industry actors responded to these 
mismatches by adapting the planning framework and the way in which wind farms 
were developed. This will be discussed in the following sections. 
6.3 Adapting the planning framework 
The uncertainty of the “policy vacuum” and the community division over wind power 
led to wind farms being high on Government problem agendas from about 2002. This 
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led to one of the most significant planning related changes over the period, the 
development of wind farm planning guidance or frameworks at all levels of 
government (e.g. Campbell, 2006, Environment Australia, 2005, NSW Heritage 
Office, 2003, Oberon Council, 2005, Planning NSW, 2002, Planning SA, 2002). 
As with the grid integration of wind power, there was a mismatch between wind 
power and the existing planning framework. And, as with the grid integration of wind 
power, working towards a mutual fit was a turbulent process. Whereas the guiding 
vision of system managers for grid integration was “technological neutrality”, for the 
planning system it was “appropriate development”104. 
Many jurisdictions spoke of “appropriate development” in some form. Some, such as 
Victoria and South Australia specifically identified “appropriate development” as the 
goal or expected outcome of applying their respective planning frameworks (Planning 
SA, 2003, SEAV, 2002a). Others, such as the NSW Heritage Office (NSW Heritage 
Office, 2003) noted that wind farms could be “inappropriate” without proper 
planning. Yet for the high usage of the term, it is difficult to find an operational 
definition of appropriate development. Indeed, a parliamentary inquiry in South 
Australia recommended that Planning SA should define what it meant by terms like 
“appropriate” (ERD Committee, 2004). So, while the vague vision of “appropriate 
development” was generally supported (or at least not opposed), what exactly was 
“appropriate” was far from clear. 
This aspect of the case illustrates a number of issues that may be encountered when 
trying to consensually operationalise vague visions. A useful way of looking at the 
operationalizing process for appropriate (or sustainable) development is to look at 
                                                 
104 Appropriate development was also part of AusWEA’s mission statement and a guiding vision of 
their best practice guidelines. This is discussed further in the Section 6.4. 
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who is the decision-maker, what issues they consider, how they are considered, and 
how trade-offs are managed. Using this framework I will review the Victorian wind 
farm guidelines and identify specific points of contention. Victoria provides a great 
opportunity for learning because of the level of controversy, scrutiny, and policy 
review. The review begins with an overview of the guidelines, and then follows the 
framework just described. 
6.3.1 The Victorian wind energy policy and planning guidelines 
The Victorian wind farm planning guidelines were developed in the first half of 2002 
by a high-level Government working group and were released in August by the 
Minister for Planning (Delahunty, 2002b, Young, 2002). The guidelines underwent a 
period of consultation with Local Government and according to Chris Wilson 
(Wilson, 2004b), a senior policy officer in the Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, a number of responses were received ranging in opinion from 
supportive, through constructively critical, to unsupportive. The responses themselves 
were not available to the public; however we can get an indication of them from 
council meeting minutes. For example, the Bass Coast Shire Council was supportive 
of the Minister for planning being the responsible authority for projects greater than 
30 MW, but felt that anemometers should require a planning permit (Bass Coast Shire 
Council, 2002). Ararat rural City Council had some concern about the fact that the 
Minister for planning would be the responsible authority for projects above 30 MW – 
the Challicum Hills wind farm that the council had been the responsible authority for 
was 50 MW – but overall did not seem too concerned with the policy and guidelines 
(Ararat Rural City Council, 2001). South Gippsland Shire Council was much more 
critical, particularly of what they perceived as the lack of public consultation about 
the guidelines in a short period of time that the government had allowed for feedback 
(South Gippsland Shire Council, 2002b). 
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In mid-October, changes were made to the Victorian planning provisions which 
addressed a number of the mismatches discussed in Section 6.2.1. The planning 
package included: siting and design guidelines; a defined planning process where the 
Minister for Planning would be the decision-maker for proposals greater that 30 MW 
or those requiring an EES; the prohibition of wind farms in national parks; the 
nomination of the Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria (SEAV) as the central 
point of contact on wind energy; a SPPF amendment that supported renewable energy 
because of its environmental, energy security, and economic benefits; a planning 
permit exemption for anemometers105, and a land-use definition for a wind energy 
facility (Delahunty, 2002a, DSE, 2003, 2005a, b, d, SEAV, 2002a). 
Two unaddressed mismatches were guidance in the SPPF on protecting landscape 
values and the limited public domain knowledge on promising wind farm locations. 
These were responded to separately: as of November 2003, the Minister for Planning 
required that applications on whether an EES was required had to be accompanied by 
a landscape impact assessment, and that landscape assessments in EESs had to be 
independently peer reviewed (Delahunty, 2003a); and, in January 2004, the State 
Government released a wind atlas which showed the windy areas of Victoria (Office 
of the Premier, 2004, Thwaites, 2004). 
The planning changes created more certainty about how a wind farm proposal would 
be assessed, what would be considered and by whom. While this reduced uncertainty, 
it was not universally supported the next section will discuss. 
                                                 
105 This was, at least in part, a response to the increasing opposition to anemometers in South Gippsland 
(e.g. South Gippsland Shire Council, 2002a, c, VCAT, 2002) 
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6.3.2 Who is the decision maker? 
The Victorian planning process for wind farms stated that the Minister for Planning 
would be the decision maker for projects over 30 MW and those requiring an EES106. 
This process was criticised by some Local Government and community actors. As 
noted previously, Local Governments were concerned about losing decision-making 
power (Sellars, 2004c).  
This loss of power was most strongly criticised in South Gippsland, the area where 
opposition to wind farms was strongest107. A community group in South Gippsland, 
the Prom Coast Guardians, was concerned that wind farm planning would no longer 
reflect local values. This group formed following the controversial Toora wind farm 
proposal in South Gippsland. The Prom Coast Guardians expected proposals to 
exceed 30 MW, effectively meaning that local government would no longer be the 
decision maker (Wills, 2002). This was an accurate expectation. Since the guidelines 
were introduced, there have been only two wind farm proposals in Victoria that have 
been less than 30 MW108 and one of those, the 12 MW Wonthaggi proposal, was 
called in by the Minister for Planning anyway because it required an EES (Jacka and 
                                                 
106 Approval was still required from the Federal Government where a wind farm affected matters of 
national or international significance, most often in relation to migratory bird species. 
107 The Federal Labor member for South Gippsland, Christian Zahra, attempted to return power to 
Local Government by linking MRET to local planning. He proposed a private members bill which 
proposed a modification to MRET so that only projects with local council approval be eligible to create 
RECs (Australia, 2003, Harvey, 2003, Weekly Times, 2004). The Federal Liberal/National 
Government was already considering the future of MRET at this time and the proposal was not 
incorporated. 
108 The primary reason for the larger proposals was that economies of scale were required to make 
projects viable.  
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Westwood, 2003). For Noreen Wills (2002), spokesperson for the Prom Coast 
Guardians, the designation of the Minister for Planning as the decision-maker 
amounted to the loss of a democratic right. Presumably, the reason for these concerns 
was that they expected local Government to be more representative of local values 
and more receptive to local concerns. 
6.3.3 Which issues are and are not considered? 
One of the areas of uncertainty identified by various actors was over which issues 
should be considered in wind farm planning (e.g. Victorian Coastal Council, 1999). 
As this section will illustrate, operationalizing appropriate development required 
decisions about what would and what would not be considered. This had an impact on 
whether people agreed that a wind farm was an “appropriate development”. 
The planning and EES process covered a wind range of issues. The Victorian wind 
farm guidelines required that five issues be considered when deciding on a planning 
permit application (SEAV, 2002a): the contribution to Government policy objectives, 
visual amenity, amenity of the surrounding area, aircraft safety, and flora and fauna. 
Often, wind farms also required an EES. The issues typically considered under an 
EES were: biodiversity, greenhouse benefits, visual amenity, socio-economics, 
cultural heritage, noise, tourism, telecommunications and aircraft safety. To my 
knowledge no one objected to any of these being considered. However, there were 
two concerns raised by objectors against a number of proposals which the planning 
panels deemed not valid in planning decisions: property devaluation and community 
division (Banon et al., 2005, Jacka et al., 2005, Jacka and Westwood, 2003, Smith et 
al., 2004).  
Concern about property devaluation was the cause of opposition to a number of wind 
farm proposals. Under Victorian planning law however, this is not considered a 
relevant consideration (Banon et al., 2005, Jacka et al., 2005, Jacka and Westwood, 
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2003, Moles et al., 2006, Smith et al., 2004). The panel in the Bald Hills case cited 
three reasons why: because property valuation is imprecise, because it is at best an 
indirect measure of amenity impacts, and because it is not always an accurate measure 
of amenity impacts (Smith et al., 2004). Despite this, locals remained concerned based 
on advice they had received from land valuers (Sellars, 2003, Smith et al., 2004). 
Another concern in many wind farm proposals was community division; as with 
property devaluation, it too was not regarded as a valid consideration in wind farm 
planning (Banon et al., 2005, Jacka et al., 2005, Jacka and Westwood, 2003, Smith et 
al., 2004). The reasons given by planning panels varied. In the Bald Hills wind farm 
case, the panel’s response to suggestions that the wind farm should not be built 
because of a high level of community opposition was that a planning decision is not 
an opinion poll (Smith et al., 2004). They also dismissed community division as a 
consideration on the grounds that the effects were most likely transient and that even 
if they weren’t, the community was not really divided because the majority of 
residents opposed the project (Smith et al., 2004). In the Waubra case, the panel 
disregarded claims of community division on the grounds that the proponents 
consultation program was comprehensive and there was a low level of articulated 
opposition (Banon et al., 2005). Other planning panels acknowledged division, or the 
potential for ongoing division, and recommended that proponents should adopt 
strategies to minimise community division during the application process (Jacka and 
Westwood, 2003) and make efforts to show tangible benefits once the wind farm is 
operating (Jacka et al., 2005). 
While these two issues may not have been considered relevant to planning decision-
making, they were real concerns for some local residents and the cause of opposition. 
These people did not support the State Government’s form of “appropriate 
development” because it did not take into account issues which were important to 
them. 
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6.3.4 How are issues assessed? 
Another important aspect of operationalizing appropriate development is how issues 
are considered and whether actors support the methods used. This can be illustrated 
with examples from two of the most significant wind farm issues, greenhouse gas 
abatement and landscape impact. These are significant issues because greenhouse 
abatement was the main driver for wind farm development, whilst landscape impact 
was often the most controversial detriment. Actors supported the inclusion of these 
issues, but debated how they were assessed. 
6.3.4.1 Greenhouse gas abatement 
There has been increasing scrutiny of the way in which the greenhouse gas abatement 
expected from a proposal was calculated. In early wind farm proposals – such as that 
by EEC for Cape Bridgewater, by Stanwell Corporation for Toora, and by Pacific 
Hydro for the Portland area – the greenhouse benefits were unquestioned. Figures 
were put forward for the estimated greenhouse gas reduction and these were accepted 
by the planning panel in each case. 
The generally accepted method for estimating greenhouse abatement is (AusWEA, 
2002b, SEAV, 2002a, Sinclair Knight Merz, 2001b): 
Greenhouse emissions 
reduction (mass of 
emissions e.g. tonnes) 
= 
Annual energy 
production of the 
wind farm (unit of 
energy e.g. MWh) 
X 
A co-efficient (mass of 
emissions produced by 
other generators per unit of 
energy e.g. tonnes/MWh) 
Essentially, the co-efficient simplifies the interaction of the wind farm with the other 
generators in the electricity grid. The coefficient can be for the NEM as a whole, 
regions of the NEM, or specific connection points, and is calculated using a weighted 
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average. That is, the emissions intensity of the coal, gas and hydro generators is 
multiplied by the proportion of energy that the particular type of generator either has 
provided or is expected to provide in the future. These are then added to give the final 
figure. However, there is not one universally accepted method for performing this 
calculation because a number of assumptions are required about the mix of generation 
that will be displaced. Further discussion is provided in Healey (2003). 
As the level of opposition to proposals has grown, so has the scrutiny of the benefits 
claimed by proponents. The main criticism has been that wind power is intermittent, 
that coal-fired power plants take a long time to start up or shut down or that they 
respond by manipulating the steam turbine rather than the rate at which they burn 
coal, and that therefore wind turbines do not completely displace the emissions from 
coal-fired power stations as claimed (Saunders et al., 2006, Smith et al., 2004). 
The scrutiny was particularly strong in the Bald Hills case109 where objectors argued 
that the emissions reduction would be less than was claimed by the developer and 
therefore that the project should not proceed (Smith et al., 2004). The planning panel 
concluded that while the objectors had not proved that the estimated emissions 
reductions were incorrect, they had shown that the method for estimating emissions 
reductions should be re-examined and made more transparent (Smith et al., 2004). 
In her assessment of the Bald Hills project, the Minister for Planning noted that the 
existing method may have given a high estimate of emissions abatement, but that it 
was a satisfactory approximation (Delahunty, 2004). She also noted that there was no 
agreed method for estimating greenhouse abatement from a wind farm that took into 
                                                 
109 One reason for the strong and co-ordinated opposition to the Bald Hills case was the role played by 
Tim Le Roy, who acted as a spokesperson for the objectors and wrote newspaper articles and letters to 
the editor (Le Roy, 2003a, b, 2004a, b). 
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account the intermittency of wind farm output and the fluctuation in electricity 
demand (Delahunty, 2004). She stated that SEAV would be asked to re-evaluate the 
current method (Delahunty, 2004). SEAV commissioned consultants to review the co-
efficient used to estimate emission reduction from wind farms (MMA, 2006), 
although the outcome in terms of planning applications was unknown at the time of 
writing.  
There was further close scrutiny of the Macarthur wind farm (Saunders et al., 2006). 
The investigation by that planning panel responded to many of the outstanding 
questions that had been raised by objectors and critics, placing estimates of the 
greenhouse benefits of wind farms on more solid ground. 
This issue raises an important point about how benefits of “sustainable” technologies 
are perceived. Estimating greenhouse abatement is an esoteric endeavour that was 
rarely questioned by wind supporters; essentially, supporters tended to take the 
benefits of wind power at face value. It has only been through the scrutiny of critics 
and objectors that a better understanding of how these benefits materialise has been 
reached. 
6.3.4.2 Landscape impact 
Landscape impact is another significant issue for which the methods of assessment 
have developed as actors gained more experience. While this section focuses on 
Victoria, the issue was also significant in South Australia (ERD Committee, 2004). 
As noted previously, the planning panel who advised on wind farm planning for 
Victoria noted that the SPPF provided little guidance on protecting landscape values, 
whereas it did provide guidance on other environmental values (Smith and Jacka, 
2002b). The panel recognised that landscapes of high value are a public resource and 
should be protected. They noted that for this to occur, the Government needed to 
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specify how “…landscape values should be evaluated and weighted in planning 
decisions” (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). 
In its policy and planning guidelines, the State Government listed the factors that 
affect the magnitude of visual impact – such as the size of the development; possible 
viewing locations; and the significance and features of the landscape and its 
sensitivity to change – but in terms of assessment, the guidelines only suggested that 
decision-makers consider the relevant planning overlays (SEAV, 2002a). They did not 
offer any guidance on how landscape impacts should be evaluated or weighted.  
Following the release of the guidelines, the controversy surrounding wind power 
remained high. In November 2003, recognising that visual impact was still a 
significant issue, the Government modified the EES process for wind farms so that if 
an EES was required, the landscape impact assessment had to undergo independent 
peer review (Delahunty, 2003a, DSE, 2004a). How assessments should be performed 
was still undefined. 
The central issue in how landscape assessments were undertaken was how to deal 
with subjectivity. The panel engaged to look at Victorian wind farm planning noted 
that landscape assessments needed to have the highest degree of objectivity possible 
so that they could stand up to rigorous scrutiny (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). Some 
developers (e.g. Adair, 2002a, Harding, 2002) emphasized the subjectivity of visual 
impact to imply that it should hold less weight than things that can be measured 
“objectively” such as greenhouse benefits, investment, and jobs. The Bald hills 
planning panel applied similar logic landscape assessments by professionals. They 
stated that an assessment which is not based on social research, with reference to 
community values, is “inevitably subjective” and “an interesting and informative 
guide, but nothing more.”, although they did also say that such an approach was not 
necessarily invalid (Smith et al., 2004). 
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The importance of community involvement in landscape assessment was noted by a 
number of planning panels (Smith et al., 2004, Smith and Jacka, 2002b, c). They 
noted that proponents who did not involve the community risked failing to respond to 
significant views in the wind farm design, or accusations of professional elitism and 
being dismissive of community opinions (Smith et al., 2004, Smith and Jacka, 2002b, 
c). 
At the time of writing, landscape assessment methods had not been defined by the 
State government. A de facto standard that emerged was to identify different 
landscapes in the vicinity of a proposal, to characterise different landscapes and 
establish their significance (e.g. local, state, national, international), to establish the 
sensitivity of these landscapes to modification, to establish the level of modification 
that a proposal would result in, and to ultimately establish the visual impact of the 
proposal (Saunders et al., 2006, Smith et al., 2004, Smith and Jacka, 2002b). 
AusWEA had also formed a partnership with the Australian Council of National 
Trusts to work on agreed landscape assessment methods. This partnership will be 
discussed further in Section 6.4.2. 
6.3.4.3 Discussion 
These two examples show that that how issues are considered has an impact on 
operationalising visions such as appropriate or sustainable development. Claimed 
benefits or detriments should not be taken at face value because they are compatible 
with an existing stance110. Actors need to work towards agreed and robust methods for 
                                                 
110 This also applies to how benefits or detriments are portrayed. Refer to the examples of different 
starting positions in Section 6.2.2 where for some actors the burden of proof was with the benefits, 
whereas for others it was with the detriments. 
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estimating or measuring benefits and detriments, particularly when the issues are 
esoteric, such as greenhouse benefits, or subjective, such as landscape impact.  
6.3.5 Managing trade-offs 
The final aspect of operationalizing appropriate development is how trade-offs 
between the various considerations are managed. This is important because people 
holding different values may reach different conclusions when presented with the 
same evidence (Harding, 1998). This was well illustrated in the Portland Wind Energy 
Project (PWEP), where the proponent, the planning panel and the Minister for 
Planning weighted issues differently and reached different conclusions. 
The consultants for the proponent, SKM, used a mathematical multi-criteria model to 
evaluate different project options against a base case (refer to Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9 -  Consultant’s decision-making model as illustrated by the 
planning panel (Smith and Jacka, 2002c) 
The basic structure of the model was that each of the primary branches of economic 
prosperity, environmental sustainability, and community well-being were awarded 
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0.333 points. Each secondary branch was awarded an equal share of the 0.333. The 
performance of the project according to these different branches was scored and 
added to give a result out of 1 for the project, the higher the score, the better the 
performance of the project (Smith and Jacka, 2002c). 
The planning panel criticised the model for the way that it proportionally distributed 
points. According to the panel, there were 6 issues under “environmental 
sustainability” and 4 under “economic prosperity” (Smith and Jacka, 2002c). The 6 
environmental issues had 0.056 points each and the 4 economic issues had 0.083 
points each111. For the panel, this raised questions about whether individual 
environmental issues (say greenhouse gas reduction) should be given less weight than 
individual economic issues (say tourism) (Smith and Jacka, 2002c). The panel did not 
support what they saw as an arbitrary distribution of value (Smith and Jacka, 2002c).  
The panel also criticised the model because it obscured trade-offs which occurred 
within each category. According to the panel, the trade-off between greenhouse 
benefits and landscape impact occurred within the “environmental sustainability” 
category (Smith and Jacka, 2002c). The panel argued that such trade-offs should be 
more explicit. 
For its own analysis, the panel identified the range of relevant issues based on the 
EES and planning requirements, assessed the proposal on each of these issues and 
made a qualitative analysis to reach their decision. To validate this decision and make 
their value judgements explicit they assigned relative weights to each of these 
issues112, gave the proposal a numerical score for each issue, and combined the 
                                                 
111 0.333/6 = 0.056 and 0.333/4 = 0.083 
112 Greenhouse and landscape issues were given the highest weighting, with economics and flora and 
fauna next highest (Smith and Jacka, 2002c). 
 Chapter 6 – Planning, development and the community 
258 
relative weights and scores for each issue to give an overall score (Smith and Jacka, 
2002c). 
The panel recommended to the Minister for Planning that the wind farms at the 3 
Capes should go ahead with design modifications so long as a proposed 
manufacturing facility was established, otherwise the Cape Bridgewater proposal 
should not proceed. They recommended that the wind farm at Yambuck should not 
proceed because of the potential impact on the endangered Orange-Bellied Parrot 
(Smith and Jacka, 2002c). 
The Minister for Planning reached a different decision. The Minister did not explicitly 
state her weighting of the various issues, or even whether she made her decision in 
such an explicit way; instead she only made the overall comment that the benefits “far 
outweigh” the “potential disbenefits” (Delahunty, 2002c). 
This example shows that, based on similar information, different decisions can be 
reached depending on the relative weightings of different issues and can consequently 
be a point of contention between actors. Currently, the Victorian wind farm guidelines 
say little on how to manage trade-offs; only that “Considerable weight should be 
given to the [proposal’s] contribution to Government policy objectives in relation to 
the development of renewable energy.” (SEAV, 2002a p.24) and that visual impact 
should be weighted with regard to Government policy to support renewable energy 
(SEAV, 2002a). 
6.3.6 Discussion and summary 
In this section I have shown how the operationalization of vague visions such as 
“appropriate development” can be better understood by looking at who is the 
decision-maker, what issues they consider, how they are considered, and how the 
various considerations are weighted against each other (i.e. trade-offs). Each of these 
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areas was the source of some debate or controversy in the Victorian Government’s 
attempt to operationalise “appropriate development”. 
We saw that local community members felt disempowered by the State-Government 
making itself the decision-maker on projects over 30 MW. We saw that the planning 
process did not necessarily respond to some of the concerns of local community 
members, such as effects on property values or community division. We saw that the 
assessment processes for two of the most significant issues, greenhouse abatement 
and landscape impact, changed as actors debated how these issues should be assessed 
and understood. Finally, we saw that how actors weighted issues could result in 
different decisions. 
By acknowledging that there are different areas in which appropriateness can be 
examined actors may be able to develop a more effective decision-making process. It 
can also help actors to appreciate why efforts focused on say methods for landscape 
assessment (which will be discussed in the following section) may not resolve 
controversy if the real point of contention is how landscape impacts are valued 
relative to the greenhouse gas abatement. 
6.4 Adapting wind farm development 
The wind industry, like the Government, invested significant resources into 
responding to the mismatches and controversy described earlier in the chapter. 
For AusWEA the problem was that controversial projects could hinder the 
development of the whole industry, erode public support, and cause Governments to 
question support measures such as MRET. In responding to these concerns, AusWEA, 
like Governments, had a vision of appropriate development and sought to make it 
operational. They developed best practice guidelines to help developers understand 
what issues should be considered when developing a wind farm. AusWEA also 
engaged in detailed collaborative investigations on how to assess landscape and bird 
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impacts. These two issues had been the reasons for the Victorian Government 
rejecting projects113, suggesting that what developers saw as appropriate, and what the 
Government saw as appropriate, was not always consistent. From late 2002, AusWEA 
also began responding more directly to community opposition and negative claims. 
These areas of activity for AusWEA will be analysed in turn. 
For developers, the problems were more related to how to get their project approved, 
this included finding less controversial sites and fostering community support. The 
change in site selection will be illustrated for Victoria114, while the experience of 
developer Wind Power Pty Ltd will be used to show learning about more effective 
consultation. The next section begins with the efforts of AusWEA. 
6.4.1 Best practice guidelines and accreditation 
AusWEA's first major initiative was its best practice guidelines for wind farm 
development. The AusWEA board identified the need for guidelines in mid 2000 
(Flynn, 2005, Maddox, 2002b, 2005). This was just after the EEC controversy and the 
VCC workshop described in Section 6.2.1. At the time, the industry was growing 
rapidly, Government offered little guidance, some proposals had been met with 
objections, opposition groups were forming, and the media was giving critics 
increasing attention (Maddox, 2002a, 2005). Based on overseas experience, AusWEA 
knew that inappropriate projects could hurt the further development of the industry 
                                                 
113 EECs proposal for Cape Bridgewater near Portland was denied planning permits by VCAT based on 
the detrimental landscape impacts. Pacific Hydro’s proposal for Yaloak, North West of Melbourne, was 
denied a planning permit by the State Government due to potential bird impacts. 
114 It was predominantly in Victoria where this change in location occurred due to local opposition. In 
South Australia, the locations of proposals changed in response to grid integration issues, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
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and saw an opportunity to learn lessons from other countries (AusWEA, 2002b, 
Flynn, 2005). 
AusWEA, like various Government actors, had a vision of “appropriate 
development”, although as later sections will discuss, they did not necessarily agree 
on what was “appropriate”. AusWEA’s approach in the best practice guidelines was 
to help developer’s understand what issues should be considered, at which stage of the 
development process, and to what level of detail (Maddox in South Australia, 2003). 
The guidelines offered broad advice on how to consider particular issues and manage 
trade-offs. 
AusWEA received funding from the AGO and the guidelines were released in early 
2002. They were based on the UK guidelines, supplemented by Australia-specific 
information obtained from various stakeholders such as Government department and 
agencies, wind farm developers, community groups, landowners, and Network 
Service Providers (AusWEA, 2002b). 
The intention of the best practice guidelines was to inform developers and planning 
authorities about wind farm development and to establish industry norms (AusWEA, 
2002b, Flynn, 2005). AusWEA hoped that the industry would gain a better reputation 
through the improved development practices of developers (Maddox, 2002a). 
AusWEA also hoped that planning authorities would use the guidelines to help assess 
the appropriateness of proposals and that Governments would use the guidelines in 
the development of the planning framework, creating some consistency between 
different planning jurisdictions (AusWEA, 2002b, Maddox, 2005, South Australia, 
2003). 
To date, Governments have not drawn on the guidelines as AusWEA had hoped 
(Maddox, 2005, South Australia, 2003). In an interview, Rick Maddox (2005) stated 
that in hindsight of his experience in developing bird risk assessment standards, which 
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involved getting agreement between State and Federal stakeholders, it would have 
been difficult to get widespread agreement from Governments on the best practice 
guidelines. 
While Government may not have explicitly supported the guidelines, AusWEA were 
commended for their efforts by the Victorian wind farm policy planning panel (refer 
to Section 6.2.1). The panel praised the guidelines as an “excellent initiative”, 
although also noted that such industry based guidelines would be expected to “…err 
in favour of industry beneficial interpretations of particular environmental situations.” 
and by implication were not necessarily representative of community values (Smith 
and Jacka, 2002b). 
It is difficult to gauge how extensively the guidelines are used within the industry 
because ultimately they are voluntary (Maddox, 2002a). As Rick Maddox (2005) 
noted, not all developers have necessarily acted in a manner that could be described as 
“best practice”; some have been more in line with “appropriate” and “sensitive” 
development, whereas others have shown inexperience and/or been highly 
commercially-focused (Maddox, 2005). In 2005, AusWEA sought to encourage best 
practice by developing an accreditation scheme for project development (AusWEA, 
2005e, La Fontaine, 2005, Maddox, 2005). The implementation and effects of this 
scheme were unknown at the time of writing. 
6.4.2 Landscape assessment 
As noted previously, the impact of wind farms on the landscape was one of the most 
contentious aspects of their development. Recognising the seriousness of the issue and 
the lack of consistency in the assessment of landscape values, AusWEA and the 
Australian Council of National Trusts formed a partnership (AusWEA, 2003b).  
According to Karl Mallon (2005), both groups recognised that they had common 
interests and that partnership would be more productive than a path of conflict. To 
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that time, the Victorian division of the National Trust had been highly critical of wind 
farm development (Fyfe, 2002, Jackson, 2002). The partnership created tensions 
within each organisation. Within the National Trust, it reportedly contributed to the 
resignation of the Victorian Chairman, who remained a staunch opponent (Millar and 
Button, 2003). Within AusWEA, there was debate about how the outcomes from the 
project might affect existing proposals (Mallon, 2005). 
The project had two objectives. The first was to provide more detailed and widely 
supported information on how to perform landscape assessment than was currently in 
the AusWEA best practice guidelines (Planisphere, 2005). The second was to 
recommend the agreed methods to planning authorities (Planisphere, 2005). These 
objectives were to be achieved over three stages (Planisphere, 2005): identifying and 
understanding the key issues, developing agreed methods for assessing landscape 
values, and testing the agreed methods.  
Stage one was completed in 2005. This had involved literature reviews and extensive 
consultations with stakeholders via a survey and workshops (one of which I attended). 
Stage 1 was in essence about developing an agreed problem agenda for landscape 
issues. The priority areas identified from this work were (Planisphere, 2005): 
landscape assessment methods, a site-specific landscape assessment model, wind farm 
design guidelines, and community engagement guidelines.  
The outcomes from Stage 1 were praised by the Federal Minister for the Environment 
and Heritage (Campbell, 2005). At the time of writing, AusWEA and ACNT were 
seeking funding to undertake the remaining stages of the project. A significant 
indirect outcome of stage 1 was that AusWEA and ACNT had begun to understand 
and trust each other (Mallon, 2005, Scott, 2005). This trust and recognition of 
common interests have created a promising basis for future learning and embedding. 
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At the time of writing, a draft national framework for landscape assessment had been 
developed and was undergoing public consultation. This framework further addressed 
some the uncertainty of landscape assessment by setting out what information should 
be produced when and at which stages the public should be involved. 
6.4.3 Bird risk assessment standards 
Another significant issue in wind farm development was the effect on birds, 
particularly where it affected endangered species, such as the orange-bellied parrot 
(Smith and Jacka, 2002c), or iconic species, such as the wedge-tail eagle (Jacka et al., 
2005). 
AusWEA recognised the importance of bird impacts and, as part of their best practice 
guidelines, engaged a consultant to provide information on identifying and mitigating 
bird impacts (AusWEA, 2002b). The Victorian wind farm policy planning panel 
praised AusWEA for this initiative and noted that the industry should also collect bird 
strike information to inform planning decisions (Smith and Jacka, 2002b). One 
challenge of doing this was that different project teams had used different assessment 
methods. 
AusWEA received funding from the AGO to develop standardised methods for bird 
risk assessment, monitoring, data recording, and impact analysis115 (Lane, 2005). The 
target audience for the standards are developers, Government agencies, and interested 
community members (AusWEA, 2005h). As with the landscape assessment 
investigation, this was an attempt to develop widely supported methods for assessing 
a key wind farm issue. 
                                                 
115 The South Australian Environment Resources and Development Committee, in their investigation 
into wind farms, had also recommended that standardised assessment methods for bird impacts be 
adopted (ERD Committee, 2004). 
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The standards were released in 2005 following an issues paper and stakeholder 
workshops (AusWEA, 2005h). The standards took a risk management approach, with 
the level of investigation required in a project dependent on the level of risk to birds 
in the area. The process also resulted in an agreed method for assessing the impacts of 
a wind farm by performing before and after studies on the wind farm site and a 
reference site (AusWEA, 2005h). 
Rick Maddox noted that it was very difficult to get agreement from all the State and 
Federal Government agencies involved. The challenge was to have a consistent 
approach which was general enough to be widely applicable, yet still locally-specific 
in order to meet the needs of the State agencies. In the end the guidelines were 
released as “interim” because getting endorsement from all States was too difficult. 
AusWEA’s expectation is that the standards will be more formally endorsed once they 
have been "road tested" (Maddox, 2005). 
6.4.4 Responding to community opposition 
From 2002, the growing opposition to wind farms featured highly on AusWEA’s 
problem agenda (Mallon, 2006). It was at about this time that wind power was being 
increasingly criticised in the media and MRET was due to undergo a policy review 
(Mallon, 2003, 2006). AusWEA was concerned that negative perceptions of wind 
power could harm the social and political support which was required for the industry 
to grow (Maddox, 2003, Mallon, 2003, 2006). 
AusWEA responded in two ways. First, as discussed in the last three sections, it 
provided guidance to developers on how to operationalise “appropriate development”. 
Second, AusWEA began producing educational information and responding to 
newspaper articles and letters-to-the-editor. This second area of response was linked 
to the MRET campaign because public support (social protection) was seen as a pre-
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requisite for maintaining and improving MRET (politically-produced technological 
protection) (Mallon, 2006). 
AusWEA took a strategic approach in responding to the criticism. They sought to 
engage with single issue groups, such as the Australian Council of National Trusts 
and Birds Australia to reach agreed solutions (as discussed in the previous sections) 
(Mallon, 2003). They did not engage directly with what they perceived to be anti-
wind groups, such as the various coastal or landscape guardians, but took a combined 
proactive and reactive approach. AusWEA began producing and disseminating 
various media releases, fact-sheets, briefing papers and reports on key issues 
(AusWEA, 2003e, f, h, i, j, k, Mallon, 2003). These were later updated in much 
greater detail after they received funding from the Australia Greenhouse Office as part 
of the so-called Wind Industry Development Project (Maddox, 2003, 2004). The 
intention was that the public could access this information, either directly or via 
developers, at the early stage of proposals to reduce uncertainty about potential 
impacts. The aim was to break the cycle of claim and counter-claim which was 
tending to occur between supporters and opponents (Maddox, 2003, Mallon, 2006). 
AusWEA also began to respond to what it perceived as critical or misinformed 
articles, news reports and letters-to-the-editor (Anthony, 2004a, b, c, d, e, f, 2005, 
AusWEA, 2004b, c, j, Lloyd-Besson, 2004a, b, c, d, e, Mallon, 2003). AusWEA also 
continued to emphasize good-news stories (AusWEA, 2005d). 
The success of these efforts has been mixed. While some recent proposals have had 
very low levels of articulated opposition (e.g. Banon et al., 2005, Harty et al., 2005), 
others, such as Macarthur, have been more controversial (Saunders et al., 2006). In 
the Macarthur case, the planning panel specifically recommended that the wind 
industry and Government should, in consultation with wind power critics, prepare 
material that responds to common wind farm issues (Saunders et al., 2006). This 
suggests that further work is needed to distribute information that all actors regard as 
credible and unbiased. 
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6.4.5 Looking for less controversial locations 
Another change that occurred was in site selection by developers. 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was rising opposition to wind farm 
proposals in Victoria’s coastal regions. Even following the release of the Victorian 
wind farm guidelines in 2002, formal proposals were still focused in coastal regions. 
The Victorian Coastal Council (2003) was highly critical of the guidelines, stating that 
they did not appear to have encouraged developers away from Victoria’s (tourist-
attracting) coastal regions. 
Developers were aware of the need to look for inland locations and many of these 
investigations became formal proposals from about 2003, as shown in Figure 10. In 
essence they were searching for sites where there was greater consensus about the 
appropriateness of a wind farm.  
The developer’s strategy was relatively simple; while the wind resource is generally 
not as good inland (Coppin et al., 2003, SEAV, 2004), developers expected that this 
would be partly offset by a more straightforward planning process (Sim, 2002).  The 
move inland also generally resulted in larger proposals (see Figure 10 and Table 17) 
and taller towers (Saunders et al., 2006). The larger proposals were an attempt to 
obtain economies of scale, while the taller towers an attempt to harness the better 
wind speeds that usually occur at higher heights. Developers had to balance these 
changes against the increased visual impact of larger proposals and towers. 
Developers were primarily responding to their own problem agendas in terms of 
getting projects approved. However, they would have at least been aware, if not also 
responding to, the larger effect on the wind industry due to the efforts of AusWEA 
through the MRET campaign. 
So how effective was this shift of focus inland? Some inland proposals were well 
supported and had low levels of opposition, for example Challicum Hills, Waubra, 
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and Mt Gellibrand (Banon et al., 2005, Braithwaite, 2003, Harty et al., 2005). Others, 
such as Macarthur, were more controversial, but ultimately still received planning 
permission (Hulls, 2006, Saunders et al., 2006). Others, such as an investigation by 
Wind Power Pty Ltd about an hour north-west of Melbourne met with strong 
opposition and never became a formal proposal (Griffiths, 2004, Marino, 2005, 
Melton/Moorabool Leader, 2005a, b, Sellars, 2005). 
6.4.6 Community Consultation 
In addition to shifting their focus inland, some developers also learnt about how to 
consult local communities more effectively. 
Many actors identified community consultation as an important part of the 
development process, because it allows developers to learn about the concerns and 
values of the community and to inform the public on the expected impacts of a project 
(AusWEA, 2002b, Braithwaite, 2003, Jacka and Westwood, 2003). As noted earlier, 
providing information was particularly important because wind farms were still new 
to most regions of Australia and the public was not familiar with them. 
A good example of learning about effective community consultation is the 
experiences of Wind Power Pty Ltd in three of their proposals: Wonthaggi, Bald Hills, 
and Waubra. 
Wonthaggi was the first of these proposals and the developer’s consultation process 
drew criticism from locals and the planning panel. Locals criticised the fact that the 
only information display for the project was closed early, that no public meeting was 
held regarding the project, that the EES was not displayed at the local council offices 
as it should have been, and the lack of consultation with local groups or clubs (Jacka 
and Westwood, 2003). The planning panel concluded that this criticism was justified 
and noted that many concerns related to fears of the unknown, fears which could have 
been responded to through effective consultation (Jacka and Westwood, 2003). Also, 
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Figure 10 – Locations of formal wind farm proposals in Victoria (refer to Table 17 for details) (Map based on VicMap, 2005) 
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Table 17 – Wind farm proposals in Victoria 
 Project and developer MW Year1 Status Reference 
1 Energy Equity Corporation 25 1997 Refused (Halstead, 1999, 
VCAT, 1999) 
2 Codrington wind farm (Pacific 
Hydro) 
18.2 c1999 Operating (Pacific Hydro, 2002b) 
3 Challicum Hills (Pacific Hydro) 52.5 c1999 Operating (Pacific Hydro, 2002a) 
4 Toora Wind Farm (Stanwell 
Corp.) 
21 2000 Operating (South Gippsland Shire 
Council, 2000) 
5 Portland Wind Energy Project 
(Pacific Hydro) 
180 2000 Approved (Environment Australia, 
2004) 
6 Discovery Bay (TME Australia) 50 2001 Withdrawn (TME Australia Pty 
Ltd, 2001) 
7 Swan Bay (Wind Power) 5.25 2001 Withdrawn (Hobson, 2001) 
8 Wonthaggi (Wind Power) 12 2001 Operating (DSE, 2004b) 
9 Nirranda (Stanwell Corp) 50 2001 Withdrawn (DSE, 2004b) 
10 Bald Hills (Wind Power) 109 2001 Approved (DSE, 2004b) 
11 Nirranda South Wind farm 
(Nirranda South Wind Farm Pty 
Ltd) 
60 2002 Withdrawn (DSE, 2004b) 
12 Yaloak Wind Farm (Pacific 
Hydro) 
105 2003 Refused (DSE, 2004b) 
13 Rosedale (Pacific Hydro) 50 2003 Proposed (King, 2003) 
14 Welshpool (Meridian Energy) 30-40 2003 Proposed (Heath, 2003b) 
15 Dollar (Meridian Energy) 50-120 2003 Proposed (Heath, 2003a) 
16 Naroghid Wind Farm 
(developer) 
30-55 2004 Approved (Wilson, 2004a) 
17 Macarthur Wind Farm (Meridian 
Energy) 
250 2004 Approved (AusWEA, 2005g, 
DSE, 2005c) 
18 Mt Gellibrand Wind Farm 
(ProVentum) 
232 2004 Approved (AusWEA, 2005g, 
DSE, 2005c) 
19 Waubra (Wind Power)  <128 
turbines 
2004 Approved (Lausberg, 2004) 
20 Woolsthorpe Wind Farm 50-90 2004 Proposed (Woolsthorpe Wind 
Farm, 2004) 
21 Drysdale Wind Farm (Drysdale 
Wind Farm Pty Ltd) 
60 – 80 2005 Proposed (Drysdale Wind Farm, 
2005) 
1The year shown is the earliest record of the proposal I could find with Environment Australia, Victoria’s 
Department of Sustainability and Environment, or the relevant local government. 
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the lack of consultation created the perception that local issues and values were not 
adequately considered in the EES process (Jacka and Westwood, 2003). To the 
objectors, the Wonthaggi wind farm was an inappropriate development. 
The Bald Hills project to a large extent ran concurrently with the Wonthaggi project. 
Again the local community criticised the developer’s handling of community 
consultation. A key aspect of this case was that there was a major design change just 
before the beginning of the initial planning panel hearing (Theophanous and 
Delahunty, 2003). As a result, the developer was asked to produce a Supplementary 
Environmental Effects Statement reflecting the changed design (Theophanous and 
Delahunty, 2003). The panel concluded that the community consultation had been 
poorly handled and recommended that in future developments, Wind Power Pty Ltd 
make use of professional advice on community consultation (Smith et al., 2004).  
The developer acknowledged that they had been on a steep learning curve with the 
Wonthaggi and Bald Hills projects; they had undertaken community consultation in-
house and admitted that some mistakes had been made (Smith et al., 2004). However, 
the developer also argued that they had learnt lessons from these experiences and 
engaged a consultant to conduct the consultation for the Supplementary EES (Smith et 
al., 2004). In contrast to the EES process, which the panel found to have “caused 
division” and “exacerbated conflicts”, the Supplementary EES was “broadly well 
advised and conducted” (Smith et al., 2004 p.264). 
Waubra was the third proposal from Wind Power Pty Ltd. By this time, it had learnt 
the value of engaging an expert in community consultation. The planning panel 
described the consultation process as professional and competent (Banon et al., 2005). 
Overall the project had a low level of articulated opposition; in part this was because 
the location was less controversial than the coastal sites of Wonthaggi or Bald Hills, 
and this was maintained by the more effective consultation process. 
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While Wind Power Pty Ltd learnt lessons about effective consultation, it seems that 
this learning was not necessarily industry wide. Developers were still being criticised 
for their consultation processes in 2006. 
One possibility is that developers had not fully appreciated the distinction between 
extensive consultation and effective consultation. For example, most planning panel 
assessments have noted that there has been extensive consultation; in the Yaloak 
proposal, Pacific Hydro went beyond the minimum requirements (Jacka et al., 2005), 
in the Macarthur proposal, Southern Hydro undertook “…a significant level of good 
faith consultation…” (Saunders et al., 2006), and in the Naroghid proposal, the 
proponent had articles in the local paper, held an information attended by 80 people, 
and had one-on-one discussions (Jacka and Thatcher, 2005); yet in all these cases the 
planning panels also found that the consultation was ineffective to some degree. In the 
Yaloak case, Pacific Hydro was criticised for not transparently modifying the wind 
farm design in response to community concerns or not providing justification for not 
modifying the design (Jacka et al., 2005). In the Macarthur case, “The panel was 
surprised by the paucity of information made available to objectors…” during the 
preparation and exhibition of the planning permit application (Saunders et al., 2006 
p.203). And, in the Naroghid case, the planning panel was critical of the proponents 
efforts to respond to specific questions from locals during the development process 
(Jacka and Thatcher, 2005). It appears that while some developers have learnt about 
how to more effectively consult the local community, this learning has not yet become 
trans-local and widely embedded. 
6.4.7 Discussion and Summary 
The wind industry invested significant resources into responding to the mismatches 
and controversy described earlier in the chapter. 
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AusWEA’s concern was that controversial projects could hinder the development of 
the whole industry, erode public support, and cause Government’s to question support 
measures such as MRET. They realised that they had to maintain a high level of 
public support (social protection) because this was a pre-requisite for maintaining and 
improving MRET (politically-created technological protection).  
AusWEA worked to reduce uncertainty in a number of areas and in a way that 
operationalised their vision of “appropriate development”. They produced best 
practice guidelines for wind farm development, which guided developers on what 
issues to consider, at what level of detail, and when during the development process. 
They engaged with other actors on the controversial issues of landscape and bird 
impacts, actors with whom they shared interests but not necessarily views. In relation 
to birds, this has resulted in a widely supported risk assessment standard. In relation to 
landscape impact, this has resulted in a widely supported problem agenda for which 
AusWEA and the ACNT are currently seeking funding. AusWEA also released fact 
sheets and began responding to what they perceived to be misinformed newspaper 
articles and letters-to-the-editor. This has not necessarily been successful, with the 
planning panel for the Macarthur wind farm recommending that the wind industry and 
Government work towards producing credible information which responds to 
community concerns.  
The concern for developers was how to get their projects approved. They responded 
to the opposition in a variety of ways. They changed their site selection processes, 
putting less emphasis on wind resource and more emphasis on less controversial 
locations which were typically inland. They also endeavoured to consult the 
community more effectively. While many developers undertook extensive 
consultation, this was not always effective, as noted by a number of planning panels. 
At least one developer, Wind Power Pty Ltd, learnt from their mistakes; in their early 
developments they had managed community consultation in-house, whereas in later 
developments they engaged a consultation expert. 
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6.5 Discussions and conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate and explain the significant changes or 
attempts to change related to planning and the community. In doing so, I have also 
tested the insights from Chapter 2 in terms of positive feedback dynamics, which 
actors were in a position to encourage these dynamics, and challenges for actors to 
anticipate. This final section highlights these findings. 
6.5.1 Importance of dynamics 
This facet of the case has illustrated why increasing functionality, decreasing 
uncertainty, increasing use, increasing technical legitimacy, strengthening 
expectations, increasing embedding and alignment, learning and articulation, and 
attracting actors are important dynamics in the introduction of new technologies. This 
is summarised in Table 18. 
The chapter showed that increasing functionality and the demonstration of this were 
important because actors were critical of claimed benefits. In this case, the greenhouse 
abatement benefits claimed by developers were questioned by opponents of projects. 
Developers needed to more robustly estimate the benefits, while State Government 
saw the need to improve its understanding of how wind power reduced greenhouse 
emissions, to show that it was effective at doing so, and communicating this to the 
public.  
This chapter has shown that uncertainty can lead to financial and emotional cost for 
those involved. Uncertainty was reduced by Governments developing planning 
frameworks and a wind atlas, by the wind industry developing guidelines on wind 
farm development, by the wind industry and developers providing information, and by 
the construction of wind farms which people could then use to develop their own 
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Table 18 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks 
Dynamic Why? Who? How? 
Increasing 
use 
To capture 
economies of 
scale 
- Developers - Larger projects, or multiple small 
projects linked together financially 
Increasing 
embedding 
and 
alignment 
To reduce 
uncertainty, 
capture learning, 
and build trust. 
- Government 
- Industry 
associations 
- NGOs 
- Planning frameworks 
- Industry standards and best practice 
guidelines 
- Stable relationships between actors, 
for example through partnerships in 
research. 
Increasing 
functionality 
To better meet 
the need it is 
targeted towards 
and to reduce 
opposition. 
- Developers 
- Government 
- More robust estimates of benefits 
- Better understand and articulate 
performance 
Strengthening 
expectations 
To encourage 
alignment in the 
direction of 
progress and 
reduce 
uncertainty. 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
- Developers 
- Communities 
- First-hand experience with a wind 
farm 
- Accurate and well communicated 
information to the public 
- Trust between industry and the public 
- Embedding and alignment in the form 
of planning requirements and 
industry norms. 
Increasing 
legitimacy  
To encourage 
more positive 
expectations 
about the support 
or use of the 
technology 
- Industry 
association 
- Developers 
- Government 
- Increasing functionality and 
demonstrating performance 
- Strengthening expectations and links 
to positive vague visions. 
- Providing tangible benefits to 
communities such as employment 
- Implementing the technology with 
supportive actors 
Reducing 
uncertainty 
To avoid the 
financial and 
emotional cost 
that can come 
when outcomes 
are uncertain. 
- Government 
- Investors 
- Industry 
association 
- Communities 
- Agreed direction of progress and path 
to operationalise it (e.g. Shared 
visions, problem agendas, potential 
solutions); 
- Embedding and alignment in the form 
of planning requirements and 
industry norms. 
- Trans-local learning in the form of 
industry best practice and 
development procedures 
- Gaining personal experience with the 
technology 
Learning and  
articulation 
To better 
understand and 
address 
mismatches, 
inadequacies and 
inexperience. 
 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
- Developers 
- Communities 
- Understand how the existing 
institutional framework is 
mismatched with or inadequate for 
the new technology. 
- Understand the processes for 
implementing the new technology 
and articulate in the form of codified 
trans-local knowledge such as best 
practice guidelines. 
- Gaining first-hand experience with 
the implementation and use of the 
new technology (tacit learning) 
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Dynamic Why? Who? How? 
Attracting 
actors 
To enable change 
to all aspects of 
the socio-
technical regime 
and increase 
legitimacy. 
- Government 
- Industry 
association 
- NGOs 
- Public 
- Create robust, specific and high 
quality expectations of economic 
(e.g. investment and employment) 
and environmental (e.g. greenhouse 
abatement) benefits. 
- Demonstrate that the mismatches and 
inadequacies between the technology 
and the socio-technical regime are 
either having a costly impact, or that 
there would be greater benefits if they 
were mutually suited. 
first-hand experience116. 
This chapter showed that strengthening expectations was important because 
expectations affected how people acted and reacted. By strengthening expectations 
through accurate information, demonstration, and first-hand experience, actors can 
reduce uncertainty about what the best course of action might be. For example, when 
wind farms were new and developers were inexperienced, they had expectations about 
what constituted a good site, how the development and consultation should be 
undertaken, what the public’s reaction would be, etc. After some controversial coastal 
projects, developers shifted their focus inland where they expected the typically lower 
wind speeds to be offset by lower development costs due to high community 
acceptance. For communities, they formed expectations about what the effects of a 
wind farm would be based on the information they received from the developer and 
the level of trust that had for them, information on the internet, past experience, and 
visits to other wind farms. Strengthening expectations is also important because actors 
may initially allocate the burden of proof differently; some may expect the technology 
to be beneficial unless shown otherwise and other actors may expect vice-versa. The 
                                                 
116 This was not always a good thing. One early wind farm at Toora, in South Gippsland, Southwest of 
Melbourne had ongoing noise issues (Buttler, 2004b, Leongatha Star, 2003, Strong, 2003). This created 
a negative image of wind farms, particularly because in those early days the wind industry had been 
telling people that noise was not a problem with wind farms (Adair, 2002a, Harding, 2002, Victorian 
Coastal Council, 1999). 
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Government and AusWEA were able to shape expectations through the development 
of planning requirements and best practice guidelines respectively. 
The chapter showed that increasing use was important because of its links with 
economies of scale. Because of the competition under MRET, and because inland 
wind speeds are typically lower, developers saw the need to increase the size of 
projects to capture economies of scale and enable projects to be financially viable. 
The chapter showed that increasing embedding and alignment was important because 
it helped to capture learning and to reduce uncertainty about the direction of progress. 
We saw that there was initially uncertainty because the planning framework was 
inadequate, developers were inexperienced with developing wind farms or with 
developing them in Australia, and communities were unfamiliar with wind farms. We 
saw that Government and industry had a vague vision of appropriate development and 
sought to make it operational. Despite the fact that the way they did so was not 
universally supported, the planning frameworks and best practice guidelines did 
reduce uncertainty about the direction of progress and captured the tacit and explicit 
learning of actors. We also saw that social embedding and alignment, in the form of a 
partnership between AusWEA and ACNT was constructive on multiple levels, it built 
trust which provided a foundation for ongoing work, and it led to the development of 
well-supported guidelines for landscape assessment. 
The chapter showed that increasing social legitimacy was important because it linked 
with public support for wind power which in turn linked to the political support for 
the technology. We saw that for some people the link between wind power and 
positive visions such as sustainability and rural development was strengthened, while 
others linked wind power to negative visions such as industrialisation of rural 
landscape. Government and AusWEA attempted to do this by operationalising their 
visions for appropriate development, while a number of developers attempted to find 
sites that were supported by the local community. 
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We saw that learning and articulation were important because there were significant 
mismatches and inadequacies between wind power and the existing institutional 
framework, and because actors may be inexperienced with the implementation and/or 
use of the technology. We saw these situations for wind power in Australia and the 
Government and industry had to learn how to address the mismatches, inadequacies 
and inexperience through research and accumulating experience. 
Finally, the chapter showed that attracting actors was important because different 
actors were responsible for different aspects of the socio-technical regime. In order for 
the planning framework to be adapted to wind power, Government actors had to be 
involved. Attracting actors is also important because a broad support base for a 
technology can increase its social and political legitimacy. 
6.5.2 Insights to strengthen SNM 
The events analysed in this chapter have shown that mismatches and inadequacies 
between the new technology and the institutional framework can create uncertainty 
for actors. It has also shown that finding a mutual fit by operationalising a vague 
vision can be a contentious process. We can learn from these events to strengthen 
SNM. I have used a similar style of table to that in Chapter 2 to arrange the challenges 
because many of them relate to more than one dynamic (See Table 8). Those 
challenges identified in Chapter 2 that are supported by this facet of the case are 
shown in the table, along with those challenges that have come from this case. The 
numbers in brackets (chapter-number) in the table provide a cross-reference to a more 
detailed discussion in the following text and in the final chapter. 
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Table 19 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks 
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Possible strategy 
(6-1) Mismatch with 
institutional framework 
(Kemp et al., 1998) 
  ?   ?  ?   
The appropriate strategy is 
case specific. An approach 
for understanding likely 
mismatches or 
inadequacies is to identify 
how the new technology 
interacts with the existing 
institutional framework. 
This may be most 
apparent after an 
experiment with the new 
technology. 
(6-2) Inexperience with 
the new technology 
 ?  ?  ?   ?  
Actors could encourage 
the production and 
distribution of trans-local 
knowledge (e.g. produce 
best practice guidelines, or 
hold seminars and 
conferences). If possible, 
actors could look for 
opportunities to gain 
personal experience with 
the technology. 
Proponents may need help 
to distribute information 
from actors who are 
credible with users or the 
public. 
(6-3) Actors allocate the 
burden of proof differently 
with respect to benefits 
and detriments (Brooks, 
1996)         ? ? 
Actors could make efforts 
to understand how others 
allocate the burden, for 
example by analysing the 
language they use. They 
could also reflect on what 
“tests” they and others 
apply to information 
before they regard it as 
credible. 
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Possible strategy 
(6-4) Beware of over-
simplifying controversy 
into for and against. 
       ? ?  
Actors could the following 
questions to better 
understand a debate about 
a new technology: how do 
actors allocate the burden 
of proof? Are actors not 
considering an issue which 
is important to others? 
Does a local community 
agree with how something 
is being measured or 
considered? Do actors 
have different values? Is 
opposition prompted by a 
fear of the unknown? Each 
of these situations may 
have different implications 
for trying to improve, 
mediate, or facilitate the 
situation. 
(6-5) The level of 
consensus may affect the 
type of learning. 
  ?     ? ? ? 
Actors could investigate 
the role that consensus is 
playing in the type of 
learning that is occurring. 
If consensus is low, then 
adversarial learning may 
occur with supporters and 
opponents trading 
rhetorical blows. If 
consensus is high, the 
cooperative learning may 
occur with actors 
undertaking research 
towards an agreed 
outcome. 
(6-6) Lack of trust 
       ? ? ? 
Possible strategies include 
(Adler et al., 2000, 
Bingham, 2003): focusing 
on actors’ interests rather 
than their position, for 
distrusting actors to jointly 
formulate questions and 
methods for gathering 
information, and to have 
information peer-reviewed 
by a neutral third-party. 
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Possible strategy 
(6-7) Difficulty of 
embedding vague visions 
in a consensual manner 
(Berkhout, 2006, Eames et 
al., 2006, Smith et al., 
2005, Weber, 2003) 
?     ? ? ? ? ? 
Actors could use the 
following approach to 
better understand the 
difficulty of embedding 
appropriate or sustainable 
development: who is the 
decision maker, what 
issues are they 
considering, how are they 
considering those issues, 
and how are trade-offs 
being managed. Processes 
of negotiation and trust-
building may help to 
increase the level of 
consensus. 
(6-8) Undesirable societal 
or environmental effects 
?   ?   ? ? ? ? 
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
 
Proponents could 
investigate why particular 
effects of the new 
technology are undesirable 
(i.e. second order learning) 
and work towards 
mitigating these impacts. 
These efforts may be 
particularly powerful if 
they in partnership with 
other actors who are 
widely seen as credible 
and unbiased. 
(6-9) Actors measure 
legitimacy according to 
their interests 
      ?  ?  
Societal actors (e.g. the 
general public) may 
measure legitimacy 
according to how strongly 
the technology is linked to 
sustainability in terms of 
demonstrated benefits and 
low or acceptable 
detriments. The benefits 
and detriments that are 
most important may vary 
depending on the specific 
actors involved. 
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Possible strategy 
(6-10) Balance between 
having a network with low 
diversity, which will reach 
agreement easily about 
problems and their 
expected solutions, but 
risks becoming insular, 
and a network with high 
diversity, which may have 
greater representation of 
views, but struggle to 
reach consensus about 
problems and solutions. 
(Hoogma, 2000, Verheul 
and Vergragt, 1995, 
Weber et al., 1999) 
       ? ? ? 
Actors could form 
partnerships with other 
groups who have 
overlapping interests but 
different views and work 
towards a mutually 
beneficial goal. 
(6-11) Balance between 
providing protection and 
maintaining incentive to 
innovate (Kemp et al., 
1998) 
?  ?        
Actors could investigate 
the possible direct and 
indirect effects that 
competitive forms of 
protection can have on the 
way that technologies are 
implemented. 
(6-12) Balance between 
increasing use and 
undesirable impacts  ?     ?    
Actors could monitor the 
impact of increasing use 
on the social legitimacy of 
the new technology. 
(6-13) Inequitable 
distribution of risks and 
benefits (Kemp and Soete, 
1992) 
        ?  
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
 
Implementers of the new 
technology could look for 
strategies to bring greater 
local benefits. For 
example, by setting up a 
community fund. 
(6-14) Repeated problems 
when setting up an 
experiment 
  ?        
“When designing a new 
experiment, seek out and 
utilise previous relevant 
experience” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
 
“Modular projects allow 
for changes to be made in 
light of the experience 
gained” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
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6.5.2.1 (6-1) Mismatches with institutional framework 
Researchers such as Kemp et al (1998) note that the introduction of a new technology 
may be hindered by the existing institutional or regulatory framework. In this case we 
saw that there were mismatches and inadequacies between the planning framework 
and wind farms in terms of a lack of planning policy on the value of renewable energy 
technologies, lack of guidance on assessing landscape impact, wind farms not being 
recognised as a land-use, and an uncertain planning process for wind farms. This 
created uncertainty for developers and communities with a consequent financial and 
emotional cost. Governments and AusWEA responded with learning and embedding. 
Governments at all levels produced planning guidance and amending planning 
schemes. AusWEA developed best practice guidelines for wind farm development.  
The appropriate strategy for actors may be case specific. One possible approach for 
understanding likely mismatches or inadequacies is to identify how the new 
technology interacts with the existing institutional framework. This may be most 
apparent after an experiment with the new technology. 
6.5.2.2 (6-2) Inexperience with the new technology 
One challenge to introducing new technologies observed in this case was that because 
wind power was new, many actors had no previous experience with it or how to best 
embed it in the existing socio-technical regime. 
In this case, developers were initially inexperienced with how to develop wind farms, 
for example which locations were most suitable across all the relevant issues, how 
particular issues should be considered, and how to effectively consult the community. 
AusWEA responded by producing trans-local knowledge in the form of best practice 
guidelines and by forming partnerships to develop agreed methods for estimating bird 
and landscape impacts. Developers began to search for less contentious sites, 
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generally inland, and some began to learn how to more effectively consult the 
community. 
Local communities were also unfamiliar with wind farms in most cases. Without prior 
experience, locals could not appreciate the extent or severity of potential impacts on 
their amenity. In some, this created a fear of the unknown. Some sought to overcome 
this by seeking answers from the internet, and potentially found incorrect or outdated 
information, or extreme examples. Once some wind farms had been constructed, some 
visited existing wind farms. AusWEA attempted to produce educational material, 
however the findings of the MacArthur wind farm planning panel suggests that further 
work is needed to distribute information that is perceived as credible and unbiased 
(Saunders et al., 2006). 
A possible strategy for actors is to encourage the production and distribution of trans-
local knowledge by producing best practice guidelines or hold seminars and 
conferences). If possible, actors could look for opportunities to gain personal 
experience with the technology; demonstration projects could be useful in this regard. 
Proponents may need help in distributing information from actors who are credible 
with users or the public. 
6.5.2.3 (6-3) Burden of proof 
Brooks (1996) notes that actors may allocate the burden of proof differently for a new 
technology. Proponents may expect the technology to be beneficial until proven 
otherwise, or they may more readily accept that the benefits exist than they do 
detriments. The opposite may be true for opponents.  
In this case we saw that developers used biased language to promote their projects, for 
example by emphasizing the “objective” benefits and dismissing the subjective 
detriments. We saw that the Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria and the former 
Minister for Planning placed the burden of proof on those opposing wind farms. In 
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contrast, we saw that the Australian Council of National Trusts placed the burden on 
proponents. 
Actors may find that making efforts to understand how others allocate the burden, for 
example by analysing the language they use, could be beneficial because it might help 
them to understand why some actors are opposed to the new technology or the way it 
is currently being implemented. They may also find benefits in reflecting on what 
“tests” they and others apply to information before they regard it as credible. 
6.5.2.4 (6-4) Beware of oversimplifying controversy 
Cambrosio and Limoges (1991) as well as Rip and Talma (1998) note that 
controversies are more complex than proponents and opponents with views for and 
against. We saw some of this complexity in the debate about wind power. 
As shown in Section 6.2.2, there was a multi-dimensional debate about wind power, 
which could be understood in a simplified sense as a spectrum of opinion which 
occurred at the project level and also at the technology level. The controversy at these 
levels was often played out in adversarial arenas, such as the planning process, media, 
or government policy review, which often tended to create an impression of for and 
against. 
The analysis suggests that no one actor group within the multi-dimensional debate 
could be regarded as objectively “correct”. Rather the debate was a mixture of varying 
levels of inexperience, self-interest, differing views on whether the burden of proof 
lay with benefits or detriments, and differing views on how to manage trade-offs. The 
majority of people acknowledged that wind farms could be appropriately developed, 
the debate was over where and how. 
As fostering sustainable technologies will be about fostering new technologies, actors 
will be inexperienced and unfamiliar with them. Proponents may find that a 
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technocratic approach may exacerbate the situation rather than diffuse it. While 
proponents may know more about the technology itself, they may need to learn about 
how to integrate the technology in line with societal values, if indeed it should be 
integrated at all. Wickson (2004) makes a similar argument regarding genetically 
modified crops in Australia. 
Actors could use the following questions to understand better a debate about a new 
technology: how do actors allocate the burden of proof? Are actors not considering an 
issue which is important to others? Does a local community agree with how 
something is being measured or considered? Do actors have different values? Is 
opposition prompted by a fear of the unknown? Each of these situations may have 
different implications for trying to improve, mediate, or facilitate the situation. 
6.5.2.5 (6-5) The level of consensus may affect the type of learning 
This chapter has illustrated two different paths for learning, adversarial and 
cooperative. In both cases, actors may produce new knowledge, but the way that this 
occurs and the implications appear quite different. 
In adversarial learning, learning came as a result of the criticism and objections of 
those opposing projects or wind power. Supporters of wind power were forced to 
build a defence to these attacks, for example by providing more detailed information, 
conducting investigations into specific issues, strengthening their arguments etc. A 
good example is the development of methods for estimating the greenhouse benefits 
of wind farms. Supporters took estimates without question and it has only been 
through the scrutiny of critics and objectors, and the consequent investigations by 
planning panels and government agencies, that the esoteric topics of grid operation 
and greenhouse abatement have been better understood. One issue with this 
adversarial learning path is that there is likely to be a lack of trust between the actors 
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involved and, as a consequence, critics may remain sceptical of the resulting 
information, such as noted by the Macarthur wind farm planning panel. 
In contrast, cooperative learning came as a result of partnerships between actors who 
realised that they had overlapping interests, but different opinions, and worked 
towards an agreed outcome. The two good examples of this are the agreed landscape 
assessment methods and the bird risk assessment standards. These examples of 
cooperative learning resulted in reduced uncertainty and in positive social (in terms 
for which actors interact and trusted each other), cognitive (in terms of agreed 
problem agendas), and institutional change (in terms of standard procedures for 
assessing the landscape impacts and the risk to birds). Because the actors involved are 
credible and have agreed outcomes, it appears more likely that the outcomes will be 
widely supported. The consensus path requires actors who are prepared to engage 
with each other, to acknowledge common interests, and to compromise to work 
towards a shared goal. This may not always be possible and actors may be reluctant to 
take part because the outcomes cannot be guaranteed. 
Actors could investigate the role that consensus is playing in the type of learning that 
is occurring. If consensus is low, then adversarial learning may occur with supporters 
and opponents trading rhetorical blows. If consensus is high, the cooperative learning 
may occur with actors undertaking research towards an agreed outcome. 
6.5.2.6 (6-6) Lack of trust 
A theme noted in the previous few lessons has been that of trust, something that 
Gilding and Critchley (2003) regard as an important part of technological change. 
A lack of trust, for example in adversarial learning, can make learning and embedding 
more difficult because actors groups do not accept the information put forward by 
others. So, while adversarial learning may lead to a strong case, it is likely to be more 
difficult to embed this learning because it is mistrusted by others.  
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The case suggests that trying to lower the credibility of others is a less effective 
strategy than engaging with actors who have overlapping interests but different 
opinions. Similarly, pejorative labelling may at best convince Government or the 
public that particular actors are not worth listening to; however it is also quite possible 
that this will stimulate ongoing controversy. Once actors start down this path, then 
trust or a basis for trust breaks down and is very hard to re-build. Consensus therefore 
appears to lead to more robust outcomes.  
More constructive strategies may include those that build trust, such as (Adler et al., 
2000, Bingham, 2003): focusing on actors’ interests rather than their position, jointly 
formulate questions and methods for gathering information, and having information 
peer-reviewed by a neutral third-party. 
6.5.2.7 (6-7) Difficulty of embedding vague visions in a consensual manner 
This chapter has illustrated that embedding a vague vision such as “appropriate 
development” or the closely related “sustainable development” can be controversial. 
Proponents are likely have visions of the future in which their favoured technology 
plays an important role, however these visions may not be widely accepted. The 
approach used in this thesis to study the operationalisation of “appropriate 
development” was to analyse who was the decision maker, what issues were 
considered, how they were considered, and how trade-offs were managed.  
Actors may make decisions about whether something is appropriate or sustainable 
based on a “gut-feel” rather than a rigorous examination of the whole range of issues. 
Investigating a decision-making process in a more explicit way, such as by using the 
approach just outlined, could help to illuminate where actors disagree and where 
efforts to building consensus might most effectively be targeted. 
Actors may also find it beneficial to understand better the role that values play in 
operationalising sustainability or appropriate development. Harding (1998) notes, 
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debates that may seem to be over “facts” are often actually over different values. If 
values are not explicitly stated or discussed, then the cause for any conflict may be 
somewhat obscured. Making values explicit will not ensure consensus, but it may help 
to build trust between actors. A particularly challenging situation is where there is a 
trade-off between the value of avoiding an expected problem in the future and a 
tangible problem in the present, for example climate change and landscape impact in 
relation to wind power, or world food security and potential human or environmental 
harm in relation to genetically modified food (Braun 2002). 
Actors could use the following questions to understand better the difficulty of 
embedding appropriate or sustainable development: who is the decision maker, what 
issues are they considering, how are they considering those issues, and how are trade-
offs being managed? Processes of negotiation and trust-building may help to increase 
the level of consensus. 
6.5.2.8 (6-8) Undesirable societal and environmental effects 
Kemp et al (1998) note that new technologies may solve some problems, but at the 
same time they may also introduce new ones. In this case we saw that wind power 
could reduce greenhouse gas emissions from electricity supply, but at the same time 
there were landscape, noise, and bird issues that had to be managed. More generally, 
the International Energy Agency notes that all renewable energy technologies have 
some undesirable environmental impacts (IEA, 1998). Managing the undesirable 
impacts of technologies that feature in visions of a sustainable future is likely to be 
one of the major challenges for operationalising those visions. 
The SNM workbook advises actors to prepare pre-emptive strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the project before they occur (Weber et al., 1999). Further to 
this, proponents could investigate why particular effects of the new technology are 
undesirable (i.e. second order learning) and work towards mitigating these impacts. 
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These efforts may be particularly powerful if they in partnership with other actors 
who are widely seen as credible and unbiased. 
6.5.2.9 (6-9) Actors measure legitimacy according to their interests 
Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) note that a lack of legitimacy for a new technology can 
hinder positive feedbacks, however they provide little detail on how actors might 
increase legitimacy. In this chapter we gained some insight into how members of the 
public might measure the legitimacy of a new technology.  
The chapter showed that linking a technology to a desirable symbol or vision, such as 
sustainability or appropriate development, can increase the social legitimacy of a 
technology, particularly when the link is demonstrated rather than just rhetorical. 
Hence, actors may find that actions that demonstrate these links help to build strong 
support for the new technology. The link between appropriate development and social 
legitimacy is summed up well by wind farm developer Paul Ebert (1999 p.45) who 
says that to him "…appropriate developments are ones which lead to further and 
wider support for wind energy." 
In general, the analysis suggests that societal actors (i.e. the general public) may 
measure legitimacy according to how strongly the technology is linked to 
sustainability in terms of demonstrated benefits and low or acceptable detriments. The 
benefits and detriments that are most important may vary depending on the specific 
actors involved. 
6.5.2.10 (6-10) Balance between a network of low diversity and one of 
high diversity 
A number of researchers have noted the significance of the actor network in the 
introduction of a new technology (Hoogma, 2000, Verheul and Vergragt, 1995, 
Weber et al., 1999). A particular challenge is finding the right level of diversity within 
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the actor network. A network with low diversity may find it easy to reach agreement 
about problems and their expected solutions, but the network risks becoming insular. 
In contrast, a network with high diversity may have greater representation of views, 
but struggle to reach consensus about problems and solutions. 
An example of low diversity comes from my anecdotal experience at AusWEA 
conferences between 2002 and 2005; my impression was that the attendees did not 
represent a diverse range of views which meant that speakers were not testing their 
ideas because they were “preaching to the converted”. An example of where the 
balance in diversity seems to be working is in the partnership between AusWEA and 
the Australian Council of National Trusts. These groups had different views on 
landscape impact but were working towards a common goal, meaning that the 
outcome is likely to be more robust and widely supported than if either group had 
undertaken the project alone. An effective strategy therefore seems to be for actors to 
form partnerships with other groups who have overlapping interests but different 
views and work towards a mutually beneficial goal. 
6.5.2.11 (6-11) Balance between protection and pressure 
Kemp et al (1998) note that there is a tension between protecting a new technology 
and maintaining pressure for actors to innovate. In this facet of the case we saw the 
detrimental effect that competition – i.e. pressure to innovate – can have. Lauber 
(2004) and Mitchell (1995) have similarly noted that competitive support measures 
for renewable energy technologies can exacerbate controversy. 
The competitive nature of MRET encouraged developers towards sites of highest 
wind resource, which in Victoria at least tended to be coastal and controversial. It also 
encouraged larger wind farms because of economies of scale, but these came at an 
increased visual impact. Finally, competition led to secrecy between firms and 
consequently the public, which in turn hindered learning. In a number of cases, 
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members of public were suspicious of firms because they felt that developers had 
hidden agendas117. 
Actors creating market-based protection measures like MRET may find it useful to 
investigate the possible direct and indirect effects that competitive forms of protection 
can have on the way that technologies are implemented. 
6.5.2.12 (6-12) Balance between increasing use and undesirable impacts 
As just noted, the competition in the market for wind power encouraged actors to 
propose larger projects to gain economies of scale in the cost of turbines and grid 
connection. However, larger projects came at an increased visual impact and were 
more difficult to connect to the grid. Based on this, I suggest that increasing use of the 
new technology can help to deliver greater benefits (e.g. greenhouse abatement) and 
reduce the costs of the technology; however increasing use can also result in 
undesirable impacts if they are not managed carefully. Actors may find it beneficial to 
monitor the impact of increasing use on the social legitimacy of the new technology. 
6.5.2.13 (6-13) Inequitable distribution of risks and benefits 
As Kemp and Soete (1992) note, the risks and benefits of a technology may be 
unequally distributed. Similarly, Resolve (2000) notes that conflicts of large dams can 
occur because the benefits are regional or national, while the adverse impacts are 
predominantly local. A strategy used by a number of wind farm developers was to try 
                                                 
117 Developer, Grant Flynn (2005) noted that it was difficult to know how much detail to reveal early 
on in a project. For example, announcing plans for a project when conducting wind resource testing 
created a risk of false hopes or unnecessary fears if the wind resource was not sufficient to support a 
project. On the other hand, waiting until after wind resource testing to announce a possible project 
created a risk of being accused of secrecy and hidden agendas. 
Chapter 6 – Planning, development and the community 
293 
to generate greater local benefits, for example local employment through linking the 
project to a manufacturing facility (although these facilities only lasted a few years). 
Others set up community funds and targeted a certain amount of money from the wind 
farm back into the community. 
The SNM workbook advises actors to prepare pre-emptive strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the project before they occur (Weber et al., 1999). Further to 
this, this chapter suggests that actors could look for strategies to bring greater local 
benefits, for example by setting up a community fund or linking to project to local 
industry. 
6.5.2.14 (6-14) Repeated problems when setting up an experiment 
The SNM workbook notes that actors may face similar issues when setting up 
experiments with a new technology and suggests that they should draw on the 
experiences from previous experiments (Weber et al., 1999). This chapter illustrated 
this in relation to community consultation about wind farm projects. The company 
Wind Power Pty Ltd learnt from its early projects in terms of selecting a site and 
consulting the community, which led to a well supported project at Waubra. The 
analysis supports the workbook claim that modular projects allow actors to 
accumulate experience and learn from past mistakes and successes (Weber et al., 
1999). However, the analysis also suggests that they may need to invest effort to 
learning from their experiences, as illustrated by the criticism of many planning 
panels that while being extensive, developers were not being effective in their 
community consultation.  
6.5.3 Final remarks 
This chapter has illustrated and explained the significant changes and attempts to 
change that occurred in relation to planning and the community. These events provide 
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clear illustrations of how an existing institutional framework can be inadequate for a 
new technology, and how actors can be inexperienced and unfamiliar with the new 
technology. It also provides examples of how actors can move towards a mutual fit 
through a combination of cognitive, social, institutional and technological change. In 
this case it occurred through a combination of changes to how the new technology 
was developed, changes to the institutional framework, and social change to work 
towards agreed solutions. This chapter has also offered insights that can be used to 
strengthen SNM. I will return to these insights again in the final chapter.
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7 Conclusions 
7.0 Reflecting on the research questions 
The aim of the research behind this thesis was to improve SNM as a guide for action 
by responding to identified weaknesses using existing literature and a case study of 
wind power in Australia. Four questions were used to guide this research: 
1. What weaknesses have researchers identified in SNM that hinder its use as a 
guide for action? 
2. What insights are available from existing literature that can provide an initial 
response to the weaknesses identified? 
3. How applicable are these initial responses to the case of grid-connected wind 
power in Australia between 1997 and 2007?  
4. Does the case offer any additional insights that can be used to respond to the 
weaknesses? 
Question 1 was answered in the first chapter where I reviewed existing literature and 
identified four weaknesses in SNM: a weak link between the conceptual framework 
and tangible action, the vague role of actors, an inadequate treatment of consensus and 
influence, and an inadequate appreciation of the challenges that actors might face.  
Question 2 was answered in Chapter 2 which reviewed existing literature to identify 
insights that could be used to help strengthen the weaknesses. In response to the weak 
link between concept and action, Chapter 2 proposed an approach that emphasised 
dynamics that contribute to positive feedbacks. Ten such dynamics were identified 
and this formed a structure around which the other insights were built. In response to 
the vague role of actors and the inadequate treatment of consensus and influence, the 
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chapter reviewed existing literature to gain a better understanding of how actors might 
contribute to the development of a niche and used the concept of resource 
interdependency to understand the importance of consensus and why actors have a 
limited amount of influence. This understanding was used to hypothesise which actors 
might be in a position to encourage particular positive feedback dynamics and also to 
help understand the wind power case. Finally, in response to the inadequate 
appreciation of the challenges that actors might face, Chapter 2 identified many 
challenges from existing literature and linked them to the positive feedback dynamics.  
Questions 3 and 4 were answered to varying degrees in the empirical Chapters (3 to 6) 
and this final chapter draws together these findings and analyses their effectiveness as 
responses to the identified weaknesses in SNM. The chapter then reflects on how 
generally applicable the findings are and their significance in the broader context. The 
chapter and thesis conclude by highlighting possible directions of future research. 
7.1 Summary of findings 
The end of each empirical chapter analysed tested the insights from Chapter 2 against 
the empirical material and identified whether or not particular dynamics were 
important, which actors were able to encourage or discourage these dynamics and 
how, and challenges that actors faced in trying to encourage the dynamics. This 
section draws together these findings using the same tables that have been used 
throughout the thesis. It then reflects on how well these findings have responded to 
the weaknesses of SNM. 
7.1.1 Actions, actors and dynamics 
Part of the aim of this thesis was to show that the insights gained from SNM and 
others studies could be made more usable for actors by focusing on dynamics that 
may encourage positive feedbacks. Chapter 2 identified ten dynamics that the 
literature indicated would be important. They were strengthening expectations and 
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visions, stimulating demand, increasing use, learning and articulation, increasing 
functionality, decreasing cost, decreasing uncertainty, increasing legitimacy, 
increasing alignment, and attracting actors. All of these dynamics were found to be 
important in the wind power case. 
Table 20 summarises the dynamics, why they may be important, which actors might 
be in a position to encourage them, and how actors might encourage them. Cross 
references are provided back to the empirical chapters to help maintain a chain of 
evidence as recommended by Yin (2003).  
Table 20 – Actions, actors and dynamics to encourage positive feedbacks 
Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Stimulating 
demand 
To: 
- Enable 
increasing use 
(Chp 3) 
- Create a business 
opportunity (Chp 
3, 4) 
- Attract actors 
(Chp 3, 4) 
- Initiate adoption 
and mutual 
adaptation (Chp 
4, 5, 6).  
- Overcome the 
chicken and egg 
dilemma 
(Hoogma, 2000). 
- Government 
(Chp 3, 4) 
- Large companies 
- Create nursing or bridging markets, 
such as MRET, for the new 
technology or for the product of the 
technology (Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004) (Chp 3, 4) 
- Regulations such as California ZEV 
legislation (Schot et al., 1994) 
- Demonstration projects (Hoogma, 
2000) 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Increasing 
alignment 
To:  
- Increase the 
functionality of 
the new 
technology (Chp 
5) 
- Reduce 
uncertainty (Chp 
5, 6)  
- Reduce conflict 
between actors 
(Chp 5, 6)  
- Capture learning 
(Chp 5, 6) 
- Build trust (Chp 
6) 
- Create a 
“configuration 
that works” (Rip, 
1995, Rip and 
Kemp, 1998). 
- Government 
(Chp 4, 5, 6) 
- Industry 
associations 
(Chp 5, 6) 
- System 
managers (Chp 
5) 
- Network Service 
Providers (Chp 
5)  
- NGOs (Chp 6) 
- Macro actors 
(Rip, 1995) 
- Formation of influential working 
groups such as WEPWG and 
WETAG (Chp 5) 
- Technical standards for grid 
connection that are applicable to 
wind power (Chp 5) 
- Financial investments (Chp 3, 5) 
- Construction of new infrastructure 
(Chp 5) 
- Development of complementary 
technologies such as a wind power 
forecasting system (Chp 5) 
- Inclusion of wind power in 
operating procedures, such as 
forecasting and long-term planning. 
(Chp 5)  
- Planning frameworks (Chp 6) 
- Industry standards and best practice 
guidelines (Chp 6) 
- Stable relationships between actors, 
such as through research 
partnerships (Chp 6) 
- See also (Deuten, 2003, Hoogma et 
al., 2002, Raven, 2005, Rip, 1995, 
Rycroft and Kash, 2002, van den 
Belt and Rip, 1987) 
Increasing use To: 
- Gain 
environmental 
benefits (Chp 3) 
- Gain economic 
benefits (Chp 3) 
- Increase political 
legitimacy (Chp 
4) 
- Increase 
technical 
legitimacy 
through 
demonstration 
(Chp 5) 
- Capture 
economies of 
scale (Chp 3, 6) 
- Developers (Chp 
3, 5, 6) 
- Investors (Chp 3, 
5) 
- Actors in the 
supply chain 
- Larger projects, or multiple small 
projects financially linked together 
(Chp 6)  
- Install more wind farms (Chp 3, 5) 
- Invest in wind farms (Chp 3) 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Decreasing 
cost  
(relative to 
incumbents) 
To: 
- Become 
competitive with 
incumbent 
technologies 
without the need 
for on-going 
protection or 
assistance (Chp 
4) 
- Remove cost as a 
reason for 
opposition (Chp 
4)  
- See also 
(Hoogma et al., 
2002, Kemp, 
1994). 
- Manufacturers 
(Chp 4) 
- Developers (Chp 
4) 
- Government 
(Chp 4) 
- Investors (Chp 4) 
 
 
- Scale economies (Chp 3, 4) 
- Learning economies (Chp 4) 
- Lower investment risk premiums 
(Chp 4) 
- Supply chain improvements such as 
local manufacturing (Chp 3, 4) 
- See also (Kemp, 1994, Kemp and 
Soete, 1992) 
 
Increasing 
legitimacy 
To : 
- Encourage 
positive 
expectations 
about the support 
or use of the 
technology (Chp 
4, 6) 
- Attract actors 
(Chp 3, 5) 
- Enable the 
technology to be 
socially, 
institutionally 
and 
technologically 
embedded (Chp 
5). 
- See also 
(Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, 
Verheul and 
Vergragt, 1995). 
- Large companies 
(Chp 3, 4) 
- Industry 
associations 
(Chp 4, 6) 
- Manufacturers 
(Chp 4) 
- Developers (Chp 
3, 4, 5, 6) 
- Government 
(Chp 3, 4, 5, 6) 
- Creating markets such as MRET 
(Chp 3). 
- Promoting resources, industry 
capabilities, and stable investment 
environment (Chp 3) 
- Strong positive links with a problem 
to be solved e.g. climate change 
(Chp 3) (Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004) 
- Increasing installed capacity of wind 
farms (Chp 3) 
- Demonstrate benefits such as 
greenhouse abatement, capital 
investment and employment (Chp 4) 
- Demonstrate decreasing costs (Chp 
4) 
- Provide a strong business case for 
industry support 
- Increasing use (Chp 4, 5) 
- Provide operating data for analysis 
(Chp 5) 
- Increasing functionality and 
demonstrating performance (Chp 6) 
- Strengthening expectations and links 
to positive vague visions (e.g. 
sustainability, drought-proofing 
farms, regional development) (Chp 
4, 6). 
- Prime movers supporting the 
technology (Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000)  
- Providing tangible benefits to 
communities such as employment 
(Chp 6) 
- Implementing the technology with 
supportive actors (Chp 6) 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Reducing 
uncertainty 
To:  
- Remove hurdles 
to increasing the 
technology’s 
commercial 
legitimacy (Chp 
4) 
- Attract actors 
(Chp 4) 
- Increase use in 
terms of 
investment 
decisions (Chp 
4) 
- Decrease costs 
(Chp 3, 4) 
- Encourage 
investment in the 
technology and 
other 
complementary 
institutional and 
technological 
structures (Chp 
5) 
- Reduce the 
financial and 
emotional cost 
that can occur 
when outcomes 
are uncertain 
(Chp 6) 
- Government 
(Chp 4, 5, 6) 
- Industry 
association 
(AusWEA) (Chp 
4, 6) 
- Investors (Chp 5, 
6) 
- Developers (Chp 
5, 6) 
- System 
managers (Chp 
5) 
- Communities 
(Chp 6) 
- NGOs 
- Stable market (continuity in 
protection/market) (Chp 4) 
- Clear direction of progress (e.g. 
visions, agreed path for 
operationalising the vision,  
problems and potential solutions) 
(Chp 3, 4, 5, 6) 
- Embedding of the new technology 
(in an aligned way) in social, 
institutional and technological 
structures (Chp 5, 6). 
- Embedding in visions of the future 
or as the solution to a problem (e.g. 
wind is part of the response to 
climate change) (Chp 3, 4) 
- Financial investments (Chp 3)  
- Standardization of interfaces with 
existing technologies or 
infrastructure, for example technical 
standards for grid connection (Chp 
5). See also (Rycroft and Kash, 
2002). 
- Strengthening expectations by 
making them more robust, specific 
and realistic (Chp 5) (Hoogma et al., 
2002) 
- Trans-local learning in the form of 
industry best practice and 
development procedures (Chp 6). 
See also (Deuten, 2003) 
- Gaining personal experience with 
the technology (Chp 6) 
Increasing 
functionality 
To: 
- Better meet the 
need it is 
targeted towards 
(Chp 6). 
- Reduce 
opposition (Chp 
6) 
- Designers 
- Developers (Chp 
6) 
- Manufacturers 
- Government 
(Chp 6) 
- Users 
- Larger projects 
- Projects with better wind resources 
- Better understand and articulate 
performance (Chp 6) 
- Increased utility per unit cost 
- Increased reliability 
- More effectively integrated into 
electricity network  
- More robust estimates of benefits 
(Chp 6) 
- Better articulated user requirements 
(Rip, 1995) and more effective use 
involvement (Rohracher, 2003) 
- Network economies (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985) 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Learning and  
articulation 
To:  
- Better 
understand how 
to reduce costs, 
reduce 
uncertainty, 
increase 
legitimacy, have 
justified goals, 
and better 
achieve goals 
(Chp 4) 
- Better 
understand and 
address 
mismatches, 
inadequacies and 
inexperience, i.e. 
find a mutual fit 
between the new 
technology and 
the existing 
regime (Chp 5, 
6) 
- Reduce 
uncertainty 
- See also 
(Deuten, 2003, 
Hoogma et al., 
2002, Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 
2004). 
Local knowledge 
- Developers (Chp 
6) 
- Manufacturers 
- Government 
(Chp 4, 6) 
- Industry 
association (Chp 
3, 4, 6) 
- Consultants (Chp 
4) 
- System managers 
(Chp 5) 
- Communities 
(Chp 6) 
- Users 
 
Trans-local 
knowledge 
- Industry 
association (Chp 
5, 6) 
- Consultants 
- Government 
(Chp 5, 6) 
- System managers 
(Chp 5) 
- Professional 
societies 
- Industry conferences, seminars, 
newsletters etc that allow the 
circulation and aggregation of 
individual experiences (trans-local 
knowledge) (Chp 3, 4, 5, 6) 
- Government policy reviews 
(focused on first and/or second-
order learning) (Chp 4) 
- Accumulating first-hand experience 
with the implementation and use of 
the new technology (tacit learning) 
(Chp 6). 
- Engaging researchers to investigate 
specific issues (e.g. government 
opinion of wind power, the effect of 
diverse wind farm locations on the 
variability of output, experiences 
with grid integration of wind power 
overseas) (Chp 4, 5, 6) 
- Understanding experiences from 
other locations that have been 
through similar issues (Chp 5) 
- Understanding how the risks 
associated with a new technology 
can be managed and how the 
opportunities that it may bring can 
be harnessed (Chp 5) 
- Risk management strategies (Chp 5) 
- Understand how the existing 
institutional framework is 
mismatched with or inadequate for 
the new technology (Chp 6) 
- Understand the processes for 
implementing the new technology 
and articulate in the form of trans-
local knowledge such as best 
practice guidelines (Chp 6) 
- Provide continuity in the actor 
network so that tacit learning is not 
lost (Raven, 2005). 
- See also (Deuten, 2003, Hoogma, 
2000, Hoogma et al., 2002, Schot 
and Rip, 1996, Weber, 2003, Weber 
et al., 1999). 
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Dynamic Why? Suggestions of who Examples of how 
Attracting 
actors 
To: 
- Enable 
increasing use 
(Chp 3) 
- Build support 
(Chp 4) 
- Increase 
legitimacy (Chp 
4, 6) 
- Provide all the 
links in the 
supply chain 
(Chp 3).  
- Enable change 
and embedding 
in all aspects of 
the socio-
technical regime 
(Chp 3, 5, 6) 
- See also 
(Hoogma et al., 
2002, Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 
2004, Jacobsson 
and Johnson, 
2000). 
- Government 
(Chp 3, 5, 6) 
- Industry 
association (Chp 
3, 4, 5, 6) 
- Developers (Chp 
3, 4, 5) 
- Manufacturers 
- Investors (Chp 4) 
- NGOs (Chp 4, 6) 
- System 
managers (Chp 
5) 
- Network Service 
Providers (Chp 
5) 
- Public (Chp 6) 
- Increase the social, commercial, 
technical and political legitimacy of 
the technology (Chp 3, 4, 5, 6) 
- Foster robust, specific and high 
quality expectations of economic 
(investment, employment), 
environmental, and/or social 
benefits (Chp 3, 5, 6) 
- Create a market opportunity such as 
MRET (Chp 3, 4) 
- Provide stability and continuity in 
the market opportunity 
- Demonstrate links to a desirable 
visions (e.g. emission-free 
characteristics of wind power) (Chp 
4, 6) 
- Boost regional economies through 
investment, employment, and 
income (Chp 3).  
- Highlight opportunities that may be 
missed if particular actors are not 
involved (Chp 5) 
- Demonstrate that the mismatches 
and inadequacies between the 
technology and the socio-technical 
regime are either having a costly 
impact, or that there would be 
greater benefits if they were 
mutually suited (Chp 6) 
- See also (Borup et al., 2006, 
Hoogma et al., 2002, Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, Raven, 2005, van 
Merkerk and Robinson, 2006) 
Strengthening 
expectations 
To:  
- Attract actors 
(Chp 4) 
- Reduce 
uncertainty about 
demand and 
direction 
progress (Chp 4, 
5, 6) 
- Encourage 
alignment (Chp 
5)  
- Encourage 
consensus on the 
need for action 
(or inaction) 
(Chp 5) 
- See also 
(Hoogma et al., 
2002) 
- Government 
(Chp 4, 5, 6) 
- Industry 
association (Chp 
4, 6)  
- Investors (Chp 5) 
- Developers (Chp 
5, 6) 
- System 
managers (Chp 
5) 
- Communities 
(Chp 6) 
- Design policies with unambiguous 
goals (Chp 4) 
- Carefully manage second-order 
learning processes such as policy 
reviews which question the 
justification for existing goals or 
policies (Chp 4) 
- Gathering operational data to test 
initial expectations (Chp 5) 
- First-hand experience with a wind 
farm (Chp 6) 
- Accurate and well communicated 
information to the public (Chp 6) 
- Trust between industry and the 
public (Chp 6)  
- Embedding and alignment in the 
form of planning requirements and 
industry norms (Chp 6). 
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7.1.2 Challenges 
As part of making SNM more usable for actors, this thesis identifies challenges to 
encouraging the dynamics shown in Table 20 and where possible strategies for how 
actors might respond. These challenges and strategies are summarised in Table 21. 
Cross references are provided to the empirical chapters (chapter-challenge number) to 
help maintain a chain of evidence. The challenges and strategies shown in italics were 
identified in the literature review of Chapter 2; those shown in plain text were 
identified from the wind power case. 
Table 21 – Challenges to stimulating positive feedbacks 
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Suggested strategy 
(4-1) Competition 
with incumbent 
actors to gain 
influence over the 
institutional 
framework 
(Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004). 
?  ?     ?   
Increase the political 
legitimacy of the new 
technology. 
(4-2) Government or 
company policies to 
support the 
technology may be 
intermittent, 
ambiguous, send 
conflicting messages 
or lack a long-term 
vision (Garud and 
Karnøe, 2003, 
Hoogma et al., 2002, 
Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, 
Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001, 
Raven, 2005, 
Verbong and Geels, 
2007) 
?    ? ?  ? ? ? 
Actors creating protection 
could more carefully 
consider the objectives of 
the protection measure and 
in particular whether they 
complement each other or 
come into conflict when 
applied in detail. 
Proponents of the new 
technology can advocate for 
more consistent protection 
and undertake risk 
management strategies to 
limit the impact of the 
uncertainty. 
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Suggested strategy 
(4-3) Protection not 
linked to dynamics 
such scale and 
learning economies 
or local 
manufacturing (wind 
power case) 
?    ?      
Actors creating protection 
could define up front how 
the success of the protection 
measure will be measured. 
Note that the use of a target 
is likely to shift the measure 
of success to whether or not 
the target is met and away 
from learning and positive 
feedbacks. 
(4-4, 6-11) Balance 
between providing 
protection and 
maintaining 
incentive to innovate 
(Kemp et al., 1998) 
?  ?        
Actors creating market-
based protection measures 
like MRET may find that 
economic studies of 
different options for the 
compliance mechanism can 
inform the design of the 
policy. Note that the 
compliance mechanisms 
may be viewed differently 
by different actors (i.e. as a 
penalty for non-compliance 
or as a cap on costs). See 
also (Lauber, 2004, 
Mitchell, 1995). 
 
Actors could investigate the 
possible direct and indirect 
effects that competitive 
forms of protection can 
have on the way that 
technologies are 
implemented. 
(4-10) Local search 
processes (i.e. too 
similar to existing 
regime) (Jacobsson 
and Johnson, 2000) 
         ? 
No strategy identified. 
(5-1) Mismatches 
with existing 
operating 
procedures or 
behaviours of use 
(Barnes et al., 2004, 
Kemp, 1994)    ?    ?   
Actors could anticipate 
likely mismatches by 
identifying the similarities 
and differences of the new 
and incumbent technologies 
and identifying how these 
characteristics relate to 
operating procedures or 
behaviours. Note that this 
strategy this strategy may 
encourage substitutional 
thinking (See 4-9)  
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Suggested strategy 
(5-2) Mismatches 
with existing 
infrastructure 
(Frankel, 1955) 
   ?    ?   
Actors could anticipate 
likely mismatches by 
identifying the similarities 
and differences of the new 
and incumbent technologies 
and to identifying how these 
characteristics relate to the 
existing infrastructure. Note 
that this strategy this 
strategy may encourage 
substitutional thinking (See 
4-9) 
(6-1) Mismatch with 
institutional 
framework (Kemp et 
al., 1998) 
  ?   ?  ?   
An approach for 
understanding likely 
mismatches or inadequacies 
is to identify how the new 
technology interacts with 
the existing institutional 
framework. This may be 
most apparent after an 
experiment with the new 
technology. 
(6-2) Inexperience 
with the new 
technology 
 ?  ?  ?   ?  
Actors could encourage the 
production and distribution 
of trans-local knowledge 
(e.g. produce best practice 
guidelines, or hold seminars 
and conferences). If 
possible, actors could look 
for opportunities to gain 
personal experience with the 
technology. Proponents may 
need help to distribute 
information from actors 
who are credible with users 
or the public. 
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Suggested strategy 
(4-5, 5-10)  Balance 
between maintaining 
flexibility for 
learning whilst 
reducing uncertainty 
and building 
alignment through 
embedding (Hoogma 
et al., 2002) 
  ?   ?  ?   
Possible strategies for 
actors, particularly those 
who creating protection or 
in control of the institutional 
framework, are to establish 
triggers for when learning 
should occur, such as when 
there is a change in context 
or objectives are no longer 
being achieved, or to limit 
the potential for change for 
example by limiting the 
scope of the learning. 
 
Actors could limit the 
potential for change for 
example by limiting the 
scope of the learning, 
promising transition 
arrangements, or 
grandfathering existing 
requirements. 
(4-11) Balance 
between first-order 
learning and second-
order learning 
  ?   ?  ?   
No strategy identified. 
(5-8) Institutional 
change tends to be 
slow and difficult 
unless there is a 
social mandate 
(Unruh, 2002)           
Actors could try to increase 
the political legitimacy of 
the technology by making a 
strong business case for 
industry support, 
strengthening links between 
the technology and desirable 
symbols or visions, and 
encouraging articulation of 
support. 
(5-11) Path towards 
mutual adaptation 
may require 
transitional 
strategies 
 
          
Actors may need to 
implement interim policies, 
operating procedures or 
technologies to give the 
regime time to adapt to the 
new technology, and the 
new technology may 
initially have to adapt to the 
existing regime. 
(6-12) Balance 
between increasing 
use and undesirable 
impacts 
 ?     ?    
Actors could monitor the 
impact of increasing use on 
the social legitimacy of the 
new technology. 
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Suggested strategy 
(3-1, 4-6, 5-7, 6-9) 
Actors measure the 
legitimacy of a 
technology by 
different factors 
depending on their 
interests. 
      ?  ?  
Niche actors could consider 
how different stakeholders 
measure legitimacy and try 
to emphasise these aspects. 
 
Business actors may 
measure legitimacy based 
on the market opportunity, 
the availability of resources, 
and level of uncertainty.  
 
Governments may measure 
legitimacy on the basis of: 
articulated popular support 
(or low levels of 
opposition), a large 
advocacy coalition or 
support constituency, a 
strong business case for 
industry support, and the 
contribution of the 
technology to existing 
policy objectives. 
 
Technical actors may 
measure legitimacy on the 
basis of how effectively the 
technology meets its 
function. 
 
Societal actors (e.g. the 
general public) may 
measure legitimacy 
according to how strongly 
the technology is linked to 
sustainability in terms of 
demonstrated benefits and 
low or acceptable 
detriments. The benefits and 
detriments that are most 
important may vary 
depending on the specific 
actors involved. 
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Suggested strategy 
(4-7) New 
technology may be 
significantly more 
expensive and have 
lesser performance 
than existing options 
(Kemp and Soete, 
1992) 
?   ? ?      
Actors could seek to reduce 
costs through scale and 
learning economies, local 
manufacturing or other 
improvements in the supply 
chain, and reducing 
uncertainty for investors. 
They may also be able to 
increase the cost of 
incumbents by arguing for 
the inclusion of externalities 
(e.g. carbon impact). 
(4-8) Niche actors 
may be fragmented 
and lack political 
power, rather than 
being a cohesive, 
unified advocate for 
the new technology 
(Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, 
Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2001). 
?      ? ? ?  
Actors may be able to 
increase their political 
influence by joining forces 
with other actors with 
common interests. This can 
give the technology or class 
of technologies an 
independent voice, it can 
focus and align the opinions 
of actors, it can facilitate the 
creation and articulation of 
trans-local knowledge and it 
can help to set a clear 
problem agenda. 
(4-9) Incorrect 
expectations about 
future markets 
because of 
unforeseen changes, 
optimism, functional 
or substitutional 
thinking, or 
assumptions of a 
static or malleable 
context (Geels and 
Smit, 2000) 
?     ?    ? 
“Seek out independent 
observers to assess the 
extent of the project’s 
success” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
 
Actors could become more 
aware of assumptions in 
their expectations of the 
future, such as those 
identified by Geels and Smit 
(2000), and consider 
alternative possibilities as 
part of a risk management 
strategy. 
(5-3) Actors do not 
necessarily have to 
have opposing 
interests for them to 
end up on opposite 
sides of a debate. 
       ? ? ? 
Actors could identify how 
their interests overlap with 
others and use this common 
ground as a basis for a 
constructive relationship. 
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Suggested strategy 
(5-4) Balance 
between the interests 
of firms and the 
interests of the 
industry. Firms are 
competing to stake 
their claim in a 
growing industry, 
but the same time 
they must co-operate 
in order to tackle 
systemic barriers 
which affect the 
whole industry 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
       ? ? ? 
“Monitor carefully potential 
barriers to co-operation 
between partners in an 
experiment, especially if 
they have competing stakes 
and are prone to free-
riding” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
 
Actors could look for ways 
of providing information in 
a form that is useful to 
others but protects the 
commercial interests of 
firms, e.g. confidentiality 
agreements, providing 
limited amounts of 
information, providing 
information via a trusted 
intermediary (e.g. industry 
association).   
(5-5) Niche may not 
develop because key 
niche actors do not 
get sufficiently 
involved (Weber et 
al., 1999).        ? ? ? 
“Committed partners 
increase the chances of 
project success” (Weber et 
al., 1999). 
 
Actors could try to 
communicate to uninvolved 
actors that opportunities, 
framed in terms of the 
uninvolved actor’s interests, 
will be missed if issues are 
not resolved. 
(5-6) Tension 
between getting 
issues on a high-
level problem 
agenda and 
maintaining the 
legitimacy of the 
technology 
?      ?   ? 
When trying to attract high-
level actors or funding, 
actors could try to ensure 
that the issues are linked 
with potential solutions, or 
to at least define a 
promising path towards 
solutions. 
(5-9) Difficult for 
actors to think long-
term when their 
short-term future is 
uncertain (Rip, 
1995) 
     ?  ?  ? 
Government actors could 
make efforts to facilitate 
learning and embedding 
even when there is 
uncertainty about the future. 
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Suggested strategy 
(6-3) Actors allocate 
the burden of proof 
differently with 
respect to benefits 
and detriments 
(Brooks, 1996) 
        ? ? 
Actors could make efforts to 
understand how others 
allocate the burden, for 
example by analysing the 
language they use. They 
could also reflect on what 
“tests” they and others 
apply to information before 
they regard it as credible. 
(6-4) Beware of 
over-simplifying 
controversy into for 
and against. 
       ? ?  
Actors could use the 
following questions to 
better understand a debate 
about a new technology: 
how do actors allocate the 
burden of proof? Are actors 
not considering an issue 
which is important to 
others? Does a local 
community agree with how 
something is being 
measured or considered? Do 
actors have different values? 
Is opposition prompted by a 
fear of the unknown? Each 
of these situations may have 
different implications for 
trying to improve, mediate, 
or facilitate the situation. 
(6-5) The level of 
consensus affects the 
type of learning. 
  ?     ? ? ? 
Actors could investigate the 
role that consensus is 
playing in the type of 
learning that is occurring. If 
consensus is low, then 
adversarial learning may 
occur with supporters and 
opponents trading rhetorical 
blows. If consensus is high, 
then cooperative learning 
may occur with actors 
undertaking research 
towards an agreed outcome. 
(6-6) Lack of trust 
       ? ? ? 
Possible strategies include 
(Adler et al., 2000, 
Bingham, 2003): focusing 
on actors’ interests rather 
than their position, for 
distrusting actors to jointly 
formulate questions and 
methods for gathering 
information, and to have 
information peer-reviewed 
by a neutral third-party. 
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Suggested strategy 
(6-7) Difficulty of 
embedding vague 
visions in a 
consensual manner 
(Berkhout, 2006, 
Eames et al., 2006, 
Smith et al., 2005, 
Weber, 2003) ?     ? ? ? ? ? 
Actors could use the 
following approach to better 
understand the difficulty of 
embedding appropriate or 
sustainable development: 
who is the decision maker, 
what issues are they 
considering, how are they 
considering those issues, 
and how are trade-offs 
being managed? Processes 
of negotiation and trust-
building may help to 
increase the level of 
consensus. 
(6-8) Undesirable 
societal or 
environmental 
effects (Kemp et al., 
1998) 
?   ?   ? ? ? ? 
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
 
Proponents could 
investigate why particular 
effects of the new 
technology are undesirable 
(i.e. second order learning) 
and work towards 
mitigating these impacts. 
These efforts may be 
particularly powerful if they 
in partnership with other 
actors who are widely seen 
as credible and unbiased. 
(6-13) Inequitable 
distribution of risks 
and benefits (Kemp 
and Soete, 1992) 
          
“Prepare pre-emptive 
strategies to deal with 
possible opposition to the 
project before they occur” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
 
Implementers of the new 
technology could look for 
strategies to bring greater 
local benefits. For example, 
by setting up a community 
fund. 
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Suggested strategy 
(6-10) Balance 
between having a 
network with low 
diversity, which will 
reach agreement 
easily about 
problems and their 
expected solutions, 
but risks becoming 
insular, and a 
network with high 
diversity, which may 
have greater 
representation of 
views, but struggle 
to reach consensus 
about problems and 
solutions. (Hoogma, 
2000, Verheul and 
Vergragt, 1995, 
Weber et al., 1999) 
       ? ? ? 
Actors could form 
partnerships with other 
groups who have 
overlapping interests but 
different views and work 
towards a mutually 
beneficial goal. 
(5-12, 6-14) 
Repeated problems 
may occur when 
setting up an 
experiment with a 
new technology 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
  ?        
“When designing a new 
experiment, seek out and 
utilise previous relevant 
experience” (Weber et al., 
1999). 
 
A qualification to the 
workbook advice is that 
actors may need to invest 
resources into 
understanding how 
applicable the lessons from 
other countries or previous 
experiments are to the 
specific case. 
 
“Modular projects allow for 
changes to be made in light 
of the experience gained” 
(Weber et al., 1999). 
Excessive growth 
before technology, 
industry or demand 
have stabilised 
(Karnøe and Garud, 
1998) 
?          
Refer to Karnøe and Garud 
for further discussion of this 
issue. 
Users may lack the 
skills to use the new 
technology (David, 
1985) 
 ?         
Refer to David for further 
discussion of this issue. 
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Suggested strategy 
Excessive instability 
in the existing socio-
technical regime 
(Raven, 2005). 
       ?   
Refer to Raven for further 
discussion of this issue. 
Poorly articulated 
demand or user 
requirements 
(Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000, Rip, 
1995) 
 ?  ?  ?     
Refer to Jacobsson and 
Johnson or Rip for further 
discussion on this issue. 
Weak connectivity 
between actors 
(Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004) 
  ?      ?  
Refer to Jacobbson and 
Bergek for further 
discussion on this issue. 
Ambiguous or 
antagonistic 
behaviour by 
incumbent actors 
(Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004) 
     ?   ?  
Refer to Jacobbson and 
Bergek for further 
discussion on this issue. 
There may be an 
element of hype 
associated with the 
early promotion of 
the technology 
which may fade if 
the marketed 
benefits or 
performance levels 
are not reached 
(Borup et al., 2006, 
Garud and Karnøe, 
2003, Geels, 2002b, 
Verbong and Geels, 
2007). 
?   ?   ?  ? ? 
Refer to the references 
listed for further discussion 
on this issue. 
7.1.3 Responding to the weaknesses identified in SNM 
Table 20 and Table 21 summarise a large amount of information from existing 
literature and the wind power case. The question remains: how well does this 
information respond to the identified weaknesses in SNM? The following sections 
reflect on each weakness in turn. 
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7.1.3.1 Weak link between concepts and action 
The first weakness identified was the weak link between the conceptual framework of 
SNM and action. Particular issues that researchers have identified are that SNM does 
not provide concrete objectives or link in with management principles, it is highly 
complex, and it appears too structured for the real world (Caniels and Romijn, 2006, 
Grablowitz et al., 1998). 
This thesis proposed that a stronger link can be made between the conceptual 
framework of SNM and concrete action by placing greater emphasis on dynamics that 
encourage positive feedbacks at the niche level (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Kemp, 
1994, Unruh, 2000, 2002). Chapter 2 identified ten dynamics from the literature and 
all of these were found to be important in the wind power case, often for multiple 
interrelated reasons, which reflects the complex nature of socio-technical change.  
Two of the dynamics that were not prominent in SNM previous were increasing 
legitimacy and decreasing uncertainty. The concept of legitimacy as a property of a 
technology came from the work of Jacobsson and Bergek (2004). As was shown 
throughout the empirical chapters, the legitimacy of wind power changed over time 
and was linked to how different actors perceived wind power in Australia. An 
addition to the work of  Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) is that different actor groups 
appear to measure legitimacy differently. 
Uncertainty was discussed in SNM previously (Kemp et al., 1998, Kemp and Soete, 
1992); however it was not clearly identified as a goal when introducing new 
technologies and little was said about how actors might avoid or reduce uncertainty. 
In this case we saw that uncertainty was the result of Government energy policy 
reviews, as well as the mismatches between wind power and the electricity grid and 
the existing planning framework. We also saw that reducing uncertainty was the goal 
of many actors and how they sought to achieve this. This suggests that providing 
Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
315 
guidance on avoiding and reducing uncertainty would be of use to actors fostering 
new technologies. 
Overall, using the ten dynamics as a framework, this thesis was able to identify more 
specific actions that may encourage positive feedbacks and the development of 
niches. This appears to be a promising first step towards linking concept to action.  
Reflecting on this approach reveals a number of issues that are still to be resolved. 
The first is that the approach remains complex and this may present a barrier to actors 
who are not familiar with concepts related to socio-technical change. A second issue 
is that there is a tension between providing generalised (trans-local) insights and 
insights that are specific enough to be useful in a particular case. In order for actors to 
make use of these trans-local insights, they may need to consider them in the context 
of their particular case. The complexity and the need for re-contextualisation may 
make it difficult or resource intensive for those who are not knowledgeable in socio-
technical change to try to make use of the framework in real time. Section 7.4 
discusses this further in relation to possible future research. 
7.1.3.2 Vague role of actors 
The second weakness identified was that the role of actors in SNM remains vague. 
For example, SNM appears to require both a niche manager and a much wider actor 
network, although exactly how each actor could best contribute remains poorly 
defined. Caniels and Romijn (2006) criticise SNM because it provides little guidance 
on how to engage key actors who are not interested in becoming involved, or 
preventing actors who are involved from leaving.  
This thesis proposes that the role of actors could be made more explicit by identifying 
typical niche roles that relate to encouraging positive feedbacks and to define an 
approach for identifying which regime actors may be required because they are 
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responsible for a particular part of the regime (e.g. planning framework, energy 
policy, electricity system operation etc). 
A finding from this study is that all actors groups have some role in encouraging the 
various dynamics, but that not all actors are in a position to encourage all dynamics as 
shown in Table 20. For example, the wind industry association, AusWEA, was well 
placed to develop and facilitate trans-local learning and increasing the political 
legitimacy of wind power, but was less well placed to directly stimulate demand. 
Developers were well placed to increase the use of wind power (e.g. number and size 
of wind farms); however they were not well placed to decrease the uncertainty of the 
demand for wind power. Some actors, such as Governments, could potentially have a 
role in encouraging almost all the dynamics, although it is likely that different 
departments within the Government will be best positioned to encourage difference 
dynamics. 
This finding that different actors have different roles also applies in terms of finding a 
mutual fit for the new technology and the regime. Different actors are responsible for 
different aspects of the socio-technical regime, and for this reason a wide range of 
actors were required in the search for a mutual fit between wind power and the 
regime. For example, Federal and State Government were responsible for the energy 
policies that created a demand for wind power. State Governments were responsible 
for planning frameworks. Developers were responsible for how they developed wind 
farms and conducted community consultation. The wind industry as a collective was 
responsible for promoting wind power, encouraging best practice within the industry, 
and creating and disseminating trans-local knowledge. Electricity System managers 
were responsible for the operation of the electricity grid, but only within a scope set 
by higher-level policy makers. Finding a mutual fit requires all of these actors to 
engage with each other. 
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These findings can help the niche manager to understand better which actors they 
need to engage with and what actions might be effective. A question remains about 
who might be best positioned to be the niche manager. This thesis suggests that it will 
need to be an actor who is motivated to support the new technology and in a position 
to oversee a wide range of activity. This suggests that an actor such as a Government 
department, an industry association, or perhaps a sufficiently large company might be 
in the best position. 
A difference between the existing literature and the wind power case was on the role 
of “users”. Existing literature tends to emphasise “users” as consumers or end-users, 
while in the wind power case the users were wind farm developers and/or investors. 
Thus, in the wind power case, the users had a much greater and more direct influence 
over the technology. 
Further improvements that could be made to SNM are to strengthen the link between 
typical aspects of the regime (e.g. planning frameworks, infrastructure, energy or 
industry policy, consumer demand etc) and actors who are typically responsible for 
these aspects, and also to identify strategies for engaging each of these actors. Also, 
greater study is required of technologies with different user types (e.g. producers as 
users, as in the wind power case, and end-users as with electric vehicles). These will 
be discussed further in Section 7.4. 
7.1.3.3 Consensus and limits of influence 
The third weakness identified was that SNM does not adequately address the 
difficulties of reaching consensus or the limited ability of actors to influence others 
(Berkhout et al., 2004, Caniels and Romijn, 2006, Smith et al., 2005). This thesis 
proposed that issues of consensus and limited influence could be more explicitly 
incorporated in the framework for action and the possible challenges. 
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This has been done by more explicitly acknowledging that particular actors are 
typically in the best position to influence (for better or worse) particular dynamics. 
This was also achieved by identifying challenges related to these issues, including: 
competing with incumbent actors (4-1), the slow pace of institutional change (5-8), 
how different actors might measure legitimacy (3-1, 4-6, 5-7 and 6-9), the political 
influence of niche actors (4-8), tensions within the niche actor-network (5-4), the need 
to attract key actors (5-5), how actors might allocate the burden of proof (6-3), 
understanding controversies (6-4), the link between consensus and learning (6-5), the 
benefits of being prepared to compromise (6-5), issues of trust (6-6), embedding 
vague visions (6-7), undesirable effects (6-8), inequity (6-9), and the level of diversity 
in the niche actor-network (6-10). 
All of these challenges can have an impact on the path towards a mutual fit and actors 
can do more to prepare themselves than to “Prepare pre-emptive strategies to deal 
with possible opposition to the project before they occur”, as the SNM workbook 
currently suggests (Weber et al., 1999 p.69)118. 
A particular addition to SNM was the improved understanding of the role of visions in 
socio-technical change. This thesis has shown that the social construction and 
operationalisation of vague visions such as economic rationalism, technological 
neutrality, or appropriate development, can influence how a new technology is 
protected, the formation of positive feedbacks, and how a mutual fit is found between 
the technology and the existing socio-technical regime. 
                                                 
118 Note that an underlying tension in SNM, mentioned in Section 1.2.5, about whether actors should 
persist with trying to enhance the diffusion of a technology when its desirability is in question remains 
unresolved. 
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Further improvements could be made to SNM by better understanding how niche 
actors can anticipate the challenges noted and effectively manage them. This thesis 
has identified some strategies and these should be tested in other cases. This will be 
discussed further in Section 7.4. 
7.1.3.4 Challenges 
The fourth weakness was that the research that led to SNM did not adequately 
appreciate the challenges that actors would face in stimulating niche development 
(Hoogma et al., 2002). This thesis has shown via the literature review in Chapter 2 
and the wind power case study that actors may face many challenges when fostering 
new technologies. These were linked with the positive-feedback dynamics so that 
actors can better understand what challenges they may face when trying to encourage 
particular dynamics. The fact that many of the challenges identified in the literature 
were relevant in the wind power case suggests that such a list could be relevant to a 
wide range of technologies. 
The full list of challenges is shown in Table 21. The challenges related to consensus 
and influence have the potential to be a valuable addition to SNM as discussed in the 
previous section. Two other groups of challenges that are worth high-lighting are 
building legitimacy and finding balance. 
One challenge that came out of each of the empirical chapters was that actors measure 
the legitimacy of a technology according to their interests. As noted in those chapters, 
the concept of legitimacy came from Jacobsson and Bergek (2004), but they provide 
little detail on how actors measure legitimacy or might increase it. This thesis offers 
some insight into the measures for legitimacy used by different actor groups. These 
findings can be used by actors to build the legitimacy of a technology for different 
actors groups and may help to attract previously disinterested actors to the new 
technology. 
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A second group of challenges were those about finding balance. SNM notes a number 
of “tensions” that actors need to balance. Many of these were relevant to the wind 
power case, particularly the balance between learning and embedding. The thesis also 
identified several more balancing acts that actors faced, including: increasing use vs 
undesirable impacts, first-order learning vs second-order learning, and getting issues 
on high-level problem agendas vs maintaining the legitimacy of the technology. 
Forewarning actors that they may face these balancing acts is useful and SNM could 
be further improved if it was able to provide actors with indicators of imbalance.  
Section 7.4 discusses these issues of legitimacy and balance further in relation to 
future research directions. 
7.2 Generalization of findings 
One of Yin’s (2003) principles for case study design is to ensure external validity, i.e. 
how generalizable are the study’s findings beyond the immediate case? 
Being a single case, the findings can only be tentatively applied to other situations. 
This has been reflected in that way that the findings have been presented, for example 
through use of the word “possible” in relation to strategies that actors might find 
useful. From an academic perspective, each insight in relation to actors, dynamics, 
actions, challenges and strategies should be regarded as a hypothesis to be tested 
rather than as a definitive statement about socio-technical change. For this reason, 
further case studies of different technologies in different contexts are required to give 
this new perspective a stronger foundation. 
To ensure a diverse range of cases, future research may find the following 
characteristics useful when selecting cases (Bunting, 2003, Geels, 2002b, van de Poel, 
1998): the time period of the study; the domain of application in terms of the level of 
diversity, whether the domain has a dominant artefact, and the technology’s position 
in a supply chain (e.g. is a producer or user technology?); the influence of the socio-
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technical landscape; the complexity of the technology; and the phase in the innovation 
process. 
From a practical perspective, actors can use the insights as a starting point for better 
understanding their situation and will need to evaluate the relevance and applicability 
for themselves. I have been using the findings of this thesis in this way to understand 
better the development of green buildings within the Australian construction sector119. 
In 2002, the Green Building Council of Australia (GBCA) formed to promote green 
buildings in Australia. In 2003, the GBCA released Green Star Office Design, an 
environmental rating system for office buildings similar to LEED in the United States 
and BREEAM in the UK. The uptake of Green Star has been rapid. In 2002 there 
were 45 member companies of the GBCA and no certified buildings; by the start of 
2008 there were 521 member companies, the number of certified projects had reached 
42 and the number of projects registered to undergo assessment had reached 489 
(Bondareva, 2007, GBCA, 2008b). 
Anecdotally, some of the insights appear to apply well to the case of green buildings 
in Australia. For example, the GBCA has been acting as a dedicated network builder, 
has been a creator and facilitator of trans-local knowledge through its reports and 
conferences, and has been aligning stakeholders around green buildings. The tension 
between learning and embedding has been evident with the GBCA creating 
uncertainty in the market and a rush of applications when they released an updated 
version of their rating tool based on the experience gained over the past few years 
(GBCA, 2007a). This was broadly similar to the rush of applications that ESCOSA 
received when it proposed generator licence conditions for South Australia (Chapter 
5). Another insight that appears relevant is that different actors measure legitimacy 
differently; the reasons that stakeholders have become involved with green buildings 
                                                 
119 While completing this thesis I was also working as a consultant on green building projects. 
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include environmental concern, corporate reputation, workplace productivity, 
attracting and retaining staff (Sustainable Building Leaders Project, 2006). Finally, the 
difficulty of embedding the vague vision of “green building” has also been present, 
particularly in relation to timber products and how the sustainability of forestry 
products should be assessed (GBCA, 2007b, 2008a). 
On the other hand, some of the insights do not appear to apply well. For example the 
insights related to stimulating demand do not apply well because the building market 
and electricity market have very different characteristics in terms of the products 
being sold and the stakeholders involved. While Government targets stimulated 
demand for wind power, it appears to have been the industry-based rating scheme 
combined with a growing societal desire to be more sustainable that has stimulated 
demand for green buildings. The two cases also differ in terms of users, with green 
buildings having a wider and more direct range of users than wind farms do. For a 
green building, the term user could be applied to the companies that own the 
buildings, the contractors who build the buildings, the building manager and the 
occupants of the building. 
7.3 Significance of the findings in the broader context 
The expected outcome of this research is that actors supporting a new technology will 
be able to plan their activities more effectively because they are more aware of what 
actions have been beneficial for other technologies and of challenges that they may 
face. This will not guarantee that a new technology will become widespread, only that 
it has a better chance of becoming more widespread. 
At this point it is worth reflecting on whether or not this will achieve the broader goal 
of actually helping actors. To put it another way, will the insights in this thesis reach 
the target audience and, assuming it does, will they get anything out of it?  
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There are (at least) three issues here. The first is one of generalizability. As noted in 
the previous section, the findings from this single case can only be tentatively applied 
to other cases. Therefore much work remains to be done to provide a robust body of 
knowledge to actors trying to foster new technologies. 
The second issue is one of dissemination. Most of the target audience (i.e. those 
wanting to or currently fostering technologies for sustainability) are unlikely to read a 
thesis to gain the insights that it contains. Publication such as the SNM workbook 
written by Weber et al (1999) may be a good way to share findings. There is an 
opportunity for researchers to update the workbook based on this thesis and other 
research that has been completed in the area since the workbook was first published. 
Alternatively, the creation of an SNM website might reach a broader audience and 
lead to experiments with SNM in practice. 
The third issue is one of effectiveness. Just because actors have information, does not 
mean that they will act or respond. As Hes (2005) noted in her research into 
integrating green initiatives into design, providing information was not enough, it was 
also important to speak the right “language” of that professional group – in her case 
designers and architects (Hes, 2005). Other authors also highlight that different 
professions have different languages, ways of looking at problems, and cultures 
(Adler and Birkhoff, c2002)120. The implications for this research is that if actions for 
encouraging dynamics and challenges to doing so are to be made relevant to particular 
actor groups, then they may need to be targeted with issues of professional culture and 
language in mind. 
                                                 
120 Anecdotally I have seen this in the design of large building developments where the client, 
architects and various engineering disciplines need to integrate their different perspectives. 
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7.4 Future research directions 
Throughout this chapter I have noted a number of avenues for future research. As a 
final step, this section collects them together. 
The first research direction is to actually test the usability and usefulness of SNM in 
practice. This was after all the original goal of SNM and it would help to test the 
hypothesis underlying SNM that it can actually make a difference. Particular issues 
that could be investigated are whether actors find SNM too complex, whether the re-
contextualisation of insights is impractical for ex ante application, whether the link 
between actors and actions has been sufficiently strengthened, and whether the 
possible strategies for responding to the challenges identified have any value. 
A second research direction is to expand the applicability of the approach used in this 
thesis to other technologies, in particular those in domains where there are many 
possible niches, on end-user and producer-as-user technologies, and those at an earlier 
innovation phase such as prototype testing. Studies in these areas would complement 
the findings in this thesis and produce a set of lessons that were more widely 
applicable. 
A third direction is to further explore the challenges and strategies related to particular 
dynamics. The way that they have been presented in tables this thesis means that 
inevitably there are challenges that are not located near each other despite affecting 
similar dynamics. A study that focuses on a particular dynamic may identify 
interactions between such challenges and as a result be able to formulate more 
effective strategies. A dynamic that should be studied further is the concept of 
legitimacy as a property of a technology. The concept has been briefly studied in 
existing literature and was found to be a useful concept in this thesis. What makes a 
technology legitimate for different actor groups? What is the significance of 
legitimacy? How can actors increase the legitimacy of a technology? Is increasing 
legitimacy an effective strategy for attracting actors? This thesis has drawn some 
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initial conclusions to these questions that researchers could use to generate 
hypotheses. 
A fourth direction is to study the balances that need to be found when fostering new 
technologies. As noted earlier, indicators of balance or imbalance between the 
competing goals could prove useful to actors trying to walk the tight-rope of fostering 
a new technology. 
My personal direction is applying the research findings in my current role as a 
building services engineer and “green” building consultant. This touches on a number 
of the research directions just identified, for example applying the findings to other 
cases and also making the findings more specific and relevant for different actor 
groups. In this regard I am finding work by Rohracher (2001, 2003), Hes (2005), and 
Brown and Vergragt (Brown and Vergragt, In Press) interesting and informative 
reading. 
7.5 Final remarks 
I will finish the thesis with three quotes that illustrate the complexity of making a 
transition towards sustainability and the importance of social processes in making this 
transition: 
"It is important to emphasize that there is no such thing as a perfectly clean – 
and therefore fully sustainable by itself – technology. There are only varying 
degrees of environmentally friendly development, and a sustainable development 
process probably consists of deployment of a mix of technologies. Only the 
heterogeneous mix is sustainable, and then only in the long-run, not the 
component technologies independently. Determining such a sustainable strategy 
requires much more sophisticated processing of information from a much wider 
range of sources involving much wider networks of expertise than is necessary 
for present technological innovation in individual industries and companies. The 
necessary systemic integration of information can only be built up gradually 
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through a process of collective learning, which we still can visualise only dimly 
and imperfectly." 
Brooks (1996 p.25) 
"Contemporary technologies are becoming extremely complex in two respects: 
they depend increasingly on scientific knowledge and equipment, and further, in 
order to operate, they assume an organizational fabric which itself is complex. 
… At the same time, the knowledge needed to understand the technical operation 
of the system has become so specialised as to be esoteric to the majority of 
people. Specialists in increasingly narrow fields have been cut off from each 
other by their respective skills; with even greater reason, the multitude of non 
technicians has been cut off from scientists and engineers." 
Kemp and Soete (1992 p.439 - 440) 
"Utopians through the centuries have tried to … [steer a path towards 
sustainability], by producing blueprints for society. They can be very inspiring, 
but they tend to ignore the thorny transitional problem of how to reach the ideal 
state. In reality what seems to be needed is a process of social negotiation of 
both means and ends. There is no obvious way forward: rather there is a host of 
often complex tactical and strategic issues to resolve and a host of pathways 
forward." 
Elliott (1997 p.206) 
The quotes suggest that the search for a sustainable existence will be an ongoing 
challenge; one that will need regular modulation in response to changing situations. 
This will require us to process large amounts of information and, because of the 
resource inter-dependence between actors, it will also require us to work together. As 
Elliott notes, this will require social negotiation of means and ends. Bodies of 
knowledge such as SNM can help us to understand these thorny transitional problems 
and to work towards a sustainable existence. The challenge is to find a way to 
simplify the complexity, whilst still providing insight to help us move forward. 
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